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VOLUME 9



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THE
ROMAN HISTORY,

FROM THE
BUILDING OF ROME

TO THE
RUIN OF THE COMMONWEALTH.

ILLUSTRATED WITH MAPS.

BY
N. HOOKE, ESQ.


A NEW EDITION, IN ELEVEN VOLUMES.

VOL. IX.

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THE ROMAN HISTORY.

BOOK IX.


CHAP. III.

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IN the beginning of the new year, when the consular fasces were transferred to Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Marcellinus, and L. Marcius Philippus, the question concerning the persons, by whom, and the manner, in which, king

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Bef. Chr.
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Y. R. 697. Ptolemy should be replaced on the throne of
 Bef. Chr. 55. Egypt, came under deliberation. Cicero's
 396 Cons. letters to his friend Publius Lentulus Spinther
 (who had the best claim to the commission, and was proconsul of Cilicia) being almost wholly narrative of what passed at Rome in relation to that affair, will probably be more satisfactory to the reader than any abridgment of the matter therein contained could be; especially as we have so good a translation of those letters into our language.


TO PUBLIUS LENTULUS, PROCONSUL.

Ep. Fam.
 l. i. Ep. 1.
 Ed. Græv.
 B. i. Let. 12.
 Melmot.

“I find it much easier to satisfy the world than myself, in those sacred offices of friendship I exert in your behalf. Numberless indeed are the obligations you have conferred upon me: and as you persevered with unwearied zeal till you had effected my recal from exile, I esteem it the greatest mortification of my life, that I cannot act in your affairs with the same success. The truth is, Ammonius, who resides here as ambassador from Ptolemy, defeats all my schemes, by the most shameless and avowed bribery: and he is supplied with money for this purpose, from the same quarter as when you were in Rome. The party in the king's interest (though their number, it must be owned, is inconsiderable) are all desirous that Pompey may be employed to re-instate him in his dominions. The senate, on the other hand, fall in with the pretended oracle; not indeed as giving any credit to its predictions,

but as being in general ill-inclined to this prince, and detesting his most corrupt practices. In the mean while, I omit no opportunity of admonishing Pompey with great freedom, and conjuring him not to act such a part in this affair as would cast the deepest stain upon his character. I must do him the justice at the same time to acknowledge, that so far as his own conduct is concerned, there does not appear the least foundation for any remonstrances of this sort. On the contrary, he is perpetually expressing the highest zeal for your interest: as he lately supported it in the senate, with the utmost force of eloquence, and the strongest professions of friendship. Marcellinus¹, I need not tell you, is a good deal displeased at your soliciting this commission: in all other respects, I dare venture to say, he will very strenuously promote your interest. We must be contented to take him in his own way: for I perceive it is impossible to dissuade him from proposing, that the injunction of the oracle shall be complied with: and, in fact, he has already made several motions to that purpose.


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“ I write this early on the thirteenth, and I will now give you an account of what has hitherto passed in the senate. Both Hortensius and Lucullus agreed in moving, that the prohibition of the oracle should be obeyed: and indeed it does not seem possible to bring this matter to bear upon any other terms. But we

¹ One of the present consuls.

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Vid. infra,
 p. 7.

proposed, at the same time, that, in pursuance of the decree, which was made on your own motion, you be appointed to re-establish Ptolemy in his kingdom; the situation of your province lying so conveniently for that purpose. In a word, we consented that army should be given up, in deference to the oracle; but insisted nevertheless, that you should be employed in effecting this restoration. Crassus, on the other side, was for having this commission executed by three persons, to be chosen from among the generals: and, consequently, he did not mean to exclude Pompey. Marcus Bibulus joined with him as to the number; but thought, that the persons to be nominated should not bear any military command. All the rest of the consulars were in the same sentiments, except Servilius Afranius, and Volcatius. The first absolutely opposed our engaging in Ptolemy's restoration upon any terms whatsoever: but the two last were of opinion, that, agreeably to the motion of Lupus, this commission should be given to Pompey. This circumstance has increased the suspicion concerning the real inclination of the latter: as his most particular friends were observed to concur with Volcatius, they are labouring this point with great assiduity: and, I fear, it will be carried against us. Libo and Hypsæus are openly soliciting for Pompey: and indeed, the conduct of all his friends at this juncture make it generally believed, that he is desirous of the office. Yet the misfortune is, those who are unwilling it should

fall into his hands, are not the more inclined to place it in yours: as they are much displeased at your having contributed to the late advancement of his power². For myself, I find I have the less influence in your cause, as it is supposed I am solely governed by a principle of gratitude: at the same time, the notion which prevails, that this affair affords an opportunity of obliging Pompey, renders my applications likewise not altogether so effectual as they might otherwise prove. It is thus I am labouring in this perplexed business: which the king himself, long before you left Rome, as well as the friends and dependants of Pompey, had artfully embarrassed. To this I must add the avowed opposition I meet with from the consulars; who represent our assisting Ptolemy with an army, as a measure that would highly reflect upon the dignity of the senate: be assured, however, I shall employ every means in my power of testifying both to the world in general, and to your friends in particular, the sincerity of that affection I bear you. And were there any honour in those who ought to have shewn themselves influenced by its highest and most refined principles, I should not have so many difficulties to encounter. Farewell."

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² Lentulus, during his consulate, had proposed and carried that law, which, that Pompey might provide corn in a time of scarcity, invested him with the whole power of the Roman empire.

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Bef. Chr.

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Lib. i. Ep.

2. Ed.

Græv.

B. i. Let

14. Melm.

TO THE SAME.

“ The senate met on the thirteenth of January, but came to no resolution; the greatest part of that day having been spent in some warm contests which arose between Marcellinus the consul, and Caninius, one of the tribunes of the people. I had myself also a very considerable share in the debates: and I represented the zeal you have always shewn towards the senate, in terms that influenced them, I am persuaded, much to your advantage. The next day, therefore, we thought it sufficient briefly to deliver our opinions: as I perceived, not only by the favourable manner in which I was heard the day before, but also by inquiring into the sentiments of each particular member, that the majority was clearly on our side. The business of the day opened with reporting to the house the several opinions of Bibulus, Hortensius, and Volcatius. The respective questions, therefore, were,

“ In the first place, whether three commissioners should be nominated for restoring the king, agreeably to the sentiments of Bibulus?


“ In the next, whether according to those of Hortensius, the office should be conferred upon you, but without employing any forces?

“ Or, lastly, whether, in conformity to the advice of Volcatius, this honour should be assigned to Pompey?

“ The points being thus stated, it was moved


that the opinion of Bibulus might be referred to the deliberation of the house in two separate questions. Accordingly, as it was now in vain to oppose his motion so far as it related to paying obedience to the declaration of the oracle, the senate in general came into his sentiments: but as to his proposal of deputing three commissioners, it was rejected by a very considerable majority. The opinion next in order was that of Hortensius. But, when we were going to divide upon it, Lupus, a tribune of the people, insisted that in virtue of his office he had the privilege of calling to a division of the house, prior to the consuls; and therefore demanded that the voices should be first taken upon the motion he had made in favour of Pompey. This claim was generally and strongly opposed: as indeed it was both unprecedented and unreasonable. The consuls themselves, however, did not greatly contest that point: nor did they absolutely give it up. Their view was to protract the debates: and they succeeded accordingly. They perceived, indeed, that, notwithstanding the majority affected to appear on the side of Volcatius, yet, upon a division, they would certainly vote with Hortensius. Nevertheless, several of the members were called upon to deliver their opinions; though, in truth, much against the inclinations of the consuls, who were desirous that the sentiments of Bibulus should prevail. The debates continuing till night, the senate broke up without coming to any resolution. I happened to pass the

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Vid. supra,
p. 4.

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same evening with Pompey : and as I had that day supported your cause in the senate with more than ordinary success, I thought it afforded me the most favourable opportunity of speaking to him in your behalf. And what I said seemed to make so strong an impression, that I am persuaded I have brought him wholly over to your interest. To say the truth, whenever I hear him mention this affair himself, I entirely acquit him of being secretly desirous of this commission. On the other hand, when I observe the conduct of his friends of every rank, I am well convinced (and indeed it is now evident likewise to the whole world) that they have been gained by the corrupt measures which a certain party, with the consent of Ptolemy and his advisers, have employed.——I write this before sun-rise on the sixteenth of January : and the senate is to meet again on this very day. I hope to preserve my authority in that assembly, as far, at least, as is possible amidst such general treachery and corruption which has discovered itself upon this occasion. As to what concerns the bringing this matter before the people ; I think we have taken such precautions as will render it impracticable, unless by actual violence, and in direct and open contempt both of our civil and religious institutions. For this purpose a very severe order of the senate³

³ “ When an act passed the senate in a full house, held according to the prescribed forms, and without any opposition from the tribunes, (who had the privilege of putting a negative upon all proceedings in the senate) it was

(which I imagine was immediately transmitted to you) was entered yesterday in our journals, notwithstanding the tribunes, Cato and Caninius, interposed their negatives.

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“ You may depend upon my sending you a faithful account of every other occurrence which may arise in this affair : and be assured I shall exert the utmost of my vigilance and my credit, to conduct it in the most advantageous manner for your interest. Farewell.”

TO THE SAME.

“ When the senate met on the sixteenth of this month, your affair stood in a very advantageous posture. We had succeeded the day before against the motion of Bibulus for appointing three commissioners, and had now only to contend with Volcatius ; when our adversaries prevented the question from being put, by artfully protracting the debates. For, they saw we had in a very full house, and amidst great contrariety of opinions, carried our point, to the considerable mortification of those, who were for taking the king’s affairs out of your direction, and transferring them to another hand. Curio opposed us upon this occasion with great warmth ; while Bibulus spoke with more temper, and indeed seemed almost

Lib. i. Ep.
4. Ed.
Græv.
B. i. Let.
16. Melm.


called a *senatus consultum*, a decree of the senate : but if any of these essentials were wanting, or a tribune interposed, it was then only styled a *senatus auctoritas*, an order of the senate, and considered as of less authority.” Melm. from Manutius.

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inclined to favour our cause. But Cato and Caninius absolutely refused to suffer any decree to pass, till a general assembly of the people should be convened.

“ By the Pupian law, as you well know, there cannot be another meeting of the senate till the first of February : nor indeed throughout that whole month, unless all the foreign ambassadors should have received, or be refused, audience. In the mean while, a notion prevails among the people, that your adversaries have insisted upon this pretended oracle, not so much with an intent of obstructing your particular views, as in order to disappoint the hopes of those who may be desirous of this expedition to Alexandria, merely from the ambition of commanding an army. The whole world is sensible indeed of the regard which the senate has shewn to your character : and it is notoriously owing to the artifices of your enemies, that the house did not divide upon the question proposed in your favour. But should the same persons, under a pretended zeal for the public (though, in fact, upon the most infamous motives) attempt to bring this affair before a general assembly of the people, we have concerted our measures so well⁴, that they cannot possibly effect their design without having recourse to violence ; or at least without setting the ordinances of our country, both civil and religious, at avowed defiance——But—if methods of violence

⁴ i. e. They had engaged some tribune to say Veto, or some magistrate to observe the heavens.

should be employed, I cannot pretend, in this general contempt of all legal authority, to answer for the event: in every other respect I will venture to assure you, that both the senate and the people will pay the highest attention to your dignity and character. Farewell."

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
TO THE SAME.

" — You are sensible, as I perceive by your last letter, that you have been treated with the same insincerity by those who ought to have concurred in supporting your dignities, as I formerly experienced from some of my pretended friends, in the affair of my banishment. Thus, whilst I was exerting the utmost efforts of my vigilance, my policy, and my interest, in order to serve you in the article relating to Ptolemy, I was unexpectedly alarmed in a point of much more important concern, by the infamous law which Cato has lately proposed to your prejudice." [Caius Cato, to cut off all hopes at once from Lentulus of obtaining this commission, had proposed a law to the people for recalling him from his government.] "Where affairs are thus embroiled, every thing is, undoubtedly, to be feared: yet my principal apprehension, I confess, arises from the treachery of your false friends. But however that may be, I am earnestly endeavouring to counteract the malevolent designs of Cato.

Lib. i. Ep.
5. Ed.
Græv.
Book i.
Let. 17.
Melm.

Ad Q. Fr.
i. 3.

"As to the Alexandrian commission, both yourself and your friends will, I trust, have

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Bef. Chr.
55.
396 Cons.


abundant reason to be satisfied with my conduct. But at the same time I must say I greatly fear it will either be taken out of your hands, or intirely dropped : and I know not which of these alternatives I should least chuse.”——

TO THE SAME⁵.


Lib. i. Ep.
5. Ed.
Græv.
Book i.
Let. 18.
Melm.

“ You are informed, I imagine, by many hands, of what passes here. I leave it therefore to your other friends to supply you with an account of our transactions, and content myself with only sending you my conjectures. To this end I must previously acquaint you, that, on the sixth of February, Pompey made a speech in a general assembly of the people in favour of Milo, during which he was insulted with much clamour and abuse. Cato afterwards inveighed in the senate against Pompey with great acrimony, and was heard with the most profound silence and attention : both which circumstances seem to have affected him very sensibly. Now from hence I surmise, that he has laid aside all thoughts of being employed in the Alexandrian expedition. That affair remains as yet intirely open to us : for the senate has hitherto determined nothing to your prejudice but what they are obliged, in deference to the oracle, to refuse to every other candidate for this office. It is my pre-

⁵ This and the foregoing letter are blended together in the common editions : but they are here separated upon the authority of Manutius and Gronovius. Melm.

sent hope therefore, as well as endeavour, that the king may throw himself into your hands, when he shall find that he cannot, as he expected, be restored by Pompey ; and that, unless he is replaced upon the throne by your assistance, his affair will be entirely dropped. And this step he will undoubtedly take, if Pompey should give the least intimation of its being agreeable to him. But I need not tell you the difficulty of discovering the sentiments of a man of his reserve. However, I shall omit no method in my power to effect this scheme ; as I shall easily, I trust, be able to prevent the injurious designs of Cato.

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“ I do not find that any of the consulars are in your interest, except Hortensius and Lucullus : all the rest of that rank, either openly, or in a more concealed manner, oppose your views. Nevertheless, my friend, be not discouraged : on the contrary, let it be still your hope, notwithstanding the attempts of the worthless Cato, that you will again shine out in all your former lustre. Farewell.”

TO THE SAME.

“ You will receive a full account from Pollio of all that has been transacted in your affair, as he was not only present, but a principal manager. Believe me, I am much concerned at the unfavourable aspect of this business. However, it affords me a very sensible consolation, that there is strong reason to hope the prudence of your friends will be able to

L. I. Ep.
vi. Ed.
Græv.
Book I.
Let. xix.
Melm.

Y. R. 697. elude the force of those iniquitous schemes
 Bef. Chr. which have been projected to your prejudice.
 55.
 396 Cons. Even time itself will probably contribute to
 this end; as it often wears out the malevolence
 of those who either professedly or in a dis-
 guised manner mean one ill.”——

Middl. p.
 433.

The senate grew at length so weary of this affair, that they resolved to leave the king to shift for himself, without interposing at all in his restoration; and so the matter hung; whilst other affairs more interesting were daily rising at home, and engaging the attention of the city.

Ad Quint.
 Frat. ii. 2.

The election of ædiles, which had been industriously postponed through all the last summer, could not easily be kept off any longer: the city was impatient for its magistrates, and especially for the plays and shows with which they used to entertain them; and several also of the new tribunes being zealous for an election, it was held at last on the twentieth of January, when Clodius was chosen ædile without opposition⁶.

Middl. p.
 434.

⁶ It may justly seem strange (says Dr. Middleton) how a man so profligate and criminal as Clodius, whose life was a perpetual insult upon all laws divine and human, should be suffered not only to live without punishment, but to obtain all the honours of a free city in their proper course; and it would be natural to suspect that we had been deceived in our accounts of him by taking them from his enemies, did we not find them too firmly supported by facts to be called in question: but a little attention to the particular character of the man, as well as of the times in which he lived, will enable us to solve the difficulty.

First, the splendor of his family—Cicero calls the nobles

This magistracy, which freed him from all apprehension of judges and a trial, gave him a great advantage over his antagonist Milo, who was become a private man. He now accused Milo of the same crime of which Milo had accused him, of public violence and breach of the laws, in maintaining a band of gladiators to the terror of the city. Milo made his appearance to this accusation on the second of February, when Pompey, Crassus, and Cicero

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Bef. Chr.
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Middl. p.
436—440.

Ad Q. Fr.
ii. 3.

of this class prætors and consuls elect from their cradles by a kind of hereditary right, whose very names were sufficient to advance them to all the dignities of the state. [And therefore how worthless, how pestilent soever Clodius was, he did not fail to be defended and supported by the honest, the optimates, when his attempts were not against the interest of their faction.]

In Verr. v.
70.
Pro Sext.
9.

Secondly, his personal qualities were peculiarly adapted to endear him to all the meaner sort; his bold and ready wit, his talent at haranguing, his profuse expense, and his pursuing popular measures contrary to the maxims of his ancestors, who had [almost] all been stern assertors of the aristocratical power.

Thirdly, the contrast of opposite factions, who had each their ends in supporting him.—The senate particularly, whose chief apprehensions were from the triumvirate, thought that the rashness of Clodius might be of some use to perplex their measures, and stir up the people against them on proper occasions; or it humoured their spleen at least to see him insulting Pompey to his face. *Videtis igitur hominem per seipsum jam pridem afflictum ac jacentem perniciosis optimatum discordiis excitari.—Ne a republica reipub. pestis amoveretur, restiterunt; etiam ne causam diceret; etiam ne privatus esset: etiamne in sinu atque in deliciis quidam optimi viri viperam illam venenatam ac pestiferam habere potuerunt? Quo tandem decepti munere? Volo, inquiunt, esse qui in concione detrahat de Pompeio—De Harusp. Resp. 24.*

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Bef. Chr.
55.
596 Cons.

appeared with him ; and M. Marcellus, though Clodius's colleague in the ædileship, spoke for Milo at Cicero's desire ; and the whole passed quietly and favourably for him on that day. The second hearing was appointed on the ninth, when Pompey undertook to plead his cause ; but no sooner stood up to speak, than Clodius's mob, by a continual clamour of reproaches, and invectives, endeavoured to hinder him from going on, or at least from being heard ; yet Pompey, with a presence of mind which, in spite of their attempts, commanded silence, spoke for near three hours. When Clodius rose up to answer him, Milo's mob, in their turn, so disturbed and confounded him, that he was not able to speak a word ; while a number of epigrams and lampoons upon him and his sister were thrown about, and publicly rehearsed among the multitude below, so as to make him quite furious ; till recollecting himself a little, and finding it impossible to proceed in his speech, he demanded aloud of his mob, " Who it was that attempted to starve them by famine ?" To which they presently cried out, " Pompey : " he then asked, " Who it was that desired to be sent into Egypt ?" " Pompey," they cried out again. But when he asked, " Who it was that they themselves had a mind to send ?" they answered, " Crassus : " for the old jealousy was now breaking out again between him and Pompey ; and though he appeared that day on Milo's side, yet he was not, as Cicero says, a real well-wisher to him.

These warm proceedings among the chiefs brought on a fray below, among their partizans; the Clodians began the attack, but were repulsed by the Pompeians; and Clodius himself driven out of the rostra: Cicero, when he saw the affair proceed to blows, thought it high time to retreat towards home; but no great harm was done; for Pompey, having cleared the forum of his enemies, presently drew off his forces to prevent any farther mischief or scandal on his side.

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55.
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The senate was presently summoned to provide some remedy for these disorders, where Pompey, who had drawn upon himself a fresh odium from his behaviour in the Egyptian affair, was severely handled by Bibulus, Curio, Favonius, and others: Cicero chose to be absent, since he must either have offended Pompey, by saying nothing for him, or the honest party, by defending him. The same debate was carried on for several days, in which Pompey was treated very roughly by the tribune Cato, who inveighed against him with great fierceness, and laid open his perfidy to Cicero, to whom he paid the highest compliments, and was heard with much attention by all Pompey's enemies.

Ad Quint.
Fr. ii. 3.

Pompey answered him with an unusual vehemence; and reflecting openly on Crassus, as the author of these affronts, declared, he would guard his life with more care than Scipio Africanus did, when Carbo murdered him⁷.—

⁷ N.B. That Scipio was murdered by Carbo, there is no shadow of proof. See Vol. VI. Book VI. Chap. IX.

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These warm expressions seemed to open a prospect of some great agitation likely to ensue : Pompey consulted Cicero on the proper means of his security ; and acquainted him with his apprehensions of a design against his life ; that Cato was privately supported, and Clodius furnished with money by Crassus ; and both of them encouraged by Curio, Bibulus, and the rest, who envied him ; that it was necessary for him to look to himself, since the meaner people were wholly alienated, the nobility and senate generally disaffected, and the youth corrupted.


Cicero readily consented to join forces with him, and to summon their clients and friends from all parts of Italy. For, though he had no mind to fight his battles in the senate, he was desirous to defend his person from all violence, especially against Crassus, whom he never loved : they resolved likewise to oppose with united strength all the attempts of Clodius and Cato against Lentulus and Milo. Clodius, on the other hand, was not less busy in mustering his friends against the next hearing of Milo's cause : but as his strength was much inferior to that of his adversary, so he had no expectation of getting him condemned, nor any other view but to tease and harass him : for, after two hearings, the affair was put off by several adjournments to the beginning of May ; from which time we find no farther mention of it.

Ad Q. Fr.
l. 6.

The consul Marcellinus, who drew his colleague Philippus along with him, was a reso-

lute opposer of the triumvirate, as well as of all the violences of the other magistrates : for which reason he resolved to suffer no assemblies of the people, except such as were necessary for the elections into the public offices: his view was to prevent Cato's law for recalling Lentulus, and the monstrous things (so Cicero calls them) which some were attempting at this time in favour of Cæsar. Cicero gives him the character of one of the best consuls that he had ever known, and blames him only in one thing ; for treating Pompey on all occasions so rudely ; which made Cicero often absent himself from the senate, to avoid taking part either on the one side or the other. For the support therefore of his dignity and interest in the city, he resumed his old task of pleading causes⁸ ; which was always popular and respectable, and in which he was sure to find full employment. His first cause was the defence of L. Bestia on the tenth of February, who, after the disgrace of a repulse from the prætorship in the last election, was accused of bribery and corruption in his suit for it ; and, notwithstanding the authority and eloquence of his advocate, was convicted and banished. He was a man extremely corrupt, turbulent, and seditious, had always been an enemy to Cicero, and supposed to be deeply engaged in Catiline's plot ; and is one instance of what Cicero says, that he was often forced,

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Ad Q. Fr.
ii. 3.

Ep. Fam.
vii. 1.

⁸ It is very remarkable that Cicero, to preserve his dignity, made himself advocate-general for all state-felons.

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against his will, to defend certain persons who had not deserved it of him, by the intercession of those who had.

Middl. p.
443.

Cicero was about this time engaged in the defence of P. Sextius, the late tribune, accused of public violence, or breach of peace in his tribunate; he had been a true friend to Cicero in his distress, and borne a great part in his restoration: but fancying himself afterwards neglected, or not sufficiently requited by him, had since his return been very cold to him, and even churlish. But Cicero, instead of resenting this, having heard that Sextius was indisposed, went in person to his house, and cured him of all his jealousies, by freely offering his assistance and patronage in pleading his cause; which he managed so well, that Sextius was acquitted, and in a manner the most honourable, by the unanimous suffrages of all the judges; and with an universal applause of Cicero's humanity and gratitude.

Ibid. 4.

Middl. p.
444.


Pompey attended this trial as a friend to Sextius; while Cæsar's creature, Vatinius, appeared not only as an adversary, but as a witness against him: which gave Cicero an opportunity of exposing the whole course of his profligate life⁹, (as Sextius particularly desired) with all the keenness of his raillery, to the great diversion of the audience¹. Va-

⁹ We shall find that Cicero afterwards, notwithstanding the profligacy of Vatinius's whole life, appeared as a witness to his general good behaviour.

¹ This speech against Vatinius is still remaining, under the title of *the interrogation*; because it consists chiefly of a string of questions.

tinus made some attempt in his turn to rally Cicero, and contemptuously reproached him with the baseness of changing sides, and becoming Cæsar's friend, on account of the fortunate state of his affairs.

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[For Cæsar, being in the career of his victories in Gaul², had lately sent a request to the senate, "that money might be decreed to him for the payment of his army; with a power of chusing ten lieutenants, for the better managing of the war, and the conquered provinces." It seemed strange, that, after all his conquests, he should not be able to maintain his army without money from home, at a time when the treasury was greatly exhausted: and the renewal of a commission, obtained at first by the people's favour, against the inclination of the senate, was of hard digestion. But Cæsar's interest prevailed, and Cicero himself was the promoter of it, and procured a decree to his satisfaction, yet not without disgusting the pretended patriots, those counterfeit republicans, scrupulously zealous against all extraordinary grants: but Cicero "alleged the extraordinary services of Cæsar, and that the course of his victories ought not to be checked by the want of necessary supplies, while he was so gloriously extending the bounds of the empire, and conquering nations whose names had never been heard before at Rome: and though it were possible for him to maintain

De Prov.
Cons. xi.
13.

Middl. p.
440.

² Cæsar's progress in conquest will be related hereafter, in an uninterrupted summary of his exploits.

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his troops without their help, by the spoils of the enemy, yet those spoils ought to be reserved for the splendor of his triumph, which it was not just to defraud by their unseasonable parsimony.”]

What Cicero says he replied to Vatinius, will be seen in a long letter he wrote two years after this time to Lentulus Spinther, which will be inserted in its proper year, with some observations upon it.

Middl. p.
445.

In the beginning of April, the senate granted the sum of three hundred thousand pounds to Pompey, to be laid out in purchasing corn for the use of the city, where there was still a great scarcity, and as great at the same time of money; so that the moving a point so tender could not fail of raising some ill-humour in the assembly: when Cicero, whose old spirit seems to have revived in him from his late success in Sextius's cause, surprised them by proposing, “that, in the present inability of the treasury to purchase the Campanian lands, which by Cæsar's act were to be divided to the people, the act itself should be reconsidered, and a day appointed for that deliberation:” the motion was received with an universal joy, and a kind of tumultuary acclamation: the enemies of the triumvirate were extremely pleased with it, in hopes that it would make a breach between Cicero and Pompey.

Middl. p.
446.

Pompey, whose nature was singularly reserved, expressed no uneasiness upon it, nor took any notice of it to Cicero, though they met and supped together familiarly, as they

used to do : but he set forward soon after towards Afric, in order to provide corn ; and, intending to call at Sardinia, proposed to embark at Pisa or Leghorn, that he might have an interview with Cæsar, who was now at Luca, the utmost limit of his Gallic government. He found Cæsar exceedingly out of humour with Cicero ; for Crassus had already been with him at Ravenna, and greatly incensed him by his account of Cicero's late motion ; which he complained of so heavily, that Pompey promised to use all his authority to induce Cicero to drop the pursuit of it ; and for that purpose sent away an express to Rome, to entreat him not to proceed any further in it till his return ; and when he came afterwards to Sardinia, where his lieutenant Quintus, the brother of Cicero, then resided, he entered immediately into an expostulation with him about it.——But of the effect of this remonstrance we shall have a full account in the long letter to Lentulus, just now referred to for another particular.


Milo's trial being put off (as before mentioned) to the fifth of May, Cicero took the benefit of a short vacation to make an excursion into the country, and visit his estates and villas in different parts of Italy.——During this tour, his old enemy Gabinius, the proconsul of Syria, having gained some advantages in Judæa against Aristobulus, (who had been dethroned by Pompey, and carried prisoner to Rome, but had thence made his escape) sent public letters to the senate, to

Y. R. 697.
Bef. Chr.
55.
396 Cons.

Middl. p.
453.

Ad Quint.
Fr. ii. 8.

Y. R. 697.
Bef. Chr.
55.
396 Ccons.



give an account of his victory, and to beg the decree of a thanksgiving for it. His friends took the opportunity of moving the affair in Cicero's absence, from whose authority they apprehended some obstruction; but the senate, in a full house, slighted Gabinius's letters, and rejected his suit: an affront which had never been offered before to any proconsul. Cicero was infinitely delighted with it, calls the resolution divine, and was doubly pleased for its being the free and genuine judgment of the senate, without any struggle or influence on his part —.

Middl. p.
454, 455.

Vide Ar-
gum. Ma-
nutii in
Orat. de
Harusp.
Resp.
Dio, lib.
xxxix. p.
100.

Many prodigies were reported to have happened about this time in the neighbourhood of Rome: horrible noises under ground, with clashing of arms; and on the Alban hill, a little shrine of Juno, which stood on a table, facing the east, turned suddenly of itself towards the west. These terrors alarmed the city, and the senate consulted the haruspices, who were the public diviners or prophets of the state, skilled in all the Tuscan discipline of interpreting portentous events, who gave the following answer in writing, "That supplications must be made to Jupiter, Saturn, Neptune, and the other gods: that the solemn shows and plays had been negligently exhibited and polluted; sacred and religious places made profane; ambassadors killed contrary to law; faith and oaths disregarded; ancient and hidden sacrifices carelessly performed and profaned.—That the gods gave this warning, lest, by the discord and dis-

sension of the better sort, dangers and destruction should fall upon the senate and the chiefs of the city; by which means the provinces would fall under the power of a single person, their armies be beaten, great loss ensue, and honours be heaped upon the unworthy and disgraced.”—


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 Ref. Chr.
 55.
 396 Cons.

One may observe from this answer, that the diviners were under the direction of those, who endeavoured to apply the influence of religion to the cure of their civil disorders: each party interpreted it according to their own views: Clodius took a handle from it of venting his spleen afresh against Cicero; and, calling the people together for that purpose, attempted to persuade them, “that this divine admonition was designed particularly against him, and that the article of the civil and religious places referred to the case of his house, which, after a solemn consecration to religion, was rendered again profane; charged all the displeasure of the gods to Cicero’s account, who affected nothing less than a tyranny, and the oppression of their liberties.”

Cicero made a reply to Clodius the next day in the senate, where, after a short and general invective upon his profligate life, “he leaves him,” he says, “a devoted victim to Milo, who seemed to be given to them by Heaven for the extinction of such a plague, as Scipio was for the destruction of Carthage: he declares the prodigy to be one of the most extraordinary which had ever been reported to the senate; but laughs at the absurdity of applying

De Harusp.
 Respons.
 vi. 10—18.

Y. R. 697.
Bef. Chr.
55.
396 Cons.



Middl. p.
447.

any part of it to him ; since his house, as he proves at large, was more solemnly cleared from any service or relation to religion than any other house in Rome by the judgment of the priests, the senate, and all the orders of the city. Then running through the several articles of the answer, he shews them all to tally so exactly with the notorious acts and impieties of Clodius's life, that they could not possibly be applied to any thing else:—particularly, as to the violation of faith and oaths, that it related evidently to those judges who had absolved Clodius, as being one of the most memorable and flagrant perjuries which Rome had ever known ; that the answer itself suggested this interpretation, when it subjoined that ancient and occult sacrifices were polluted, which could refer to nothing so properly as to the rites of the Bona Dea, which were the most ancient and the most occult of any in the city, celebrated with incredible secrecy to that goddess, whose name it was not lawful for men to know, and with ceremonies which no man ever pried into but Clodius."

Middl. p.
459.

About the middle of summer, and before the time of chusing new consuls, which was commonly in August, the senate began to deliberate on the provinces which were to be assigned to them at the expiration of their office. The consular provinces, about which the debate singly turned, were the two Gauls, which Cæsar now held ; Macedonia, which Piso ; and Syria, which Gabinius possessed. All who spoke before Cicero, excepting Ser-

De Prov.
Cons. 8, 9,
&c.

vilius, were for taking one or both the Gauls from Cæsar; which was what the senate generally desired: but when it came to Cicero's turn, he gladly laid hold on the occasion to revenge himself on Piso and Gabinius; and exerted all his authority to get them recalled, with some marks of disgrace, and their governments assigned to the succeeding consuls; but as for Cæsar, his opinion was, "that his command should be continued to him till he had finished the war, which he was carrying on with such success, and settled the conquered countries." This gave no small offence; and the consul Philippus could not forbear interrupting and reminding him, "that he had more reason to be angry with Cæsar than with Gabinius himself; since Cæsar was the author and raiser of all that storm which had oppressed him." But Cicero replied, "that, in this vote, he was not pursuing his private resentment, but the public good, which had reconciled him to Cæsar; and that he could not be an enemy to one who was deserving so well of his country: that a year or two more would complete his conquests, and reduce all Gaul to a state of peaceful subjection: that the cause was widely different between Cæsar and the other two: that Cæsar's administration was beneficial, prosperous, glorious to the republic; theirs scandalous, ignominious, hurtful to their subjects, and contemptible to their enemies."—In short, he managed the debate so, that the senate readily consented to leave Cæsar in the possession of his government,

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Y. R. 697. and to recall Piso from Macedonia ; but Gabinius was not now recalled from Syria.

Niddl. p.
465.

Plut. in
Pomp. &
in Cæs.

All people's eyes and inclinations began now to turn towards Cæsar, who, by the eclat of his victories³, seemed to rival the fame of Pompey himself ; and by his address and generosity gained ground upon him daily in authority and influence in public affairs. After three prosperous campaigns, he spent the winter of 697 at Luca, whither a vast concourse of all ranks resorted to him from Rome. So great was the number of magistrates and other persons in command, who came to wait on him, that the lictors at his gate are reckoned to have amounted to a hundred and twenty.

Sueton. in
Cæs. 24.

At this interview of the triumvirs, it was privately agreed among them, that Pompey and Crassus, who were now again made friends by Cæsar, should jointly sue for the consulship, in order to defeat the hopes and designs of L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, one of the competitors, a professed enemy of the triumvirate ; who, thinking himself sure of being elected, could not forbear boasting, " that he would effect, when consul, what he had not been able to do when prætor, rescind the acts of Cæsar, and recal him from his government : " for Cæsar had no sooner surrendered the consular fasces to his successors in that magistracy (the

³ Cæsar, in two campaigns (those of the years 695 and 696) had carried the Roman arms triumphantly through the very heart of Gaul, from the lake of Geneva to the German ocean ; and in the present year (697) had subdued the Veneti.

consuls of 695) than he was affronted and attacked by this same Domitius and C. Memmius, two of the then newly-chosen prætors, (than whom Rome perhaps never produced two more consummate knaves⁴), who called in question the validity of his acts, and made several rash efforts to get them annulled by public authority.

Pompey and Crassus, the better to conceal their design upon the consulship, let pass the time, when, according to custom, they should have put themselves among the candidates. And, because they thought it would be difficult to carry their point in an assembly where the consul Marcellinus presided, they laid a scheme to hinder all elections of magistrates during his year: their project happened to be favoured by the tribune C. Cato, the same who had formerly been so active in opposing the desires of Pompey with relation to the affair of king Ptolemy, and in endeavouring to get Lentulus Spinther recalled from Cilicia. Cato to revenge himself on Marcellinus, for not suffering him to hold any assemblies of the people⁵, for promulgating certain laws of his

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Sueton. in
Cæs. 24.


Dio, p.
103.

Ad Quint.
Fr. ii. 6.

⁴ Of the impudent wickedness of these men we shall find a notable proof in one of Cicero's letters, when we come to the year 699. Yet, unworthy and detestable as Domitius was, Cicero thinks it a most sad thing, that this illustrious noble, a consul designed ever since he was born, should not be able at this time to obtain the consulship. *Quid enim hoc miserius, quam eum, qui, tot annos quos habet, designatus consul fuerit, consulem fieri non posse?* Ad Att. iv. 8. Dio, p. 103.

⁵ It is likely, that the means employed by Marcellinus

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own fashion (disliked probably by the aristocratic worthies), would not suffer the consuls to hold any for the choice of the magistrates; and in this resolution he was supported by two of his colleagues, as well as by the triumph⁶, till the year⁷ expired. The government fell into an interregnum.

Plut. in
Pomp.

was to proclaim all the days on which assemblies of the people could lawfully be held, holidays. Crevier.

⁶ Plutarch tells us, that the secret treaty among the triumvirs having transpired, the partisans of the aristocracy were filled with indignation, and that the consul Marcellinus, to unmask Pompey, interrogated him in an assembly of the people, "Whether he had any intention to stand for the consulship?" Pompey answered, "that perhaps he would, and perhaps he would not:" but Crassus, when the same question was put to him by the consul, answered with more temper, "that he would do what should appear to him to be most for the benefit of the republic."

Val. Max.
vi. 2.

Valerius Maximus writes, that, when Marcellinus was one day haranguing on the danger the city was in from the power of Pompey, and found himself encouraged by a general acclamation of the people, he said to them, "Cry out, citizens, cry out while you may; for it will not be long in your power to do so with safety."

Ibid. 4.

He reports likewise, that Cn. Piso, a young nobleman, who had impeached Manilius Crispus, a man of prætorian rank, and notoriously guilty, being provoked by Pompey's protection of him, turned his attack against Pompey himself, and charged him with many crimes against the state: being asked therefore by Pompey, "Why he did not chuse to impeach him rather than the criminal?" he briskly replied, "That if he would give bail to stand a trial, without raising a civil war, he would soon bring him before his judges."

⁷ It was in this year, 697, that Cicero pleaded for Cornelius Balbus and M. Cœlius.

Middl. p.
460.

Balbus was a native of Gades in Spain, of a splendid family in that city, who, for his fidelity and services to the

CHAP. IV.

Pompey and Crassus are elected consuls for the year 698.

The state of king Ptolemy's affairs at this time. Cato repulsed from the prætorship. Provinces assigned to the consuls, by the law of Trebonius, for five years. They attempt reformatations at home. Pompey's theatre. Piso returns to Rome ignominiously from his government of Macedonia. Crassus, in spite of bad omens, embarks for Syria, (the province fallen to him by lot) even before the year of his consulship is expired. L. Domitius Ahenobarbus and Appius Claudius Pulcher are elected consuls for the year 699.

OF all those who had intended to present themselves candidates for the consulship of the Y. R. 698.

Roman generals in that province, and especially in the Sertorian war, had the freedom of Rome conferred upon him by Pompey, in virtue of a law, which authorized him to grant it to as many as he thought proper. But Pompey's act was now called in question, as originally null and invalid, on a pretence, that the city of Gades was not within the terms of that alliance and relation to Rome which rendered the citizens capable of that privilege. Pompey and Crassus were his advocates; and, at their desire, Cicero also, who had the third place, or post of honour assigned him, to give the finishing hand to the cause. The prosecution was projected, not so much out of enmity to Balbus as to his patrons, Pompey and Cæsar, by whose favour he had acquired great wealth; being at this time general of the artillery to Cæsar, and the principal manager or steward of all his affairs. The judges gave sentence for him, and confirmed his right to the city; from which foundation he was raised afterwards by Augustus to the consulate itself: his nephew also, young Balbus, who was made free with him at the same time,

Pro Balb.
1, 2, &c.

Y. R. 698. year 698, L. Domitius alone persisted in the purpose of entering the lists against

Hist. N.
vii. 43.
Ibid. v. 5.

obtained the honour of a triumph for his victories over the Garamantes; and, as Pliny tells us, they were the only instances of foreigners and adopted citizens, who had ever advanced themselves to either of these honours in Rome.

Middl. p.
461.

Cœlius was a young gentleman of equestrian rank, of great parts and accomplishments, trained under the discipline of Cicero himself, to whose care he was committed by his father upon his first introduction into the forum. Before he was of age to hold any magistracy, he had distinguished himself by two public impeachments: the one of C. Antonius, Cicero's colleague in the consulship, for the mal-administration of his province of Macedonia; the other of L. Atratinus, for bribery and corruption. Atratinus's son was now revenging his father's quarrel, and accused Cœlius of public violence, for being concerned in the assassination of Dio, the chief of the Alexandrian embassy; and of an attempt to poison Clodia, the sister of Clodius: he was a true libertine, and had been this lady's gallant; whose resentment, for her favours slighted by him, was the real source of all his trouble.—He was acquitted of both charges.

Vid. Vol.
VIII.

Middl. p.
462.
Ad Att.
iv. 5.
Ad Quint.
ii. 15.

Cicero seems to have composed a little poem about this time, in compliment to Cæsar; and excuses his not sending it to Atticus, "because Cæsar pressed to have it, and he had reserved no copy: though, to confess the truth," he says, "he found it very difficult to digest the meanness of recanting his old principles. But adieu," says he, "to all right, true, honest, counsels: it is incredible what perfidy there is in those who want to be leaders; and who really would be so, if there was any faith in them. [He speaks of *the honest*.] I felt what they were to my cost, when I was drawn in, deserted, and betrayed by them: I resolved still to act on with them in all things; but found them the same as before; till by your advice I came at last to a better mind. You will tell me, that you advised me indeed to act, but not to write; it is true; but I was willing to put myself under a necessity of adhering to my new alliance [with the triumvirs], and preclude the

Pompey and Crassus ; and his constancy perhaps was owing to Cato's management, whose sister Porcia he had married : Cato pressed him to perseverance, by saying, that not his own elevation, but the liberty^s of the Romans, was the interest in question.

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Bef. Chr.
54.
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Plut. in
Cat.

Plutarch reports, that when Domitius, ac-

possibility of returning to those who, instead of pitying me, as they ought, never cease envying me.—But since those, who have no power, will not love me, my business is to acquire the love of those who have. You will say, I wish that you had done it long ago ; I know you wished it ; and I was a mere ass for not minding you."

In this year also, Cicero wrote that celebrated letter to Lucceius, in which he presses him to attempt the history of his transactions. Lucceius had just finished the history of the Italic and Marian civil wars, with intent to carry it down through his own times, and, in the general relation, to include, as he had promised, a particular account of Cicero's acts : but Cicero, who was pleased with his style and manner of writing, labours in this letter to engage him to postpone the design of his continued history, and enter directly on that separate period : "from the beginning of his consulship to his restoration, comprehending Catiline's conspiracy and his own exile : " and he desires this historian-friend, "to allow so much to friendship and affection, as not to confine himself to the strict laws of history and the rules of truth, but to exceed those bounds in his praises." Ep. Fam. lib. v. 12.

Middl. 466.

A little before Cicero's return from exile, his son-in-law Piso Frugi died. Tullia, having lived a widow about two months, was married this year to Furius Crassipes ; who, though little is said of him, seems to have been a nobleman of principal rank and figure. The wedding feast was held at Cicero's house on the sixth of April.

Middl. 450.
Ad Quint.
ii. 4.
Ep. Fam.
i. 7.

* What a worthy champion this Domitius was of the laws and liberties of Rome, we shall see presently : but the villain was Cato's brother-in-law, and Cæsar's enemy : and there we find his merit.

Y. R. 698.
Bef. Chr.
54.
397 Cons.

accompanied by Cato, went before day to the Campus Martius to solicit votes, he fell into an ambush prepared by his rivals: the slave who carried the flambeau before him was killed, and Cato wounded in the arm: the latter nevertheless exhorted Domitius to fight it out to his last breath; but the intimidated candidate thought it more prudent to go home. So that Pompey and Crassus, without further opposition, were elected consuls⁹.

Pompey, when, in concert with his two associates, he had entertained new schemes of ambition, laid aside all thoughts of obtaining for himself the commission to restore king Ptolemy; and, in appearance at least, became willing to serve Lentulus in that affair. This change of his disposition gave occasion to the two following letters from Cicero to that proconsul. The first was probably written (if not in the end of 697) in the beginning of 698, during the interregnum, and before the election of Pompey and Crassus to the consulship; the second after that election.

TO PUBLIUS LENTULUS, PROCONSUL.

L. I. Ep.
vii. Ed.
Græv.
Book II.
Let. ii.
Melm.

“ I have received your letter, wherein you assure me, that the frequent accounts I send of your affairs, together with the convincing proofs I have given you of my friendship, are circumstances extremely agreeable to you.—

⁹ This was the second time of their being consuls: in their first consulship they were colleagues, as now.

If you do not hear from me as frequently as you wish, it is solely because I dare not trust my letters to every conveyance.—

Y. R. 698.
Ref. Chr.
54.
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“ It is not easy to give a satisfactory answer to your inquiry concerning the sincerity of your professed friends, and the disposition of others in general towards you. This only I will venture to say, that a certain party, and particularly those who have the strongest obligations, as well as the greatest abilities, to distinguish themselves in your service, look upon you with envy: that (agreeably to what I have myself experienced upon a different occasion) those whom, in justice to your country, you have necessarily offended, are your avowed opposers; as others, whose interest and honours you have generously supported, are much less inclined to remember your favours than to oppose your glory. These are circumstances indeed which I long suspected, and have often intimated to you; but of which I am now most thoroughly convinced. I observed upon the same occasion, (and I believe I told you so in a former letter) both Hortensius and Lucullus to be extremely in your interest: as among those who were in the magistracy, Lucius Racilius¹ appeared very sincerely and affectionately to espouse your cause. But, excepting the two former, I cannot name any of the consulars who dis-


¹ Tribune
in 697.
Pigh.

¹ Dr. Middleton dates this letter in 697, Mr. Melmoth in 698. If it was written in 697, it would seem to have been in December, after the tribuneship of Racilius was expired.

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covered the least degree of friendship towards you when your affair was before the senate.

As for my own endeavours, they might perhaps be generally considered as flowing rather from those singular favours I have received at your hands, than from the uninfluenced dictates of my real sentiments. With regard to Pompey, he seldom attended the house at that season: but I must do him the justice to say, he often takes an opportunity, without my previously leading him into the subject, of discoursing with me concerning your affair; as well as very willingly enters into the conversation, whenever I start it myself. Your last letter, I perceived, was extremely agreeable to him: and I could not but observe, with equal admiration and pleasure, the polite and most judicious manner in which you addressed him. Before he received this letter, he seemed a little inclined to suspect, that the notion which some had entertained, of his inclination to be your competitor, had alienated you from him. But you have now wholly fixed that excellent man in your interest; who in truth had all the antecedent reasons for being so, that an uninterrupted series of the highest services could possibly give him². I must confess he always appeared to me, even when the conduct of Caninius

Vid. supra,
p. 9.

Vid. vol.
VIII. p.
479.

² Lentulus, during his consulate, had proposed and carried that law in favour of Pompey, by which he was commissioned to provide corn in a time of scarcity, a commission which in effect invested him with the whole power of the Roman empire.

had raised the strongest suspicions of the contrary³, to favour your interest : but I can now assure you, that I found him, after he had perused your letter, intirely disposed to promote whatever may contribute either to your interest or your honour. You may consider then what I am going to offer as his immediate sentiments and advice : as indeed it is the result of frequent consultations which we have held together.

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“ We are of opinion, that it may be proper for you to consider, whether any advantages may be derived from your being in possession of Cilicia and Cyprus. For if there should appear a sufficient probability of being able to make yourself master of Alexandria and Egypt, we think it equally for your honour, and that of the republic, to march thither with your army, supported by your fleet⁴; having

³ “ It was an usual artifice with Pompey to employ his friends in soliciting those honours in his behalf, to which he affected to appear himself perfectly indifferent, or even averse. This was his policy in the present instance : and at the same time that he pretended to serve Lentulus, in this affair, his creature Caninius, a tribune of the people, was practising every stratagem to procure the commission for Pompey.—But when Pompey found that this was impracticable, he pretended a friendship for Lentulus, and joined with Cicero in giving the advice which makes a great part of this letter.”

Melm.
p. 95.

⁴ It is very remarkable that “ Cicero makes the very measures, which he here so strongly recommends to Lentulus, an article of his charge against Antony. For when the senate, after various debates, had resolved intirely to drop the affair of the king’s restoration, Ptolemy applied himself to Gabinius, proconsul of Syria, who, upon the

Melm.
p. 96.

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Bef. Chr.

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


first left the king at Ptolemais, or some other convenient place in that neighbourhood. By these means, when you shall have quieted the disturbances in Alexandria, and secured it by a proper number of forces, Ptolemy may safely take possession of his kingdom. Thus he will be restored by you, as the senate had once decreed : and restored too without an army, agreeably to the sentiments of those who insist upon observing the injunctions of the oracle. We are the rather confirmed in recommending this measure, as there is no decree of the senate subsisting, which particularly prohibits you from replacing Ptolemy on his throne. As to the order, which absolutely forbids all assistance whatever to be given to him, you know it was not only protested against, when it was voted, but is generally looked upon rather as the warm dictates of an exasperated faction, than as having the full authority of a

promise of ten thousand talents, and at the recommendation of Pompey, boldly undertook and effected his restoration, without being authorized by any legal commission for that purpose : and it was by the persuasion of Antony, who commanded the Roman cavalry, that Gabinius engaged in that enterprize. This affords a topic of great indignation in one of the Philippics ; and Cicero there speaks of this transaction as a most impudent violation of all authority, both sacred and civil : *Inde iter* (says he) *ad Alexandriam contra senatus auctoritatem, contra rempublicam & religiones*. Philip. ii. 19. But what opinion must every unprejudiced reader conceive of our author, when he finds him condemning and approving the same transaction, and advising his friend to pursue a step which he afterwards publicly and justly reproached in his adversary ?”

decree of the senate. However, we deem it necessary to add, that we are sensible the world will judge of the propriety of this scheme entirely by the event. Should it succeed as we wish, your policy and resolution will universally be applauded: on the other hand, should it miscarry, it will undoubtedly be condemned as an action of ill-considered and unwarrantable ambition. How far this enterprize may be practicable, you, who are situated almost within view of Egypt, are the most competent judge. If therefore you are well satisfied of being able to render yourself master of that kingdom, we are clearly of opinion you should not delay your march one moment: but if you are doubtful of the success, it is our advice that you by no means make the attempt. This I will venture to assure you, that, should you execute this project in the manner we wish, there will be a very considerable party to give it applause, even during your absence; as all Rome will unite in the same approbation, the moment you shall return amongst us. Nevertheless I am persuaded, if this scheme should not take the desired effect, it may be attended with very disagreeable consequences to yourself; not only upon account of that order of the senate which I just now mentioned, but likewise in regard to the oracle. When therefore I recommend such measures as you shall have full assurance will terminate in your glory, I must at the same time strongly dissuade you from engaging in them, if you should have the

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least reason to apprehend an opposition. For (I repeat it again) the world will be determined in their opinion of this whole transaction, not as it is reasonable, but as it shall be successful. If the method here proposed should appear too dangerous to be hazarded in your own person, we think it may at least be advisable to assist the king with a number of your forces, provided he shall give sufficient security to your friends in the province, for repaying them the money they have advanced in support of his cause. And the circumstances and situation of your government render it extremely easy either to promote or obstruct his restoration, as you shall see proper. After all, you are the best judge what method will be most expedient to pursue: I thought it my part, however, to inform you of these our concurrent sentiments.” [N. B. Lentulus, wisely judging the affair too hazardous for one of his dignity and fortunes, left it to a man of a more desperate character, Gabinius.]

“ You congratulate me on the present situation of my affairs in general, and particularly on the friendship of Milo, together with the vain and ineffectual schemes of the worthless Clodius. It is no wonder you should rejoice in these the generous effects of your own amicable offices. But to say truth, such an incredible perverseness (not to give it a more severe appellation) prevails amongst a certain party, that they rather chuse to alienate me by their jealousies from the common cause, than to retain me in that interest by their fa-

your and encouragement⁵. I will own to you, their malice has almost driven me from those principles which I have so long and so invariably pursued. At least, if they have not provoked me so far, as to make me forget the dignity of my character, they have taught me that it is high time I should act with a view likewise to my own safety. I might, consistently with the highest views of patriotism, reconcile both these distinct ends, were there any honour or fortitude in those of consular rank [the venerable bench of consulars.] But such a meanness of spirit in general prevails among them, that, instead of applauding the resolution with which my actions have been ever uniformly directed in the cause of the commonwealth, they look with envy upon those dignities to which my public services have advanced me. I the rather mention this, as it is to you that I am principally indebted, not only for the happiness of being restored to my country, but almost for my very first successful steps in the paths of patriotism and of glory.—

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As to your inquiry concerning the situation of public affairs, there are great divisions amongst us; but the zeal and prudence of the respective parties are by no means equal.

⁵ Cicero at this time was falling into the measures of Cæsar, Pompey, and Crassus; measures which he thought to be contrary to the true interest of his country: he endeavours here therefore to palliate, as well as he can, this unworthy conduct: but as he enters more fully into the motives of it in Ep. Fam. lib. i. 9. the reader is referred to that epistle, which will be presently inserted. Melm.

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Those who enjoy the largest share of wealth and power have gained a superiority of credit likewise by the folly and instability of their antagonists; as they have obtained from the senate, with very little opposition, what they had no hopes of receiving even from the people, without raising great disturbances. Accordingly the house has voted Cæsar a sum of money for the payment of his army, together with a power of nominating ten lieutenants; as they have also, without the least difficulty, dispensed with the Sempronian law⁶ for appointing him a successor⁷. [*—Et stipendium Cæsari decretum est, et decem legati; et ne*

Plut. in
Cæs.

⁶ What Cicero here means by saying the senate had dispensed with the Sempronian law for appointing a successor to Cæsar, I confess I understand not. The government of Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum had been granted to Cæsar, at the motion of the tribune Vatinius, by a law of the people, for the term of five years. It would seem therefore, that the senate could have no right, in virtue of the Sempronian law, or any other law, to appoint him a successor before the expiration of that term.

Melm. p.
104.

⁷ — “Cicero was the chief adviser and promoter of these very measures, which he here condemns. If this were a fact which stood upon the credit of historians, the passage before us would strongly incline one to suspect that they had misrepresented the truth. But we have a testimony to produce, which, though of undoubted authority, is the last one should have expected in the case: for it is the testimony of Cicero himself. In a speech which he pronounced at the bar, either a little before or soon after the date of this letter, he mentions each of these particular grants, which he enumerates to Lentulus, and then adds: *Harum ego sententiarum & princeps & auctor fui.*” Orat. pro Balb. 27.

lege Sempronia succederetur, facile perfectum est.

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“ I do but slightly touch upon these particulars, as I cannot reflect on our affairs with any satisfaction. However, I mention them as suggesting an useful caution to both of us, to preserve a proper poise between our interest and our honour, and not to advance one by an undue depression of the other. A maxim this, which I have learned, not so much from my favourite philosophy, as from sad experience; and which I would recommend to you ere you are taught it by the same unpleasing method of conviction.”—


TO THE SAME.

“ Marcus Plætorius will fully inform you of the promises we have received from Pompey, together with every thing that has hitherto been attempted or effected in your favour. He was not only present indeed, but a principal agent throughout the whole proceedings; as he acted in every article of your concerns agreeably to what might be expected from a judicious, a vigilant, and an affectionate friend. To him likewise I must refer you for an account of public affairs; as I know not well what to say of them myself. Thus much, however, I can assure you, that they are in the hands (and in the hands they are likely to remain) of our professed friends⁸. As for

Lib. i. Ep.
8. Ed.
Græv.
B. ii. Let.
4. Melm.

⁸ Cæsar, Pompey, and Crassus.

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myself, both gratitude and prudence, together with your particular advice, have determined me, as they ought, to join in his⁹ interest, whom you were formerly desirous of associating with you in mine. You are sensible, nevertheless, how difficult it is to renounce our old and habitual notions of politics ; especially under a full persuasion of their rectitude. However, I conform myself to his system, since I cannot with any decency oppose him : and, whatever some may perhaps imagine, I am by no means acting in this a counterfeit part. The truth of it is, Pompey has gained such an absolute possession of my esteem, that I begin to look upon every thing as just and reasonable which falls in with his interest or inclination. I should think too it would be no imprudent resolution, even in his adversaries themselves, to desist from an opposition to which they are evidently unequal. In the mean time, I have the satisfaction to find the world in general agreed, that my character requires I should support, or at least not obstruct, the measures of Pompey : while some are even of opinion, I may reasonably retire from all public business to my favourite pursuits of a literary kind. And, indeed, were I not prevented by my friendship to Pompey, I should most certainly adopt this latter scheme, as of all others the most suitable to my inclinations. For I can now no longer maintain that dignity in the

⁹ Pompey.

senate, and that freedom in the commonwealth, which was the single motive of my ambition, and the sole end I proposed to myself in all my labours: a misfortune, however, which is not peculiar to myself, but extends to every Roman in general. In a word, I am under the sad necessity, either of tamely submitting to the sentiments of those few who lead the republic, or of imprudently joining in a weak and fruitless opposition¹. I the rather mention this, that you may deliberate, before your return among us, what part it may be advisable for you to act in the present conjuncture. To speak freely, the measures both of those of senatorian and equestrian rank, and indeed the whole system of the commonwealth in general, are totally changed. All therefore that I have now to wish, is the preservation of the public tranquillity; which those who are in the admini-

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¹ A determined patriot could not have been reduced to the alternatives which Cicero here mentions, as there was a third expedient, which every man of strict political integrity, who dared to act up to his principles, would undoubtedly have embraced. "An honest physician," says Sir William Temple, "is excused for leaving his patient when he finds the disease grown desperate, and can by his attendance expect only to receive his own fees, without any hopes or appearance of deserving them." Our author, in one of his orations, mentions it to the immortal honour of the celebrated Metellus, that *de civitate decedere quam de sententia maluit*: and he who is actuated by the same sublime patriotism, will never find himself under the poor necessity of justifying wrong measures by the impossibility of enforcing right ones.

Melm. p.
113.

Vid. Vol.
VII. p. 184.

Y. R. 698.
Bef. Chr.
54.
397 Cons.

Vid. Vol.
VIII. p.
372.

stration seem to give us a prospect of enjoying, if a certain party could be prevailed upon to submit with less impatience to their power. As to any hopes of supporting in the senate that true consular character of a firm and inflexible patriot, it is in vain now to expect it: every means for that purpose is totally lost, by the mistaken conduct of those who disoblged Pompey², and dissolved that strong union which subsisted between the senate and the equestrian order.

“ But to return to what more immediately relates to your own private affairs:——Pompey is extremely your friend: and, by all that I can observe, you may obtain any thing you shall desire during his consulship³. At least I shall solicit him very strenuously for that purpose: as you may rely on my most active offices in every instance where you are concerned. I am well persuaded my assiduity on this occasion will not be disagreeable to him: on the contrary, he will receive it with pleasure, were it for no other reason than as affording him a proof of my grateful disposition. In the mean time I entreat you to believe, that whatever bears the least connection with your interest, is of more importance to me than my own. From these sentiments it

² Cato, Metellus, Celer, Lucullus, and others, had opposed Pompey's desire of having his acts in Asia confirmed by the senate.

³ Pompey and Crassus were at this time consuls.

is that I despair, not only of being able to return, but, even sufficiently to acknowledge, the infinite obligations I owe you. Though at the same time I am conscious of having exerted, on all occasions, the most unwearied endeavours in your service.

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“It is rumoured here, that you have obtained a complete victory⁴: and we impatiently expect an express with the confirmation of this agreeable news. I have already talked with Pompey upon this subject: and, as soon as your courier arrives, I shall employ my utmost diligence in convening the senate. In fine, were I to perform much more for your interest than lies within the narrow compass of my present power, I should still think I had fallen far short of what you have a right to expect. Farewell.”

DURING the continuance of the tumults occasioned by the election of new consuls, Cicero retired into the country to one of his villas on the delightful shore of Baiæ, the chief place of resort and pleasure for the great and rich. Pompey came thither in the month of April, and no sooner arrived than he sent his compliments to Cicero; and he spent his whole time with him: they had much discourse on public affairs, in which Pompey expressed great uneasiness, and owned himself dissatisfied

Ad Att.
iv. 10.

⁴ By a posterior * letter from Cicero to Lentulus, it appears, that this proconsul was saluted imperator by his soldiers: it was probably for the victory here mentioned: but against what power the battle was fought is no where said.

* Ep. Fam.
i. 9.

Y. R. 698.

ibid. 9.

Middl. 469.

Dio, lib. °

xxxix. p.

116, &c.

with his own part in them : but Cicero, in his account of the conversation, intimates some suspicion of his sincerity.—In the same letter he mentions a current report at Puteoli, that king Ptolemy was restored, and desires to know what account they had of it at Rome. The report was very true : for Gabinus, tempted by Ptolemy's gold, and the plunder of Egypt, and encouraged, also, as some write, by Pompey himself, undertook to replace him on the throne with his Syrian army⁵; which he executed with a high

* Vid. supr.
vol. VIII.
p. 93.

⁵ Scaurus, whom Pompey left in Syria*, did nothing there to gain him much honour. Neither did Philippus nor Marcellinus, who had the province of Syria successively after Scaurus, distinguish themselves by any considerable exploits. The incursions and depredations of the Arabs, whom those commanders could not totally suppress, served for a pretext to Clodius to make Syria a consular province, and he recompensed Gabinus with it, who, during his consulship, had so well served him in his attack upon Cicero.

Vid. vol.
VIII. p.
76, 89, 93.

Judæa, dependent on the government of Syria, was agitated by great commotions when Gabinus arrived there. It has been mentioned that Pompey decided the quarrel between the two brothers, Hyrcanus and Aristobulus, in favour of the former, to whom he gave the office of high-priest, and the authority of command, but without the diadem; and that he carried away Aristobulus, with his two sons, Alexander and Antigonus, and two daughters, prisoners. Alexander made his escape on the road, returned into Judæa, and after concealing himself some time, got together a sufficient number of his father's party to dispossess Hyrcanus. He thought likewise of fortifying himself against the power of the Romans, by building the walls of Jerusalem which Pompey had thrown down.

Gabinus quickly reduced Alexander to sue for favour : nor did he refuse him his life and liberty. But though he brought back Hyrcanus to Jerusalem, and put him again in

hand and the destruction of all the king's enemies, in open defiance of the authority of the

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possession of the high-priesthood, he gave a new form to the government of the nation, making it aristocratical. He divided all the country into five provinces, and in each of these created a sovereign council.

It was on his pacification of Judæa, that Gabinius made application to the senate to be honoured with a public thanksgiving, called supplications, and met with a refusal.

Jos. Antiq.
l. iv. 10.
& de Bell.
Jud. i. 6.
Vid. supr.
P. 23.

He was preparing to carry the war into the country of the Arabs, when the hopes of a richer booty than he could find among them, made him turn towards Parthia.

Phraates, king of Parthia, had been murdered by his own sons, Orodes and Mithridates, who afterwards contended with one another for the crown. Mithridates, finding himself the weaker, had recourse to Gabinius. He came to the Roman camp, accompanied by Orsanes, the most illustrious of the Parthian nobles; and by presents and promises he engaged the proconsul to undertake his cause: but when Gabinius had passed the Euphrates with his army, the prospect of a yet richer prey, and more easy to be acquired, brought him quickly back again. For Ptolemy Auletes came to him with commendatory letters from Pompey, and with a promise from himself of ten thousand talents, on condition that he would replace him on the throne of Egypt. The greater part of the Roman officers did not approve of the enterprise, as being prohibited by a decree of the senate, and the oracle of the Sibyl. But Marc Antony [the future triumvir] who commanded the cavalry, being gained by Ptolemy, and not being religiously scrupulous, counselled and determined Gabinius to the undertaking.

Dio, l.
xxxix.
App. in
Parth. &
Syr.
Plut. in
Crass. &
in Anton.

After the death of Seleucus Cybiosactes, whom his queen Berenice put to death, as has been before mentioned, Archelaus (the son of that Archelaus who had commanded Mithridates's army, but pretended to be that king's son) offered himself to the Alexandrians to be their king, and was accepted of by them. The only difficulty was how to get away from the Roman army, which he had joined; with the intention of accompanying Gabinius into Parthia; for Gabinius, having been informed of what was in agitation,

Vid. vol.
VIII.

Y. P. 698.
 Bef. Chr.
 54.
 697 Cons.



senate, and the direction of the Sibyl. This made a great noise at Rome ; and irritated the people to such a degree, that they resolved to make him feel their displeasure for it very severely at his return.

Middl. P.
 467.

Cicero staid in the country till the beginning of May, much out of humour, and disgusted both with the republic and himself. Atticus's constant advice to him was, to consult his safety and interest, by uniting himself with the men of power ; and they, on their part, were as constantly inviting him to it, by all possible assu-

kept a watch upon him. However, he made his escape ; and, if we may believe Dio, by connivance of the Roman commander, who was willing that Egypt, by possessing an able general, might be in a condition to make the greater resistance, and thereby furnish him with a pretence to raise the price of his services. Archelaus came to Alexandria, married queen Berenice, was recognized king, and made preparations to defend his crown.

On Gabinus's arrival on the borders of Egypt, he detached Antony with the horse to seize the passes, and open the way for the army to follow. Antony was greatly assisted by Antipater the Idumæan, who not only furnished him with money, arms, and provisions, but made the conquest of Pelusium *, the key of Egypt on that side, easy to him, by gaining the Jews, who were settled in the neighbourhood of it †. The proconsul arrived at this place, entered Egypt with all his forces, fought several battles, and at length, by the death of Archelaus, who was killed in the last action, remained master of Alexandria, and the whole kingdom of Egypt, which he surrendered to Ptolemy. Antony caused funeral honours to be performed for Archelaus : but the king put his own daughter, queen Berenice, to death ; as also the richest of the Alexandrians, that with their spoils he might be the better able to satisfy the engagements he had entered into with Gabinus.

* Damietta. † They had here a temple, built by Onias, after the model of that at Jerusalem.

rances of their affection : but in his answers to Atticus he observes, “ that their two cases were very different; that Atticus, having no peculiar character, suffered no peculiar indignity ; nothing but what was common to all the citizens ; whereas his own condition was such, that if he spoke what he ought to do, he should be looked upon as a madman ; if what was useful only to himself, as a slave ; if nothing at all, as quite oppressed and subdued : that his uneasiness was the greater, because he could not shew it without being thought ungrateful.—Shall I withdraw myself then,” says he, “ from business, and retire to the port of ease ? That will not be allowed me. Shall I follow those leaders to the wars, and, after having refused a command, submit to be commanded ? I will do so ; for I see that it is your advice, and wish that I had always followed it. Or shall I resume my post, and enter again into affairs ? I cannot persuade myself to that, but begin to think Philoxenus in the right, who chose to be carried back to prison, rather than commend the tyrant’s verses. This is what I am now meditating, to declare my dislike at least of what they are doing.”


Y. R. 698.

Ad Att.
iv. 6.Diod. Sic.
l. xv. p.
331.

The city continued, for a great part of this summer, without its inferior annual magistrates : for the elections, which had been postponed from the last year, were still kept off by the consuls till they could settle them to their minds, which they effected at last, excepting in the case of two tribunes. But the most remarkable repulse was of M. Cato from the prætorship :

Middl. p.
476.Plut. in
Cat.

Y. R. 698.
 Bef. Chr.
 54.
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for the consuls, apprehending the trouble which in that office he might give them, resolved to disappoint him, if possible : and, in order to secure his competitors from impeachments for bribery, engaged the senate to decree, that the new prætors should enter upon their office without an interval of sixty days between the nomination and the taking possession ; an interval usually allowed for examining whether bribery had been practised in the election, and for prosecuting the guilty. The pretence for this decree was, that, so much of the year being spent, the whole would pass without any prætors at all, if a liberty of impeaching was allowed. “From this moment,” says Cicero, “they have given the exclusion to Cato, and, being masters of all, resolve that all the world shall know it.”

Ad Quint.
 ii. 9.

Plut. in
 Cat. & in
 Pomp.

Val. Max.
 vii. 5.

The first century, without a bribe, gave their votes for Cato. Pompey hereupon pretended that he saw something inauspicious in the heavens, and broke up the assembly. The two consuls afterwards bestirred themselves so successfully, as to get Cato excluded, and Vatinius chosen, who had been repulsed the year before with disgrace from the ædileship.

Plut. in
 Pomp.

In the assemblies for the election of ædiles, the conflict between the contending parties proved to be a bloody one. It is said, that Pompey's robe was stained with the blood of some that were slain near him ; and that sending it home, when they had brought him another, his wife was so frightened at the sight of it, that she miscarried.

When all the magistrates were chosen, the tribune Trebonius proposed to the people a law for the assignment of provinces to the consuls for the term of five years, with the power of raising what forces they thought fit. Pompey took upon himself to propose a law in favour of Cæsar, that after the expiration of the five years which had been already granted him, he should hold the government of the Gauls for five years more. This law was opposed by the generality of the senate, and above all by Cato, Favonius (his great admirer and imitator), and two of the tribunes, C. Ateius Capito, and P. Aquilius Gallus: but the superior force of the consuls and the other tribunes prevailed.

The consuls applied themselves, in the beginning of their administration, to the work of reformation. With a view to remedy the most scandalous practice of corruption in judiciary affairs, they made several new laws, and with more rigorous penalties than those already denounced; and they ordained, that the judges should be taken from the richest of the citizens; imagining, doubtless, that poverty had induced some judges to suffer themselves to be gained by presents: but could a strict regard to justice be with more reason expected from those who were become rich by all sorts of crimes? The consuls prepared likewise certain sumptuary * laws. What animated their zeal in this particular, was perhaps the excessive luxury in which their principal adversaries lived, the chiefs of the aristocratic faction. Hortensius did not conceal his taste, but took

Y. R. 698.

Dio, l.
xxxix.
p. 109.Plut. in
Cat. in
Pomp. &
in Crass.

Freinshem.

* Ep. Fam.
vii. 26.
Crevier,
tom. xii.
p. 445.

Y. R. 698.
Bef. Chr.
54.
397 Cons.



Plut. in
Pomp.

upon him boldly to defend the excess in question, by calling it magnificence and nobleness becoming the grandeur of the commonwealth. Notwithstanding this spirit of reformation, which animated the consuls, Pompey transgressed the ancient discipline by the construction, at his own expense, of a permanent theatre: for, till that time, there had never been any theatre built in Rome to continue longer than while the shows lasted that were to be then exhibited⁶.

Middl. 473.
Pliny, Hist.
vii. 3.

⁶ Pompey's theatre is much celebrated by the ancients for its grandeur and magnificence: the plan was taken from the theatre of Mitylene, but greatly enlarged, so as to receive commodiously forty thousand people. It was surrounded by a portico to shelter the company in bad weather, and had a curia or senate-house annexed to it; with a basilica also, or grand hall, proper for the sitting of judges, or any other public business: which were all finished at Pompey's cost, and adorned with a great number of images of men and women, famed for something very remarkable or prodigious in their lives and characters. Atticus undertook the care of placing all these statues; for which Pompey charged Cicero with his thanks to him. What made this fabric the more surprising and splendid, was a beautiful temple, erected at one end of it to Venus the Conqueress: and so contrived, that the seats of the theatre might serve as stairs to the temple. This was designed, it is said, to avoid the reproach of making so vast an expense for the mere use of luxury; the temple being so placed, that those who came to the shows might seem to come to worship the goddess. At the solemnity of this dedication, Pompey entertained the people with the most magnificent shows, which had ever been exhibited in Rome: in the theatre, were stage-plays, prizes of music, wrestlings, and all kinds of bodily exercise: in the circus, the horse-races, and huntings of wild beasts for five days successively, in which five hundred lions were killed; on

Ad Att.
iv. 9.
A. Gell.
x. i.
Vid. Tert.
de Spectac.
Plin. l.
viii. 7.
Dio, p.
107.
Plut. in
Pomp.

It has been mentioned, that a decree of the senate had passed for recalling Piso from his government of Macedonia. He returned to Rome about this time, after an inglorious administration of a province, whence no consular senator had ever returned but to triumph. For though, on account of some trifling advantage in the field, he had procured himself to be saluted emperor by his army, yet the occasion was so contemptible, that he durst not send any letters upon it to the senate: but, after oppressing the subjects, plundering the allies, and losing the best part of his troops against the neighbouring barbarians, who invaded and laid waste the country, he ran away in disguise from a mutiny of the soldiers, whom he disbanded at last without their pay. When he arrived at Rome, he stripped his fasces of their laurels, and entered the city obscurely and ignominiously, without any other attendance than his own retinue. On his first ap-

Y. R. 698.

Middl. 470.
In Pison.
16, &c.

the last day twenty elephants; whose lamentable howling, when mortally wounded, raised such a commiseration in the multitude, from a vulgar notion of their great sense and love to man, that it destroyed the whole diversion of the show, and drew curses upon Pompey himself for being the author of so much cruelty. So true it is, what Cicero observes of this kind of prodigality, that there is no real dignity or lasting honour in it; that it satiates while it pleases, and is forgotten as soon as it is over. It gives us, however, a genuine idea of the wealth and grandeur of those principal subjects of Rome, who, from their private revenues, could raise such noble buildings, and provide such shows, from the several quarters of the world, which no monarch on earth is now able to exhibit.

De Off.
ii. 16.

Y. R. 698.
Bef. Chr.
54.
397 Cons.

pearance in public, trusting to the authority of his son-in-law Cæsar, he had the hardiness to attack Cicero, and complain to the senate of his injurious treatment of him: but when he began to reproach him with the disgrace of his exile, he was interrupted by a loud and general clamour of the assembly⁷.

Dio. Plut.
in Crass. &
in Pomp.

The consuls having drawn lots for the provinces assigned them by the law of Trébonius, Syria fell to Crassus, agreeably to his wishes; Spain to Pompey, who was no less pleased with his fortune, having no mind to a command that would carry him far out of the way. His scheme was constantly to conduct the affairs of the city; and this scheme he pursued so faithfully, that for the six years, during which he was proconsul of Spain, he never set foot in his province, but governed it by his lieutenants; a thing without example in the com-


Middl. p.
471.

⁷ Among other things with which he upbraided Cicero, he told him, that it was not any envy for what he had done, but the vanity of what he had said, which had driven him into exile; and that a single verse of his,

Cedant arma togæ, concedat laurea linguæ,

was the cause of all his calamity; by provoking Pompey to make him feel how much the power of the general was superior to that of the orator: he put him in mind also, that it was mean and ungenerous to exert his spleen only against such whom he contemned, without daring to meddle with those who had more power, and where his resentment was more due. Cicero made a reply to him upon the spot, in an invective speech, the severest perhaps that ever was spoken by any man, on the person, the parts, the whole life and conduct of Piso.

monwealth : but the superintendence of provisions, with which he was charged, furnished him with a specious pretence to continue at Rome.

Y. R. 698.
Bef. Chr.
54.
397 Cons.


As for Crassus, whose heart was now fixed on the imagined boundless wealth of Parthia, he was in such haste to set forward on his eastern expedition, that he left Rome above two months before the expiration of his consulship : but his eagerness to involve the republic in a desperate war, for which the Parthians had given no pretext, was generally detested. The tribune Ateius declared it impious, and prohibited by all the auspices : and when he found Crassus determined to march, he waited for him at the gates of the city, and having there ready a kind of chafing-dish, with fire in it, he threw thereon perfumes, and poured libations ; and invoking certain gods with frightful names, devoted him, as he passed by, to destruction⁸.

Middl. p.
478.

Plut. in
Crass.

⁸ Ateius was afterwards turned out of the senate by Appius, when he was censor, for falsifying the auspices on this occasion ; but the miserable fate of Crassus supported the credit of them ; and confirmed the vulgar opinion of the inevitable force of those ancient rites, in drawing down the divine vengeance on all who presumed to condemn them. Appius was one of the augurs, and the only one of the college who maintained the truth of their auguries, and the reality of divination ; for which he was laughed at by the rest ; who charged him also with an absurdity in the reason which he subscribed for his censure upon Ateius, viz. that he had falsified the auspices, and brought a great calamity on the Roman people : for if the auspices, they said, were false, they could not possibly have any effect, or be the cause of that calamity. But,

Middl. p.
479.

De Divin.
i. 16.

Y. P. 698.

Middl. 479.

Crassus was desirous, before he left Rome, to be reconciled to Cicero : they had never been real friends, but generally opposite in party ; and Cicero's early engagements with Pompey kept him of course at a distance from Crassus : their coldness was still increased on account of Catiline's plot, of which when Crassus was, by some, strongly suspected, he charged Cicero with being the author of that suspicion : they carried it however on both sides with much decency, out of regard to Crassus's son, Publius, a professed admirer and disciple of Cicero ; till an accidental debate in the senate blew up their secret grudges into an open quarrel. The debate was upon Gabinus, whose conduct in relation to king Ptolemy Crassus undertook to defend, and in that defence, made many severe reflections upon Cicero ; who replied with no less acrimony, and gave a free vent to that old resentment of

Ep. Fam.
i. 9.

though they were undoubtedly forged, it is certain, however, that they had a real influence on the overthrow of Crassus ; for the terror of them had deeply possessed the minds of the soldiers, and made them turn every thing which they saw, or heard, to an omen of their ruin ; so that, when the enemy appeared in sight, they were struck with such a panic, that they had not courage or spirit enough left to make a tolerable resistance.

No people were ever more superstitious than the ancient Romans. When Crassus embarked his troops at Brundisium, there happened to be a man at the port who cried Figs of Caunus to sell, in Latin *Cauneas*, a word which, by the manner of pronouncing, might be mistaken for *Cave ne eas*, "Beware of going." This was thought to be a warning from the gods to Crassus not to pursue his enterprise. Cic. de Divin. xi. 40.

Crassus's many injuries, which had been gathering, he says, several years, but lain dormant so long, that he took it to be extinguished, till, from this accident, it burst out into a flame. The quarrel gave great joy to the chiefs of the senate, who highly applauded Cicero, in hopes to embroil him with the triumvirate: but Pompey laboured hard to make it up: and Cæsar also by letter expressed his uneasiness upon it, and begged it of Cicero, as a favour, to be reconciled with Crassus: so that he could not hold out against an intercession so powerful, and so well enforced by his affection to young Crassus: their reconciliation was confirmed by mutual professions of a sincere friendship for the future; and Crassus, to give a public testimony of it to the city, invited himself just before his departure to sup with Cicero, who entertained him in the gardens of his son-in-law Crassipes, which were upon the banks of the Tiber, and seem to have been famous for their beauty and situation.

The consuls, Pompey and Crassus, having reaped all the fruit which they had proposed from the consulship, the securing to themselves the provinces which they wanted, were not much concerned about the choice of their successors; so that, after postponing the election to the end of the year⁹, they gave way at last

⁹ Cicero, being a great part of the summer of this year in the country, put the last hand to his piece on the Complete Orator. This admirable work remains entire, a standing monument of Cicero's parts and abilities; which,

Y. R. 698.
Bef. Chr.
54.
397 Cons.

Ad Quint.
iii. 7.

Ad Att.
iv. 12.

Middl. 484.

Middl. 485.
Ep. Fam.
i. 9.

to their enemy, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, being content to have joined with him their friend, Appius Claudius Pulcher.

CHAP. V.

Cicero defends, in the senate, the interests of Crassus absent, and enters into a correspondence and intimacy of friendship with Cæsar. Unprecedented knavery of the consuls and consular candidates. The tribunician candidates do honour to Cato's virtue. Cicero defends several persons accused; and among the rest, Vatinius: in justification of this, and of the whole change of his political conduct, he writes a long letter to Lentulus Spinther.

Y. R. 699.
Bef. Chr.
53.
398 Cons.

CRASSUS had been gone but a very little time, when he was attacked in the senate by his enemies: their design was, probably, to revoke his commission¹, or at least abridge it of the power of making war upon the Parthians: but Cicero exerted himself so strenuously in his defence, that he baffled their attempts,

while it exhibits to us the idea of a perfect orator, and marks out the way by which Cicero formed himself to that character, explains the reason likewise why nobody has since equalled him, or ever will, till there be found again united, what will hardly be found single in any man, the same industry, and the same parts.

He returned to Rome about the middle of November, to assist at Milo's wedding, who married Fausta, the daughter of Sylla the dictator, a rich and noble lady, with whom, as some writers say, he found Sallust the historian in bed not long after, and had him soundly lashed, before he dismissed him.

¹ Manutius is of this opinion.

after a warm contest with the consuls themselves, and several of the consular senators. He gave Crassus an account of the debate by the following letter.

Y. R. 699.
Bef. Chr.
53.
398 Cons.

TO MARCUS LICINIUS CRASSUS.

“ I am persuaded that all your friends have informed you of the zeal with which I lately both defended and promoted your dignities; as indeed it was too warm and too conspicuous to have been passed over in silence. The opposition I met with from the consuls, as well as from several others of consular rank, was the strongest I ever encountered: and you must now look upon me as your declared advocate upon all occasions where your glory is concerned. Thus have I abundantly compensated for the intermission of those good offices, which the friendship between us had long given you a right to claim; but which, by a variety of accidents, have lately been somewhat interrupted. There never was a time, believe me, when I wanted an inclination to cultivate your esteem, or promote your interest. Though it must be owned, a certain set of men², who are the bane of all amicable intercourse, and who envied us the mutual honour that resulted from ours, have, upon some occasions, been so unhappily successful, as to create a coolness be-

Ep. Fam.
l. v. Ep. 8.
Ed. Græv.
B. ii. Let.
7. Melm.

² He means, I presume, those whom he often styles the honest.

Y. R. 699.
Bef. Chr.
53.
398 Cons.

tween us³. It has happened, however, (what I rather wished than expected) that I have found an opportunity, when even your affairs were in the most prosperous train, of giving a public testimony, by my services to you, that I always most sincerely preserved the remembrance of our former amity. The truth is, I have approved myself your friend, not only to full conviction of your family in particular, but of all Rome in general: in consequence of which, that most valuable of women, your excellent wife, together with those illustrious models of virtue and filial piety, your two amiable sons, have perpetual recourse to my assistance and advice: as the whole world is sensible, that no one is more zealously disposed to serve you than myself.


“Your family correspondents have informed you, I imagine, of what has hitherto passed in your affair, as well as of what is at present in agitation. As for myself, I intreat you to

Melm.

³ “How effectually soever Cicero might have served Crassus upon the occasion to which this letter relates, it is most certain his good offices did not proceed from a principle of friendship. It is extremely probable indeed, that his supporting the cause of Crassus in the senate is one of those instances of our author’s subjection, of which he complains” in some of his letters: “and that it was entirely in compliance with the inclinations of Cæsar and Pompey, with whom Crassus was now united.”——“It is certain that Crassus, from the time of Catiline’s conspiracy, conceived a strong and lasting aversion to our author; as, on the other hand, that Cicero, after the death of Crassus, published an oration, in which he expressly charged him with being engaged in that conspiracy.”


do me the justice to believe, that it was not any sudden start of inclination, which disposed me to embrace this opportunity of vindicating your honour: on the contrary, it was my ambition, from the first moment I entered the forum, to be ranked in the number of your friends. And I have the satisfaction to reflect, that I have never, from that time to this hour, failed in the highest sentiments of esteem for you⁴: as I doubt not you have always retained the same affectionate regard for me. If the effects of this mutual disposition have been interrupted by any little suspicions (for suspicions only I am very sure they were), be the remembrance of them for ever blotted out of our hearts. I am persuaded indeed from those virtues which form your character, and from those which I am desirous should distinguish mine, that our friendly union in the present conjuncture cannot but be attended with equal honour to us both. What instances you may be willing to give me of your esteem, must be left to your own determination: but they will be such, I flatter myself, as may tend most to

Y. R. 699.
Bef. Chr.
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⁴ What credit is it possible to give to the professions, asseverations, or even oaths, of this saint of Dr. Middleton's canonization? In a letter to Atticus, written soon after this to Crassus, Cicero thus expresses himself concerning the latter: "Our friend Crassus, they say, did not set out from Rome in his general's robe, with so much dignity as Paulus Æmilius heretofore, though, like him, a second time consul. Oh, the worthless man!" *Crassum quidem nostrum minore dignitate aiunt profectum paludatum, quam olim æqualem L. Paulum iterum consulem. O hominem nequam!* Ad Att. iv. 13.

Y. R. 699.
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advance my dignities. For my own part, I faithfully promise the utmost exertion of my best services in every article wherein I can contribute to increase yours. Many, I know, will be my rivals in these amicable offices : but it is a contention in which all the world, I question not, and particularly your two sons, will acknowledge my superiority. Be assured, I love them both in a very uncommon degree : though I will own Publius is my favourite : from his infancy he discovered a singular regard to me ; as he particularly distinguishes me at this time with all the marks even of filial respect and affection.

“ Let me desire you to consider this letter, not as a strain of unmeaning compliment, but as a sacred and solemn covenant of friendship, which I shall most sincerely and religiously observe. I shall now persevere in being the advocate of your honours, not only from a motive of affection, but from a principle of constancy : and, without any application on your part, you may depend on my embracing every opportunity, wherein I shall think my services may prove agreeable to your interest, or your inclination. Can you once doubt then, that any request to me for this purpose, either by yourself or your family, will meet with a most punctual observance ? I hope therefore you will not scruple to employ me in all your concerns, of what nature or importance soever, as one who is most faithfully your friend : and that you will direct your family to apply to me in all their affairs of every kind, whether

relating to you or to themselves, to their friends or their dependants. And be assured, I shall spare no pains to render your absence as little uneasy to them as possible. Farewell."

Y. R. 699:
Bef. Chr.
53.
398 Cons.

Cicero, whose brother Quintus was one of Cæsar's lieutenants in Gaul, began now likewise to enter into a particular intimacy and correspondence with Cæsar. Quintus, to pay his court the better to his general, had earnestly pressed his brother to an union with him, instead of adhering so obstinately to Pompey, who, as he tells him, was neither so sincere nor so generous a friend as Cæsar. To Cæsar, therefore, Cicero, not disliking the advice, wrote a letter in the familiar style; which Cæsar answered with all imaginable kindness, and the offer of every thing in which his power could serve him.—Cicero, in his account of

Middl. 488.

Ad Quint.
Fr. ii. 13.

Middl. 489.

this letter to his brother, says, "It is kind in you, and like a brother, to press me to this friendship: though I am running that way apace myself, and shall do what often happens to travellers, who, rising later than they intended, yet, by quickening their speed, come sooner to their journey's end than if they had set out earlier; so I, who have overslept myself in my observance of this man, though you were frequently rousing me, will correct my past laziness, by mending my pace for the future."

Ad Quint.
Fr. ii. 15.

—With regard to Cæsar's professions of service, he adds, "Believe me, you who know me, I have from him already, what I most value, the assurance of his affection, which

Y. R. 699.

Ad Quint.
Fr. iii. 5.

I prefer to all the great things he offers me.” In another letter he says [doubtless with equal sincerity] “I lay no great stress on his promises, want no farther honours, nor desire any new glory, and wish nothing more than the continuance of his esteem ; yet live in such a course of ambition and fatigue, as if I were expecting what I really do not desire.”

But, though he made no use of Cæsar’s generosity for himself, yet he used it freely for his friends⁵ : Cæsar, nevertheless, was chiding him all the while for his reservedness in asking.

Ibid. 1.

Middl. 497.

Ad Quint.
ii. 16.

Cicero had sent Cæsar a Greek poem, in three books, on the history of his consulship, and Cæsar’s judgment upon it was, that the beginning of it was as good as any thing which he had ever seen in that language ; but the following lines to a certain place were not equal in accuracy and spirit. Cicero desires therefore to know of his brother, what Cæsar really thought of the whole, whether the matter or the style displeased him, and begs that he would tell him the truth freely ; since, whether Cæsar liked it or not, he should not, he says,

⁵ Particularly for Trebatius the lawyer, Orfius, and Curtius. For the last of these he procured a regiment. Cicero, concerning Cæsar’s kindness to his brother Quintus, writes thus to Atticus : *Perspice—cum Cæsare suavissimam conjunctionem (hæc enim me una ex naufragio tabula delectat) qui quidem Quintum meum, tuumque, Dii boni ! quemadmodum tractat honore, dignitate, gratia ! non secus ac si ego essem imperator. Hibernam legionem eligendi optio delata commodum, ut ad me scribit. Hunc tu non ames ? Quem igitur istorum ?* Ad Att. iv. 18.

be a jot the less pleased with himself. He began however another poem, at his brother's earnest request, to be addressed to Cæsar; but, after some progress, was so dissatisfied with it, that he tore it: yet Quintus still urging, and signifying, that he had acquainted Cæsar with the design, he was obliged to resume it, and actually finished an epic poem in honour of Cæsar! which he promises to send, as soon as he could get a proper conveyance, that it might not be lost, as Quintus's tragedy of Erigone was in coming from Gaul; the only thing, says he, which had not found a safe passage, since Cæsar governed that province.

Y. R. 699.

Ad Quint.
iii. 1.

Ibid. ii. 9.

In a letter, which Cicero wrote this summer to his brother, he tells him, that there were some hopes of an election of magistrates, but those uncertain; some suspicion of a dictator, yet that not more certain; a great calm in the forum; the calm of a city, that seemed to be quieted, rather by age and decay, than concord: that his own conduct, as well in public as in private, was just what Quintus had advised, softer than the tip of his ear; and his votes in the senate such as pleased others rather than himself.—That bribery was never⁶ carried so high as at this time by the consular candidates, Memmius, Cn. Domitius, Scaurus, Messala; that they were all alike; no eminence in any; for money levelled the dignity of them all: that above eighty thousand pounds was promised to the first tribe: and money grown

Middl.
499—504.
Ad Quint.
ii. 15.Ad Att.
iv. 15, &
18.

⁶ *Ambitus redit immanis. Nunquam fuit par.*

Y. R. 699.
Bef. Chr.
53.
398 Cons.

so scarce by this profusion of it, that interest was risen from four to eight per cent.

Memmius and Cn. Domitius, who joined their interests, made a strange sort of contract with the consuls, L. Domitius and Appius Claudius, which was drawn up in writing, and attested in proper form by many of their friends on both sides; by which the consuls obliged themselves to serve them with all their power in the ensuing election; and they on their parts undertook, when elected, to procure for the consuls what provinces they desired; and gave a bond of above three thousand pounds to provide three augurs, who should testify, that they were present at making a law for granting them those provinces, when no such law had ever been made; and two consular senators, who should affirm, that they were present likewise at passing a decree of the senate, for furnishing the same provinces with arms and money, when the senate had never been consulted about it ⁷.

Middl. 501.

⁷ “ This detestable bargain of forging laws and decrees at pleasure, in which so many of the first rank were concerned, either as principals or witnesses, is alleged by an ingenious French writer as a flagrant instance of that libertinism which hastened the destruction of Rome. This great republic, of all others the most free and flourishing, owed the loss of its liberty to nothing else but a general defection of its citizens from the probity and the discipline of their ancestors. Cicero often foretells their approaching ruin from this very cause.”

Montesquieu,
Chap. x.
sur les causes de la
grandeur,
&c.

I confess, I see not the propriety of these expressions “ hastening the destruction of Rome,” “ the approaching ruin of the Roman citizens.” Was not Rome already totally ruined? By the ruin of the state, Cicero seldom means

Memmius, finding some reason to dislike his bargain, resolved to break it, and, by Pompey's advice, gave an account of it to the senate. Pompey was pleased with the opportunity of mortifying the consul Domitius, and willing likewise to take some revenge on Appius, who, though his near relation, did not enter so fully as he expected into his measures. Appius never changed countenance, nor lost any credit by the discovery; but his colleague Domitius, who affected the character of a patriot^s, was extremely discomposed; and Memmius, now grown desperate, resolved to promote the general disorder, and the creation of a dictator.

Y. R. 699.
Bef. Chr.
53.
398 Cons.

Dio, l.
XXXIX. p.
118.
Ad Att.
iv. 18.

Quintus sent his brother word from Gaul, that it was reported there, that he was present at this contract: but Cicero assures him that it was false; and that the bargain was of such a nature, as Memmius had opened it to the senate, that no honest man could have been present at it. The senate was highly incensed; and, to check the insolence of the parties concerned, passed a decree that their con-

Ad Quint.
iii. 1.

any thing else but the loss of his own influence in the government. To an impartial eye was Rome in a worse condition, were the Roman citizens more ruined, when Julius Cæsar became their lord and master, than they were at this time? Cicero himself, as we shall see presently, intimates that a dictator was really wanted; [but then he must be a dictator, who would so regulate matters, that Cicero might resume his former dignity.]

^s Cæsar had the honour to have this worthy patriot (Cato's friend and brother-in-law) for his avowed enemy, as we have formerly seen.

Vid. supr.
p. 29, &
32.

Y. R. 699.
Bef. Chr.
53.
398 Cons.

Ad Att.
iv. 16.

duct should be inquired into by what they called a private or silent judgment; where the sentence was not to be declared till after the election, yet so as to make void the election of those who should be found guilty: this they resolved to execute with rigour, and made an allotment of judges for that purpose: but some of the tribunes were prevailed with to interpose their negative, on pretence of hindering all inquisitions not specially authorized by the people.

Ad Quint.
iii. 2.
Ad Att.
iv. 16.

The candidates however were all publicly impeached by different prosecutors, and the city was now in a great ferment about them; “since,” as Cicero says, “either the men or the laws must necessarily perish; yet they will all,” says he, “be acquitted; for trials are now managed so corruptly, that no man will ever be condemned for the future, unless for murder.” But Q. Scævola, one of the tribunes, took a more effectual way to mortify them, by resolving to hinder any election of consuls during his magistracy, in which he persevered, and by his authority dissolved all the assemblies convened for that purpose. The tribunician candidates, however, were remarkably modest this year; for they made an agreement among themselves, which they all confirmed by an oath, that, in prosecuting their several interests, they would submit their conduct to the judgment of Cato, and deposit four thousand pounds apiece in his hands, to be forfeited by those whom he should condemn of any irregular practice. “If the election

Ibid. 15,
& 16.
Ad Quint.
ii. 15.

proves free," says Cicero, "as it is thought it will, Cato alone can do more than all the laws and all the judges."

Y. R. 699.
Bef. Chr.
53.
398 Cons.

A great part of this year was taken up in public trials: Suffenas and C. Cato, who had been tribunes two years before, were tried in the beginning of July, for violence and breach of peace in their magistracy, and both acquitted: but Procilius, one of their colleagues, was condemned for killing a citizen in his own house: "whence we are to collect," says Cicero, "that our Areopagites value neither bribery nor elections, nor interregnums, nor attempts against the state, nor the whole republic a rush: we must not murder a man indeed in his own house, though that perhaps might be done moderately, since twenty-two acquitted Procilius, when twenty-eight condemned him."

Ad Att.
iv. 15, &
16.

Cicero had no concern in these trials; yet he was continually employed in others through the rest of this summer. He defended Messius, one of Cæsar's lieutenants, who came from Gaul on purpose to take his trial; then Drusus, accused of prevaricating, or betraying a cause which he had undertaken to defend; of which he was acquitted by a majority only of four voices. After that, Vatinius, the last year's prætor, and Æmilius Scaurus, one of the consular candidates, accused of plundering the province of Sardinia; and about the same time likewise his old friend Cn. Plancius, who had entertained him so generously in his exile, and, being now chosen ædile, was accused by a disappointed competitor, M. Laterensis, of

Ad Att.
iv. 15.
Ad Quint.
ii. 16.
Ibid. iii. 1.

Y. R. 699. bribery and corruption. All these were acquitted; but the orations for them are lost, except that for Plancius.

Bef. Chr.
53.
398 Cons.

The reasons which induced Cicero to defend Vatinius, who had been one of his fiercest enemies, and against whom he had made that bitter* invective before mentioned, we shall find in the following letter from the orator to his friend Lentulus; a most curious piece, where he gives us his own picture at full length as a patriot and politician. We have already had him admirably well drawn by himself as a casuist in points of religious scruple.

*Vid. supr.
p. 20.

V d. supra,
p. 38.

TO LENTULUS.

Ep. Fam.
Lib. I. Ep.
ix. Ed.
Græv.
Book II.
Lett. xvii.
Melmoth.

“ ——— Though I had much rather you should gain experience by my misfortunes than your own, yet it affords me some consolation under your present disappointment⁹, that you have not paid so severe a fine as I did for being taught the little dependence there is upon the professions of the world. A reflection this, which may very properly serve as an introduction to the account you require of the motive of my late transactions.

“ You are informed then, it seems, that I am reconciled with Cæsar and Appius: a step, you assure me, you do not disapprove. But you are at a loss to guess what reasons could

* N. B. This is the letter above referred to in p. 41.


⁹ In not obtaining a commission to replace Ptolemy on his throne.

induce me to appear at the trial of Vatinius, not only as an advocate, but as a witness in his favour¹. To set this matter in the clearest light, it will be necessary to trace back the motives of my conduct to their original source. Let me observe then, my Lentulus, that, when I was recalled from exile by your generous offices, I considered myself as restored, not only to my friends and to my family, but to the commonwealth in general. And as you had a right to the best returns of my affection and gratitude for the distinguished part you acted in that affair, so I thought there was something more than ordinary due from me to my country, which had so singularly co-operated with you upon this occasion. I often took an opportunity, during your consulate, of publicly declaring these my sentiments in the senate: as I always, you well know, expressed myself to the same purpose in our private conversation. Nevertheless I had many reasons at that time to be highly disgusted. I could not, in truth, but observe the disguised malice of some, and the coolness of others, when you were endeavouring to procure a de-

Y. R. 699.
Bef. Chr.
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¹ A very learned and polite author, [Dr. Middleton] Melmoth. whose just esteem for Cicero's writings has betrayed him perhaps into some partiality towards his actions, acknowledges that "the defence of Vatinius gave a plausible handle for some censures upon Cicero." The truth of it is, the censure was more than plausible: for nothing certainly could discover more meanness of spirit than thus, in compliance with those in power, not only to defend Vatinius as an advocate, but to bear public testimony likewise to his general good conduct.

Y. R. 699.
Bef. Chr.
53.
398 Cons.



cree for restoring the inscription of that honourable monument of my public services, which had been erected by the senate. But it was not only in this instance, that those who had many obligations to concur in your good offices towards me, acted a part I had little reason to expect. They looked indeed with much ungenerous indifference on the cruel outrage which was offered to my brother and myself under our own roof; and the estimate they made, in pursuance of the senate's order, of the damages I had sustained by these acts of violence, was far unequal to my real loss. This last article of their injustice, though least indeed in my concern, I could not but very sensibly feel amidst the general wreck of my fortunes. But, though these mortifying marks of their disposition towards me were much too notorious to escape my observation, they could not efface the more agreeable impressions of their former friendship. For this reason, notwithstanding those high obligations I had to Pompey, of which you yourself were witness, and have often mentioned; notwithstanding also the affection and esteem which I always entertained for him, yet I still firmly adhered to my political principles; nor suffered these considerations of private amity to influence me in favour of his public measures. Accordingly, when Vatinius (who at the trial of P. Sextius was examined as a witness against him) intimated that Cæsar's successes had reconciled me to his party, I told him, in the presence of Pompey, that I pre-

ferred the fate of Bibulus, unhappy as he might esteem it, to all the splendid triumphs of the most victorious general². I asserted likewise upon another occasion (and asserted too in the hearing of Pompey) that the same persons who confined Bibulus to his house had driven me from mine. Indeed the whole series of those interrogatories, which I put to Vatinius at this trial, was entirely designed as an invective against his tribunate : and I particularly exposed, with much freedom and indignation, his contempt of the auspices, his corrupt distribution of foreign kingdoms, together with the rest of his violent and illegal proceedings. But it was not only upon this occasion that I spoke thus unreservedly : I frequently avowed my sentiments with the same resolute spirit in the senate. Thus, when Marcellinus and Philippus were consuls, I carried a motion, that the affair of the Campanian lands should be referred to the re-consideration of a full house on the fifteenth of May following. Now tell me, my friend, could I possibly have made a bolder or more formidable attack upon this party? Could I possibly have given a more convincing evidence that I had not departed from my old principles, notwithstanding all I had formerly suffered for their sake? The truth of it is, this motion greatly exasperated

Y. R. 699.
Bef. Chr.
53.
598 Cons.

Vid. supra,
p. 22.

² N. B. This letter was written two years after the trial of Sextius ; and perhaps Cicero never said what he here pretends to have said, " That he preferred the glory of Bibulus to the glory of Pompey and that of Cæsar, &c." I cannot think he had the boldness to speak so.

Y. R. 699.

Bef. Chr.

53.


398 Cons.

not only those whom it was reasonable to expect it would offend, but others upon whom I did not imagine it would have had any such effect. Pompey, soon after this decree had passed, set forward upon his expedition into Sardinia and Africa, without giving me the least intimation of his being disgusted. In his way thither he had a conference with Cæsar at Luca, who made great complaints of this motion. He had before, it seems, been informed of it by Crassus at Ravenna, who took that opportunity of incensing him against me. And it appeared afterwards that Pompey was much dissatisfied upon the same account. This I learnt from several hands, but particularly from my brother, who met him in Sardinia a few days after he had left Luca. Pompey told him he was extremely glad of that accidental interview, as he wanted much to talk with him. He began with saying, that, as my brother stood engaged³ for my conduct, he should expect him to exert all his endeavours to influence me accordingly. Pompey then proceeded very warmly to remonstrate against my late motion in the senate, reminding my brother of his services to us both, and particularly of what had passed between them concerning Cæsar's edicts, and of those as-

³ “ This alludes to those engagements which Quintus Cicero entered into in behalf of his brother, in order to induce Pompey to favour his recall from banishment. And it appears by what follows, that he promised, on the part of Cicero, an unlimited resignation to the measures of that ambitious chief.”

surances, he said, my brother had given him of the measures I would pursue with respect to that article. He added, that my brother himself was a witness, that the steps he had formerly taken for procuring my recall were with the full consent and approbation of Cæsar. Upon the whole therefore, he intreated him, if it were either not in my power or my inclination to support the interest and dignity of the latter, that he would at least prevail with me not to oppose them. The account which my brother gave me of this conversation, together with a message I had before received from Pompey by Vibullius, to request that I would not proceed any farther in the affair of the Campanian lands till his return, threw me into a very serious train of reflections. I could not but think, after having performed and suffered so much for my country, that I might now at least be permitted to consider what was due to gratitude and the honour of my brother: and as I had ever conducted myself with integrity towards the republic, I might be allowed, I hoped, to act the same honest part in my more private connections⁴.

Y. R. 699.
Bef. Chr.
53.
398 Cons.



⁴ “ Had Cæsar and Pompey indeed been never so much his real friends, no consideration of amity ought to have prevailed with him to have acquiesced in a scheme which was contrary to the sentiments of all the real patriots of the republic, and contrary likewise to his own: a scheme which he himself tells Atticus was formed for the destruction of the commonwealth. Ad Att. ii. 17. Had he attended to the indisputable maxim which he himself lays down in one of his philosophical treatises, it would have

Melm.

Y. R. 699.
Bef. Chr.
53.
398 Cons.

“ During the time I was engaged in these votes, and other proceedings with which Pompey appeared thus dissatisfied, I was informed of what passed in the conversation of a set of men, whom you will now guess without my naming them. This party, though they approved of my public measures, as being agreeable to what had ever been their professed sentiments, were yet so ungenerous as to express great satisfaction in believing, that my conduct would by no means please Pompey, at the same time that it would highly exasperate Cæsar. Well might I resent, indeed, so injurious a treatment; but much more when I saw them, even before my face, maliciously encouraging and caressing my avowed enemy: — Mine do I call him? rather let me say, an enemy to the laws and tranquillity of his country, and to every character of worth and virtue amongst us.

“ Their malevolence, however, had not the

decided at once the conduct which became him to observe upon an occasion where private friendship interfered with more extensive obligations: *Hæc prima lex in amicitia sancietur* (says he) *ut neque rogemus res turpes, nec faciamus rogati*. But the truth of it is, private friendship was not concerned in the case: for he well knew that neither Pompey nor Cæsar had any attachments to him of that kind. It was fear alone that determined his resolution: and having once already suffered in [what he called] the cause of liberty, he did not find himself disposed to be twice a martyr. The awkward manner, however, in which he attempts to justify himself throughout this letter, very evidently shews how impossible it is to bid farewell to integrity with a good grace.”

effect intended, and it could not warm me into those transports of indignation, of which my heart is now, indeed, no longer susceptible. On the contrary, it only induced me to examine my situation in all its various circumstances and relations, with the greatest coolness and impartiality: the process and result of which I will lay before you in as few words as I am able.

Y. R. 699.
Bef. Chr.
53.
398 Cons.

“ There have been times, as experience no less than history has taught me, when the power of the commonwealth was in worthless and wicked hands. In such a conjuncture, no hope of interest (which I have at all times most heartily condemned) nor fear of danger (which upon some occasions, however, has influenced the greatest minds) should prevail with me to co-operate in their measures: no, not though I were attached to them by the strongest ties of friendship and gratitude. But when a man of Pompey’s distinguished character presides over the republic, a man who has acquired that eminence of power and honour by the most heroic actions, and the most signal services, I could not imagine it would be imputed to me as a levity of disposition, if in some few instances I declined a little from my general maxims, and complied with his inclinations. But my justification, I thought,

“ —Cicero’s compliance can by no means be considered in the favourable light wherein he represents it; but was in reality a confession most injurious to his honour. It is certain likewise, that it was not from any advantageous opinion of Pompey’s political character and

Melm.

Y. R. 699.
Bef. Cbr.
53.
398 Cons.

* Vid. vol.
VII. p.
437.
† Vol.
VIII. p.
96.


would still rise in its strength, when it should be remembered that I favoured his credit and dignity even from the earliest part of my life ; as I particularly promoted them in my prætorship* and consulate†: when it should be remembered, that he not only assisted me with his vote and his influence in the senate during my adversity, but joined his counsels and his efforts with yours, for the same generous purpose: in a word, when it should be remembered, that he has no other enemy in the whole commonwealth except [Clodius] the man who is my professed adversary. In consequence of these sentiments it was absolutely necessary for me, you see, to unite with Cæsar, as one who was joined in the same views and the same interest. His friendship likewise, which you are sensible my brother and I have long shared, together with his humane and generous disposition, which I have abundantly experienced both by his late letters and his good offices towards me, contributed greatly to confirm me in these resolutions. To which I must add, that the commonwealth in general seemed to be most strongly averse from giving any

designs that he was induced to fall in with his measures. On the contrary, Cicero most undoubtedly had no esteem for him ; and as to his political views, he saw and acknowledged, long before the date of this letter, that they were turned on the destruction of the republic. Ομολογημενως (says he in one epistle to Atticus) τυραννιδα συσκευαζειν ; as in another, written upon the breaking out of the civil war, he calls him *hominem απολιτικωτατον*, a man utterly unacquainted with the arts of government." Ad Att. ii. 17. viii. 16.

opposition to these extraordinary men ; more especially after Cæsar had performed such glorious exploits for the honour of his country. But what had still a farther and very powerful weight in my deliberations, was Pompey's having engaged his word for me to Cæsar, as my brother had given the same assurances to Pompey.

“ Plato, I remember, lays it down as a maxim in his divine writings, that ‘ the people generally model their manners and their sentiments by those of the great.’ A maxim which at this juncture, I thought, merited my particular attention. I was convinced indeed of its truth, when I reflected on the vigorous resolutions which were taken in the senate on the memorable nones of December : and it seemed no wonder so noble a spirit should appear in that assembly, after the animating example I had given them upon my first entering on the consular office. I recollected also, that, during the whole time which intervened between the expiration of my consulship and that of Cæsar and Bibulus, when I still retained a very considerable authority in the senate, all the better part of the republic were united in their sentiments. On the other hand, about the time you took possession of your government in Spain, the commonwealth could not so properly be said to be under the administration of consuls as of infamous barterers of provinces⁶, and the mean vassals

Y. R. 699.
Bef. Chr.
. 53.
398 Cons.



⁶ Piso and Gabinius. Vid. Vol. VIII. p. 409.

Y. R. 699.
Bef. Chr.
53.
398 Cons.

and ministers of sedition. It was then that discord and faction spread through all ranks amongst us: and I was marked out as the victim of party and rage. In this critical season, however, not only every man of worth, but the greater part of the senators, and indeed all Italy in general rose up with remarkable unanimity in my cause⁷. What the event proved I forbear to mention; as, in truth, it is to be imputed to a complication of errors and artifices. But this I will say, it was not forces, so much as leaders to conduct them, that were wanting to me in this crisis. I must add, that whatever censure may justly fall on those who refused me their assistance, most certainly they who first promised it, and then deserted me, are not less to be blamed⁸. In a word, if some of my friends may well be reproached for the timid though sincere counsels they gave me, how much more severe

⁷ It is strange, that being thus defended, he should nevertheless be banished.

Melm.

⁸ "In this number was Pompey himself, who, though he had given Cicero the most solemn assurances that he would at the hazard of his life protect him against Clodius, yet, when afterwards our author solicited the execution of this promise, he absolutely refused to concern himself in the affair. Ad Att. ii. 20. x. 4. It seems altogether unaccountable, that Cicero should be so injudicious as to touch upon a circumstance that destroys the whole force of his apology; so far, I mean, as he intended to justify his conduct by his friendship to Pompey. For it exceeds all power of credulity to imagine, that he could really be influenced by a motive of that kind with respect to a man whose insincerity he had so lately and so severely experienced."

Vid. vol.
VIII. p.
419.


must their condemnation prove, who artfully alarmed me with their pretended fears? Let it be noted at the same time to my honour, that, zealous as my fellow citizens shewed themselves to rise up in the defence of a man who had formerly stood forth in theirs, yet I would not suffer them to be exposed (unsupported as they were by those who ought to have been their protectors) to the barbarous insults of lawless banditti. On the contrary, I rather chose the world should judge, by the power of my friends in recalling me from my exile, what their honest humanity could have effected, had I permitted them to have drawn their swords to prevent it.

“ You were sensible of this general zeal in my favour, when you undertook my cause: and you not only encouraged but confirmed it by your influence and authority. I shall always most willingly acknowledge, that you were assisted upon this occasion by some of the most considerable persons in Rome; who, it must be owned, exerted themselves with much greater vigour in procuring my return, than in preventing my banishment: and had they persisted in the same resolute disposition, they might have recovered their own authority at the same time that they obtained my restoration. The spirits, in truth, of the aristocratical part of the republic were at this time greatly raised and animated by the inflexible patriotism of your conduct during your consulship, together with Pompey’s concurrence in the same measures. Cæsar likewise, when

Y. R. 699.
Bef. Chr.
53.
398 Cons.

Vid. supr.
p. 21 & 28.

Y. R. 699.
 Ref. Chr.
 53.
 398 Cons.



he saw the senate distinguishing his glorious actions by the most singular and unprecedented honours, joined in adding weight to the authority of that assembly. Had these happy circumstances therefore been rightly improved, it would have been impossible for any ill-designing citizen to have violated the laws and liberties of the commonwealth. But let me intreat you to reflect a moment on the subsequent conduct of my political associates. In the first place, they screened from punishment that infamous intruder on the matron-mysteries, who shewed no more reverence for the awful ceremonies of the goddess, in whose honour these secret solemnities are celebrated, than for the chastity of his three sisters. And thus by preventing a worthy tribune * of the people from obtaining that justice upon Clodius which he endeavoured to procure, they deprived future times of a most salutary example of chastised sedition. Did not they suffer likewise that monument, that glorious monument, which was erected, not indeed with the spoils I had gained in foreign wars, but by the generosity of the senate for my civil services; did they not most shamefully suffer it to be inscribed with the name of the cruel and avowed enemy of his country⁹? Obligated most certainly I am to them for having restored me to the common-

* Milo.

⁹ “ After the suppression of Catiline’s conspiracy, the senate decreed that a temple should be erected to Liberty, as a public monument of their late happy deliverance. This temple was raised at the foot of mount Palatine,

wealth : but I could wish they had conducted themselves, not only like physicians whose views terminate merely in the health of their patients, but like the *aliptæ*¹ also, who endeavour to establish the spirits and vigour of those under their care. Whereas they have acted with regard to me, as Apelles did in relation to his celebrated picture of Venus ; they have finished one part of their work with great skill and accuracy, but left all the rest a mere rude and imperfect sketch.

“ In one article, however, I had the satisfaction to disappoint my enemies. They imagined my banishment would have wrought the same effect on me, which they falsely supposed a calamity of a like kind produced formerly in Quintus Metellus. This excellent person, whom I look upon to have been a man of the greatest fortitude and magnanimity of any in his time, they represented as broken and dispirited after his return from exile. But if broken he really were, it could not be the effect of his adversity, as it is certain he submitted to his sentence without the least reluctance, and lived under it, not only with indifference, but with cheerfulness. The truth

Y. R. 699.
Ref. Chr.
53.
398 Cons.

Vid. vol.
VII. p.
109.

near Cicero's house. And as the inscription fixed thereon undoubtedly mentioned Cicero with honour, Clodius erased those words, and placed his own name in their stead.” Melm. from Manutius.

¹ “ The *aliptæ* were persons who prepared the athletic combatants by unctions, and other proper methods, for rendering them vigorous and active in their gymnastic exercises.” Melm.

Y. R. 699.

Bef. Chr.

53.

398 Cons.

is, no man ever equalled him in the strength and heroism of his mind : no, not even the celebrated Marcus Scaurus² himself. Nevertheless, such as they had heard, or at least chose to imagine Metellus to have been, they figured me to themselves : or, if possible indeed, even yet more abject. The reverse, however, proved to be the case : and that general concern which the whole republic expressed at my absence, inspired me with more vigorous spirits than I had ever before enjoyed. The truth is, the sentence of banishment against Metellus was repealed by a law proposed only by a single tribune of the people : whereas I was recalled from mine upon the motion of the consul himself, and by a law in which every magistrate of Rome concurred. Let me add, likewise, that each order and degree in the commonwealth, headed by the senate and supported by all Italy, zealously united in one common effort for recovering me to my country³. Yet high as these unexampled honours were, they have never elated my heart with pride, or tempted me to assume an air which could give just offence even to the most malevolent of my enemies. The whole of my ambition is, not to be wanting either in advice or assistance to my friends ; or even to those whom I have no great reason to rank in that number : it is this, perhaps,


² As infamous a hypocrite and traitor as ever lived. Vid. Vol. VII. p. 39 and 44.

³ If this was the case ; whom had his friends to struggle with, in order to obtain his restoration ?

which has given the real ground of complaint to those who view only the lustre of my actions, but cannot be sensible of the pains and solicitude they cost me. But whatever the true cause may be, the pretended one is, my having promoted the honours of Cæsar: a circumstance which they interpret, it seems, as a renunciation of my old maxims. The genuine motives however of my conduct in this instance are, not only what I just before mentioned, but particularly what I hinted in the beginning of my letter, and will now more fully explain.

“ You will not find then, my friend, the aristocratical part of the republic disposed to pursue the same system as when you left them: that system, I mean, which I endeavoured to establish when I was consul, and which, though afterwards occasionally interrupted, and at length entirely overthrown, was again fully restored during your administration. It is now, however, totally abandoned by those who ought most strenuously to have supported it. I do not assert this upon the credit only of appearances, in which it is exceedingly easy to dissemble: I speak it upon the unquestionable evidence of facts, and the public proceedings of those who were styled patriots in my consulate. The general scheme of politics, therefore, being thus changed, it is time most certainly for every man of prudence (in which number I have the ambition to be justly accounted) to vary likewise his particular plan. Accordingly, that chief and favourite

Y. R. 699.
Bef. Chr.
53.
398 Cons.

Y. R. 699.
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53.
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guide of my principles, whom I have already quoted, the divine Plato himself, advises, not to press any political point farther than is consonant to the general sense of the community : for methods of violence, he maintains, are no more to be used towards one's country than one's parent. Upon this maxim, he tells us, he declined engaging in public affairs : and as he found the people of Athens confirmed by long habit in their mistaken notions of government, he did not think it lawful to attempt by force what he despaired of effecting by persuasion. My situation, however, is in this respect different from Plato's : for, on the one hand, as I have already embarked in public affairs, it is too late to deliberate whether I should now enter upon them or not ; so, on the other, the Roman people are by no means so incapable of judging of their true interests as he represents the Athenians. It is my happiness indeed to be able, by the same measures to consult at once both my own and my country's welfare ⁴. To these considerations I must add those uncommon acts of generosity, which Cæsar has exerted both towards my brother and myself : so much indeed beyond

⁴ It is not very easy to see how Cicero can be justified according to his own principles, in being accessary to the cementing an union between Pompey and Cæsar. " For he assures Atticus, in a letter which was written at the breaking out of the civil war, that he foresaw the storm that had been gathering to destroy the republic fourteen years before it fell ; and calls the union of these ambitious chiefs *sceleratæ consensionis fides*, a wicked confederacy. To which he adds, that they had upon all occa-

all example, that even whatever had been his success, I should have thought it incumbent on me at least to have defended him. But now distinguished as he is by such a wonderful series of prosperity, and crowned with so many glorious victories, I cannot but esteem it a duty which I owe to the republic, abstracted from all personal obligations to himself, to promote his honours as far as lies in my power. And believe me, it is at once my confession and my glory, that next to you, together with the other generous authors of my restoration, there is not a man in the world from whom I have received such amicable offices.


Y. R. 699.
Bef. Chr.
53.
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“ And now, having laid before you the principal motives of my conduct in general, I shall be the better able to satisfy you concerning my behaviour with respect to Crassus and Vatinius in particular: for, as to Appius and Cæsar, I have the pleasure to find that you acquit me of all reproach.

“ My reconciliation then with Vatinius was effected by the mediation of Pompey, soon after the former was elected prætor. I must confess, when he petitioned to be admitted a candidate for that office, I very warmly opposed him in the senate: but it was much less from my resentment to the man himself, than in order to support the honour and interest of

sions preferred the interest of their families, and the advancement of their power, to the honour and welfare of their country.” Plut. in vit. Pomp. Ad Att. x. 4.

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Cato. Soon after this he was impeached : and it was in compliance with the earnest solicitation of Cæsar that I undertook his defence. But you must not inquire why I appeared at this trial, or indeed at any other of the same kind, as a witness in favour of the accused, lest I should hereafter have an opportunity of retorting the question upon you. Though, to say truth, I may fairly ask it even now : for do you not remember, my friend, in whose behalf it was that you formerly transmitted certain honourable testimonials even from the utmost limits of the Roman empire ? You need not scruple, however, to acknowledge the fact : for I have acted, and shall continue to act, the same part towards those very persons. But to return to Vatinius : besides the reasons I have already assigned, I was provoked to engage in his defence by an opposition of the same sort which the parasite recommends to the amorous soldier in the play. The obsequious Gnatho, you know, advises his friend the captain, whenever his mistress endeavours to pique his jealousy by mentioning his rival Phædria, to play off Pamphila upon her in return. Thus, as I told the judges at this trial, since certain honourable persons, who were formerly much in my interest, had thought fit, by many little mortifying instances in the senate, to caress my avowed enemy before my face, I thought it but equitable to have a Clodius on my part, in opposition to the Clodius on theirs. Accord-

ingly I have, upon many occasions, acted suitably to this declaration: and all the world acknowledges I have reason.

Y. R. 699.
Bef. Chr.
53.
398 Cons.

“ Having thus explained my conduct with regard to Vatinius, I will now lay before you those motives which determined me in respect to Crassus. I was willing, for the sake of the common cause, to bury in oblivion the many and great injuries I had formerly received from him. Agreeably to this disposition, as we were then upon good terms, I should have borne his unexpected defence of Gabinius (whom he had very lately with so much warmth opposed) if he had avoided all personal reflections on myself. But when, with the most unprovoked violence, he broke in upon me whilst I was in the midst of my speech, I must confess it raised my indignation: and perhaps I took fire so much the sooner, as possibly there remained in my heart some latent sparks of my former resentment. However, my behaviour in the senate upon this occasion was much and generally applauded. Among the rest, I was complimented likewise by the same men whom I have often hinted at in this letter; and who acknowledged I had rendered a very essential service to their cause, by the spirit which I had thus exerted. In short, they affected to speak of me in public, as being now indeed restored to the commonwealth in the best and most glorious sense. Nevertheless, they had the malice in their private conversations (as I was informed by persons of undoubted honour) to express singular satisfac-

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 Bef. Chr.
 53.
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tion in the new variance that had thus happened between Crassus and myself: as they pleased themselves with imagining it would for ever throw me at a distance from those who were joined with him in the same interest. Pompèy in the mean time employed incredible pains to close this breach: and Cæsar also mentioned it in his letters as an accident that gave him much concern. Upon these considerations therefore, I thought it expedient to act agreeably both to the dictates of my natural temper, and to that experience which I had gained by my former misfortunes. In pursuance of these sentiments, I consented to a reconciliation: and, in order to render it more conspicuous to the world, Crassus set out for his government almost from under my roof: for having invited himself to spend the preceding night with me, we supped together in the gardens of my son-in-law Crassipes. It was for these reasons that I thought my honour obliged me to defend his cause in the senate: and I confess I mentioned him with that high applause of which, it seems, you have been informed.

“ Thus I have given you a full detail of the several views and motives by which I am governed in the present conjuncture, as well as of the particular disposition in which I stand with respect to the slender part I can pretend to claim in the administration of public affairs. And, believe me, I should have judged and acted in the same manner, had I been totally free from every sort of amicable bias. For,

on the one hand, I should have esteemed it the most absurd folly to have attempted to oppose so superior a force; and, on the other, supposing it possible, I should yet have deemed it imprudent to weaken the authority of persons so eminently and so justly distinguished in the commonwealth⁵. Besides, it appears to me to be the dictates of sound policy to act in accommodation to particular conjunctures, and not obstinately persevere in one inva-

Y. R. 699.
Bef. Chr.
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⁵ "It will appear very evident perhaps from the foregoing observations, that what Cicero here asserts could not possibly be his real sentiments. That it was not practicable to bring down Cæsar and Pompey from that height of power to which they were now arrived, will not, probably, be disputed: though at the same time it is very difficult to set limits to what prudence and perseverance may effect. This at least seems undeniable, that, if their power were absolutely immoveable, Cicero's conduct was in the number of those causes which contributed to render it so. However one cannot but be astonished to find our author seriously maintaining, that, granting it had not been impossible, it would yet have been impolitic, to have checked these towering chiefs in their ambitious flight. For it is plain, from a passage already cited out of his letters to Atticus, that he long foresaw their immoderate growth of power would at last over-run the liberties of the commonwealth*. It had already indeed destroyed his own, and this too by the confession of himself. For in a letter which he writes to his brother, taking notice of the strong application that Pompey had made to him to defend Gabinius, he declares he never will comply with that unworthy request, so long as he retained the least spark of liberty. But comply however he actually did: equally, in truth, to his own disgrace and the confutation of the doctrine he here advances." Ad Q. Fr. iii. 1.

Melm.

Ad Att.
x. 4.

* *i. e.* would extinguish the detestable aristocratical tyranny under which Rome had unhappily fallen.

Y. R. 699. riable scheme, when public circumstances,
 Bef. Chr. together with the sentiments of the best and
 53. wisest members of the community, are evidently
 398 Cons. changed.

“ In conformity to this notion, the judicious reasoners on the great art of government have universally condemned an inflexible perseverance in one uniform tenor of measures. The skill of the pilot is shewn in weathering the storm at least, though he should not gain his port: but if shifting his sails, and changing his direction, will infallibly carry him into the intended harbour, would it not be an instance of most unreasonable tenaciousness, to continue in the more hazardous course wherein he began his voyage? Thus (and it is a maxim I have often had occasion to inculcate) the point we ought all of us to keep in view, in our administration of the commonwealth, is the final enjoyment of an honourable repose; but the method of securing to ourselves this dignity of retreat, is by having been inflexible in our intentions for the public welfare, and not by a positive perseverance in certain favourite modes of obtaining it⁶. To repeat, therefore, what I just now declared, had I been absolutely uninfluenced by every motive of friend-


Melm.

⁶ “ The reasoning which Cicero here employs is certainly just, considered abstractedly: but by no means applicable to the present case. The question between the aristocratical party and those who were favourers of Cæsar and Pompey, was not what road should be taken to the same end; but whether Rome should be free or enslaved.”

I must here take the liberty to differ from the ingeni-

ship, I should still have pursued the same public measures in which I am now engaged. But when gratitude and resentment both conspire in recommending this scheme of action to me, I cannot hesitate a moment in adopting it; especially since it appears most conducive to the interest of the republic in general, as well as to my own in particular. To speak freely, I act upon this principle so much the more frequently, and with the less reserve, not only as my brother is lieutenant under Cæsar, but as the latter receives the slightest action, or even word of mine in his favour, with an air that evidently shews, that he considers them as obligations of the most sensible kind. And in fact, I derive the same benefit from that popularity and power which you know he possesses, as if they were so many advantages of my own. The sum of the whole in short is this: I imagined I had no other method of counteracting those perfidious designs with which a certain party were secretly contriving to undermine me, than by thus uniting the friendship and protection of the men in power with those internal aids

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Bef. Chr.
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ous and judicious gentleman, to whom I am so much indebted for these translations and remarks. The question at this time does not seem to have been, whether Rome should be free or enslaved; but whether Rome should be under the domination of the triumvirate, or of the fish-pond-men, the venerable bench of consulars, such monsters as the consuls and consular candidates of this year 699; or, if you please, whether anarchy should prevail in the empire, or a government by three men.

Vid. supra,
p. 67.

Y. R. 699.
Bef. Chr.
53.
398 Cons.

which have never yet been wanting to my support⁷.

CHAP. VI.

The trial of Gabinius for treasonable conduct in king Ptolemy's affair. He is brought to trial a second time for plundering his province of Syria. Cicero defends him at this second trial; and defends likewise Rabirius, accused of being an accomplice in Gabinius's treason. Julia, the daughter of Cæsar, and wife of Pompey, dies. Pontinius fights his way to the capitol in triumph. Cicero accepts, and presently after resigns, a lieutenancy under Pompey. The election of new consuls is obstructed by the tribunes. A design is started to create Pompey dictator, but is quickly dropt. An interregnum during the first six months of the year 700. M. Messala and Cn. Domitius are chosen consuls.

CICERO'S English historian observes, that the long and elaborate answer of the patriot to his friend Lentulus's inquiry, concerning the change in his political conduct, was written before Cicero's defence of Gabinius: otherwise he would have had a still harder task to make an apology for himself.

The recall of Gabinius from his government of Syria had been decreed the last year; but

Melm.

⁷ "There is no character in all antiquity that lies so open to discovery as that of Cicero, and yet there is none at the same time which seems to be less generally understood. Had there been no other of his writings extant, however, but this single letter, the patriot character, one should have imagined, would have been the last that the world would ever have ascribed to our author. It is observable, (and it is an observation for which I am obliged

he did not return to Rome till about the end of September in the present year. He boasted every where on his journey that he was going to demand a triumph; and, to carry on that farce, continued a while without the gates, till, perceiving how odious he was to all within, he stole privately into the city by night to avoid the disgrace of being insulted by the populace. There were three different impeachments provided against him: the first, for treasonable practices against the state; the second, for plundering his province; the third, for bribery and corruption: and so many persons offered themselves to be prosecutors, that there was a contest among them before the prætor, how to adjust their several claims.

The first indictment fell to L. Lentulus, who accused him the day after he entered the city, that, in defiance of religion and the decree of the senate, he had restored the king of Egypt

to a gentleman, who, amidst far more important occupations, did not refuse to be the censurer of these papers) that 'the principles by which Cicero attempts to justify himself in this epistle are such as will equally defend the most abandoned prostitution and desertion in political conduct. Personal gratitude and resentment; an eye to private and particular interests, mixed with a pretended regard to public good; an attention to a brother's advancement and farther favour; a sensibility in being caressed by a great man in power; a calculation of the advantages derived from the popularity and credit of that great man to one's own personal self; are very weak foundations indeed to support the superstructure of a true patriot's character. Yet these are the principles which Cicero here expressly avows and defends!'

Y. R. 699.

Middl. p.
506—510.
Ad Quint.
Frat. iii. 1.
Ibid. 2.

Y. R. 699.
Bef. Chr.
53.
398 Cons.

with an army, leaving his own province naked, and open to the incursion of enemies, who had made great devastations in it.—Gabinus durst not shew his head for the first ten days, till he was obliged to come to the senate, in order to give them an account, according to custom, of the state of his province and the troops which he had left in it. As soon as he had told his story, he was going to retire; but the consuls detained him, to answer to a complaint brought against him by the publicans, or farmers of the revenues, who were attending at the door to make it good. This drew on a debate, in which Gabinus was so urged and teased on all sides, but especially by Cicero, that, trembling with passion, and unable to contain himself, he called Cicero a banished man: upon which, says Cicero, in a letter to his brother, “nothing ever happened more honourable to me: the whole senate to a man left their seats, and with a general clamour ran up to his very face; while the publicans also were equally fierce and clamorous against him, and the whole company behaved themselves just as you yourself would have done.”

Ad Q. Fr.
iii. 2.


Cicero had been deliberating for some time, whether he should not accuse Gabinus himself; but, out of regard to Pompey, was content to appear only as a witness against him, and, when the trial was over, gives the following account of it to his brother.

Ibid. 4.

“Gabinus is acquitted: nothing was ever so stupid as his accuser L. Lentulus; nothing

so sordid as the bench : yet, if Pompey had not taken incredible pains, and the rumour of a dictatorship had not infused some apprehensions, he could not have held up his head even against Lentulus : since, with such an accuser and such judges, of the seventy-two, who sat upon him, thirty-two condemned him. The sentence is so infamous, that he seems likely to fall in the other trials ; especially that for plundering. But there is no republic, no senate, no justice, no dignity, in any of us : What can I say more of the judges ? there were but two of them of prætorian rank ; Domitius Calvinus, who acquitted him so forwardly, that all the world might see it ; and C. Cato, who, as soon as the votes were declared, ran officiously from the bench, to carry the first news to Pompey. Some say, and particularly Sallust, that I ought to have accused him : but should I risk my credit with such judges ? What a figure should I have made, if he had escaped from me ? but there were other things which influenced me : Pompey would have considered it as a struggle, not about Gabinius's safety, but his own dignity : it must have made a breach between us : we should have been matched like a pair of gladiators ; as Pacidianus with Æserninus the Samnite ; he would probably have bit off one of my ears, or have been reconciled at least with Clodius.—For, after all the pains which I had taken to serve him, when I owed nothing to him, he every thing to me, yet he would not bear my differing from him in public affairs, to say no worse of it :

Y. R. 699.
 Bef. Chr.
 53.
 398 Cons.



Y. R. 699.
Bef. Chr.
53.
398 Cons.

Ad Att.
iv. 16.

and when he was less powerful than he is at present, shewed what power he had against me in my flourishing condition, why should I now, when I have lost even all desire of power, when the republic certainly has none, when he alone has all, choose him of all men to contend with? For that must have been the case: I cannot think that you would have advised me to it. Sallust says, that I ought to have done either the one or the other, and in compliment to Pompey have defended him; who begged it of me indeed very earnestly—— A special friend this Sallust! to wish me to involve myself in a dangerous enmity, or perpetual infamy. I am delighted with my middle way; and when I had given my testimony faithfully and religiously, was pleased to hear Gabinius say, that, if it should be permitted to him to continue in the city, he would make it his business to give me satisfaction; nor did he so much as interrogate me.——” He gives the same account of this trial to his other friends: “how Lentulus acted his part so ill, that people were persuaded that he prevaricated—— and that Gabinius’s escape was owing to the indefatigable industry of Pompey, and the corruption of the bench.”

Ad Q. Fr.
iii. 7.

About the time of this trial there happened a terrible inundation of the Tiber, which did much damage at Rome; many houses and shops were carried away by it, and the fine gardens of Cicero’s son-in-law, Crassipes, demolished. It was all charged to the absolution of Gabinius, after his daring violation

of religion, and contempt of the Sibyl's books: Cicero applies to it the following passage of Homer :

Y. R. 699.
Ref. Chr.
55.
398 Cons.

As when in autumn Jove his fury pours,
And earth is loaden with incessant showers;
When guilty mortals break th' eternal laws,
And judges brib'd betray the righteous cause ;
From their deep beds he bids the rivers rise,
And opens all the floodgates of the skies.

MR. POPE, *Il.* xvi. 466.


But Gabinius's danger was not yet over : he was to be tried a second time, for the plundering his province, where C. Memmius, one of the tribunes, was his accuser, and M. Cato his judge, with whom he was not likely to find any favour : Pompey pressed Cicero to defend him, and would not admit of any excuse ; and Gabinius's humble behaviour in the late trial was intended to make way for Pompey's solicitation. Cicero stood firm for a long time : " Pompey," says he, " labours hard with me, but has yet made no impression ; nor if I retain a grain of liberty, ever will ;

Ibid. 1.

Oh ! ere that dire disgrace shall blast my fame,
O'erwhelm me, earth——" *Il.* iv. 218.

But Pompey's incessant importunity, backed by Cæsar's earnest request, made it vain to struggle any longer ; and forced him against his judgment, his resolution, and his dignity, to defend Gabinius ; at a time when his defence at last proved of no service to him ; for he was found guilty by Cato, and condemned of course to a perpetual banishment.

Y. R. 699.
Bef. Chr.
53.
398 Cons.



Middl. 515.

The trial of C. Rabirius Posthumus, a person of equestrian rank, was an appendix to that of Gabinius. It was one of the articles against Gabinius, that he had received about two millions for restoring king Ptolemy; yet all his estate that was to be found, was not sufficient to answer the damages in which he was condemned; nor could he give any security for the rest: in this case, the method was, to demand the deficiency from those through whose hands the management of his money affairs had passed, and who were supposed to have been sharers in the spoil: this was charged upon Rabirius, and “that he had advised Gabinius to undertake the restoration of the king, and accompanied him in it, and was employed to solicit the payment of the money, and lived at Alexandria for that purpose, in the king’s service, as the public receiver of the taxes, and wearing the pallium or habit of the country.”

Pro C.
Rab. 8, 9,
15.

Cicero urged in defence of Rabirius, “that he had borne no part in that transaction; but that his whole crime, or rather folly, was, that he had lent the king great sums of money for his support at Rome; and ventured to trust a prince, who, as all the world then thought, was going to be restored by the authority of the Roman people: that the necessity of going to Egypt for the recovery of that debt, was the source of all his misery; where he was forced to take whatever the king would give or impose: that it was his misfortune to be obliged to commit himself to the power of an arbitrary

monarch : that nothing could be more mad, than for a Roman knight, and citizen of a republic of all others the most free, to go to any place where he must needs be a slave to the will of another ; and that all who ever did so, as Plato and the wisest had sometimes done too hastily, always suffered for it : this was the case of Rabirius ; necessity carried him to Alexandria ; his whole fortunes were at stake, which he was so far from improving by his traffic with that king, that he was ill treated by him, imprisoned, threatened with death, and glad to run away at last with the loss of all : and at that very time, it was wholly owing to Cæsar's generosity, and regard to the merit and misfortunes of an old friend, that he was enabled to support his former rank and equestrian dignity.—”

Y. R. 698.
Bef. Chr.
53.
398 Cons.

Gabinus's trial had so near a relation to this, and was therein so often referred to, that the prosecutor could not easily neglect the fair opportunity of rallying Cicero for the part which he had acted in it : Memmius observed, that the deputies of Alexandria had the same reason for appearing in behalf of Gabinus, which Cicero had for defending him, the command of a master.—“ No, Memmius,” replied Cicero, “ my reason for defending him, was a reconciliation with him ; for I am not ashamed to own, that my quarrels are mortal, my friendships immortal : and if you imagine that I undertook that cause for fear of Pompey, you neither know Pompey nor me ; for Pompey would neither desire it of me against

Pro C.
Rab. 12.

Y. R. 699.
Bef. Chr.
53.
398 Cons.
my will, nor would I, after I had preserved the liberty of my citizens, ever give up my own."

Middl. 517. Whatever Cicero might say for himself in the flourishing style of an orator, it is certain, that he knew and felt his defence of Gabinius to be, what it really was, an indignity and dishonour to him, which he was forced to submit to by the iniquity of the times, and his engagements with Pompey and Cæsar, as he often laments to his friends in a very passionate strain: "I am afflicted," says he, "my dearest brother, I am afflicted, that there is no republic, no justice in trials; that this season of my life, which ought to flourish in the authority of the senatorian character, is either wasted in the drudgery of the bar, or relieved only by domestic studies; that what I have ever been fond of from a boy,

Ad Quint.
iii. 5.

In every virtuous act and glorious strife
To shine the first and best——

is wholly lost and gone; that my enemies are partly not opposed, partly even defended by me; and neither what I love nor what I hate left free to me."

Vell. Pat.
ii. 47.
Val. Max.
iv. 6.
Plut. in
Cæs.

About this time, and while Cæsar was engaged in his second expedition into Britain, his daughter Julia, Pompey's wife, died⁸ in child-bed at Rome, having been first delivered of a son, which died also soon after her. Her loss

⁸ Cæsar is said to have borne the news of her death with an uncommon firmness. Senec. Consol. ad Helv. p. 116.

was not more lamented by the husband and father, who both of them tenderly loved her, than by all their common friends, and the well-wishers to the public peace, who considered it as a source of fresh disturbance to the state, from the ambitious views and clashing interests of the two chiefs, whom the life of one so dear, and the relation of son and father, seemed hitherto to have united by the ties both of duty and affection.—The jealousies and separate interests of the triumvirs had obliged them to manage their power with some decency, and to extend it but rarely beyond the then customary forms; but whenever that league, which had made them already too great for private subjects, should happen to be dissolved, it was thought that the next contest must of course be for dominion, and the single mastery of the empire.


On the second of November, C. Pontinius triumphed over the Allobroges: he had been prætor when Cicero was consul, and, at the end of his magistracy, obtained the government of that part of Gaul, which some time after, provoked by oppression, broke out into rebellion, but was reduced by the vigour of this general. For this service he demanded a triumph, but met with great opposition, which he surmounted with incredible patience: for he persevered in his suit for five years successively; residing all that while, according to custom, in the suburbs of the city, till he gained his point at last by a kind of violence. Cicero was his friend, and continued in Rome

Y. R. 699.
Bef. Chr.
53.
398 Cons.

Middl. 519.

Ad Quint.
iii. 5.
Ad Att.
iv. 16.
Dio, p. 120.

Y. R. 699.
Bef. Chr.
53.
398 Cons.



on purpose to assist him; and the consul Appius served him with all his power; but Cato protested that Pontinius should never triumph while he lived; “though this,” says Cicero, “like many of his other threats, will end in nothing.” The prætor Galba, who had been Pontinius’s lieutenant, having procured by stratagem an act of the people in his favour, he entered the city in his triumphal chariot, where he was so rudely received and opposed in his passage through the streets, that he was forced to make his way with his sword, and the slaughter of many of his adversaries.

Ad Att.
iv. 18

In the end of the year Cicero consented to be one of Pompey’s lieutenants in Spain, which he began to think convenient to the present state of his affairs, and resolved to set forward for that province about the middle of January: but this seeming to give some umbrage to Cæsar, who in his letters desired him to continue at Rome, he soon changed his mind, and resigned his lieutenancy: to which he seems to allude in a letter to his brother, where he says, that he had no second thoughts in what concerned Cæsar; that he would make good his engagements to him; and being entered into his friendship with judgment, was now attached to him by affection.

Ad Quint.
ii. 15.

Ibid. iii. 1.

The prodigious unprecedented knaveries of the consuls and consular candidates, and what followed thereupon, so retarded the elections, that the year expired before the state was provided with new consuls; and the tribunes, whose authority, while there were no consuls

to controul them, was in a manner absolute, did for that reason, perhaps, keep off all assemblies for the election of those magistrates : but it seems more probable that Pompey was at the bottom of this opposition, having entertained the fond desire of being appointed dictator. He chose however to keep himself out of sight ; and retired into the country, to avoid the suspicion of affecting a sovereignty which Sylla had made so odious. “ The rumour of a dictatorship,” says Cicero, “ is disagreeable to the honest ; but the other things which they talk of⁹ are more so to me. The whole affair is dreaded, but flags : Pompey flatly disclaims it, though he never denied it to me before. The tribune Hirrus will probably be the promoter : Good gods ! How silly and fond of himself without a rival ! At Pompey’s request I have deterred Crassus Junianus, who pays great regard to me, from meddling with it. It is hard to know whether Pompey really

Y. R. 699.
Bef. Chr.
53.
398 Cons.

Middl. 522.

Ad Quint.
iii. 8.

⁹ What these other things were does not appear. Dio says, that some of the tribunes proposed, that, instead of consuls, military tribunes with consular power should be once again placed at the head of the republic. But if by other things he meant nothing worse than this proposal, I cannot guess why Dr. Middleton says, that Cicero judged rightly in thinking, that there were other things, which, in the present situation of the senate and the honest, were of more dangerous consequence than a dictatorship. Indeed the doctor is of opinion, that there was no great reason to be afraid of a dictatorship at this time. “ For there public (says he) was in so great a disorder, that nothing less than the dictatorial power could reduce it to a tolerable state.” [I pray the reader to remember this concession.] p. 524.

Y. R. 699.

Ad Quint.
iii. 9.

desires it or not; but he will not convince us that he is averse to it, if Hirrus stir in the affair." In another letter—"Nothing is yet done as to the dictatorship; Pompey is still absent; Appius in a great bustle; Hirrus preparing to propose it; but several are named, as ready to interpose their negative: the people do not trouble their heads about it; the chiefs are against it; I keep myself quiet."

* Called
Lucilius
by Plut. in
Pomp.

Dio, lib.
xl. p. 141.

The tribune Hirrus*, mentioned in these letters, did actually drop some hints leading to a dictatorship; for which Cato treated him so roughly, that he was almost reduced to throw up his office. Q. Pompeius Rufus, another of the tribunes, the grandson of Sylla, and the most warm espouser of a dictator, was, by a decree of the senate, committed to prison¹. This checked all proceeding in that project: and Pompey himself finding the greater part of the leading men utterly averse to his dictatorship, he yielded at last, after an interregnum of six months, that Cn. Domitius Calvinus and M. Messala, two of the four candidates (who, Cicero tells us, were all alike) should be declared consuls. Domitius was

Vid. supra,
p. 507.

¹ This is a fact, says M. Crevier, I can scarce believe, as it is not to be paralleled in all the history of the Roman republic. The persons of the tribunes were sacred—Besides it is clear from the testimony of Asconius Pedianus, that this Pompeius Rufus was tribune the year following the present. Now it was no longer the custom for the same magistrates to be continued in office several years: and if there had been an exception in favour of Rufus, Asconius would probably have taken a notice of it.

one of the contractors for forging decrees, and was without doubt supported in this election by the interest of his kinsman, L. Domitius, the consul, another of the contractors: as for Messala, Cicero had particularly recommended him to Cæsar; as appears by what he writes to his brother Quintus: "As to your reckoning Messala and Calvinus sure consuls, you agree with what we think here; for I will be answerable to Cæsar for Messala."

Y. R. 699.
Bef. Chr.
53.
398 Cons.

Ad Quint.
iii. 8.

CHAP. VII.

Crassus makes war upon the Parthians: the enterprise unjust, the event unfortunate. Cicero, at Rome, is elected into the college of augurs.

THE first news from abroad, after the inauguration of the consuls, was of the ill success of Crassus's hostile expedition into the Parthian²

Y. R. 700.
Bef. Chr.
52.
399 Cons.

² We are told that the Parthians were originally a people of Scythia, from whence being banished, they, for that very reason, called themselves Parthians, which word in the Scythian language signifies exiles. The country to which they retired for a settlement, was a small tract, lying to the south of Hyrcania, and to the east of Media, and consisted chiefly of barren mountains and sandy plains. During the empires of the Assyrians, Medes, and Persians, and the first Macedonian kings of Syria, scarce any mention is made of the Parthians. It was about the year of Rome 502, two hundred and fifty years before the beginning of the Christian æra, and while Antiochus, surnamed the God, was king of Syria, that, wearied out with the oppressive tyranny of the Macedonian governors, the Parthians revolted,

Justin,
lib. xli. c.
1.

Y. R. 700.

Plut. in
Crass.
Appian in
Parth.
Dio, lib. xl.
Prid. vol.
III. p.
460—464.

territories; a war commenced without any order or explicit permission from the senate, and to which the insatiable avarice of the Roman general was the sole motive. The republic had, first by Sylla, and afterwards by Pompey, made leagues of peace and amity with the Parthians, and had never complained of any infraction of them; so that this people, having no reason to apprehend an invasion, had made no preparations against it. Crassus therefore, beginning his march³ soon after his arrival in the East, passed the Euphrates, over a bridge of boats, without opposition, overran a great part of Mesopotamia, and pos-

Just. lib.
xli. c. 4. &
5.

under the leading of Arsaces. Who Arsaces was, is not agreed, but it is certain that he was always considered as the founder of the Parthian empire, and that his memory was in such veneration among them, that all his successors took his name. Arsaces extended the Parthian dominion beyond the limits of Parthia; and in length of time it became so far enlarged by the conquests of the following kings, as to include almost all the country between the Oxus and the Euphrates. Its royal cities were Ctesiphon upon the Tigris, and Ecbatana in Media. The Parthian soldiery were almost all horsemen. Some, clad in complete armour, made use of long spears in fight. The rest had scarce any other offensive weapons than the bow and arrow: but they were so dexterous in the management of these, as to be no less formidable when they turned their backs upon their enemies than when they faced them.

Strabo,
xvi. 743.

³ Plutarch relates, that Crassus, crossing Galatia in the way to his province, and finding king Dejotarus, who was advanced in years, employed in building a new city, said to him pleasantly, "Why, king, you begin your day's work at the twelfth hour." The king instantly replied, "And you, general, methinks you are not too early in your expedition against the Parthians." Crassus was past sixty, and looked much older than he was.

sessed himself of several towns; which being most of them Græcian colonies, averse to the Parthian government, readily submitted to him.

Y. R. 700.
Bef. Chr.
52.
399 Cons.

It is said, that for vanquishing a small body of horse, commanded by a Parthian officer, and for reducing by force an inconsiderable fortress, called Zenodotia, Crassus had the weakness to suffer himself to be saluted imperator by his soldiers, who at the same time despised him for his vanity.

But his greatest folly (says Plutarch) next to the enterprise itself, was, that, instead of pursuing his advantage, and pushing on to Se-leucia and Babylon, he repassed the Euphrates, leaving behind him only seven thousand foot and a thousand horse to garrison the places he had taken, and retired into Syria, for his winter-quarters; thereby giving leisure to the Parthians to prepare an army against the next year's campaign. Nor did Crassus, during the winter, take the prudent care to see his troops well exercised, and well provided for the war, but acted the part of a publican rather than a general, examining into the revenues of the province, screwing them up to the utmost height, and using all other methods of exaction whereby to enrich himself. Being told of immense treasures deposited in the temple of Jerusalem, thither he impatiently hasted, with a part of his army, to seize so delicious and so easy a prey. Eleazer, one of the priests, was then treasurer of the temple. Among other things, which he had under his

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charge, was a bar of gold of the weight of three hundred Hebrew minæ. This, for the better securing of it, he had put into a beam, which he had caused to be made hollow for that purpose; and placing this beam over the entrance, which was from the Holy Place into the Holy of Holies, caused the veil, which parted these two places, to be fastened to it, and to hang down from it. Perceiving Crassus's design of plundering the temple, he endeavoured to compound the matter with him, and therefore telling him of such a bar of gold in his custody, promised to discover and deliver it to him, upon condition that he would be satisfied with it, and spare all the rest: Crassus accepted of the proposal, and solemnly promised with an oath, that, on having this bar of gold delivered to him, he would be contented with it, and meddle with nothing else. Relying on this promise, Eleazer put him in possession of the gold. Crassus had no sooner received it, but forgetting his oath, he not only seized the two thousand talents which Pompey had left untouched, but ransacked the temple all over, and robbed it of every thing he thought worth taking away, to the value of eight thousand talents more; so that the whole of what he took from thence amounted to ten thousand talents, which is above two millions of our money⁴. [Joseph. Antiq. lib. xiv. et de Bell. Jud. lib. i.]

⁴ The plundering of the temple at Jerusalem [which I do not find any where mentioned by the Greek historians]

As soon as the season of the year permitted, Crassus, strengthened by a thousand Gallic horse, which his son Publius brought him from Cæsar's army, drew all his forces together, in order to prosecute the war against the Parthians, who had now got ready a very great army for their defence. But, before they entered upon action, ambassadors were sent from Orodes the Parthian king, to the Roman general, to ask for what reason he made war upon him. Crassus answered with haughtiness, that he would declare his reason when he should come to Seleucia. The king, on the return of his ambassadors, finding war to be unavoidable, divided his army into two parts, marched in person with one of them towards the borders of Armenia, and sent the other under the command of Surenas⁵, the most illustrious of all his nobles, and a most accomplished general, into Mesopotamia; who, immediately after his arrival there,


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was not the only sacrilege committed by Crassus. He acted the like part all over the province, wherever any riches were to be got, particularly at Hierapolis. For there being in that city an ancient temple of the Syrian goddess, called Atergetis, where much treasure was laid up, as having been the collection of many years, he seized it all, and was so greedy of securing the whole of it, that, lest any should be detained or embezzled, he spent a great deal of his time to see it all told out and weighed before him. On his last coming out of this temple, his son going before him stumbled at the threshold, and he immediately after it upon him. This was afterwards interpreted as an ill omen, that foreboded what soon happened.

Prid. vol.
iii. p. 461.

⁵ This is said to be the name, not of a person, but of a dignity, and equivalent to that of grand vizir.

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* or Artav-
 vases.

retook some of those places of which Crassus had possessed himself the year before. The garrisons, that escaped to the Roman camp, filled it with a terrible report of the number, power, and strength of the enemy; which cast a damp upon the whole army, and sunk the courage, not only of the common soldiers, but of the general officers. Cassius (the same who was afterwards concerned in the murder of Cæsar) was at this time Crassus's quæstor, and endeavoured to dissuade him from proceeding any further in his enterprise, till he had well considered it again. At the same time came to him Artabazes*, king of Armenia, who had lately succeeded his father Tigranes in that kingdom. He brought with him six thousand horse, which were only his lifeguard. Besides these, he told Crassus, he had ten thousand cuirassiers, and thirty thousand foot ready for his service: but advised him by no means to march his army through the plains of Mesopotamia, but to take his way through Armenia into the Parthian dominions. His reasons for it were, that Armenia being a rough mountainous country, the Parthian horse, of which their army almost wholly consisted, would there be useless; and he could take care that the Roman army should be there plentifully provided with all necessaries: both which advantages he would fail of, if he led his army through Mesopotamia, where he would often meet with sandy deserts, and be distressed for want both of water and other provisions. This was the best advice that

could be given him; yet Crassus answered, that, having left many brave Romans to garrison the towns which he had taken last year in Mesopotamia, he was under a necessity of going that way, that they might not be abandoned to the mercy of the enemy: but he accepted of the auxiliaries which the king offered him, and desired they might be speedily brought to him. The prospect of so considerable a reinforcement was, perhaps, what chiefly encouraged Crassus, contrary to the advice of the wisest about him, to proceed on his expedition, and, without further delay, to pass the Euphrates⁶, and again enter Mesopotamia with his army. But Artabazes, on his return, finding Orodes with a great army near his borders, was forced to stay at home to defend his own country, and therefore could not give Crassus the assistance he had promised him.

After Crassus had thus re-entered Mesopotamia, Cassius advised him to put in at some of his garrisoned towns, and there rest and refresh his army till he should have got certain intelligence of the number and strength of the enemy, and in what place and posture they were; or, if he thought not fit to make that delay, he should at least take his march to Seleucia, along the banks of the Euphrates. For, by keeping close to that river, he would avoid being surrounded by the Parthians, and

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⁶ He passed the river at a town in the province of Co-magena, called Zeugma, which word signifies a bridge.

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might be constantly supplied with provisions, and all other necessaries, from his barks that were upon it: but, while Crassus was considering on this advice, there came to him a crafty Arabian, who diverted him entirely from following it. He was the head of an Arabian tribe, (such as the Greeks called Phylarchs, and the present Arabs, Sheks) and having formerly served under Pompey, was well known to many in the Roman army, and looked on as their friend; for which reason he had been made choice of, and sent by Surenas to act this part. He is, by different authors, called by different names⁷; but whatever his name was, he effectually dissuaded Crassus from following the good advice given him by Cassius. He told the Roman general, that the Parthians durst not stand before him; that he had nothing to do, for the gaining an absolute victory over them, but to march on; and he offered himself for a guide to conduct him the shortest way to the enemy. Crassus, deceived by the fair words, and fooled by the flattery, of this man, accepted of his offer; and so was led by him into the open plains of Mesopotamia: and although Cassius and others suspected the guide of treachery, and therefore pressed Crassus to follow him no longer, but to retreat to the mountains, where he might best be able to baffle the power of the Parthian horse; and though messengers came to his

⁷ By Dio Cassius he is called Augarus, or Abgarus; by Plutarch, Ariamnes; by Florus, Mazeres; and by Appian, Acbarus.

camp from Artabazes, on purpose to persuade him to the same thing, yet he still continued in his delusion, till at length the traitor, having brought him into a sandy desert, where the Parthians might have all the advantage in a battle, rode off to Surenas, and acquainted him with what he had done: adding, that now was the time to attack the Romans, who were come to deliver themselves into his hands. Nor was it very long before Crassus perceived his error. While he was making forced marches, fearing nothing but that the enemy should escape him, his scouts came back full speed to inform him, that the Parthians were advancing in prodigious numbers, in good order, and with much confidence.

This report threw the whole army into a consternation⁸, and especially the general, who now began, though with a good deal of irresolution, to put his troops in order of battle. At first, following the advice of Cassius, he drew up his infantry in one line, extended to a great length, that the Parthian horse might not be able easily to surround it; and he placed all his cavalry in the wings: then, altering his mind, he formed the foot into a

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
⁸ According to Plutarch (whom Appian copies all along) the Roman soldiers had been already terrified with about a dozen bad omens; of which the most worthy to be remembered (or, if you please, most worthy to be forgot) was, that, when, in order to begin their march, they were going to pull up the foremost standard, the eagle upon it turned its head about, and looked back, as if it had no mind to go forward.

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
square body, having twelve cohorts in each of its four sides; and he flanked each cohort with a squadron; to the end that every part of his battalion, being supported by cavalry, might charge with the more safety and confidence. To his son he gave one of the wings, to Cassius the other, and placed himself in the centre.

In their march towards the enemy, they came to a rivulet, the sight of which, though its waters were not very abundant, greatly comforted and rejoiced the soldiers, after their long march over so parched and sandy a soil. Most of the officers were for passing the night in that place, and for endeavouring, before they proceeded farther, to get more exact information of the number and posture of the enemy: but Publius Crassus, full of ardour and confidence, persuaded his father to advance: so that he only made a short halt, to give those who needed refreshment, time for a scanty meal, as they stood in their ranks: after which he pursued his march, pushing on with great haste and precipitation.

When the two armies were near enough to engage, the Parthian pikemen soon perceived, that the Roman battalion, which they had hoped to break by the force of their ponderous and well-steeled lances, was too deep, compact, and firm, to be by them easily penetrated and dissolved. They retreated therefore, and, by their dispersion and feigned confusion, seemed as if they meant to quit the field: but the

Romans, presently after, to their great astonishment, found themselves entirely surrounded by the Parthian cavalry. Crassus ordered out against them his dart men, and other light-armed infantry. These, meeting with a flight of arrows, quickly recoiled, fell back on the legions, disordered them in some degree, and terrified them still more : for the Romans now became sensible that they had no defensive armour that was proof against the force of those murderous arrows, which the enemy incessantly showered upon them. Nor had they any means to revenge themselves ; because as soon as they advanced with that intent, the enemy fled, and, even in flying, continued to gall them with the same weapons.

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The Romans for some time entertained hopes that the Parthians would at length exhaust their stock of arrows, and then be obliged either to run away or come to a close fight ; hopes ill-grounded ; for the bowmen were supplied with arrows as fast as they wanted them, from a great number of camels loaded with them, and placed in the rear of the army for that purpose : which when Crassus understood, he ordered his son to attempt, at all hazards, a close engagement with those troops of the enemy which had approached the nearest to him. Publius, therefore, with the thousand Gallic horse he had brought from Cæsar, three hundred other horse, five hundred archers, and eight cohorts of legionary foot, advanced to the attack. The Parthians instantly gave ground,

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and even fled before him; and the sanguine young warrior, imagining himself victorious, pursued them with his whole detachment, horse and foot. Soon he perceived that the enemy's flight had been only feigned. The runaways stopped on a sudden, and, rallying, boldly returned upon him. The pikemen, in good order, faced the Romans; while the bowmen, without observing any order, galloped round them, and raised such a mighty dust, as deprived them at once both of sight and respiration: exposed to the Parthian arrows, and unable to make any defence against enemies whom they saw not, they now perished in great numbers, and by very painful deaths; and those who remained alive were in no condition to fight. When their commander urged them to advance against the pikemen of the enemy, some shewed him their hands nailed to their bucklers, others their feet pinned to the ground, so that they could neither defend themselves nor fly.

In this extremity, young Crassus, who manifested throughout the engagement an heroic bravery, had recourse to his Gallic cavalry as his last resource; and so well managed, as with these to force the Parthian pikemen to a close fight. But the match was very unequal. The Gallic javelins, or half-pikes, had little effect on troopers covered almost from head to foot with iron: whereas the long, stout lances of the Parthians proved fatal to the Gauls, whose defensive armour, if indeed they had

any, was very slight. They are said to have performed wonders in the action; but being distressed by the excessive heat and drought, to which they were not accustomed, and having lost most of their horses (transfixed by the Parthian lances) they at length resolved to rejoin, if possible, the main body of the army. Carrying with them young Crassus, grievously wounded in many places, they made to a small sandy hill, not far from them. Here tying their horses one to another, and placing them in the midst, they formed themselves into a circle, and made a rampart of their shields, hoping to find it an effectual defence against the arrows of the barbarians. But herein they fatally mistook: for on even ground, the foremost rank in some measure defended those that were behind it; whereas on an ascent, the hinder ranks standing necessarily higher than those before, all were equally exposed to the enemies' arrows: so that they quickly found their case desperate, and that they must perish without glory, and almost without resistance. The young general, disdaining to desert his troops, and attempt a precipitate flight, to which some advised him, and being deprived by a wound of the use of his own hand, commanded his armour-bearer to run him through⁹. Most

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⁹ "Publius Crassus was a youth of an amiable character; educated with the strictest care, and perfectly instructed in all the liberal studies; he had a ready wit and easy language; was grave without arrogance, modest without negligence; adorned with all the accomplishments

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
of the nobles who had accompanied him killed themselves. The rest were all slain by the enemy, except about five hundred, who fell alive into their hands. The Parthians cut off the head of young Crassus, and, taking it with them, marched to attack the proconsul.

Publius, from the beginning of his distress, had dispatched messengers to his father, to give him notice of the difficulties and dangers he had run himself into, by his inconsiderate pursuit of the Parthians. The first messengers were intercepted and killed : others reached the army. Crassus remained awhile unresolved what to do. He feared the loss of all,

proper to form a principal citizen and leader of the republic : by the force of his own judgment he had devoted himself very early to the observance and imitation of Cicero, whom he perpetually attended, and revered with a kind of filial piety. Cicero conceived a mutual affection for him, and observing his eager thirst of glory, was constantly instilling into him the true notion of it, and exhorting him to pursue that sure path to it, which his ancestors had left beaten and traced out to him, through the gradual ascent of civil honours. But, by serving under Cæsar in the Gallic wars, he had learnt, as he fancied, a shorter way to fame and power than what Cicero had been inculcating ; and, having signalized himself in a campaign or two as a soldier, was in too much haste to be a general ; when Cæsar sent him at the head of a thousand horse to the assistance of his father in the Parthian war. —But, “while he aspired,” as Cicero says, “to the fame of another Cyrus or Alexander, he fell short of that glory which many of his predecessors had reaped from a succession of honours conferred by their country as the reward of their services.” Ep. Fam. iii. 8. & ib. xiii. 16. Vid. Brut. p. 407. It. Plut. in Crass.

if he marched to the succour of his son ; yet his affection for his son urged him irresistibly to it. He moved forward : the enemy presently appeared, and, by their terrible shouts and exulting noises, proclaimed their recent victory. Before them, as they approached, was carried upon the end of a lance, the head of Publius Crassus, whilst scoffingly they asked aloud—"Of what family was that young man ? who were his parents ?" —a scene which sunk the spirits of the Roman soldiers more than all the calamities they had before suffered. Crassus is reported to have acted the hero upon this occasion. Riding through the ranks, as the army marched on, he said aloud : "This misfortune, fellow-soldiers, concerns me only : the glory and felicity of our country remains yet entire, so long as you are in a condition to defend it. And, if you compassionate me for having lost so brave a son, let your concern be shewn, by punishing the cruelty of our enemies." The soldiers gave a shout ; but with a voice so faint and languid, as spoke more of dejection than courage.

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The fight presently began. The Parthian bowmen, wheeling about the Romans, galled them in flank with showers of arrows, while the pikemen, assailing them in front, made them recoil and crowd closer together, which hastened their destruction. Night coming on, the Parthians retired, it being contrary to their custom to pass the night near an enemy, because they never fortified their camps, and because their horses and arrows could be but of little use

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in the dark. Their retreat, however, did not kindle in the Romans the least spark of hope. Giving all for lost, they had no attention to bury their dead, or console the dying, or succour the wounded: every one bewailed his own fate: for, should they remain where they then were till day-light, or should they set forward in the dark to traverse an almost boundless plain; in neither supposition did they see any chance of escaping. They were much perplexed likewise on account of their wounded men. If they took these with them, it would retard their flight; if they forsook them, the cries of the wretched, so abandoned, would publish the departure of the army. Though the soldiers knew their general to be the faulty cause of all their calamities, yet they wished to see him, and to hear him. But Crassus had not the confidence to appear. He had cast himself on the ground, and there he lay, as a man quite stunned and senseless¹. Octavius and

In Crass.

¹ What a striking example of the short-sightedness of man, the instability of human grandeur, and the madness of unbounded ambition! Plutarch tells us, that when the province of Syria fell by lot to Crassus, he thought, that fortune had never, in any instance, been so favourable to him. Transported with his good luck, he could not, even in the company of strangers, contain his joy; but, to his familiar friends and confidants, he blurted out many extravagant and childish boastings; a folly which he had never been guilty of in the former part of his life. Lucullus had done nothing against Tigranes; Pompey nothing against Mithridates: but, as for himself, the limits of Parthia should not be the limits of his conquests; the Roman eagles, under his conduct, were to fly triumphant over Bactria and India, quite to the great ocean and the extremities of the East.

Cassius, (the one his lieutenant, and the other his quæstor) having found him in this posture of dejection, endeavoured to rouse him to a more manly deportment; but without success. They took upon themselves therefore to hold a council of war; and it was resolved to retire immediately. The troops decamped in silence. Doleful and affecting were the lamentations of the miserable men, whom necessity constrained their fellows to abandon. The care of such of the wounded, who, having some strength left, dragged themselves along with the army; the apprehension of being pursued and overtaken; and the drawing up frequently in battalia upon false alarms, made the march of the army very slow. A certain officer named Egnatius, at the head of three hundred horse, leaving the main body, and pushing forward with all diligence, arrived under the walls of Carræ² about midnight. Calling out to the guard, he bade them tell Coponius, the governor, that there had been a great battle between the Romans and the Parthians. He said no more, nor discovered himself, but immediately pursued his route to Zeugma: and by this he saved indeed his three hundred horse; yet was much blamed for deserting his general. The message, however, which he sent to Coponius, proved of service to the army; for the governor, conjecturing from the words and manner of Egnatius that affairs went ill, sallied out with his

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² The Haran or Charran of the Holy Scriptures, where Abraham sojourned.

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garrison, met Crassus and his troops, and conducted them safely into the city.




The Parthians, though apprized of Crassus's retreat, waited for day, according to their custom. Then entering the Roman camp, they massacred the sick and wounded to the amount of about four thousand men. Many of the Roman soldiers they likewise overtook and slaughtered in the plain; particularly four cohorts, which had lost their way in the dark. Out of these, only twenty men escaped. It is said, that the invincible courage, with which they defended themselves, struck their assailants with such admiration, that they voluntarily opened to them a free passage to Carræ.


Surena being told, as he approached that city, of a rumour which prevailed, that Crassus and the principal men of the Romans had all made their escape, began to fear the loss of what he esteemed the chief fruit of his victory. To know the truth, he ordered one of his people, who could speak Latin, to go near the walls; and in his name invite Crassus and Cassius to a conference with him. This messenger was attended by some Arabians, who, having formerly served in the Roman army, knew the persons of both. Cassius appeared upon the walls, and was told, that Surena consented to make peace with the Romans, on the condition of their evacuating Mesopotamia. The proposal, as affairs then stood, appeared to the Roman quæstor far from being disadvantageous: he promised therefore to report it to the general. The Parthian, having

thus learnt what he wanted to know, laughed at the credulity of the Romans; and the next day, while he was preparing to attack the place, gave them to understand, that, if they would obtain leave to retire in safety, they must deliver up to him Crassus and Cassius. No thought remained now but of running away in the dark; and it was necessary to keep this resolution concealed till the moment of execution. Crassus, once more fatally deceived, imparted the secret to a traitor, named Andromachus, and even took the same traitor for his guide. Andromachus sent advice to Surena of what was intended; and, in order to complete the destruction of the Roman army, contrived to lead them, by ways so indirect, such windings and turnings, that they gained but little ground in a long march; and at length he brought them into a place full of ditches and enclosures. Many began now to suspect treachery, and would follow him no farther. Cassius, with five hundred horse, returning to Carræ, provided himself there with some Arabian guides³, who faithfully conducted him and his followers into Syria. Octavius too, the general's lieutenant, convinced of Andromachus's perfidy, made a timely retreat, leading off five thousand men to a hilly ground, where they could not be much annoyed by the

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³ It is related, that these Arabians, being superstitious about the moon, exhorted Cassius earnestly not to advance, till the moon had passed Scorpio. To which Cassius answered, that he was much more afraid of Sagittarius; alluding to the Parthian arrows.

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enemy's cavalry. Yet, when he learnt that Crassus had somehow gained an eminence, about a mile off, where he was in great danger from the Parthians, whom daylight had brought upon him, he boldly marched thither, followed by his five thousand men; who encompassing Crassus, and making a rampart for him of their shields and bodies, vowed that no arrows should reach their general, so long as a man of them remained alive to defend him. 'Surena, perceiving the ardour of his own soldiers to abate, and apprehending, that, if the Romans should spin out the battle till night, they might then gain the mountains and be safe, for the future, from his attacks, had again recourse to his wonted craft. He suffered some prisoners to escape, before whom the Parthians, discoursing with one another, had designedly said, that their king was far from intending an implacable war with the Romans, and would be glad to regain their friendship by treating Crassus with generosity. That this stratagem might more easily take effect, he ceased hostilities, and, attended by his principal officers, advanced in pacific guise towards the hill, having his bow unbent, and holding out his hand, as a friend to Crassus, whom he invited to a treaty of accommodation. "The king," he said, "having, much against his will, made the Romans sensible of his power, and of the bravery of his troops, is now disposed to give them proofs of his clemency and goodness, by suffering them to retire in safety." Crassus, who saw no reason for

so sudden a change, was not deceived ; his soldiers were : and, notwithstanding all he could say to persuade them to have patience till night, when they might make a retreat to the mountains, they seditiously, and with threats, compelled him to accept of Surena's invitation : (a behaviour strangely ill suiting with what has been just related of their zeal and fidelity.) At going from them, he is reported to have said : " Octavius and Petronius, and you the rest of the commanders here present, you are witnesses of the violence offered me : nevertheless, for the honour of the Roman name, I desire you will declare to all the world, that Crassus perished by the craft of his enemies, not by the perfidy of his soldiers and fellow-citizens."

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Octavius and Petronius, and some other officers, not enduring the thought, that their general should go alone, descended the hill with him ; but he sent back his lictors. Certain heralds from Surena, having accosted him with profound respect, desired him, in the Greek language, to send somebody before, to see that the Parthian general and his retinue were without arms. Crassus answered, that, if he had retained the least concern for his life, he would never have put himself into their hands. However, to learn what appearance things had, he sent forward two men, who were to bring him word. These were instantly seized, by Surena's order ; who then, attended by his principal officers, coming up to him, with an air of astonishment, said, " How ! what

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an indecent sight is this ! a Roman general on foot, and we on horseback !” “ No error committed on either side (answered Crassus) ; each follows the custom of his country.” “ From this moment (said the Parthian) there is a league of amity between the king my master and the Roman people ; but it must be put in writing ; for you, Romans, are very apt to forget your engagements and covenants. Let us go, therefore, and finish the treaty on the banks of the Euphrates.” Crassus hereupon ordered a horse to be brought him. “ There is no need,” said Surena, “ the king makes you a present of one ;” and immediately a horse, with rich trappings, was led to him ; and he was forcibly put into the saddle : some of Surena’s attendants switching the horse, to hasten him forward. The Romans now saw plainly, that the purpose of the Parthian was to take Crassus alive. Octavius therefore seized the bridle of the horse, and stopt him. Petronius and the other officers surrounded their general, putting themselves in a posture to defend him. A tumult and scuffle ensued. Octavius killed one of the Parthian grooms, and was himself killed by a stroke of a lance run into his back. Crassus himself fell dead quickly after ; but whether he was dispatched by the hand of an enemy, or of a friend who would preserve him from the disgrace of becoming a prisoner, is uncertain.

Surena, by fair words, notwithstanding the experience which the Romans had of his perfidy, decoyed many of those who had remain-

ed on the hill to surrender themselves prisoners. The most courageous waited for the night to attempt a retreat; but of these few escaped, the rest being intercepted by the Arabs, who scoured the country with that intent. In the several actions and disasters of this war, the Romans are said to have lost twenty thousand men killed, and ten thousand taken prisoners. It was one of the greatest blows that Rome had ever received from a foreign enemy, and for which she was ever after meditating revenge.

Orodes, at the time of Crassus's death, was in Armenia, having there made peace with Artabazes. For this prince, on the return of the messengers which he last sent to the Roman camp, finding, by the account which they brought of the measures which Crassus took in the Parthian war, that he must necessarily be undone, compounded all matters with Orodes; and by giving one of his sisters in marriage to Pacorus, the son of the Parthian, restored himself to full amity with him. And while they were sitting together at the nuptial feast, in came a messenger, who presented Orodes with the head and hand of Crassus, which Surena had caused to be cut off with that intent⁴. This much increased the mirth and joy of the feast. And it is said, that

Y. R. 700.
Bef. Chr.
52.
399 Cons.

Dio, lib.
xl.
Florus, iii.
11.

⁴ Surena did not long rejoice in his victory: for Orodes, envying him the glory of it, and growing jealous of the great augmentation of his power and interest from his late successes, soon after caused him to be put to death. Plut. in Crass.

Y. R. 700.
Bef. Chr.
52.
399 Cons.

melted gold was then poured in the mouth of the lifeless head by way of mockery; as if they would thus satiate that thirst after riches, for which Crassus had been so remarkable.

Middl. 526.

The chief and immediate concern which the city felt on the news of Crassus's death, and the destruction^s of his forces, was for the de-

Middl. 526.

* The Roman writers generally imputed this disaster to Crassus's contempt of the auspices; "as some Christians have since charged it to his sacrilegious violation of the temple of Jerusalem—both of them with equal superstition (says Dr. Middleton) pretending to unfold the counsels of Heaven, and to fathom those depths, which are declared to be unsearchable."

Connect.
part ii. p.
465. 8vo.
Ed. 1718.

D. Prideaux is one of the Christians here referred to; his words are these—"Crassus made a great number of false steps in the whole conduct of this war; and although he was often warned, yet, being deaf to all good advice, he obstinately followed his own delusions, till he perished in them. For, being, for his impious sacrilege at Jerusalem, justly destined to destruction, God did cast infatuations into all his counsels, for the leading him thereto."

Prideaux,
part ii. p.
474.
Vid. vol.
VIII. p.
92.

The same author, speaking afterwards of the deplorable end of Pompey the Great, writes thus: "No man had enjoyed greater prosperity till he prophaned the temple of God at Jerusalem: after that, his fortunes were in a continual decline, till at length, to expiate for that impiety, he was thus vilely murdered in the confines of that country where he had committed it."

Tom.
XIII. p. 71.

M. Crevier, another Christian, speaks to the same effect with regard to both these Roman generals. But it would seem, that D. Prideaux delivered these opinions not as peculiar to a believer of the Holy Scriptures, but as proper to every religious philosopher: for, having related how Cambyses, king of Persia, in a rage drew out his dagger, and ran it into the thigh of the sacred bull, the Egyptian god Apis, of which wound the god died, he afterwards relates the death of Cambyses in the following words—"As

Prideaux,
part i. p.
171. 173.

triment that the republic had suffered, and the dangers to which it was exposed, by the loss of so great an army; yet the principal mischief lay in what they did not at first regard, and seemed rather to rejoice at, the loss of Crassus himself. For, after the death of Julia, Crassus's authority was the only means left of curbing the power of Pompey and the ambition of Cæsar, being ready always to support the weaker against the encroachments of the stronger, and keep them both within the bounds of a decent respect to the laws: but this check being now taken away, and the power of the empire thrown, as a kind of prize, between two, it gave a new turn to their several pretensions, and created a fresh competition for the larger share.

By the death of young Crassus, a place became vacant in the college of augurs, for which Cicero declared himself a candidate: nor was any one so hardy as to appear against him, except Hirrus the tribune, who, trusting

Y. R. 700.

Bef. Chr.

52.

399 Cons.

Middl. 529.

he mounted his horse, his sword, falling out of the scabbard, gave him a wound in the thigh, of which he died a few days after. The Egyptians remarking, that it was in the same part of the body where he had wounded the Apis, reckoned it as an especial judgment from heaven upon him for that fact; and perchance they were not much out in it. For it seldom happening in an affront given to any particular mode of worship, how erroneous soever it may be, but that religion is in general wounded hereby; there are many instances in history, wherein God hath very severely punished the profanations of religion in the worst of times, and under the worst mode of heathen idolatry."

Y. R. 700.
Bef. Chr.
52.
399 Cons.

Philip. ii.
2.
Ep. Fam.
83.

to the popularity of his office, and Pompey's favour, had the vanity to pretend to it: but a competitor so unequal furnished matter of raillery only to Cicero, who was chosen without any difficulty or struggle, with the unanimous approbation of the whole body⁶.

CHAP. VIII.

Scandalous proceedings of the candidates for the consulship. Milo, who is one of them, has a fatal rencounter with Clodius on the Appian way, which occasions terrible tumults and mischiefs in the city. To remedy these disorders, Pompey is elected sole consul: he publishes several new laws, Milo is brought to trial, and, though defended by Cicero, is condemned. Cicero's conduct in relation to the sale of Milo's effects. Two of the late candidates for the consulship are tried for bribery by Pompey's new laws. His shameful partiality on this occasion. Two of the late tribunes are sentenced to banishment, for their riotous proceedings in their magistracy. The government of Cilicia falls by lot to Cicero. The usurious extortion practised by M. Brutus [the renowned patriot-assassin.] Cicero's military achievements. His excellent conduct in the civil government of his province. Appius and Piso are chosen censors, the last who bore that office during the republican state of Rome.

Y. R. 701.
Bef. Chr.
51.
400 Cons.

THE candidates for the consulship of the coming year were T. Annius Milo, Q. Metellus Scipio, and P. Plautius Hypsæus, who

Middl. 529.
De Leg.
Agr. ii. 7.

⁶ This college, from the last regulation of it by Sylla, consisted of fifteen, who were all persons of the first distinction in Rome: it was a priesthood for life, which no crime or forfeiture could efface: the priests of all kinds were originally chosen by their colleges, till Domitius, a

pushed on their several interests with such open violence and bribery, as if the consulship was to be carried only by money or arms. Clodius was putting in at the same time for the prætorship, and employing all his credit and interest to disappoint Milo. Pompey was wholly averse to Milo, who did not pay him that court which he expected, but seemed to affect an independency, and to trust to his own strength, while the other two competitors were wholly at his devotion: Hypsæus had been his quæstor, and always his creature; and as for Scipio, Pompey designed to become his son-in-law, by marrying his daughter Cornelia, a lady of celebrated accomplishments, the widow of young Crassus. Cicero, on the other hand, served Milo to the utmost of his power, and ardently wished his success.——

In the heat of this competition, Curio was coming home from Asia, and expected shortly at Rome; whence Cicero sent an express to meet him on the road, or at his landing in

tribune, about fifty years before, transferred the choice of them to the people, whose authority was held to be superior in sacred as well as civil affairs. This act was reversed by Sylla, and the ancient right restored to the colleges; but Labienus, when tribune, in Cicero's consulship, repealed the law of Domitius, to facilitate Cæsar's advancement to the high-priesthood. It was necessary, however, that every candidate should be nominated to the people by two augurs, who gave a solemn testimony upon oath of his dignity and fitness for the office: this was done in Cicero's case by Pompey and Hortensius, the two most eminent members of the college; and, after the election, he was installed with all the usual formalities by Hortensius.

Y. R. 701.

Bef. Chr.

51.

400 Cons.

Middl. 530.

Plut. in

Cat.

Ad Quint.

iii. 9.

Ep. Fam.

ii. 6.

Brut. init.

Y. R. 701. Italy, with a most earnest and pressing letter to
 Bef. Chr. engage him to Milo's interest.
 51.

400 Cons. The senate and the aristocratical party were
 Middl. 534. generally for Milo: but three of the tribunes
 were violent against him, Q. Pompeius Rufus,
 Munatius Plancus Bursa, and Sallust the his-
 torian; the other seven were his fast friends,
 but above all M. Cœlius, who, out of regard
 to Cicero, served Milo with a particular zeal.
 But while all things were proceeding very
 prosperously in his favour, and nothing seem-
 ed wanting to crown his success, but to bring
 on the election, which his adversaries for that
 reason laboured to keep back, all his hopes
 and fortunes were blasted at once by an
 unhappy rencounter with his old enemy Clo-
 dius.

Quintil. l.
 vi. c. 5.

Dio. l. xl.
 p. 143.
 Ascon.
 Argum.
 in Mil.

Their meeting was wholly accidental on
 the Appian road, not far from the city; Clo-
 dius coming home from the country towards
 Rome, Milo going out about three in the af-
 ternoon; the first on horseback, with three
 companions, and thirty servants well armed;
 the latter in a chariot with his wife and one
 friend, but with a much greater retinue, and
 among them some gladiators. The servants
 on both sides began presently to insult each
 other; when Clodius, turning briskly to some
 of Milo's men, who were nearest to him, and
 threatening them with his usual fierceness,
 received a wound in the shoulder from one of
 the gladiators; and, after receiving several
 more in the general fray, which instantly
 ensued, finding his life in danger, was forced

to fly for shelter into a neighbouring tavern. Milo, heated by this success, and the thoughts of revenge, and reflecting that he had already done enough to give his enemy great advantage against him, should he be left alive to pursue it, resolved, whatever was the consequence, to have the pleasure of destroying him, and ordered the house to be stormed, and Clodius to be dragged out and murdered: the master of the tavern was likewise killed, with eleven of Clodius's servants, while the rest saved themselves by flight: so that Clodius's body was left in the road where it fell, till S. Tedi-
 us, a senator, happening to come by, took it up into his chaise, and brought it with him to Rome; where it was exposed in that condition, all covered with blood and wounds, to the view of the populace, who flocked about it in crowds to lament the miserable fate of their leader. The next day the mob, headed by S. Clodius, a kinsman of the deceased, and one of his chief incendiaries, carried the body naked, so as all the wounds might be seen, into the forum, and placed it on the rostra, where the three tribunes, Milo's enemies, were prepared to harangue upon it, in a style suited to the lamentable occasion; by which they inflamed the multitude to such a height of fury, that, snatching up the body, they ran away with it into the senate-house, and, tearing up the benches, tables and every thing combustible, dressed up a funeral pile upon the spot, and, together with the body, burnt the house itself, with a basilica also, or

Y. R. 701.

Bef. Chr.

51.

400 Cons.

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Y. R. 701.

Bef. Chr.

51.

400 Cons.

public hall adjoining, called the Porcian ; and in the same fit of madness proceeded to storm the house of Milo, and of M. Lepidus the inter-rex, but were repulsed in both attacks with some loss.

These extravagancies raised great indignation in the city ; and gave a turn in favour of Milo ; who, looking upon himself as undone, was meditating nothing before but a voluntary exile : but now taking courage, he appeared in public, and was introduced into the rostra by Cœlius, where he made his defence to the people ; and to mitigate their resentment, distributed through all the tribes above three pounds a man to every poor citizen. But all his pains and expense were to little purpose ; for the three tribunes made it their business to keep up the ill humour of the populace ; and what was more fatal, Pompey would not be brought into any measures of accommodating the matter ; so that the tumults still increasing, the senate passed a decree, that the inter-rex, assisted by the tribunes and Pompey, should take care that the republic received no detriment ; and that Pompey in particular should raise a body of troops for the common security ; which he presently drew together from all parts of Italy. In this confusion the rumour of a dictator was again industriously revived, and gave a fresh alarm to the senate, who, to avoid the greater evil, came to the resolution of creating Pompey consul without a colleague. Bibulus had made the motion ; assigning for his reason,

that by this means the commonwealth would be freed from its present confusion ; or, if it must be enslaved, would have the best master it could hope for. Every body was surprised at this language from Bibulus, who had always shewed himself an enemy of Pompey : but they were yet more surprised by what Cato said on this occasion : he declared, that, though he could never have prevailed with himself to be the author of such an advice, nevertheless, since it had been moved by another, his opinion was that it should be followed. That any government was preferable to anarchy ; and that he thought no man better qualified than Pompey to hold the reins of government in a time of so great disorder. Hereupon the senate passed a decree, that Pompey should be sole consul ; and accordingly, on the twenty-fifth of February, he was, by Servius Sulpicius, the inter-rex, declared elected alone to that magistracy. Pompey, highly pleased with the honour which Cato had done him, returned him abundant thanks for it ; requesting at the same time, that he would in private give him his advice and assistance for the worthy discharge of his office. Cato answered : “ Pompey, you owe me no thanks : what I said in the senate was with a view to serve the commonwealth, not to serve you ; if you consult me in private, I will freely give you my advice : and, in public, I shall always speak my opinion, though you should not ask it.”

Dio tells us that the senate, and Bibulus in

Y. R. 701.  
Bef. Chr.  
51.  
400 Cons.



Y. R. 701. particular, were apprehensive at this time,  
 Bef. Chr. lest Cæsar should be chosen one of the consuls  
 51. at the next election, and for that reason took  
 400 Cons. this unprecedented step : which, if true, sufficiently accounts for Cato's favour to Pompey ; for the reader must have already observed, and will hereafter have fresh occasion to observe, that the main spring of some of Cato's political movements was neither the love of virtue, nor the love of his country, but a personal hatred to Cæsar.

Middl. 537. Pompey applied himself immediately to  
 Dio, xl. calm the public disorders, by the promulga-  
 143. tion of several new laws<sup>7</sup>, prepared by him  
 Ascon. for that purpose. One of them was, to ap-  
 Argum. in point a special commission to inquire into  
 Mil. Clodius's death, the burning of the senate-house, and the attack on M. Lepidus ; and to appoint an extraordinary judge of consular rank to preside in it : a second was against bribery and corruption in elections, with the infliction of new and severer penalties on those who had been guilty. Cato, according to Plutarch, objected to this law, as unjust with regard to past offences : and he advised him to provide only for the future. Appian reports, that, by Pompey's new law, all who, from the time of his first consulate, (twenty years before) had been in any public office, might be called to account for corruption in obtaining it, or mal-administration in the exercise of it. As this space of time comprised

Middl. 548. <sup>7</sup> Cicero seems to have written his *Treatise on Laws* soon after the death of Clodius.



the consulate of Cæsar, those of his party imagined there was a design to affront him; and they hinted what they thought to Pompey.— He answered them, that their suspicion was injurious to Cæsar, whose conduct, being out of the reach of censure, secured him from all danger. Appian adds, that Pompey shortened the retrospect to his second consulate; but would not entirely drop the new law. [App. de Bell. Civ. lib. ii. p. 441.]

Y. R. 701.  
Bef. Chr.  
51.  
400 Cons.

By these laws the method of trials was altered, and the length of them limited: three days were allowed for the examination of witnesses, and the fourth for the sentence; on which the accuser was to have two hours only to enforce the charge; the criminal three for his defence<sup>8</sup>. Coelius opposed his negative to these laws, as being rather privileges than laws, and provided particularly against Milo; but he was soon obliged to withdraw it, upon Pompey's declaring that he would support them by force of arms.

Pompey was the only man in Rome who had the power to bring Milo to a trial. He was not concerned for Clodius's death, or for the manner of it, but rather pleased that the republic was freed from so pestilent a demagogue; yet he resolved to take the benefit of the occasion for getting rid of Milo too, from

Middl. 537.

Ibid. 539.

<sup>8</sup> Tacitus seems to consider this regulation as the first step towards the ruin of the Roman eloquence, by imposing reins, as it were, upon its free and ancient course. *Primus tertio consulatu Cn. Pompeius astrinxit, imposuitque veluti frænos eloquentiæ—&c.* Dialog. de Orator. 38.

Middl. 537.

Y. R. 701.  
Bef. Chr.  
51.  
400 Cons.

whose ambition and high spirit he had cause to apprehend no less trouble. He would not listen therefore to any overtures from Milo's friends; and when Milo offered to drop his suit for the consulship, if that would satisfy him, he answered, that he would not concern himself with any man's suing or desisting, nor give any obstruction to the power and inclination of the Roman people. He attended the trial in person with a strong guard, to preserve peace, and prevent any violence from either side.

When the examination was over (in which many clear and positive truths were produced against Milo) Manutius Plancus called the people together, and exhorted them to appear in a full body the next day, when judgment was to be given, and to declare their sentiments in so public a manner, that the criminal might not be suffered to escape; which Cicero, in his defence of Milo, reflects upon as an insult on the liberty of the bench.

Ascon.  
Argum.

Early in the morning, on the eleventh of April, the shops were all shut, and the whole city gathered into the forum, where the avenues were possessed by Pompey's soldiers, and he himself seated in a conspicuous part, to overlook the whole proceeding, and hinder all disturbance.

The accusers were young Appius, the nephew of Clodius, M. Antonius, and P. Valerius; who, according to the new law, employed two hours in supporting their indictment.

Cicero was the only advocate on Milo's side ; but, as soon as he rose up to speak, he was received with so rude a clamour by the Clodians, that he was much discomposed and daunted at his first setting out ; yet recovered spirit enough to go through his speech of three hours ; which was taken down in writing, and published as it was delivered ; though the copy of it now extant, is supposed to have been retouched and corrected by him afterwards [or rather a new composition] for a present to Milo in his exile.

Y. R. 701.  
Bef. Chr.  
51.  
400 Cons.

In the council of Milo's friends, several were of opinion, that he should defend himself by avowing the death of Clodius, and pleading that it was an act of public benefit : but Cicero thought that defence too desperate, as it would disgust the grave, by opening so great a door to licence ; and offend the powerful, lest the precedent should be extended to themselves. But young Brutus, [discovering from his early years an apt and promising genius for the glorious business of assassination] in an oration, which he composed and published in vindication of Milo, maintained the killing of Clodius to be right and just, and of great service to the republic.

It was notorious that they had often threatened death to each other : Clodius had declared several times, both to the senate and the people, that Milo ought to be killed, and that, if the consulship could not be taken from him, his life could : and when Favonius asked him once, what hopes he could have of

Middl. 541.  
Pro Mil. 9.

Y. R. 701.  
Bef. Chr.  
51.  
400 Cons.

Pro Mil.  
10 & 21.

playing his pranks while Milo was living; he replied, that in three or four days at most he should live no more; which was spoken just three days before the fatal rencounter, and attested by Favonius. Since Milo then was charged with being the contriver of their meeting, and the aggressor in it, and several testimonies were produced to that purpose, Cicero chose to risk the cause on that issue, in hopes to persuade, that Clodius actually laid wait for Milo, and contrived the time and place; and Milo's part was but a necessary act of self-defence. This had somewhat of a plausibility, from the nature of the equipage, and the circumstances in which they met: for though Milo's was the more numerous, yet it was much more encumbered and unfit for an engagement than his adversary's; he himself being in a chariot with his wife, and all her women along with him; while Clodius with his followers were on horseback, as if prepared and equipt for fighting. He did not preclude himself however by this from the other plea<sup>9</sup>, which he often

<sup>9</sup> Asconius speaks as if Cicero approved neither the use of this plea in the present case, nor the doctrine itself whereon the plea is founded.—*Respondit his [accusatoribus] unus M. Cicero, & cum quibusdam placuisset, ait defendi crimen, interfici Clodium pro republica fuisse (quam formam Marcus Brutus secutus est in ea oratione quam pro Milone composuit & edidit, quamvis non egisset) Ciceroni id non placuit, quod quis bono publico damnari, idem etiam occidi indemnatus posset.* Nevertheless Cicero, in the case of Catiline's accomplices, seems to have followed this maxim, That whoever may, for the public good, be justly condemned, may, for the same public good, be justly put to death without trial and condemnation.



takes care to insinuate, that if Milo had really designed and contrived to kill Clodius, he would have deserved honours instead of punishment, for cutting off so desperate and dangerous an enemy to the peace and liberty of Rome.

Y. R. 701.  
Bef. Chr.  
51.  
400 Cons.

Pro Mil.  
28, &c.

Of one and fifty judges, who sat upon Milo, thirteen only acquitted and thirty-eight condemned him: the votes were usually given, by ballots; but Cato, who absolved him, chose to give his vote openly; and, if he had done it earlier, says Velleius, would have drawn others after him.

Middl. 554.

Milo went into exile at Marseilles a few days after his condemnation; and his whole estate was sold by public auction for the satisfaction of his creditors<sup>1</sup>.

Philotimus, a freedman of Cicero's wife, bought this estate, in partnership with some others, at an under-value. It was thought strange, that Cicero should suffer Philotimus, who acted as a sort of steward in his family, to engage in the purchase of a banished man's estate, such purchases being always looked upon as odious; and this was particularly so, Cicero having received great obligations from Milo. Accordingly the latter complained of it in the letters he wrote to his friends at Rome. This alarmed Cicero for his reputation; and he seems to have written to Cœlius, as he did

Melm.  
vol. I. p.  
298.

<sup>1</sup> Milo had wasted three estates in giving plays and shows to the people; and when he went into exile was found to owe above half a million of our money. Plin. lib. xvi. 15. Ascon. Argum. in Milon.

Y. R. 701.  
 Bef. Chr.  
 51.  
 400 Cons.

to several others of his correspondents, to accommodate this affair in the way that would be most for his honour. He pleaded in his justification an intent of serving Milo; yet it appears very evidently, from the following letters to Atticus on this subject, that he shared with Philotimus in the advantages of the purchase.

Ad Att.  
 v. 8.

“ They write to me from Rome, that they have seen letters from Milo, who complains of my having suffered Philotimus to enter into partnership with those who bought his estate: yet I did it by the advice of Duronius, Milo’s particular friend, and whom you know to be an honest man. Our view was to hinder his falling into the hands of strangers, and oppressive people, who might have demanded a great number of slaves that he has with him. We were, in the next place, desirous, that the provision which he intended should be made for his wife might be secured. We likewise thought, that, if there was a possibility of saving any thing for him, we could manage that matter better than any body else. Endeavour, I beseech you, to search this whole matter to the bottom; for things are often magnified in the relation. But if it be true that Milo complains, and writes to his friends on this head, and if Fausta be of the same mind, Philotimus shall not have any concern in the purchase; for I made him promise, before I left Rome, that, without Milo’s consent, he would not. The profit has not been any thing considerable: but you will judge. Talk with Duronius. I

have writ to Camillus and to Lamia, being uncertain whether you were at Rome. In a word, you will resolve to act as honesty, reputation, and my interest shall require."

Y. R. 701.  
Bef. Chr.  
51.  
400 Cons.

[We see here, says an ingenious writer, Cicero's reasons for his friendly officiousness; but I doubt whether they will convince any body, that interest was not his principal motive; and the rather, as Milo's goods were sold greatly under value. It appears by two other letters to Atticus, and by one from Cœlius to Cicero, that Philotimus restored to Milo the estates he had bought, on condition of allowing him a certain profit, in which Cicero was a sharer.]

Mong.  
Tome III.  
p. 22.

"I have one thing more to mention to you. I shall write mysteriously, but you will guess my meaning. My wife's freedman (you know whom I speak of) has embezzled, as I judge by his lame account, part of the profit made by the purchase of the estate of the Crotoniate tyrant-killer<sup>2</sup>. If you guess the meaning of this last word, you will understand all the rest. I dare not be more explicit."

Ad Att.  
vi. 4.

"Do not forget the affair I wrote to you about in my last letter; where I told you, that I have for some time suspected, from the confused inconsistent talk of my wife's freedman in several companies, that he has not given me a faithful account of the profits arising to me from the purchase of the Crotoniate's estate.

Ibid. 5.

——While I suffered him to be here, I was

<sup>2</sup> Milo, who carried an ox upon his back at the Olympic games, was of Crotona. The Milo, now in question, is called tyrant-killer, because he killed Clodius.



Y. R. 701.

Bef. Chr.

51.

400 Cons.



constantly upon my guard: for he came to sound me, in the hopes that I would remit somewhat of what he owes me; but finding himself disappointed, he flung away at once—"I will be gone; it would be shameful for me to stay any longer, and at last go away with empty hands:" and he twitted me with the old proverb, "A gift admits of no accounting;" or, as Mongault translates the passage, "We should be content with what is given." By this (says the ingenious French writer) Philotimus intimated to Cicero, that he ought to be satisfied with his yielding to him part of the profit he had made by the purchase of Milo's estate, since his name had never been mentioned in the purchase. The proverb, of which Cicero cites here only the first words, *τα μὲν δίδομενα*—is in the Gorgias of Plato, and answers to the English proverb, "We should not look a gift-horse in the mouth." From all this, I think, we may conclude, that Philotimus had Cicero in his power.

## M. CÆLIUS TO CICERO.

Ep. Fam.

l. viii.

Ep. 5.

—"As to what concerns the behaviour of Philotimus, in relation to Milo's estate, I have endeavoured that he shall act in such a manner as to give full satisfaction to Milo and his friends, and at the same time clear your character from all imputation."

Middl. p.  
545—547.

The next trial before the same tribunal, and for the same crime, was of M. Saufeius, one of Milo's confidants, charged with being the ringleader in storming the house and kill-



ing Clodius. Cicero defended him, and he was acquitted by one vote only: but being accused a second time on the same account, though for a different fact, and again defended by Cicero, he was acquitted by a great majority. But Sex. Clodius, the captain of the other side, was condemned and banished, with several others of that faction, for burning the senate-house, and the other violences committed upon Clodius's death.

Y. R. 701.  
Bef. Chr.  
51.  
400 Cons.

Pompey no sooner published his new law against bribery, than the late consular candidates, Scipio and Hypsæus, were severally impeached upon it, and, being both of them notoriously guilty, were in great danger of being condemned: but Pompey, calling the judges together, begged it of them as a favour, that out of the great number of state criminals they would remit Scipio to him: whom, after he had rescued from the prosecution, he declared his colleague in the consulship for the last five months of the year<sup>3</sup>; having first made him

<sup>3</sup> Pompey was preparing an inscription this summer for the front of the new temple, which he had lately built to Venus the Conqueress, containing, as usual, the recital of all his titles: but in drawing it up, a question happened to be started about the manner of expressing his third consulship, whether it should be by *Consul*, *Tertium*, or *Tertio*. This was referred to the principal critics of Rome, who could not, it seems, agree about it. Pompey therefore left it to Cicero to decide the matter: but Cicero, being unwilling to give judgment on either side, when there were great authorities on both, and Varro among them, advised Pompey to order *Tert.* only to be inscribed, which fully declared the thing, without determining the dispute.

Middl. 550.  
A. Gell.  
x. 1.

Y. R. 701.

Bef. Chr.

51.

400 Cons.



his father-in-law, by marrying his daughter Cornelia, a lady of fine accomplishments. The other candidate Hypsæus was left to the mercy of the law, and being likely to fare the worse for Scipio's escape, he watched an opportunity of access to Pompey, as he was coming out of his bath; and, throwing himself at his feet, implored his protection: but, though he had been his quæstor, and ever obsequious to his will, yet Pompey is said to have spurned him away with great haughtiness and inhumanity, telling him, that he would only spoil his supper by detaining him<sup>4</sup>.

Before the end of the year, two of the late tribunes, whose office was just expired, Q. Pompeius Rufus, and T. Munatius Plancus Bursa, were tried, condemned, and banished, for the violences of their tribunate, and burning the senate-house. Cœlius accused the first,

<sup>4</sup> *Cn. autem Pompeius quam insolenter? Qui balneo egressus ante pedes suos prostratum Hypsæum ambitus reum & nobilem virum & sibi amicum, jacentem reliquit, contumeliosa voce proculcatum. Nihil enim eum aliud agere, quam ut convivium suum moraretur, respondit.—Ille vero P. Scipionem socerum suum, legibus noxium quas ipse tulerat, in maxima quidem reorum & illustrium ruina muneris loco a judicibus deposcere.—Val. Max. ix. 3. It. Plut. in Pomp.*

Ad Att.

xi. 6.

Vol. II. p.

132.

This is that Pompey of whom Cicero says, that he knew him to be a man of integrity, an honest, sincere, and grave man—*hominem integrum, & castum, & gravem, cognovi*. And Dr. Middleton is of opinion, that this was his true character. Nevertheless the reader, I imagine, will not judge that this grave Pompey was a proper person to be invested with that dictatorial power, which the doctor thinks was necessary, in the present disorders of the republic, to reduce it to a tolerable state.

Vid. supr.

p. 107.

Cicero the second, the only cause, excepting that of Verres, in which he ever acted the part of an accuser. It seems Bursa had been formerly defended by him, and had proved ungrateful. Pompey, before judges of his own appointing, pleaded the cause of Bursa: yet he was condemned by an unanimous vote of the whole bench.

Y. R. 701.  
Bef. Chr.  
51.  
400 Cons.

Among the other acts of Pompey, in this his third consulship, there was a new law against bribery, contrived to strengthen the old ones that were already subsisting against it, by disqualifying all future consuls and prætors from holding any province till five years after the expiration of the magistracies; for this was thought likely to give some check to the eagerness of suing and bribing for those great offices, when the chief fruit and benefit of them was removed to such a distance. But, before the law passed, Pompey took care to provide an exception for himself, and to get the government of Spain continued to him for five years longer, with an appointment of money to pay his troops: and, lest this should give offence to Cæsar, if something of an extraordinary kind was not provided for him too, he proposed a law to dispense with Cæsar's presence in suing for the consulship, of which Cæsar at that time seemed very desirous. Coelius was the promoter of this law, engaged to it by Cicero, at the joint request of Pompey and Cæsar; and it was carried with the concurrence of all the tribunes, though not

Middl. 550.

Dio, p.  
142.

Ad Att.  
vii. 1.  
Suet. 1.  
Cæs. 26.



Y. R. 701.  
Bef. Chr.  
51.  
400 Cons.

without difficulty and obstruction from the senate.

Middl. 551.

Ad Att.  
v. 15.

By Pompey's law, just now mentioned, it was provided, that, for a supply of governors for the interval of five years, in which the consuls and prætors were disqualified, the senators of consular and prætorian rank, who had never held any foreign command, should divide the vacant provinces among themselves by lot: in consequence of which, Cicero, who was obliged to take his chance with the rest, obtained the government of Cilicia, now in the


<sup>5</sup> These preferments were, of all others, the most ardently desired by the great, for the advantages which they afforded both of acquiring power and amassing wealth; for their command, though accountable to the Roman people, was absolute and uncontrollable in the province; where they kept up the state and pride of sovereign princes, and had all the neighbouring kings paying a court to them, and attending their orders. If their genius was turned to arms, and fond of martial glory, they could never want a pretext for war, since it was easy to drive the subjects into rebellion, or the adjoining nations to acts of hostility by their oppressions and injuries, till, from the destruction of a number of innocent people, they had acquired the title of emperor, and with it the pretension of a triumph, without which scarce any proconsul was ever known to return from a remote and frontier province\*.

\* While the ancient discipline of the republic subsisted, no general could pretend to a triumph who had not enlarged the bounds of the empire by his conquests, and killed at least five thousand enemies in battle, without any considerable loss of his own soldiers. This was expressly enacted by an old law: in support of which a second was afterwards provided, that made it penal for any of their triumphal commanders to give a false account of the number of slain either on the enemies' side or their own, and obliged them, upon their entrance into the city, to take an oath before the quæstors, or public treasurers, that the accounts which they had sent to the senate



hands of Appius, the late consul. This province included also Pisidia, Pamphilia, and three dioceses, as they are called, or districts of Asia, together with the island of Cyprus; for the guard of all which a standing army was kept of two legions, or about twelve thousand foot, with two thousand six hundred horse. But, whatever benefit or glory this

Y. R. 701.

  
 Middl.  
 vol. II. p.  
 1 & 2.

Ibid. p. 3.

Their opportunities of raising money were as immense as their power, and bounded only by their own appetites: the appointments of the treasury, for their equipage, plate, and necessary furniture, amounted, as it appears from some instances, to near a hundred and fifty thousand pounds: and besides the revenues of kingdoms, and pay of armies, of which they had the arbitrary management, they could exact what contributions they pleased, not only from the cities of their own jurisdiction, but from all the states and princes around them, who were under the protection of Rome. But, while their primary care was to enrich themselves, they carried out with them always a band of hungry friends and dependents, as their lieutenants, tribunes, præfects, with a crew of freedmen and favourite slaves, who were all likewise to be enriched by the spoils of the province, and the sale of their master's favours. Hence flowed all those accusations and trials for the plunder of the subjects, of which we read so much in the Roman writers; for as few or none of the proconsuls behaved themselves with that exact justice as to leave no room for complaint, so the factions of the city, and the quarrels of families, subsisting from former impeachments, generally excited some or other to revenge the affront in kind, by undertaking the cause of an injured province, and dressing up an impeachment against their enemy.

of each number was true. [Val. Max. ii. 8.] But these laws had long been neglected, and treated as obsolete: and the honour of a triumph usually granted, by intrigue and faction, to every general of any credit who had gained some little advantage against pirates or fugitives, or repelled the incursions of the wild barbarians who bordered upon the distant provinces.

Y. R. 701.

Ep. Fam.  
ii. 11.  
Ad Att.  
v. 10. &  
15.

S. Sulpi-  
cius and  
M. Mar-  
cellus,  
consuls.  
Middl. 7.  
Ad Att.  
v. 6, 7, 8, 9.

government seemed to offer, it had no charms for Cicero : the thing itself was disagreeable to his temper, nor worthy of his talents, which (in his own opinion) were formed to sit at the helm, and shine in the administration of the whole republic ; so that he considered it only as an honourable exile, or a burden imposed by his country, to which his duty obliged him to submit. His first care therefore was to provide, that this command might not be prolonged to him beyond the usual term of a year. Before his departure he solicited all his friends not to suffer such a mortification to fall upon him. He left the city about the first of May, attended by his brother, and their two sons : for Quintus, in order to accompany him in the post of lieutenant, had quitted his lieutenancy under Cæsar.

When Cicero arrived at Tarentum, he made a visit to Pompey, who was taking the benefit of that soft air for the recovery of his health at one of his villas in those parts, and had invited and pressed him to spend some days with him upon his journey : they proposed great satisfaction on both sides from this interview, for the opportunity of conferring together with all freedom on the present state of the republic, which was to be their subject : and Cicero expected likewise to get some lessons of the military kind from this renowned commander. He promised Atticus an account of this conference ; but, the particulars being too delicate to be communicated by letter, he acquainted him only in general, that he found

Pompey an excellent citizen, and provided for all events that could possibly be apprehended.

Y. R. 702.  
Bef. Chr.  
50.  
401 Cons.

After three days' stay with Pompey, he proceeded to Brundisium, where he was detained for twelve days by a slight indisposition; and the expectation of his principal officers, particularly of his lieutenant Pontonius, an experienced leader, the same who had triumphed over the Allobroges, and on whose skill he chiefly depended in his martial affairs. From Brundisium he sailed to Actium on the fifteenth of June; whence partly by sea, and partly by land, he arrived on the twenty-sixth, at Athens, where he spent ten days, and where Pontonius at length joined him.

Vid. supra,  
p. 105.

Upon leaving Italy he had charged his friend Cœlius with the task<sup>6</sup> of sending him the news of Rome; and while he was at Athens, he received from him the first letter of intelligence.

Middl. 10.

<sup>6</sup> Cœlius (who by his father had been introduced to Cicero's acquaintance and friendship) performed the task very punctually, in a series of letters, which make a considerable part in the collection of his familiar epistles; and as they contain the jealousies and fears which gave birth to the civil war which soon broke out, it may not be disagreeable to the reader to present him with some extracts of them. He had been tribune of the people in 701, the year before this letter was written, and had distinguished himself in that office, by zealously supporting the interests of the aristocratical faction. His morals were suitable to the degenerate age in which he lived; luxurious and dissolute; and his temper was remarkably inflammable, and apt to kindle into the most implacable resentment. Vid. Ad Att. v. 2.

Melm.



Y. R. 702.

Bef. Chr.

50.

401 Cons.

Ep. Fam.

viii. 1.

Melm.

iii. 25.

## CÆLIUS TO CICERO.

“ Agreeably to my promise when we parted, I have sent you a full account of every event that has happened since you left Rome. For this purpose I employed a person to collect the news of the town, and am only afraid you will think he has executed his office much too punctually, &c. &c.

“ M. Marcellus [the consul] not having yet moved that Cæsar may be recalled from his government in Gaul, and intending to defer it, as he told me himself, to the first of June, it has occasioned the revival of those suspicions to his disadvantage, which so strongly prevailed when you were here. If you saw Pompey, as you designed to do, pray send me word in what temper you found him; what conversation he had with you; and what you could discover of his designs; for, though he seldom speaks his real sentiments, he has not wit enough to conceal them. As for Cæsar, there are many ugly reports about him; but propagated only in whispers: some say that he has lost all his cavalry; which I take indeed to be true: others, that the seventh legion has been beaten, and that he himself is so surrounded and besieged by the Bellovaci \*, that he cannot receive succours from the main body of his army. There is nothing yet certain; nor are these uncertain stories publicly talked of; but among a few, whom I need not name,

\* A people of the Belgic Gaul.



told openly by way of secrets; Domitius<sup>7</sup> never mentions them without clapping his hand to his mouth," &c.

Y. R. 702.  
Bef. Chr.  
50.  
401 Cons.

## M. T. CICERO TO M. CÆLIUS.

" Could you seriously then imagine, my friend, that I commissioned you to send me the idle news of the town; matches of gladiators, adjournments of causes, robberies, &c. —? Far other are the accounts which I expect from your hand, as I know not any man whose judgment in politics I have more reason to value.—I passed several days with Pompey, conversing with him on nothing else but the republic: but it is neither prudent nor possible to give you the particulars in a letter. Take this only from me, that Pompey is an excellent citizen<sup>8</sup>, prepared both with courage and counsel for all events which can be foreseen: wherefore give yourself up to the man; believe me he will embrace you; for he now holds the same opinion with us of good and

Ep. Fam.  
ii. 8.  
Melm. iii.  
28 [dated  
July 6,  
702.]

<sup>7</sup> This is Domitius, the decree-forging consul, and the declared enemy of Cæsar. Vid. *supra*, p. 68.

<sup>8</sup> " Cicero so often changed his opinion, or at least his language in regard to Pompey, that it is difficult to determine what his true sentiments of him were. It is probable, however, that he here speaks the dictates of his real thoughts, not only as he gives the same account to Atticus, but because Pompey received him with particular civility; a circumstance which seems at all times to have had a very considerable influence upon Cicero's judgment concerning the characters and designs of men." Vid. *Ad Att.* v. 6, 7.

Melm.  
vol. I. p.  
290.

Y. R. 702.  
Bef. Chr.  
50.  
401 Cons.

bad citizens. I have been ten days at Athens, and am just now leaving it, this sixth of July. As I earnestly recommend all my affairs to your care, so nothing more particularly, than that the time of my provincial command be not prolonged.—Farewel.”

Middl. 14.

Cicero set sail for Asia the sixth of July, and landed at Ephesus on the twenty-second, after a slow<sup>9</sup> but safe passage of fifteen days.

Ad Att. i.  
13, & 15.

Having reposed himself for three days at Ephesus, he marched forwards towards his province; and on the last of July arrived at Laodicea, one of the capital cities of his jurisdiction. From this moment the date of his government commenced; which he bids Atticus take notice of, that he might know how to compute the precise extent of his annual term.


Middl. 14.

It was Cicero's resolution, in his provincial command, to practise those admirable rules which he had drawn up formerly for his brother; and from an employment wholly tedious and disagreeable to him, to derive fresh glory upon his character, by leaving the in-

Middl. 14.

<sup>9</sup> The tediousness of this voyage was agreeably relieved by touching on the way at several of the islands of the Ægean sea, of which he sends a kind of journal to Atticus. Many deputations from the cities of Asia, and a great concourse of people, came to meet him as far as Samos; but a much greater still was expecting his landing at Ephesus: the Greeks flocked eagerly from all parts to see a man, so celebrated through the empire for the fame of his learning and eloquence; so that all his boastings, as he merrily says, of many years past, were now brought to the test.

nocence and integrity of his administration as a pattern of governing to all succeeding pro-consuls.

Y. R. 702.  
Bef. Chr.  
50.  
401 Cons.  


When any governors went abroad to their provinces, the custom had always been, that the countries through which they passed should defray the charges of their journey : but Cicero no sooner set his foot on foreign ground, than he forbade all expenses whatsoever, public or private, to be made either upon himself or any of his company ; which raised a great admiration of him in the cities of Greece. In Asia he did the same, not suffering his officers to accept, what was due to them even by law, forage and wood for firing, nor any thing else, but mere house-room, with four beds ; which he remitted also, as oft as was practicable, and obliged them to lodge in their tents ; and, by his example and constant exhortations, brought his lieutenants, tribunes, and præfects, so fully into his measures, that they all concurred with him, he says, wonderfully in a jealous concern for his honour.

Ad Att. v.  
9, 10, 11.

Ibid. 16,  
17.


About the twenty-fourth of August he went to the camp at Iconium in Lycaonia, where he had no sooner reviewed the troops than he received an account from Antiochus, king of Comagene, which was confirmed from the other princes of those parts, that the Parthians had passed the Euphrates with a mighty force, under the conduct of Pacorus, the king's son, in order to invade the Roman territory. Upon this news he marched towards Cilicia, to secure his province from the inroads of the

Middl. 16.

Ep. Fam.  
xv. 1.



Y. R. 702.  
Bef. Chr.  
50.  
401 Cons.



enemy, or any commotions within : but as all access to it was difficult, except on the side of Cappadocia, an open country, and not well provided, he took his route through that kingdom, and encamped in that part of it which bordered upon Cilicia, near to the town of Cybistra, at the foot of mount Taurus. His army, as it is said above, consisted of about twelve thousand foot and two thousand six hundred horse, besides the auxiliary troops of the neighbouring states, and especially of Dejotarus, king of Galatia, the most faithful ally of Rome, and Cicero's particular friend ; whose whole forces he could depend upon at any warning.

Ep. Fam.  
xv. 2, 3, 4.

While he lay in this camp he had an opportunity of executing a special commission, with which he was charged by the senate ; to take Ariobarzanes, king of Cappadocia, under his particular protection ; and provide for the security of his person and government : in honour of whom the senate had decreed, what they had never done before to any foreign prince, that his safety was of concern to the senate and people of Rome. His father had been killed by the treachery of his subjects, and a conspiracy of the same kind was apprehended against the son : Cicero therefore, in a council of his officers, gave the king an account of the decree of the senate, and that, in consequence of it, he was then ready to assist him with his troops and authority in any measures that should be concerted for the safety and quiet of his kingdom.—The king, after



great professions of his thanks and duty to the senate for the honour of their decree, and to Cicero himself for his care in the execution of it, said, that he knew no occasion for giving him any particular trouble at that time, nor had any suspicion of any design against his life or crown: upon which Cicero, after congratulating him upon the tranquillity of his affairs, advised him however to remember his father's fate, and from the admonitions of the senate, to be particularly vigilant in the care of his person; and so they parted. But the next morning the king returned early to the camp, attended by his brother and counsellors, and with many tears implored the protection of Cicero, and the benefit of the senate's decree, declaring, "that he had received undoubted intelligence of a plot, which those, who were privy to it, durst not venture to discover till Cicero's arrival in the country; but trusting to his authority, had now given him information of it; and that his brother, who was present, and ready to confirm what he had said, had been solicited to enter into it by the offer of the crown: he begged, therefore, that some of Cicero's troops might be left with him for his better guard and defence." Cicero told him, "that, under the present alarm of the Parthian war, he could not possibly lend him any part of his army; that since the conspiracy was detected, his own forces would be sufficient for preventing the effects of it; that he should learn to act the king, by shewing a proper concern for

Y. R. 702.  
Bef. Chr.  
50.  
401 Cons.

Y. R. 702.  
 Bef. Chr.  
 50.  
 401 Cons.

his own life, and exert his regal power in punishing the authors of the plot, and pardoning all the rest; that he need not apprehend any farther danger, when his people were acquainted with the senate's decree, and saw a Roman army so near to them, and ready to put it in execution." And having thus encouraged and comforted the king, he marched towards Cilicia, and gave an account of this accident, and of the motions of the Parthians, in two public letters to the consuls and senate<sup>1</sup>.

Ep. Fam.  
 xv. 4.

<sup>1</sup> He added a private letter also to Cato who was a particular favourer of Ariobarzanes, in which he informed him, "that he had not only secured the king's person from any attempt, but had taken care that he should reign for the future with honour and dignity, by restoring to his favour and service his old counsellors, whom Cato had recommended, and who had been disgraced by the intrigues of his court; and by obliging a turbulent young priest of Bellona, who was the head of the malecontents, and the next in power to the king himself, to quit the country."

Middl. 18.

This king, Ariobarzanes, seems to have been poor even to a proverb :

*Mancipiis locuples, eget æris Cappadocum rex.*

Hor. Ep. i. 6.

For he had been miserably squeezed and drained by the Roman generals and governors, to whom he owed vast sums, either actually borrowed, or stipulated to be paid for particular services. It was a common practice with the great men of Rome to lend money, at an exorbitant interest, to the princes and cities dependent on the empire. The ordinary interest of the provincial loans was one per cent. by the month, with interest upon interest : this was the lowest; but it was frequently four times as much. Pompey received monthly, from this very king, above six thousand pounds sterling; which yet was short of his full interest. Brutus also had lent him a very large

While he lay encamped in Cappadocia, expecting what way the Parthians would move, he received an account that they had taken a

Y. R. 702.

Ad Att.

v. 22.

sum, and earnestly desired Cicero to procure the payment of it, with the arrears of interest: but Pompey's agents were so pressing, and the king so needy, that though Cicero solicited Brutus's affair very heartily, he had little hopes of getting any thing for him. When Ariobarzanes came, therefore, to offer him the same present of money which he had usually made to every other governor, he generously refused, and desired only, that, instead of giving it to him, he would pay it to Brutus: but the poor prince was so distressed, that he excused himself by the necessity which he was under of satisfying some other more pressing demands; so that Cicero gives a sad account of his negotiation in a long \* letter to Atticus, who had warmly recommended Brutus's interests to him.

\* — “ I come now to Brutus, whom, by your authority, I embraced with inclination, and begun even to love: but—what am I going to say? I recall myself, lest I offend you.—Do not think that I ever entered into any thing more willingly, or took more pains, than in what he recommended to me. He gave me a memorial of the particulars which you have talked over with me before: I pursued your instructions exactly: in the first place I pressed Ariobarzanes to give to Brutus that money which he promised to me. As long as the king continued with me, all things looked well; but he was afterwards teased by six hundred of Pompey's agents; and Pompey, for other reasons, can do more with him than all the world besides; but especially when it is imagined that he is to be sent to the Parthian war: they now pay Pompey thirty-three Attic talents per month out of the taxes; though this falls short of a month's interest: but our friend Cneius takes it calmly; and is content to abate somewhat of the interest without pressing for the principal. As for others, he neither does nor can pay any man: for he has no treasury, no revenues: he raises taxes by Appius's method of capitation: but these are scarce sufficient for Pompey's monthly pay: two or three of the king's friends are very rich; but they hold their own as closely as either you or I.—I do not forbear however to ask, urge and chide him by letters: king Deiotarus also told me, that he had sent people to him on purpose to solicit for Brutus; but they brought him word back, that he had really no money: which I take indeed to be the case; that nothing is more drained than his kingdom; nothing poorer than the king.”

Ad Att.

vi. 1.

Y. 703.



Y. R. 702.  
Bef. Chr.  
50.  
401 Cens.

different route, and were advanced to Antioch in Syria, where they held C. Cassius blocked up; and that a detachment of them had actually penetrated into Cilicia, but were routed and cut off by those troops which were left to guard the country. Upon this he presently decamped, and, by great journies over mount Taurus, marched in all haste to possess himself of the passes of Amanus, a great and strong mountain, lying between Syria and Cilicia, and the common boundary of them both. By this march, and the approach of his army to the neighbourhood of Syria, the Parthians, being discouraged, retired from Antioch, which gave Cassius an opportunity of falling upon them in their retreat, and gaining a considerable advantage, in which one of their principal commanders, Osaces, was mortally wounded.

In the suspense of the Parthian war, which the late disgrace of Crassus had made terrible at Rome, Cicero's friends, who had no great opinion of his military talents, were in some pain for his safety and success, as appears by the following letter from Cœlius.

#### MARCUS CÆLIUS TO CICERO.


Ep. Fam.  
viii. 10.  
Melm. iv.  
14. (dated  
18th  
Novemb.)

“ We have received an express from Caius Cassius, and another from Deiotarus, which greatly alarm us. The former writes that the Parthian army had passed the Euphrates, and the latter, that they are actually marching towards your province, by the way of Coma-



gene. As I well knew how ill provided you are with troops, the principal concern I feel from this invasion, with respect to you, is, lest you should be a loser by it in point of reputation. Had you been better prepared indeed to receive the enemy, I should have been in great pain for your life: but, as the very small number of your forces will incline you, I imagine, rather to think of a retreat than an engagement, I am only anxious concerning your honour. For how far the world may consider the necessity of the case, and approve of your thus declining a battle, is a point, I confess, which gives me much uneasy reflection. In short I shall be in continual anxiety, till I hear of your arrival in Italy. In the mean time, this news of the Parthians has occasioned a variety of speculations: Some are of opinion that Pompey ought to be sent against them: and others, that it is by no means convenient that he should leave Rome. A third party is for assigning this expedition to Cæsar and his army: whilst a fourth names the consuls as the most proper persons to be employed. But all agree, however, in being silent as to any decree of the senate for placing this command in private hands. The consuls, in the apprehension that they shall either be nominated to a commission which they do not relish, or suffer the disgrace of its being given from them, forbear to convene the senate: and by this means incur the censure of neglecting the public interest. But whether indolence or pusillanimity be the real motive of their

Y. R. 702.  
Bef. Chr.  
50.  
401 Cons.



Y. R. 702.  
Bef. Chr.  
50.  
401 Cons.

declining the conduct of this war, it is concealed under the specious appearance however of modesty.

“ As we have received no courier from you, it was suspected, till the dispatch from Deiotarus arrived, that the whole was an invention of Cassius, who, it was thought, in order to colour his own rapine, had suffered a parcel of Arabs to make an incursion into the province, and then represented them to the senate as a formidable body of Parthians. Whatever therefore may be the true state of the affair, let me persuade you to be extremely circumspect in giving a faithful and accurate account of it to the senate: that you may neither be reproached with magnifying matters, in order to gratify the private purposes of Cassius, nor with concealing any thing which may be of importance for the public to know.

“ It is now the eighteenth of November; and as we are advanced thus far towards the end of the year, I do not see that any thing can be done in this affair till the first of January. For you know how slow and inactive Marcellus is upon all occasions, and are no stranger to the dilatory disposition of Sulpicius: you will easily judge therefore what is to be expected from two men of this unperforming cast; and that those who usually act with so much coldness as to make one doubt their inclinations, even in points they really desire to effect, will not be very warm in forwarding a business to which they are certainly averse.


“ If the Parthian war should become a serious matter, the new magistrates will be engaged for the first two or three months of their office in adjusting the proper measures to be taken in this conjuncture. On the other hand, if it should appear to be an invasion of no consequence, or such at least, as, with the supply of a few additional troops, may easily be repelled by you and the other proconsuls already in those provinces, or by your successors : Curio, I foresee, will begin to play his double game ; that is, he will in the first place attempt to weaken the authority of Cæsar ; and in the next, endeavour to throw some little advantages on the side of Pompey. As for Paullus\*, he declares most vehemently against suffering Cæsar to continue in Gaul : and our friend Furnius is the only tribune whom I suspect of obstructing his measures for that purpose. You may depend upon these articles as certain : but beyond these I cannot with any assurance pronounce. Time indeed may produce much ; as many schemes I know are concerted : but they all turn upon the points I have already specified.—I forgot to mention, that Curio designs to make an attempt to procure a division of the lands in Campania. It is pretended that Cæsar does not concern himself in this matter : certain, however, it is, that Pompey is very desirous of having the distribution settled before Cæsar’s return, that he may be precluded from applying them to his own purposes.

“ As to what concerns your leaving the pro-

Y. R. 702.  
Bef. Chr.  
50.  
401 Cons.

\* One of  
the con-  
suls elect.  
Middl. 25.



Y. E. 702.  
 Bef. Chr.  
 50.  
 401 Cons.  


vince, I dare not promise that you shall be relieved by a successor ; but you may rely upon my endeavouring all I can, that your administration shall not be prolonged. Whether you will think proper to remain in your government, if affairs should be so circumstanced as to render it indecent for me to oppose any decree of the senate for that purpose, depends upon yourself to determine : as it does upon me to remember how warmly you made it your request, when we parted, that I would prevent any such resolution from being taken. Farewell.”

Ad Att.  
 v. 15.

It is no wonder that Cicero's friends should be in pain for him, when they thought he would have to do with the Parthians : nevertheless, when he found himself engaged, and pushed to the necessity of acting the general, he wanted (by his own account) neither the courage nor conduct of an experienced leader. In a letter to Atticus, dated from his camp : “ We are in great spirits,” says he ; “ and, as our counsels are good, have no distrust of an engagement : we are securely encamped, with plenty of provisions, and in sight almost of Cilicia ; with a small army indeed, but, as I have reason to believe, intirely well affected to me : which I shall double by the accession of Deiotarus, who is upon the road to join me. I have the allies more firmly attached to me than any governor ever had : they are wonderfully taken with my easiness and abstinence : we are making new levies of citizens,



and establishing magazines : if there be occasion for fighting, we shall not decline it ; if not, shall defend ourselves by the strength of our posts. Wherefore be of good heart ; for I see, as much as if you were with me, the sympathy of your love for me."

Y. R. 702.  
Bef. Chr.  
50.  
401 Cons.

The danger of the Parthians being over, Cicero, unwilling to dismiss his army without attempting something, led it against an untamed race of banditti, or freebooters, inhabiting the mountains, close to which he now lay. They had never submitted to the Roman power, but lived in defiance of it. Cicero thought the reduction of them a matter of importance. To take them unprovided, he drew off his forces, on pretence of marching to the distant parts of Cilicia : but after a day's journey, stopped short, and, having refreshed his army and left his baggage behind, turned back again in the night with the utmost celerity, and reached Amanus before day on the thirteenth of October. Coming upon the natives by surprise, he easily killed or made them all prisoners. Erana, indeed, the capital of the mountain, made a brave resistance ; for it held out almost a whole day. Upon this success, Cicero was saluted emperor.

It appears, by a letter from the victorious emperor, that he thought his victory gave him a just claim to a triumph.

Y. R. 702.

Bef. Chr.

50.

401 Cons.

CICERO TO M. CÆLIUS, CURULE ÆDILE ELECT.

Ep. Fam.

Melm. iv.

13. [written about the end of November.]

“ I wish you would inquire the reason that your letters miscarry ; for I cannot be induced to think that you have not once written to me since your election. But to turn to the principal purpose of this epistle.—Your wish has succeeded, and I have just had employment enough of the military kind to entitle me to a triumph. You were under some apprehensions, I perceive, about the Parthians, as being diffident of my forces. I must acquaint you then, that, having received advice, that the Parthians had committed hostilities, I took the advantage of some defiles, and of the neighbouring mountains, to lead my army, supported by a tolerable number of auxiliaries, to Amanus. The reputation of my name was of some benefit to me likewise in my march : as you cannot imagine of what importance it is, in places of this kind, to have the populace ask, ‘ Is this the consul that saved Rome ? Is this he that was so honoured by the senate ? ’ Together with other questions of the same import, which I need not add. When I approached to Amanus, a mountain which separates Cilicia from Syria, I had the satisfaction to hear that Cassius had obliged the enemy to abandon the siege of Antioch ; and that Bibulus had taken upon himself the command of the province. However, I employed my army in harassing the Amanienses, our eternal

enemies: and, having put many of them to the sword, as well as taken a great number of prisoners, and entirely dispersed the rest, I surprised and burnt some of their fortresses. Having thus obtained a complete victory, I was saluted with the title of imperator by the whole army at Issus, the very place where Alexander defeated Darius. From thence I marched into the most infested parts of Cilicia, where I am now before Pindenissum; a city of great strength, and which I have already been battering above these three weeks<sup>2</sup>. The garrison makes a most obstinate and vigorous defence: so that nothing seems wanting to complete the glory I shall here obtain, but that the name of this place were less obscure<sup>3</sup>. If I should make myself master of it, as I trust I shall, I will send an immediate express to the senate. In the mean time, I have given this general account of my operations, to let you see there is some foundation to hope that your good wishes will be accomplished. But to return to the Parthians: this summer's campaign has proved, you find, tolerably suc-

Y. R. 702.  
Bef. Chr.  
50.  
401 Cons.

<sup>2</sup> The siege was begun about the first of November: so that this letter was written towards the end of November: if he began to batter in a few days after his investing the place.

<sup>3</sup> Cicero in a letter to Atticus, speaking of this siege, writes thus: "What the plague, you will say, are these Pindenissians? I never heard their name before.—How can I help that? Could I turn Cilicia into Ætolia or Macedonia? Take this however for certain, that no man could do more than I have done with such an army, &c."

Ad Att.  
v. 20.

Y. R. 702.  
Bef. Chr.  
50.  
401 Cons.

cessful: I am in great pain, however, for the next. Let me intreat you, therefore, my dear friend, to endeavour that a successor be appointed to my government: but, if that should prove a matter of too much difficulty (as you intimate in one of your letters, and as I am myself inclined to suspect) be careful at least to guard against what may easily be prevented, I mean the prolongation of my residence <sup>4</sup>.

<sup>4</sup> Cicero wrote, about the same time, a letter of congratulation to Curio, on his being elected to the tribunate; and presses him to be steady to the interests of the senate, and to employ his tribunitian power in his favour, that he may not be continued in his government beyond his year.

#### CICERO TO CURIO, TRIBUNE OF THE PEOPLE.


Ep. Fam.  
ii. 7.  
Melm. iv.  
16.

“ The congratulations of a friend are not usually considered as too late, if they are paid as early as possible: my great distance therefore from Rome, together with the slow progress with which news travels into this corner of the world, will excuse me from not sooner sending you mine. But now I sincerely give them you: and most ardently wish you may obtain immortal honour by your administration of the tribunate. To this end, I must exhort you not to suffer yourself to be turned aside from your natural bias, in compliance with the sentiments and advice of others: on the contrary, let me entreat you to be directed in your ministry by the faithful light of your own superior wisdom. No man indeed is capable of giving you more prudent counsels than will arise from the suggestions of your own good sense: and, believe me, you can never be misguided, so long as you pursue the honest dictates of your uninfluenced judgment. I say not this inconsiderately, but as perfectly well knowing the genius and principles of him to whom I am addressing myself. Yes, my friend, I can never be apprehensive that you will act either weakly or irresolutely, whilst you support the mea-



“ I expect from your letters (as I mentioned in one of my former) not merely an account

Y. R. 702.  
Bef. Chr.  
50.  
401 Cons.



sures your heart approves. It was neither chance nor ignorance that led you to solicit the magistracy in so important a crisis. It was a deliberate and well-considered resolution that engaged you in this design: and you were perfectly sensible of the great and general confusion in which the commonwealth is involved, together with the utter uncertainty in what manner these our unhappy divisions will finally be terminated. You frequently reflect, I doubt not, on the vain, the treacherous, and the pliant dispositions of the present generation. To repeat then what I just now mentioned: let me conjure you to persevere steadfastly in your old principles, to consult the dictates of your own breast, and faithfully to comply with its wise and worthy admonitions. Hardly, perhaps, is any man more qualified than yourself to direct the conduct of others: none, I am sure, to steer your own. Good gods! why am I thus prevented from being a witness of your glorious actions, and an associate of your patriot designs? The latter, I am persuaded, you are far from wanting: however, the strength and warmth of my affection might possibly render the conjunction of my counsels with yours not altogether unprofitable.

“ You will hear from me again very soon, as I purpose in a few days to send an express to the senate, with particulars of the success of my arms during the last summer's campaign. In the mean time you will perceive, by the letter which I delivered to your freedman Thraso, with what zealous pains I have solicited your election to the pontifical dignity: an election indeed which will be attended with much difficulty. I conjure you in return, my dear Curio, not to suffer this my very troublesome provincial administration to be lengthened out beyond the usual period: and I intreat it by all the strong and tender ties of our mutual friendship. When I first made this request to you in person, and several times afterwards repeated it by letter, I had not the least imagination of your being tribune. I then indeed only intreated your good offices as an illustrious senator, and one who stood high in the

Y. R. 702.  
Bef. Chr.  
50.  
401 Cons.

of what is at present going forward in the republic, but a clear prospect of what is likely to happen.—Farewell.”

To satisfy the earnest desire which Cicero had formerly expressed (and which he here again expresses) of being informed of what passed at Rome in his absence, his correspondent wrote several letters to him concerning the state of public affairs; particularly one of the first of August, and, a short time after, another, which refers to it, and which Cicero, by some words in the beginning of the letter now before us, appears to have received: but it is not improbable, that a letter from Cœlius, dated the second of September, and another written in October, full of intelligence, were not yet come to Cicero's hands; and as to that (above \* transcribed) of the eighteenth of November, he had unquestionably not received it; and this perhaps occasioned his apprehensions, that some of Cœlius's letters had miscarried.

\* p. 164.

I doubt not but the reader has a portion of the same curiosity which Cicero had;

favour and esteem of every Roman. But I now apply to Curio, not only as my noble friend, but as a powerful tribune. I do not desire however (what indeed would be more difficult to obtain) that any thing unusual should be decreed in my favour: but, on the contrary, that you would support that decree, and maintain those laws, by which I was appointed to this government. In a word, my single and most earnest request is, that the terms upon which I set out for this province may not be changed. Farewell.”

nor do I know how it can be better gratified, than by adding here, to the letter of the eighteenth of November, the other four, just above mentioned of dates prior to that; or so much of them, at least, as is to the purpose. There will be occasion hereafter to refer to them as the best vouchers of the facts they relate.

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Bef. Chr.  
50.  
401 Cons.

## M. CÆLIUS TO CICERO.

——“Curio is a candidate [for the tribuneship.] This greatly alarms those who are unacquainted with the real good qualities of Curio’s heart. I hope, and indeed believe, he will act agreeably to his professions, and join with the senate in supporting the friends of the republic: I am sure, at least, he is full of these designs at present; in which Cæsar’s conduct has been the principal occasion of engaging him. For Cæsar, though he spares no pains or expense to gain over even the lowest of the people to his interest, has thought fit to treat Curio with singular contempt. The latter has behaved himself with so much temper upon this occasion, that he, who never acted with artifice in all his life, is suspected to have dissembled his resentment, in order the more effectually to defeat the schemes of those who oppose his election; I mean the Lælii and the Antonii, together with the rest of that wonderful party.

Ep. Fam.  
viii. 4.  
Melm. iii.  
32. [dated  
Aug. 1,  
702.]

“I have been so much engaged by the difficulties which have retarded the several elections, that I could not find leisure to write to

Y. R. 702.  
Bef. Chr.  
50.  
401 Cons.

you sooner: and indeed, as I every day expected they would be determined, I waited their conclusion, that I might give you at once an account of the whole. But it is now the first of August, and they are not yet over; the elections of prætors having met with some unexpected delays. As to that in which I am a candidate [the curule ædileship] I can give no account which way it is likely to be decided: only it is generally thought that Hirrus will not be chosen. This is collected from the fate that has attended Vincianus, who was candidate for the office of plebeian ædile. That foolish project of his, for the nomination of a dictator<sup>5</sup>, (which we formerly, you may remember, exposed to so much ridicule) suddenly turned the election against him; and the people, by the loudest acclamations, expressed their joy at his repulse. At the same time Hirrus was universally called upon by the populace to give up his pretensions at the ensuing election. I hope therefore you will very soon hear, that this affair is determined in the manner you have wished with regard to me, but have scarce<sup>6</sup> dared to wish with regard to him.

——“As to the state of the commonwealth, we begin to give up all expectation that the face of public affairs will be changed. How-

<sup>5</sup> Vincianus and Hirrus, elected tribunes for the year 700, were the chief promoters of the project of making Pompey dictator. Vide supra, p. 107 & 139. And vid. Ad Q. Fr. iii. 8.

<sup>6</sup> Because Hirrus was supported by Pompey. Melm.



ever, at a meeting of the senate, held on the twenty-second of the last month, in the temple of Apollo, upon a debate relating to the payment of the forces commanded by Pompey<sup>7</sup>, mention was made of that legion, which, as appeared by his accounts, had been lent to Cæsar : and he was asked of what number of men it consisted, and for what purposes it was borrowed. In short, Pompey was pushed so strongly upon this article, that he found himself under a necessity of promising to recall this legion out of Gaul : but he added at the same time, that the clamours of his enemies should not force him to take this step too precipitately.


Y. R. 702.  
Bef. Chr.  
50.  
401 Cons.

“ It was afterwards moved, that the question might be put concerning the election of a successor to Cæsar. Accordingly the senate came to a resolution, that Pompey (who was just going to the army at Ariminum<sup>8</sup>, and is now actually set out for that purpose) should be ordered to return to Rome with all expedition ; that the affair relating to a general election of governors for all the provinces might

<sup>7</sup> “ Pompey, though he remained in Rome, was at this time governor of Spain ; which had been continued to him for four years at the end of his late consulship. It was the payment of his troops in that province which was under the consideration of the senate.” Plut. in Pomp.

<sup>8</sup> “ Now called Rimini, situated upon the Rubicon, a river which divides Italy from that part of the Roman province called Cisalpine Gaul. The army here mentioned is supposed to be part of those four legions, which were decreed to Pompey for the support of his government in Spain.” Plut. *ibid.*

Y. R. 702.  
Bef. Chr.  
50.  
401 Cons.



be debated in his presence. This point, I imagine, will be brought before the senate on the thirteenth of this month, when, if no infamous obstacles should be thrown in the way by the tribunes<sup>9</sup>, the house will certainly come to some resolution; for Pompey, in the course of the debate, let fall an intimation, that he thought every man owed obedience to the authority of that assembly. However, I am impatient to hear what Paullus, the senior consul elect, will say, when he delivers his opinion upon this question, &c.—Farewell.”

#### MARCUS CÆLIUS TO CICERO.

Ep. Fam.  
viii. 5.  
Melm. iii.  
33. written  
in August.

“How far you may be alarmed at the invasion which threatens your province and the neighbouring countries, I know not; but for myself, I confess, I am extremely anxious for the consequence. Could we contrive indeed, that the enemy’s forces should be only in proportion to yours, and just sufficient to entitle you to the honour of a triumph, there could not be a more desirable circumstance. But the misfortune is, if the Parthians should make any attempt, I well know it will be a powerful one: and I am sensible at the same

Melm.

<sup>9</sup> “Some of the tribunes, together with Sulpicius, one of the present consuls, were wholly in Cæsar’s interest. They thought, or pretended to think, that it was highly unjust to divest Cæsar of his government before the time was completed for which it had been decreed; of which there remained about two years unexpired.” Dio, xl. p. 148.

Y. R. 702.  
 Bef. Chr.  
 50.  
 401 Cons.

time, that you are so little in a condition to oppose their march, that you have scarce troops to defend a single defile. But the world in general will not be so reasonable as to make the proper allowances for this circumstance. On the contrary, it is expected from a man in your station, that he should be prepared for every occurrence that may arise: without once considering whether he be furnished with the necessary supplies for that purpose. I am still the more uneasy on your account, as I foresee the contest concerning affairs in Gaul will retard the nomination of your successor: and, though I dare say you have already had this contingency in your view, yet I thought proper to apprize you of its probability, that you might be so much the more early in adjusting your measures accordingly. I need not tell you the usual artifices will undoubtedly be played off. A day will be appointed for considering of a successor to Cæsar; upon which some tribune will interpose his negative; and that a second will probably declare, that, unless the senate shall be at liberty to put the question freely concerning all the provinces in general, he will not suffer it to be debated with regard to any in particular. And thus shall we be trifled with for a considerable time: possibly, indeed, two or three years may be spun out by these contemptible arts.


“ If any thing new had occurred in public affairs, I should, as usual, have sent you the account, together with my sentiments there-

Y. R. 702.

Ref. Chr.

50.

401 Cons.



upon : but at present the wheels of our political machine seem to be altogether motionless. Marcellus is still pursuing his former designs concerning the provinces : but he has not yet been able to assemble a competent number of senators. Had this motion been brought on the preceding year, and had Curio at the same time been tribune, it would probably have succeeded : but, as affairs are now circumstanced, you are sensible how easy it will be for Cæsar, regardless as he is of the public interest, when it stands in competition with his own, to obstruct all our proceedings. Farewell."

## M. CÆLIUS TO CICERO.

Ep. Fam.

viii. 9.

Melm. iii.

34. [dated

Sept. 2,

702.]

Vid. supra,

p. 177.

——“ I mentioned, in one of my former, that the affair of the provinces would come before the senate on the thirteenth of the last month : nevertheless, by the intervention of [Caius] Marcellus, the consul elect, it was put off to the first of this instant. But, when the day arrived, they could not procure a sufficient number of senators to be present. It is now the second of September, and nothing has yet been done : and I am persuaded it will be adjourned to the following year. As far as I can see, therefore, you must be contented to leave the administration of your province in the hands of some person whom you shall think proper to appoint for that purpose, as I am well convinced you will not soon be relieved by a successor. For, as Gaul must



Y. R. 502.  
 Bef. Chr.  
 50.  
 401 Cons.

take the same fate with the rest of the provinces, any attempt that should be made for settling the general succession will certainly be obstructed by Cæsar's party. Of this I have not the least doubt: and therefore I thought it necessary to give you notice, that you might be prepared to act accordingly. —————

Your friend Pompey openly declares, that Cæsar ought not to be admitted as a candidate for the consulship while he retains his command in the province<sup>1</sup>. He voted however against the passing a decree for this purpose at present. Scipio moved, that the first of March next might be appointed for taking into consideration the nominating a successor in the Gallic provinces; and that this matter should be proposed to the house separately, and without blending it with any other question. Balbus Cornelius was much discomposed at this motion: and I am well assured he has complained of it to Scipio in very strong terms."

<sup>1</sup> "Pompey, who contributed more than any man to the advancement of Cæsar's power, had lately procured a law, by which the personal appearance of the latter was dispensed with, in soliciting the consular office. But Pompey now began to repent:—not that his own designs were more favourable to the liberties of Rome than those of Cæsar: but as discovering at last, that they could not both subsist together." Melm.

Y. R. 702.  
 Bef. Chr.  
 50.  
 401 Cons.

## M. CÆLIUS TO CICERO.

Ep. Fam. .  
 viii. 8.  
 Melm. iv.  
 7. written  
 in October.

—————“ As to public affairs, we had waited several days in expectation that something would be determined concerning Gaul; frequent motions having been made in the senate for this purpose, which were followed by very warm debates. At length, however, it plainly appearing, agreeable to Pompey’s sentiments, that Cæsar’s command in Gaul should not be continued longer than the first of March, the senate passed the following orders and decrees<sup>2</sup>.

“ By authority of the senate, held in the temple of Apollo, on the thirtieth day of September. Signed; L. Domitius Ahenobarbus; Q. Cæcilius; Metellus Pius Scipio; L. Villius Annalis; C. Septimius; Caius Luceius Hirrus; C. Scribonius Curio; L. Atteius Capito; M. Oppius. Whereas a motion was made by Marcus Marcellus, the consul, concerning the consular provinces; it is ordered, that Lucius Paullus and Caius Marcellus, consuls elect, shall, on the first of March, next

Melm.  
 vol. I. p.  
 64.

<sup>2</sup> When an act passed the senate in a full house, held according to the prescribed forms, and without any opposition from the tribunes (who had the privilege of putting a negative upon all proceedings in the senate) it was called a *senatus consultum*, a decree of the senate. But if any of those essentials were wanting, or a tribune interposed, it was then only styled a *senatus auctoritas*, an order of the senate, and considered as of less authority. Manut.

following their entering upon their office, move the senate concerning the consular provinces : at which time no other business shall be proceeded upon, nor any other motion made in conjunction therewith. And for this purpose the senate shall continue to assemble, notwithstanding the comitial<sup>3</sup> days, and until a decree shall be passed.

Y. R. 702.  
Bef. Chr.  
50.  
401 Cons.

“ Ordered, That, when the consul shall move the senate upon the question aforesaid, they shall be impowered to summon such of the three hundred judges, who are members of the senate, to attend.

“ Resolved, that if any matters shall arise upon the question aforesaid, which shall be necessary to be laid before the people, that Servius Sulpicius and Marcus Marcellus, the present consuls, together with the prætors and tribunes of the people, or such of them as shall be agreed upon, shall call an assembly of the people for that purpose : and if the magistrate aforesaid shall fail herein, the same

<sup>3</sup> “ The comitial days were those on which the comitia or assemblies of the people were held : and on these days the law prohibited the senate to be convened. The senate, however, in the present instance, and upon many other occasions, took upon themselves to act with a dispensing power.” See Middl. on the Rom. Sen. p. 121. They had the impudence, as we see, to resolve, that if the tribunes made use of their legal privilege, they should be deemed enemies to the republic. And, what is worthy to be observed, the tribunes, in the present case, were using their legal privilege in support of justice ; the senate were dispensing with the laws in order to injure and oppress. The reader will remark, that Curio is one of those who sign this resolution of the house.

Melm.

Y. R. 702.  
Bef. Chr.  
50.  
401 Cons.

shall be proposed to the people by their successors.

“ The thirtieth day of September, in the temple of Apollo. Signed; L. Domitius Ahenobarbus; Q. Cæcilius; Metellus Pius Scipio; L. Villius Annalis; C. Septimius; C. Scribonius Curio; M. Oppius.

“ The consul, Marcus Marcellus, having moved the senate concerning the provinces.

“ Resolved, That it is the opinion of the senate, that it will be highly unbecoming any magistrate, who has a power of controuling their proceedings, to occasion any hinderance, whereby the senate may be prevented from taking the aforesaid motion into consideration as soon as possible: and that whosoever shall obstruct or oppose the same, shall be deemed an enemy to the republic.

“ Ordered, That if any magistrate shall put a negative upon the foregoing resolution, the same shall be entered as an order of the senate, and again referred to the consideration of this house.

“ This resolution was protested against by Caius Cælius, Lucius Vinicius, Publius Cornelius, and Caius Vibius Pansa.

“ Resolved, That the senate will take into consideration the case of such of the soldiers under Cæsar’s command who have served out their legal time<sup>4</sup>, or who, for other reasons,

Melm.

<sup>4</sup> As the strength of Cæsar’s army in Gaul consisted principally in his veterans, this clause was added, as Gronovius observes, with a view of drawing off those soldiers from his troops.



are entitled to a discharge; and make such order thereupon as shall be agreeable to equity.

Y. R. 702.  
Bef. Chr.  
50.  
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“Resolved, That, if any magistrate should put his negative upon the foregoing decree, the same shall stand as an order of the senate, and be again referred to the consideration of this house.

“This resolution was protested against by Caius Cœlius and Caius Pansa, tribunes of the people.

— “In the debates which preceded these decrees, Pompey let fall an expression that was much observed, and gave us confident hopes of his good intentions. He could not, without great injustice, he said, determine any thing in relation to the provinces under Cæsar’s command, before the first of March: but after that time, he assured the senate he should have no sort of scruple. Being asked, ‘what if a negative should then be put upon a decree of the senate for recalling Cæsar?’ Pompey answered, ‘he should look upon it as just the same thing, whether Cæsar openly refused to obey the authority of the senate, or secretly procured some magistrate to obstruct their decrees.’ ‘But suppose,’ said another member, ‘Cæsar should insist upon being a candidate for the consulship, and, at the same time, of retaining his command?’ ‘Suppose,’ replied Pompey with great temper, ‘my own son should take a stick and beat me?’ From expressions of this kind the world has conceived a notion,

Y. R. 702.  
Bef. Chr.  
50.  
401 Cons.

that a rupture will undoubtedly ensue between Pompey and Cæsar. I am of opinion<sup>5</sup> however, that the latter will submit to one of these two conditions : either to give up his present pretensions to the consulate, and continue in Gaul ; or to resign his command of the province, provided he can be assured of his election. Curio is preparing most strongly to oppose his demands. What he may be able to effect I know not ; but sure I am, that a man who acts upon such patriot principles must gain honour at least, if he gain nothing else  
\_\_\_\_\_.”

Middl. 27.  
Ep. Fam.  
xv. 4.

From Amanus, Cicero led his army to another part of the highlands, the most disaffected to the Roman name, possessed by a stout and free people, who had never been subject even to the kings of that country. Their chief town was called Pindenissum, situated on a steep and craggy hill : it was the constant refuge of all deserters, and the harbour of foreign enemies, and at that very time was expecting and prepared to receive the Parthians. Cicero laid siege to it in form : and though he attacked it with all imaginable vigour, and

Vid. supr.  
p. 157 &  
174.

<sup>5</sup> It is remarkable that Cœlius, the writer of this letter, whom Cicero judged to be an able politician, and to have a longer foresight than any body, was mistaken in almost all his conjectures ; mistaken concerning Cæsar, concerning Curio, and concerning himself. For Cæsar did not submit, &c. and Curio took Cæsar's part ; and so did Cœlius himself in the beginning of the civil war. Cœlius obtained the ædileship this year [702] from his competitor Hirrus, formerly Cicero's competitor for the augurate.

a continual battery of his engines, yet it cost him above six weeks to reduce it to the necessity of surrendering at discretion. The inhabitants were sold for slaves; all the other plunder, excepting the horses, was given to the soldiers.

Y. R. 702.  
Bef. Chr.  
50.  
401 Cons.

After this action, another neighbouring nation, called Tiburani, terrified by the fate of Pindenissum, voluntarily submitted, and gave hostages; so that Cicero sent his army, under the command of his brother, into winter-quarters, in those parts of the province which were thought the most turbulent.

These martial exploits spread Cicero's fame into Syria, where Bibulus was just arrived to take upon him the command; but kept himself close within the gates of Antioch till the country was cleared of all the Parthians: his envy of Cicero's success and title of emperor, made him impatient to purchase the same honour by the like service on the Syrian side of the mountain Amanus: but he had the misfortune to be repulsed in his attempt, with the intire loss of the first cohort, and several officers of distinction, which Cicero calls an ugly blow, both for the time and the effect of it.

Middl. 29.  
Ad Att.  
v. 20.

Though Cicero, for his victory (which he calls a just victory) at Amanus, had been saluted emperor, and had ever since assumed that appellation, yet he sent no public account of it to Rome till after the affair of Pindenissum, an exploit of more eclat and importance; for which he expected the honour



Y. R. 702.

Ad Att.  
vii. 1. and  
Vid. supra,  
p. 169.

of a thanksgiving, and began to entertain hopes even of a triumph. His public letter is lost, but that loss is supplied by a particular narrative of the whole action in a private letter to Cato. His design, in paying Cato this compliment, was to engage his vote and concurrence to the decree of the supplication <sup>6</sup>.

Y. R. 703.

Melm.  
B. v. Let.  
i. Ep. Fam.  
xv. 4. Ed.  
Græv.

After a detail of his proceedings, and successes, from the time of his arrival in the province, he thus continues—"And, now, if a motion should be made in the senate concerning the honours due to the success of my arms, I shall esteem it the highest glory to be supported in my pretensions by your suffrage. I am sensible it is usual for the gravest characters to request, as well as to be requested for, favours of this nature, in the strongest terms: but I persuade myself it will be more proper for me to remind than to solicit you in the present instance. You have frequently indeed, not only distinguished me with your vote, but with your highest applause, both in the senate and in the assemblies of the people. And, believe me, I have ever thought there was so much weight and authority in all you uttered, that a single word of yours in my favour was the highest honour I could possibly receive. I remember upon a certain occasion, when you refused to vote for a public thanksgiving, which was proposed in favour of a very worthy and illustrious citizen, you told the senate, you should will-

<sup>6</sup> Cicero wrote at the same time, for the same end, to C. Claudius Marcellus, and P. Æmilius Paullus, the two consuls of the present year 703.



ingly have given your suffrage in support of the honour in question, had it been designed as a reward for any civil services which that consul had performed in Rome. Agreeably to this maxim, you formerly concurred in-voting that a public thanksgiving should be decreed to me, not indeed for having advanced the glory of our country by my military achievements (for that would have been a circumstance nothing uncommon) but for having, in a most singular and unexampled manner, preserved the liberties of the whole commonwealth without drawing a sword. I forbear to mention the general share you have taken in all the envy, the difficulties, and the dangers, to which my life has been exposed: and a far greater you were willing to have taken, if I could have been prevailed upon to have consented<sup>7</sup>. I forbear to mention likewise that you considered my enemy\* as your own: and that, in order to give me a convincing proof of your great regard, you scrupled not to shew your approbation even of his death, by defending Milo in the senate. In return, (and I speak of it, not as a favour for which you are indebted to me, but as a tribute which I owed to truth) I have been no silent admirer of your virtues: for who indeed can suppress his applause of them? In all my speeches, both


Y. R. 703.  
Bef. Chr.  
49.  
402 Cons.

Vid. *supra*,  
vol. VIII.  
p. 422, &c.

\* Clodius.

<sup>7</sup> This seems to import, that Cato would have concurred in measures to defend Cicero by arms, against the sovereign authority of the people, if Cicero had followed that counsel. But Plutarch reports, that Cato advised Cicero to submit. Plut. in Cat.

Y. R. 703.  
Bef. Chr.  
49.  
402 Cons.



in the forum and in the senate, as well as in the several pieces I have published, either in our own language or in Greek, I have ever represented your character as superior, not only to the noblest amongst our contemporaries, but to the most celebrated in history.


“ After all, you will wonder, perhaps, what should induce me to set so high a value upon these little transient honours of the senate. I will acknowledge then the whole truth, and lay open my heart before you with a freedom becoming that philosophy we cultivate, and that friendship we profess : a friendship delivered down to us from our parents, and improved by many reciprocal good offices.

“ Let me previously observe, that, if ever any man was a stranger to the desire of empty applause and vulgar admiration, it is myself : and this frame of mind, which I possess by temper, has been still strengthened (if I am not deceived) by reason and philosophy. As an evidence of this, I appeal to my consulate ; in which, as in every other part of my life, though I pursued that conduct, I confess, from whence true honours might be derived, yet I never thought they were of themselves an object worthy of my ambition. On the contrary, I refused the government of a very noble province : and, notwithstanding it was highly probable I might have obtained a triumph, yet I forbore to prosecute my pretensions of that kind. I forbore too the offering myself as a candidate for the office of augur :

though you are sensible, I dare say, that I might have succeeded without much difficulty. But I will acknowledge, that the injurious treatment I afterwards suffered, though you always speak of it indeed as a circumstance which reflects the highest honour upon my character, and as a misfortune only to the republic, has rendered me desirous of receiving the most distinguished marks of my country's approbation. For this reason, I solicited the office of augur, which I had before declined : and, as little as I once thought the military honours deserved my pursuit, I am now ambitious of that distinction which the senate usually confers on its successful generals. I will own, I have some view by this means of healing the wounds of my former unmerited disgrace : and therefore, though I just now declared that I would not request your aid on this occasion, I recall my words, and do most earnestly request your suffrage and assistance ; upon the supposition, however, that what I have performed in this campaign shall not appear contemptible in your eyes, but, on the contrary, far superior to the actions of many of those generals who have obtained the most glorious rewards from the senate.

“ I have observed (and you are sensible I always listen with great attention whenever you deliver your opinions) that as often as any question of this nature has come before the senate, you were less inquisitive into the military than civil conduct of the proconsul. It was the political ordinances he had established,

Y. R. 703.  
Bef. Chr.  
49.  
402 Cons.





Y. R. 703.  
Bef. Chr.  
49.  
402 Cons.

and the moral qualities he had displayed, that seemed to have the principal weight in determining your vote. If you should examine my pretensions in this view, you will see, that, with a weak and inconsiderable army, I found a strong defence, against the danger of a very formidable invasion, in the lenity and justice of my government. By these aids I effected what I never could by the most powerful legions: I recovered the friendship of our alienated allies, firmly strengthened their allegiance to the republic, and conciliated their affection at a time when they were waiting the opportunity of some favourable revolution to desert us. But perhaps I have expatiated farther upon this subject than was necessary; especially to you, before whom all our allies in general are accustomed to lay their complaints. To them therefore I refer you for an account of the benefits they have received by my administration. They will all of them, as with one voice, I am persuaded, give you the most advantageous testimony in my favour; but particularly those illustrious clients of yours, the Cyprians<sup>8</sup> and Cappadocians: to whom

Vid. supra,  
p. 162. the  
note.  
Middl.  
21—27.

<sup>8</sup> The debt above mentioned, that was owing from Ariobarzanes to Brutus, was not the only affair which the latter had recommended to Cicero: he had burdened him with another much more troublesome.

The city of Salamis in Cyprus owed to two of his friends, as he pretended, Scaptius and Matinius, above twenty thousand pounds sterling upon bond, at a most extravagant interest; and he begged of Cicero to take their persons and concerns under his special protection. Appius, who was Brutus's father-in-law, had granted every



I may likewise add your great and royal friend, prince Deiotarus. If thus to act is a merit of

Y. R. 703.  
Bef. Chr.  
49.  
402 Cons.

thing which was asked to Scaptius, a prefecture in Cyprus, with some troops of horse, with which he miserably harassed the poor Salaminians, in order to force them to comply with his unreasonable demands: for he shut up their whole senate in the council-room, till five of them were starved to death with hunger. Brutus laboured to place him in the same degree of favour with Cicero: but Cicero, being informed at Ephesus of this violence, by a deputation from Salamis, made it the first act of his government to recall the troops from Cyprus, and put an end to Scaptius's prefecture, having laid it down for a rule, to grant no command to any man, who was concerned in trade, or negotiated money in the province: to give satisfaction however to Brutus, he enjoined the Salaminians to pay off Scaptius's bond, which they were ready to do according to the tenor of his edict, by which he had ordered, that no bond in his province should carry above one per cent. by the month. Scaptius refused to take the money on those terms, insisting on four per cent. as the condition of his bond expressed; which by computation almost doubled the principal sum; while the Salaminians, as they protested to Cicero, could not have paid the original debt, if they had not been enabled to do it by his help, and out of his own dues, that he had remitted to them, which amounted to somewhat more than Scaptius's legal demand.


Ad Att.  
vi. 1.

Ad Att.  
v. 21.

This extortion raised Cicero's indignation; and, notwithstanding the repeated instances of Brutus and Atticus, he was determined to over-rule it; though Brutus, in order to move him the more effectually, thought proper to confess, what he had all along dissembled, that the debt was really his own, and Scaptius only his agent in it. This surprised Cicero still more, and though he had a warm inclination to oblige Brutus, yet he could not consent to so flagrant an injustice, but makes frequent and heavy complaints of it in his letters to Atticus. In one of them he says, "You have now the ground of my conduct; if Brutus does not approve it, I see no reason why we should

Y. R. 703.  
Bef. Chr.  
49.  
402 Cons.

the most superior kind, if, in all ages, the number has been far less considerable of those who



love him; but I am sure it will be approved by his uncle Cato\*." In another, "If Brutus thinks that I ought to allow him four per cent. when by edict I have decreed but one through all the provinces, and that to the satisfaction of the keenest usurers; if he complains, that I denied a præfecture to one concerned in trade, which I denied for that reason to your friend Lanius, and to Sex. Statius, though Torquatus solicited for the one, and Pompey himself for the other, yet without disgusting either of them; if he takes it ill, that I recalled the troops out of Cyprus, I shall be sorry indeed, that he has any occasion to be angry with me; but much more, not to find him the man that I took him to be.—I have not forgot, however, what you intimated to me in several of your letters, that if I brought back nothing else from the province but Brutus's friendship, that would be enough: let it be so, since you will have it so; yet it must always be with this exception, as far as it can be done, without my committing any wrong."—In a third, "How, my dear Atticus, you, who applaud my integrity and good conduct, and are vexed sometimes, you say, that you are not with me, how can such a thing, as Ennius says, come out of your mouth, to desire me to grant troops to Scaptius, for the sake of extorting money? Could you, if you were with me, suffer me to do it, if I would?—If I really had done such a thing, with what face could I ever read again, or touch those books of mine, with which you are so much pleased?" He tells him likewise in confidence, that all Brutus's let-

Ad Att.  
vi. 2.

Ibid. vi. 1.  
& 3.

See Melm.  
Vol. I. p.  
426. note  
12 & 13.  
Vid. supra,  
p. 192.

\* It is very difficult to suppose that Cato was ignorant of his nephew's infamous extortion, and the horrible proceedings of his nephew's agent. For Cato (as Plutarch informs us) having settled a correspondence throughout all the Roman provinces, received constant intelligence of the conduct of the several governors in their respective commands. And the Cyprians had a particular claim to the patronage of Cato, as he had been employed in executing a commission, by which the island was annexed to the dominions of the republic. Cicero, in a letter to Cato, calls them (as we see) "those illustrious clients of yours"—and refers him to them for a testimony of his good conduct in his government, of which Cyprus was a part.

knew how to subdue their desires than to vanquish their enemies, he that has given an instance of both cannot certainly but be deemed, in Cato's estimation at least, to have strengthened his claim to the honours of his country, and to have improved the splendor of his military achievements, by the more unusual lustre of his civil conduct.


“ Let me in the last place, and as in diffidence of my own solicitations, call in philosophy for my advocate ; than which nothing has afforded me a more valuable satisfaction. The truth is, she is one of the noblest blessings that the gods have bestowed on man. At her shrine we have both of us, from our earliest years, paid our joint and equal adorations : and, while she has been thought, by some, the companion only of indolent and secluded speculatists, we (and we alone I had almost said) have introduced her into the world of business, and familiarized her with the most active and important scenes. She therefore it is that now solicits you in my behalf ; and when philosophy is the suppliant,

ters to him, even when he was asking favours, were unmannerly, churlish, and arrogant, without regarding either what or to whom he was writing ; and, if he continued in that humour, “ you may love him alone,” says he, “ you shall have no rival of me ; but he will come, I believe, to a better mind.” But to shew, after all, what a real inclination he had to oblige him, he never left urging king Ariobarzanes till he had squeezed from him a hundred talents, in part of Brutus's debt, or about twenty thousand pounds ; the same sum, probably, which had been destined to Cicero himself.

Y. R. 703.  
Bef. Chr.  
49.  
402 Cons.



Y. R. 703.  
Bef. Chr.  
49.  
402 Cons.



Cato, surely, can never refuse. To say all in one word : be well assured, if I should prevail with you to concur in procuring a decree I so much wish to obtain, I shall consider myself as wholly indebted for that honour to your authority and friendship. Farewell."

Middl. 29.

But Cato was not to be moved from his purpose by these compliments, or motives of friendship : he was an enemy by principle to all decrees of this kind, and thought them bestowed too cheaply, and prostituted to occasions unworthy of them ; so that, when Cicero's letters came under deliberation, though he spoke with all imaginable honour and respect of Cicero, and highly extolled both his civil and military administration, yet he voted against the supplication<sup>9</sup>, which was decreed, however, without any other dissenting voice, except that of Favonius, who loved always to mimic Cato, and of Hirrus, who had a personal quarrel with Cicero : yet, when the vote was over, Cato himself assisted in drawing up the decree, and had his name inserted in it, which was the usual mark of a particular approbation of the thing, and friendship to the person in whose favour it passed. But Cato's answer to Cicero's letter will shew the temper

Ep. Fam.  
xv. 6.

Melm.  
Vol. II.  
p. 5.

<sup>9</sup> Cicero had undoubtedly no claim to the honour he demanded ; and for this reason, among others, because the number of the slain, on the side of the enemy, was not so great as the laws in these cases required ; as is evident from a letter of Cœlius to Cicero on the subject. Vid. Ep. Fam. VIII. ii. Melm. vi. 6.



of the man, and the grounds on which he acted on this occasion.

Y. R. 703.  
Bef. Chr.  
49.  
402 Cons.

M. CATO TO M. T. CICERO, EMPEROR.

“Not only my regard for the republic, but my affection for you, makes me very sincerely rejoice in finding, that you exercise the same integrity and vigilance in the conduct of our arms abroad, as distinguished our administration of your most important affairs at home. I have therefore paid your actions that honour, which, according to my best judgment, was due to them: and, in speaking of them before the senate, as well as afterwards, when I assisted in drawing up the decree in your favour, I ascribed to your probity and prudent conduct the defence of your province, the preservation of the crown and person of Ariobarzanes, and the recovery of the allies to their duty and affection to our empire. If you rather chuse, however, that we should ascribe to the gods those advantages, for which the republic is not at all indebted to fortune, but wholly to your moderation and consummate wisdom, I am glad that the senate has decreed a thanksgiving. But if your willingness to let fortune have the credit of your actions, be for this reason, that you imagine a thanksgiving necessarily opens your way to a triumph, I must observe, that the latter is not always a consequence of the former. Yet granting it were, is it not far more to the honour of a general to have it declared, by a vote of the


Ep. Fam.  
xv. 5.  
Melm. v. 2.

Y. R. 703.

Bef. Chr.

49.

402 Cons.



senate, that he preserved his province by the mildness and equity of his administration, than that he owed it either to the strength of his troops, or to the favour of the gods? Such, at least, were my sentiments when this question came before the house: and if I have employed more words than usual in explaining them, it was from a desire of convincing you, that, though I proposed to the senate what I thought would be most for the advantage of your reputation, I rejoice that they have determined what is most agreeable to your wishes. I have only to request the continuance of your friendship; and to intreat you steadily to persevere in those paths of integrity, which you have hitherto pursued, both in respect to our allies, and to the republic<sup>1</sup>. Farewell.”

Melm.

Vol. I. p.

431. n. 1.

<sup>1</sup> “This letter (to speak in virtuoso language) is an unique, and extremely valuable, as being the only composition that has been transmitted to us from the hands of Cato. It confirms what Plutarch expressly asserts, that Cato’s manners were by no means of a rough and unpolished cast, as no refusal could have been drawn up in more decent and civil terms. A judicious eye, however, cannot but discern, through this veil of politeness, the nice touches of a delicate and concealed raillery.”—— Nevertheless, as Cicero had a farther suit to make to the senate, in the demand of a triumph, he chose to dissemble his resentment, and returned the following civil answer to Cato.

## TO MARCUS CATO.

Ep. Fam.

xv. 6.

Melm. vi.

10.

“Praise from thy lips ’tis mine with joy to boast:  
He best can give it who deserves it most:”

“As Hector, I think, says to the venerable Priam in one of Nævius’s plays. Honourable indeed is that applause

Cæsar was not displeased, perhaps, to hear of Cato's stiffness, as it might naturally create

Y. R. 703.

Middl. 31.

Ad Att.

vii. 2.

which is bestowed by those who have themselves been the constant objects of universal approbation. Accordingly, I esteem the encomiums you conferred upon me in the senate, together with your congratulatory letter, as a distinction of the highest and most illustrious kind. Nothing could be more agreeable to my wishes, as nothing could be more glorious for my reputation, than your having thus freely given to friendship whatever you could strictly give to truth. Were Rome entirely composed of Catos, or could it produce many (as it is surprising it can furnish even one) of that venerable character, my desires would be amply satisfied: and I should prefer your single approbation to all the laurels and all the triumphal cars in the universe. In my own judgment, indeed, and according to the refined estimate of true philosophy, the compliments you paid me in the senate, and which have been transmitted to me by my friends, are undoubtedly the most significant distinction I can possibly receive. I acquainted you, in my former letter, with the particular motives which induced me to be desirous (for I will not call it ambitious) of a triumph. And if the reasons I have assigned will not, in your opinion, justify a warm pursuit of that honour, they must prove, at least, that I ought not to refuse it, if the senate should make me the offer. And I hope that assembly, in consideration of my services in this province, will not think me undeserving of a reward so usually conferred. If I should not be disappointed in this hope, my only request is, (what indeed you kindly promise) that, as you have paid me the honour you thought most to my glory, you would rejoice in my obtaining those which are most to my inclination. And this disposition you have already very sincerely shewn, not only by your letter, but by having signed the decree that has passed in my favour. For decrees of this kind, I know, are usually subscribed by those who are most in the interests of the person to whose honour they are voted. I will only add, that I hope to see you very soon; and may I find the re-

Y. R. 703.  
Bef. Chr.  
49.  
402 Cons.

a coldness between him and Cicero : for, in a congratulatory letter to Cicero upon the success of his arms, and the supplication decreed in his honour, he aggravated the rudeness and ingratitude of Cato. Cicero himself was highly disgusted at it, especially when Cato, soon afterwards voted a supplication to his son-in-law Bibulus. "Cato," says Cicero, "was shamefully malicious ; he gave me what I did not ask, a character of integrity, justice, and clemency, but denied me what I did.—Yet this same man voted a supplication of twenty days to Bibulus : pardon me if I cannot bear this usage."

Middl. 58.  
Ad Att.  
vi. 8.

Cicero, in writing afterwards to Atticus on the same subject, says, "Consider what you would advise me with regard to a triumph, to which my friends invite me : for my part, if Bibulus, who, while there was a Parthian in Syria, never set a foot out of the gates of Antioch, any more than he did upon a certain occasion out of his own house<sup>2</sup>, had not solicited a triumph, I should have been quiet ; but now it is a shame to sit still." Again, "As to a triumph, I had no thoughts of it before Bibulus's most impudent letters, by which he obtained an honourable supplica-

Vid. supra,  
vol. VIII.  
p. 364.

Ad Att.  
vii. 2.

public in a happier situation than what my fears presage ! Farewell."

<sup>2</sup> N. B. This is that Bibulus, of whose lot, when the contempt he met with abroad made him shut himself up in his own house, Cicero once said, or pretends to have said, even in the presence of Pompey, that he preferred it, unhappy as it might appear, to all the splendid triumphs of the most victorious general. Vide supra, p. 75.



tion. If he had really done all that he has written, I should rejoice at it, and wish well to his suit; but for him, who never stirred beyond the walls while there was an enemy on this side the Euphrates<sup>3</sup>, to have such an honour decreed; and for me, whose army inspired all their hopes and spirits into his, not to obtain the same, will be a disgrace to us; I say to us, joining you to myself: wherefore I am determined to push at all, and hope to obtain all."

Y. R. 703.  
Bef. Chr.  
49.  
402 Cons.

The remaining part of Cicero's government was employed in the civil affairs of the province, where his whole care was to ease the several cities and districts of that excessive load of debts, in which the avarice and rapaciousness of former governors had involved them. He laid it down for the fixed rule of his administration, not to suffer any money to be expended either upon himself or his offi-

Middl. 33.  
Ad Att.  
v. 21.

<sup>3</sup> After the contemptible account which Cicero gives of Bibulus's conduct in Syria, it must appear strange to see him honoured with a supplication, and aspiring even to a triumph: but this was not for any thing that he himself had done (for he had suffered\* a defeat) but for what, before the arrival of Bibulus, his lieutenant Cassius had performed against the Parthians; the success of the lieutenants being ascribed always to the auspices of the general, who reaped the reward and glory of it: and as the Parthians were the most dangerous enemies of the republic, and the more particularly dreaded at this time for their late victory over Crassus, so any advantage gained against them was sure to be well received at Rome, and repaid with all the honours that could reasonably be demanded.

Middl. 15.


\*Vid. supr.  
p. 187.  
Vid. supra,  
p. 162,  
163, 164.

Y. R. 703.

Bef. Chr.

49.

402 Cons.



cers : and when one of his lieutenants, L. Tullius, in passing through the country, exacted only the forage and firing which was due by law, and that but once a-day, and not, as all others had done before, from every town and village through which they passed, he was much out of humour, and could not help complaining of it, as a stain upon his government, since none of his people besides had taken even a single farthing. All the wealthier cities of the province used to pay to all their proconsuls large contributions, for being exempted from furnishing winter quarters to the army : Cyprus alone had paid yearly, on this single account, two hundred talents, or about forty thousand pounds : but Cicero remitted this whole tax to them, which alone made a vast revenue ; and applied all the customary perquisites of his office to the relief of the distressed province : yet for all his services and generosity, which amazed the poor people, he would accept no honours but what were merely verbal, prohibiting all expensive monuments, as statues, temples, brazen horses, &c. which, by the flattery of Asia, used to be erected of course to all governors though never so corrupt and oppressive. While he was upon his visitation of the Asiatic districts, there happened to be a kind of famine in the country ; yet wherever he came, he not only provided for his family at his own expense, but prevailed with the merchants and dealers who had any quantity of corn in their storehouses, to supply the people with it on easy

terms; living himself all the while splendidly and hospitably, and keeping an open table, not only for all the Roman officers, but the gentry of the province. In the following letter to Atticus, he gives him a summary view of his manner of governing.

Y. R. 703.  
Bef. Chr.  
49.  
402 Cons.

“ I see,” says he, “ that you are much pleased with my moderation and abstinence; but you would be much more so, if you were with me; especially at Laodicea, where I did wonders at the sessions, which I have just held, for the affairs of the dioceses, from the thirteenth of February to the first of May. Many cities were wholly freed from all their debts; many greatly eased; and all, by being allowed to govern themselves by their own laws, have recovered new life. There are two ways, by which I have put them in a capacity of freeing, or of easing themselves at least from their debts; the one is by suffering no expense at all to be made on the account of my government. When I say none at all, I speak not hyperbolically: there is not so much as a farthing: it is incredible to think, what relief they have found from this single article. The other is this; their own Greek magistrates had strangely abused and plundered them. I examined every one of them who had borne any office for ten years past: they all plainly confessed; and without the ignominy of a public conviction, made restitution of the money, which they had pillaged: so that the people, who had paid nothing to our farmers for the present lustrum, have now paid the ar-

Ad Att.  
vi. 2.



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rears of the last, even without murmuring. This has placed me in high favour with the publicans: a grateful set of men, you will say: I have really found them such.—The rest of my jurisdiction shall be managed with the same address, and create the same admiration of my clemency and easiness<sup>4</sup>. There

Cibb. p.  
178.

Vid. supra,  
p. 154.

<sup>4</sup> Surely a corrupt and vicious taste for glory was never more visible in any man than it is in Cicero, when he affects to despise \* his provincial government of Cilicia; where he had done more good and deserved more praise, than in any one scene of his life; having, agreeably to his determined purpose, when he entered upon that employment, so conducted himself as to leave the innocence and integrity of his administration for a pattern of government to all succeeding proconsuls. But, though he had there (as our late laureate observes) “thrown into actual practice those various virtues, of which, as a private man, he had hitherto only recommended the precepts; yet so quiet, so confined an eminence, such simplicity of virtue, alas! had no charms for Cicero. The thing itself was quite disagreeable to his temper. And truly a temper more delicately difficult to please we seldom meet with; yet was not this distaste more extraordinary than the reasons for it.—‘The whole affair is too inconsiderable for a man of my strength and capacity, who am able to sustain, as I used to do, the weightier business of the republic.’ [*Is-tum negotium non est dignum viribus nostris, qui majora onera, in republica, sustinere et possem et solem.*”]

This weightier business of the republic, if we consider the whole political conduct of Cicero, we must observe to be mere party business; nothing more than employing his

Ep. Fam. ii.  
12.  
Melm. vi. 4.

\* When just setting out from his province for Italy, he writes thus to Cœlius: “Rome, my friend, Rome alone, is the object that merits your attention: and may you ever live within the splendour of that illustrious scene! All foreign employments (and it was my sentiment from my first entrance into the world) are below the ambition of those who have talents to distinguish themselves on that more conspicuous theatre. And would to God, as I was ever well convinced of this truth, I had always acted accordingly.”



is no difficulty of access to me, as there is to all other provincial governors; no introduction by my chamberlain: I am always up before day, and walking in my hall, with my doors open, as I used to do when a candidate at Rome: this is great and gracious here; though not at all troublesome to me, from my old habit and discipline, &c——”<sup>5</sup>.

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utmost eloquence to defend the senate in its usurpations upon the rights of the people, and to defend every super-egregious villain who professed himself his admirer, or to be of the aristocratical faction; because, so long as the senate governed with sovereign authority, so long Cicero, by the means of that same eloquence, had a considerable share in the government.

For, as to what the laureate imagines, that Cicero's great object was “to mend the morals of Rome, an enterprise not within the reach of human policy, benevolence, or wisdom to effect,” it does not appear that Cicero had any such chimerical project. Ill qualified must he have been for a reformer of manners, who made it his business to screen from punishment the most notorious violators of the laws, even corrupt judges, that sold decrees. Vid. vol. VIII. p. 343 & 352. He employed his eloquence to defend Antonius, of whose robberies he shared the profit; he defended Vatinius and Gabinius, men whom he himself had branded for knaves; and, as we have seen, was ready to defend Catiline, if Catiline would have requested that favour. Vid. vol. VIII. p. 191. Even in the suppression of Catiline's conspiracy, which he for ever boasts of as the most glorious of all exploits, his manner of doing it was absolutely illegal and inexcusable, and of so pernicious a tendency, that he seems richly to have deserved the banishment to which he was condemned on that account. Vide vol. VIII. p. 290, the note; and 312.


Vid. vol.

VIII. p.

367.

<sup>5</sup> What pity it is that a man who knew so well what was right, and could occasionally conform his conduct so strictly to it, should appear, even by his own account of himself, to have had no better motive for so doing than

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Middl. 36.

Ad Att.  
vi. 1.Vid. infra,  
p. 216.

Middl. 40.

But Cicero's method of governing gave no small umbrage, it seems, to his predecessor Appius, who considered it as a reproach upon himself, and sent several querulous letters to Cicero, because he had reversed some of his constitutions: "And no wonder," says Cicero, "that he is displeased with my manner; for what can be more unlike than his administration and mine? Under him the province was drained by expenses and exactions; under me, not a penny levied for public or private use: What shall I say of his præfects, attendants, lieutenants? Of their plunders, rapines, injuries? Whereas now, there is not a single family governed with such order, discipline, and modesty, as my province. This some of Appius's friends interpret ridiculously, as if I was taking pains to exalt my own character, in order to depress his; and doing all this, not for the sake of my own credit, but of his disgrace."

Cicero's letters to Appius make one book of his familiar epistles, the greatest part of which are of the expostulatory kind, on the subject of their mutual jealousies and complaints. In this slippery state of their friendship, an accident happened at Rome, which had like to have put an end to it. His daughter mere vain-glory, and the desire of applause; and should be all the while a detestable hypocrite, a villain in his heart, and so shameless as to make no scruple to own to his intimate friend, that he practised falsehood and hypocrisy without scruple, and as a necessary means to the living comfortably in the world. We shall meet with this confession very soon, in one of his letters.

ter Tullia, after parting from her second husband Crassipes, as it is probably thought, by divorce, he being alive at this time, and under Cicero's displeasure, was married, in her father's absence, to a third, P. Cornelius Dolabella: several parties had been offered to her, and, among these, Tib. Claudius Nero, who afterwards married Livia, whom Augustus took away from him: Nero made his proposals to Cicero in Cilicia, who referred him to the women, to whom he had left the management of that affair; but, before these overtures reached them, they had made up the match with Dolabella, being mightily taken with his complaisant and obsequious address. He was a nobleman of patrician descent, and of great parts and politeness; but of a violent, daring, ambitious temper, and, by a life of pleasure and expense, greatly distressed in his fortunes; which made Cicero very uneasy when he came afterwards to know it. Dolabella, at the time of his marriage, for which he made way also by the divorce of his first wife, gave a proof of his enterprising genius, by impeaching Appius Claudius of practices against the state in his government of Cilicia, and of bribery and corruption in his suit for the consulship. This put a great difficulty upon Cicero, and made it natural to suspect that he privately favoured the impeachment, where the accuser was his son-in-law: but, in clearing himself of it to Appius, though he dissembled in disclaiming any knowledge of that match, yet he was very sincere in pro-

Y. R. 703.

Ad Att.  
vii. 1.

Ibid. vi. 6.

Ep. Fam.  
viii. 6.

Ib. iii. 12.

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Bef. Chr.  
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fessing himself an utter stranger to the impeachment, and was in truth, for his own sake, greatly disturbed at it. But as from the circumstance of his succeeding to Appius in his government, he was of all men the most capable of serving or hurting him at the trial, so Pompey, who took great pains to screen Appius, was extremely desirous to engage Cicero on their side, and had thoughts of sending one of his sons to him for that purpose: but Cicero saved them that trouble, by declaring early and openly for Appius, and promising every thing from the province that could be of any service to him: so that Appius, instead of declining a trial, contrived to bring it on as soon as he could; and with that view, having dropt his pretensions to a triumph, entered the city, and offered himself to his judges, before his accuser was prepared for him: he was acquitted, without any difficulty, of both the indictments.

The following letters not only lay before us the base hypocritical conduct of Cicero, with regard to Appius and Dolabella, but contain several important particulars of what at this time was doing at Rome in relation to Pompey and Cæsar, and the approaching breach between them.

#### MARCUS CÆLIUS TO CICERO.


Ep. Fam.  
viii. 6.  
Melm. v.  
5.

“ You have been informed, I doubt not, that Dolabella has exhibited articles of impeachment against Appius: and this prose-




cution seems to be more agreeable to the world in general than I imagined. Appius however has acted with great prudence upon the occasion: for, as soon as his adversary had lodged his information, he withdrew his petition for a triumph, and immediately entered the city. By this means he silenced the reports to his disadvantage; as he appeared more willing to take his trial than his prosecutor expected. Appius relies greatly, in this conjuncture, upon your assistance: and I am persuaded, you are not disinclined to serve him. You have it now in your power to do so, as far as you shall think proper: though I must add, you would be more at liberty to limit your good offices toward him, if you and he had never been ill together. But as the case now stands, were you to measure out your services by the right he has to demand them, it might be suspected that you were not sincere in your reconciliation: whereas you can hazard no censure by obliging him, as you will shew that you are not to be discouraged from acting a generous part, even where friendship might incline you to the contrary. This reminds me of acquainting you, that Dolabella's wife obtained a divorce just upon the commencement of this prosecution. I remember the commission<sup>6</sup> you left with me,

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<sup>6</sup> It seems very evident from this passage, that there was some prospect of a divorce between Dolabella and his wife before Cicero left Rome; and that Cicero had commissioned Cœlius, in case this event should happen, to take some measures for procuring a match between Dolabella and his daughter Tullia. Melm. Vol. I. p. 438.

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when you set out for the province : as I dare say, you have not forgotten what I afterwards wrote to you concerning that affair. I have not time to enlarge upon it at present : only let me advise you, how much soever you may relish the scheme, to wait the event of this trial, before you discover your sentiments. If, indeed, your inclinations should be known, it will raise a very invidious clamour against you : and should you give Dolabella the least intimation of them, they will certainly become more public than will be convenient either for your interest or your honour. He would undoubtedly be unable to conceal a circumstance so advantageous to his present views, and which would give so much credit to the prosecution in which he is engaged : and, I am persuaded, he would scarce refrain from making it the subject of his conversation, notwithstanding he was sure the discovery would prove to his prejudice.

“ Pompey, I am told, interests himself extremely in behalf of Appius ; insomuch that it is generally imagined he has a design of sending one of his sons to solicit you in his favour. Meanwhile we are in the humour here of acquitting all criminals : nothing, in truth, so base and so villanous can be perpetrated, that is not sure of escaping punishment. You will perceive how wondrously active our consuls are in their office, when I tell you that they have not yet been able to procure a single decree of the senate, except one for appointing the Latian festivals. Even

our friend Curio has not hitherto acted with any spirit in his tribunate: as indeed it is impossible to describe the general indolence that has seized us. If it were not for my contest with the vintners, and the surveyors of the public aqueducts, all Rome would appear in a profound lethargy. In short, I know not to what degree the Parthians may have animated you: but as for us, in this part of the world, we are fast asleep. But how much soever we may want to be awakened, I hope it will not be by the Parthians. It is reported nevertheless, though I know not on what foundation, that they have gained some slight advantage over the troops of Bibulus near mount Amanus.


Y. R. 703.  
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Vid. supr.  
p. 187.

“ Since I wrote the above, I must recall what I said concerning Curio: the cold fit is at length expelled by the warmth of those censures to which the levity of his conduct has exposed him. For, not being able to carry his point with respect to the intercalation [for which he had applied himself to the pontifical college, in order to lengthen out the period of his tribunician ministry] he has deserted the interest of the senate, and harangued the people in favour of Cæsar. He threatens likewise to propose a viarian law, somewhat of the same tendency with the agrarian, which was formerly attempted by Rullus: as also another, empowering the ædiles to distribute corn among the people.

“ If you should determine (as I think you ought) to employ your good offices in behalf

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of Appius, I beg you would take that opportunity of recommending me to his favour. Let me prevail with you likewise not to declare yourself with respect to Dolabella; as your leaving that point at large will be of singular importance, not only to the affair I hint at, but also in regard to the opinion the world will entertain of your justice and honour.

“ Will it not be a high reflection upon you, if I should not be furnished with some Grecian panthers? Farewell.”

#### TO MARCUS CÆLIUS.

Ep. Fam.  
ii. 11.  
Melm. v.  
12.

“ Would you imagine I should ever be at a loss for words? I do not mean of that chosen and elegant kind which are the privilege of you celebrated orators, but those of ordinary and common use. Yet, believe me, I am utterly incapable of expressing the solicitude I feel concerning the resolutions that may be taken in the senate in regard to the provinces. I am extremely impatient indeed to return to my friends at Rome: among which number you are principally in my thoughts. I will confess likewise, that I am quite satiated with my government. For, in the first place, I have more reason to apprehend that some reverse of fortune may deprive me of the glory I have here acquired, than to expect I should be able to raise it higher; and, in the next place, I cannot but look upon the whole business of this scene as much inferior to my strength; which is both able and accustomed to support a far



more important weight. I will acknowledge too, that I am uneasy in the expectation of a very terrible war [with the Parthians] which is like to be kindled in this part of the world; and which I may probably escape, if I should obtain my dismissal at the stated time.

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
“I do not forget the panthers you desired; and have given my orders to the persons usually employed in hunting them: but these animals are exceedingly scarce with us. They take it so unkind, you must know, that they should be the only creatures in my province for whom any snares are laid, that they have withdrawn themselves from my government, and are gone into Caria.—Be well assured the honour of your ædileship is much my care: and this day particularly reminds me of it, as it is the festival of the Megalensian games,” [which were under the conduct of the curule ædiles, of whom Cœlius was now one. The festival began on the fourth of April, and continued six days.]

“I hope you will send me a minute detail of our public affairs: as I have an entire dependence on the accounts which are transmitted to me by your hand. Farewell.”

#### TO MARCUS CÆLIUS, CURULE ÆDILE.

“Your very agreeable letters visit me but seldom: perhaps by some accident or other they lose their way. How full was the last \* which came to my hands of the most prudent and obliging advice! I had determined indeed

Ep. Fam.  
ii. 13.  
Melm.  
v. 15.  
\* Vid. supr.  
p. 208.

Y. R. 703.  
Bef. Chr.  
49.  
402 Cons.  


to act in the manner you recommend: but it gives an additional strength to one's resolutions, to find them agreeable to the sentiments of so faithful and so judicious a friend. I have often assured you of my extreme affection for Appius: and I had reason to believe, after our mutual reconcilment, that he entertained the same favourable disposition towards me. For he distinguished me, in his consulate, with great marks of honour and amity.—I appeal to you, that I was not wanting, on my part, in a suitable return: and, indeed, he stood so much the higher in my esteem, as I was sensible of the affection he had conceived for you. Add to this, that I am, as you well know, wholly devoted to Pompey, and tenderly attached also to Brutus. Can I then want a reason of uniting myself with Appius, thus supported, as he is, by the most powerful friends and alliances, and flourishing in every other advantage that can be derived from affluent possessions, in conjunction with great abilities?—Believe me, I have never said or done the least thing, throughout the whole course of my government, with a view of prejudicing his reputation. And now, that my friend Dolabella has so rashly attacked him, I am exerting all my good offices to dissipate the rising storm with which he is threatened. You mentioned something of a lethargic inactivity that had seized the republic. I rejoiced, no doubt, to hear that you were in a state of such profound tranquillity, as well as that our spirited friend\* was so much infected

\* Curio.

with his general indolence, as not to be in a humour of disturbing it. But the last paragraph of your letter, which was written, I observed, with your own hand, changed the scene, and somewhat indeed discomposed me. Is Curio really then become a convert to Cæsar? But, extraordinary as this event may appear to others, believe me, it is agreeable to what I always suspected. Good gods! how do I long to laugh with you at the ridiculous farce which is acting in your part of the world!

“I have finished my juridical circuit; and not only settled the finances of the several cities upon a more advantageous basis, but secured to the farmers of the revenues the arrears due to their former agreements, without the least complaint from any of the parties concerned. In short, I have given entire satisfaction to all orders and degrees of men in this province. I propose, therefore, to set out for Cilicia on the seventh of May. From whence, after having just looked upon the troops in their summer cantonment, and settled some affairs relating to the army, I intend, agreeably to the decree of the senate for that purpose, to set forward to Rome. I am extremely impatient, indeed, to return to my friends; but particularly to you, whom I much wish to see in the administration of your ædileship. —Farewell.”

Y. R. 703.  
Bef. Chr.  
49.  
402 Cons.

Y. R. 703.  
Bef. Chr.  
49.  
402 Cons.

## TO APPIUS PULCHER.

Ep. Fam.  
iii. 10.  
Melm.  
vi. 1.


“When I first received an account of the ill-judged prosecution which had been commenced against you, it gave me great concern; as nothing could possibly have happened that I less expected. But, as soon as I had recovered from my surprise, I was well satisfied that you will easily disappoint the malice of your enemies; as I have the highest confidence in your own judicious conduct for that purpose; as well as a very great one in that of your friends. I see many reasons, indeed, to believe, that the envy of your adversaries will only brighten that character they meant to sully. Though I cannot but regret, that they should have thus snatched from you an honour you so justly merit, and of which you had so well-grounded an assurance; the honour I mean of a triumph. However, you will shew your judgment if you should consider this pompous distinction in the light it has ever appeared to my own view: and at the same time enjoy a triumph of the completest kind in the confusion and disappointment of your enemies: as I am well convinced, that the vigorous and prudent exertion of your power and influence will give them full reason to repent of their violent proceedings. As for myself, be well assured (and I call every god to witness the sincerity of what I promise) that I will exert my utmost interest in support, I will not say of your person, which I




hope is in no danger, but of your dignities and honour. To this end I shall employ my best good offices for you in this province, where you once presided; and employ them with all the warmth of an intercessor, with all the assiduity of a relation, with all the influence of a man, who, I trust, is dear to those cities, and with all the authority of one who is invested with the supreme command. In a word, I hope you will both ask and expect of me every service in my power: and, believe me, I shall give you greater proofs of my affection than you are disposed, perhaps, to imagine. Notwithstanding, therefore, the letter I received from you by the hands of Quintus Servilius was extremely short, yet I could not but think it much too long: for it was doing an injury to the sentiments of my heart, to suppose you had any occasion to solicit my assistance. I am sorry you should have an opportunity of experiencing, by an incident so little agreeable to you, the rank you bear in my affection; the esteem which I entertain for Pompey, whom I justly value above all men, and the measure of my unfeigned regard for Brutus: circumstances, I should hope, of which our daily intercourse had rendered you sufficiently sensible. However, since it has so happened, I should think I acted a most unworthy, not to say a criminal part, if I were to omit any article wherein my services can avail you.

“ Pontinius remembers the singular instances of friendship he has received from you,

Y. R. 703.  
Bef. Chr.  
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and of which I myself was a witness<sup>7</sup>, with all the gratitude and affection to which you have so undoubted a right. The urgency of his affairs had obliged him, though with great reluctance, to leave me. Nevertheless, having been informed, just as he was going to embark at Ephesus, that his presence in this province might be of advantage to your cause, he immediately returned back to Laodicea. I am persuaded you will meet with numberless such instances of zeal upon this occasion: can I doubt then that this troublesome affair will prove, in the conclusion, greatly to your credit?

“ If you should be able to bring on an election of censors, and should exercise that office in the manner you certainly ought, and for which you are so perfectly<sup>8</sup> well qualified, you can never want that authority in the republic which will afford at once a protection both to yourself and your friends. Let me intreat, therefore, your most strenuous endeavours to prevent my administration from being prolonged: that, after having filled up the measure of my affectionate services to you here, I may have the satisfaction also of presenting them to you at Rome.

<sup>7</sup> Pontinius met with so strong an opposition to his claim of a triumph for quelling the Allobroges, and particularly from Cato, that it was four years before his petition was granted. Appius was then consul, and favoured him. Vid. *supra*, p. 106.


<sup>8</sup> N. B. Cicero, while he wrote this, thought no man less qualified for the office than Appius: whose projects of reformation are a subject of ridicule to him and his correspondent Cœlius. Ep. Fam. viii. 14.

“ I read with pleasure, though by no means with surprise, the account you gave me of that general zeal which all orders and degrees of men have shewn in your cause: a circumstance of which I had likewise been informed by my other friends\*. It affords me great satisfaction to find, that a man, with whom I have the honour and pleasure to be so intimately united, is thus distinguished with that universal approbation he so justly deserves. But I rejoice in this upon another consideration likewise; and as it is a proof that there still remains a general disposition in Rome to support the cause of illustrious<sup>9</sup> merit: a disposition, which I have myself also experienced, upon every occasion, as the honourable recompense of my pains and vigils in the public service. But I am astonished that Dolabella, a young man whom I formerly rescued with the utmost difficulty from the consequences of two capital impeachments, should so ungratefully forget the patron to whom he owes all that he enjoys, as to be the author of this ill-considered prosecution of my friend. And what aggravates the folly of his conduct is, that he should thus adventure to attack a man, who is distinguished with the highest honours, and supported by the most powerful friendships; at the same time that he himself (to speak of him in the softest terms) is greatly deficient in both these respects. I had received an account from our friend Cœlius, before your letter reached my hand, of the idle

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\* Vid. supr.  
p. 208.

<sup>9</sup> The illustrious merit of Appius we have seen above. Melm. Vid. supra, p. 206.

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and ridiculous report he has propagated, and on which you so largely expatiate. There is so little ground, however, for what he asserts, that be assured I would much sooner break off all former friendship with a man who had thus declared himself your enemy, than be prevailed upon to engage with him in any new connexions<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> “ Nothing could be more distant from Cicero’s heart than what he here pretends. For there is the strongest evidence to believe that it was his fixed intention, at this very time, to enter into an alliance with Dolabella; and, in fact, Tullia was married to him soon after the date of this letter. Cicero affirms, I must acknowledge, in an epistle to Atticus, that this transaction was entirely without his knowledge: but he seems to have dealt as insincerely upon this occasion with his bosom friend, as he too frequently did with all the world beside. Accordingly he assures Atticus, he so little expected the news of his daughter’s match, that he was actually in treaty for the disposal of her to another person. But, if the latter part of this assertion were true, it aggravates his dissimulation; for the former most evidently was false. For, not to mention the great probability there is that he left a commission with Cœlius, when he set out for the province, relating to the marriage in question, it appears that he had received more than one letter from him upon this subject, before he wrote the last-mentioned to Atticus; and consequently that he could not have been so much a stranger to the affair as he chose to represent himself. For Cicero’s answer to the letter of Cœlius, concerning this treaty with Dolabella, is extant, and it cannot be dated later than the beginning of May in the present year: because he mentions the seventh of that month as a future day, on which he proposed to return from another part of his province into Cilicia. But the letter to Atticus must have been written in the latter end of the same year, because he takes notice in it of the death of Hortensius. Now he was not informed of that event till he came to Rhodes, in his voyage from Cilicia; as he himself tells us in the intro-

Ad Att.  
xi. 6.

Vid. *supr.*  
p. 209.



“ You have not the least reason to doubt of my zeal to serve you ; of which I have

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duction of his oratorical treatise, inscribed to Brutus. If Cicero then was capable of thus disguising the truth concerning Dolabella, to the nearest and most valuable of his friends ; it is no wonder he should not scruple to act a still more counterfeit part in all that he says of him to Appius.

“ And this dissimulation he very freely acknowledges to Cœlius, who indeed was in the whole secret of the affair ; as it was by his intervention that it seems to have been principally conducted. Accordingly Cicero, taking notice to Cœlius of the letter now before us, which he tells him was written in consequence of the information he had received from him, expresses himself in the following remarkable words : What would you have said, had you seen the letter I wrote to Appius after my receiving yours upon that subject ? *Quid si meam (sc. epistolam,) legas quam ego tum ex tuis literis misi ad Appium ? sed quid agas ? sic vivitur :* which, in plain English, amounts to this, That, if a man will live in the world, he must submit to the lowest and most contemptible hypocrisy\*. And it must be owned that Cicero, in the present instance, as well as in most others, acted up to the full extent of his maxim.” Ad Att. vi. 6. Ep. Fam. viii. 6. De Clar. Orator. i. Ep. Fam. ii. 15.

Vid. infra,  
P. 223.

The letter to Cœlius, in which we find this convenient maxim, contains the following passage :

—“ It is with great pleasure I find that Dolabella enjoys the happiness of your esteem and friendship. I was at no loss to guess the circumstance to which you alluded when you mentioned your hopes, that the prudence of my daughter Tullia would temper his conduct.” M. Bayle observes, that Cœlius’s letter to Cicero, concerning Dolabella (whom Cœlius knew to be a rake and a spendthrift) is exactly in the style of compliment that would now be used in the like case. “ *On excuseroit le passé sur la*

Ep. Fam.  
ii. 15.  
Melm.  
vi. 15.

Article  
Tullie.

\* How admirably well does this maxim accord with those words in the above letter—“ The probity of my heart, a disposition in me worthy of those sublime contemplations to which I have devoted myself from my earliest youth.”

Y. R. 703.  
Bef. Chr.  
49.  
402 Cons.

given many conspicuous testimonies in this province, as well as at Rome: your letter, nevertheless, intimates some sort of suspicion of the contrary. — — —

“ If ever you experienced the probity of my heart, or observed a disposition in me worthy of those sublime contemplations to which I have devoted myself from my earliest youth; if ever you discovered, by my conduct in the most important transactions, that I was neither void of spirit nor destitute of abilities, you ought to have believed me incapable of acting a low and little part towards my friends, much more a base and a treacherous one — —

“ But abstracted from these numerous and powerful motives, there is one, which, of itself, might be sufficient to evince the disposition in which I stand towards you. For, tell me,

*jeunesse; et si l'on n'osoit pas assurer que toutes les imperfections de cet age fussent corrigées, on diroit que le mariage avec une personne si accomplie, avec la fille d'un si excellent pere, acheveroit la guerison.”* The letter runs thus:

MARCUS CÆLIUS TO CICERO.

Ep. Fam.  
viii.  
Melin.  
vi. 1.

“ I congratulate you on your alliance with so worthy a man as Dolabella: for such I sincerely think him. His former conduct, it is true, has not been altogether for his own advantage. But time has now worn out those little indiscretions of his youth: at least, if any of them should still remain, the authority and advantage of your advice and friendship, together with the good sense of Tullia, will soon, I am confident, reclaim him. He is by no means, indeed, obstinate: and it is not from any incapacity of discerning better, whenever he deviates from the right path. To say all in one word, I infinitely love him.”

did ever any man entertain, or had ever any man reason to entertain, so high an esteem for another, as that which you know I am filled with for the illustrious father-in-law of your daughter? If personal obligations indeed can give him a title to these sentiments; do I not owe to Pompey the enjoyment of my country, my family, my dignities, and even my very self<sup>2</sup>?—

Y. R. 703.  
Bef. Chr.  
49.  
402 Cons.

—“ Upon the whole, as you are united, not only by alliance, but by affection to my illustrious friend; what are the sentiments, do you imagine, that I ought to bear towards you? The truth of it is, were I your professed enemy, as I am most sincerely the reverse, yet, after the letter which I lately received from Pompey, I should think myself obliged to sacrifice my resentment to his request, and be wholly governed by the inclinations of a man to whom I am thus greatly indebted.——I expect every day to hear that you are chosen censor, &c.—Farewell.”

In a subsequent letter to Appius, he writes thus——


“ Whilst I lay encamped on the banks of the Pyramus [a river in Cilicia] I received two letters from you, and both at the same time.—

Ep. Fam.  
iii. 11.  
Melm.  
iii. 11.

<sup>2</sup> “ Cicero by no means thought himself so much obliged to Pompey as he here pretends: and all these extravagant professions were a mere artifice (and a thin one it must be owned) to make Pompey believe that he had forgotten the ill usage he had formerly received from him.” Vid. ad Att. ix. 13.

Melm.

Y. R. 703.  
Bef. Chr.  
49.  
402 Cons.



Vid. supr.  
p. 206.

Vid. supr.  
p. 222.

One of them was dated on the fifth of April; but the other, which seemed to have been written later, was without any date. I will answer the former therefore in the first place, wherein you give me an account of your having been acquitted of the impeachment exhibited against you for mal-administration in this province. I had before been apprised of many circumstances of this event by various letters and expresses, as well as by general report.—But notwithstanding your letter was in some measure anticipated, yet it heightened my satisfaction to receive the same good news from your own hand. My information was by this means not only more full than what I had learnt from common fame, but it brought you nearer to my imagination, and rendered you in some sort present to those sentiments of joy which arose upon this occasion in my heart. Accordingly, I embraced you in my thoughts, and kissed the letter that gave me so much reason to rejoice upon my own account as well as upon yours. I say, upon my own account, because I look upon those honours, which are thus paid by the general voice of my country to virtue, industry, and genius, as paid to myself; being too much disposed, perhaps, to imagine that these are qualities to which my own character is no stranger. But, though I am by no means surprised that this trial should have ended so much to your credit, yet I cannot forbear being astonished at that mean and unworthy spirit which carried your enemies to engage



in this prosecution.” [hinting at Dolabella, whose friendship and alliance Cicero was at this time courting.]—“Farewell: and if you are (as I sincerely hope) in the possession of the censorial office, reflect often on the virtues of your illustrious ancestor \*.”

Y. R. 703.  
Ref. Chr.  
49.  
402 Cons.

\* App.  
Claud.  
Cæcus.  
Dio, p.  
147.

In a little time after Appius's trial he was chosen censor, together with Piso, Cæsar's father-in-law, the last men who bore that office during the aristocracy, or rather the anarchy of Rome. Clodius's law, mentioned above, which had greatly restrained the power of these magistrates, was repealed the last year by Scipio the consul (Pompey's father-in-law), and their ancient authority restored to them, which was now exercised with great rigour by Appius: who, though really a libertine, and remarkable for indulging himself in all the luxury of life, yet, by an affectation of severity, hoped to retrieve his character, and passed for an admirer of that ancient discipline, for which many of his ancestors had been celebrated. But this vain and unseasonable attempt of reformation served only to alienate people from Pompey's cause, with whom Appius was strictly allied: whilst his colleague Piso, who foresaw that effect, chose to sit still, and suffer him to disgrace the knights and senators at pleasure, which he did with great freedom, and, among others, turned Sallust the historian out of the senate, and was hardly restrained from putting the same affront upon Curio. This added strength to Cæsar; of whom both the senate and Pom-

Vid. vol.  
VIII. p.  
410.

Middl. 42.

Ep. Fam.  
viii. 14.

Dio, p.  
150.

pey were at this time become extremely jealous: the senate, because of Cæsar's amazing victories, which made him idolized more than ever by the people: Pompey, because Cæsar, as in all other accomplishments, so even in military virtue, appeared now to be his superior beyond compare.

## CHAP. IX.

*The war of Cæsar in Gaul, commenced in the year 695, and continued to the year 703.*

C. J. Cæs.  
de Bell.  
Gall. Com.  
lib. i.

GAUL (without including the Roman province) was, at the time of Cæsar's going thither, divided into three principal parts, Aquitain, Celtic Gaul, and Belgic Gaul.

Aquitania.

Aquitain, the smallest of the three, was bounded on the north by the river Garonne, on the south by the Pyrenees, on the west by the ocean, and on the east by the Roman province\*.

\* Contain-  
ing almost  
all Pro-  
vence and  
Languedoc.

Gallia  
Celtica.

The largest of the three, named Celtic Gaul, because inhabited by a people who called themselves Celtæ, though by the Romans they were called <sup>3</sup> Galli [Gauls], had for its boundaries the ocean on the west, the Rhine on the east, the Garonne on the south, and the Seine and the Marne on the north.

The two last named rivers made the south-

<sup>3</sup> Cæsar very rarely, if ever, gives the name of Gauls to the people of Aquitania or of Gallia Belgica. Crev.

ern boundary of Belgic Gaul. On its other sides it was encompassed by the British channel and the Lower Rhine.

Gallia  
Belgica.

Each of these nations had its distinct language, customs, and laws. Of the three, the Belgæ (or Belgic nation) were the most warlike, because situated the most remote from the refinements and luxury of the Roman province, and because continually engaged in war with their neighbours, the Germans, on the other side the Rhine.

For the same reason the Helvetii were distinguished above the rest of the Celtæ for their bravery, being almost constantly, either as aggressors, or as acting on the defensive, at war with the Germans.

The people  
of Switzer-  
land.

In the consulship of M. Messala and M. Piso [Y. of R. 692.] Orgetorix, the most opulent and most illustrious of the Helvetian nobles, formed a singular project of ambition. Having first gained to his purpose the principal men of the state, he exhorted the people to remove all together in a body out of their own country; representing to them, that, as they surpassed all the other Celtæ in bravery, they would find it easy to acquire the sovereignty over the whole country of Celtic Gaul. To this proposal the Helvetii listened the more readily, not only because they thought themselves confined within limits too narrow for their number (their territory being only a hundred and forty miles in length, and eighty in breadth) but because, being bounded on one side by the Rhine, a broad and

\* Mount  
St. Claude.

† Inhabit-  
ants of  
Franche  
Comté.  
‡ Lake of  
Geneva.

deep river ; on another by Mount Jura \*, a high ridge of hills that runs between them and the Sequani † ; and on the side of the Roman province by the lake ‡ Lemán and the river Rhone, they could not easily make hostile incursions on their neighbours, which restraint was a great grievance, a ground of much discontent to a numerous people that took delight in war.

Moved by these considerations, and by the authority and persuasions of Orgetorix, they presently resolved to set about the providing of all necessaries for the projected migration. They imagined two years would be sufficient for these preparations, and they obliged themselves by a law to begin their march on the third. The whole management of this design was committed to Orgetorix, who undertook an embassy to two of the neighbouring states, the Sequani and Ædui, in order to establish peace and amity with them. As his aim was to make himself king of his own nation, he took this opportunity to persuade Casticus, whose father had for many years reigned over the Sequani, and been styled friend by the senate and people of Rome, to possess himself of the same regal authority which his father had held. He likewise persuaded Dumnorix the Æduan (brother of Divitiacus, at that time the leading man in the state, and greatly beloved of the people) to aspire to royalty, and he gave him his daughter in marriage.

The people  
of Autun.

The three entered into strict engagements



to assist and support one another in their respective schemes; and they entertained the flattering hope, that, having once brought those to effect, they should afterwards, with their united forces, easily get possession of all Celtic Gaul.

It happened, that the ambitious design of Orgetorix, to raise himself to empire at home, became known to his countrymen: upon which discovery his person was seized, and a capital process commenced against him. Had he been found guilty, the law condemned him to be burnt alive: but, on the day appointed for his trial, his relations, servants, clients, and debtors, assembling in a body to the number of ten thousand, rescued him out of the hands of justice. The people, provoked at this contempt of the laws, resolved to support the authority of them; and the magistrates had collected a considerable force for that purpose, when Orgetorix died suddenly: it was given out he perished by his own hand.

The Helvetii, notwithstanding the death of the projector, continued to pursue the project of migration with the same diligence as before: when they had furnished themselves with provisions for three months, and completed their other preparations, they burnt all their towns, twelve in number; their boroughs and villages, amounting to four hundred; and what corn they could not carry off; that, having thus banished all thoughts of returning to their own country, they might proceed

in their enterprise with the more determined courage. Before their departure, they strengthened themselves by allies and companions (who after their example, and at their persuasion, burnt and destroyed their respective dwellings), the Rauraci, Tulingi, Latobrigi, and a swarm of Boii from Norica<sup>4</sup>.

There were only two ways by which they could march out of their own country : one through the territories of the Sequani, between mount Jura and the Rhone, narrow and difficult, insomuch that in some places a single file of waggons could hardly pass. The impending mountain was besides very high and steep, so that a handful of men would be sufficient to stop them. The other lay through the Roman province, far easier and readier, because the Rhone, which flows between the confines of the Helvetii and the

<sup>4</sup> The first were the people of Basil who then made part of the Helvetic body. The second and third were neighbours of the Helvetii. This is all we know of them with certainty. The Boii were originally inhabitants of the Bourbonnois, colonies of whom had settled in Germany and in Italy. Norica was Bavaria, and part of Austria. Crev.

After the total defeat of this multitude, a roll, written in Greek characters, was found in their camp, and brought to Cæsar. It contained a list of all who had set out upon this expedition, not only of those who were able to bear arms, but of the children, women, and old men. By this list it appeared, that the number of the Helvetii was two hundred and sixty-three thousand; of the Tulingi thirty-six thousand; of the Latobrigi fourteen thousand; of the Rauraci twenty-three thousand; of the Boii thirty-two thousand; in all three hundred and sixty-eight thousand.

Allobroges\*, a people lately subjected to the Romans, but seeming not yet well affected to their government, was in some places fordable: and Geneva, a frontier town of the Allobroges, had a bridge which belonged to the Helvetii, whose country bordered upon theirs. The Helvetii therefore doubted not of obtaining a passage, either by persuasion or by force, through the territories of the Allobroges. Their general rendezvous was to be on the banks of the Rhone; and the day they fixed for it was the twenty-eighth of March, in the consulship of Piso and Gabinus.

\* Inhabitants of Savoye and Dauphiné.

[Year of Rome 695.]

Cæsar, having notice of these proceedings, and that it was the design of the Helvetii to attempt a passage through the Roman province, hastened his departure<sup>5</sup> from Rome;

<sup>5</sup> We see by this account, which is from Cæsar himself, that the reason of his sudden and expeditious journey, from his quarters near Rome into Transalpine Gaul, was the intelligence he received of the motions and purposes of the Helvetii; who had fixed upon the twenty-eighth of March for their rendezvous on the banks of the Rhone, which they were to pass by the bridge at Geneva: and that he arrived at Geneva time enough to prevent their passage, by breaking down the bridge, receive an embassy from the Helvetii, and, by deferring his answer to the thirteenth of April, gain time sufficient to assemble forces out of the province, and draw up lines sixteen feet high, and nineteen miles in length, before the said thirteenth of April: we cannot, therefore, well suppose, that he left the neighbourhood of Rome much later than the middle of March.

Nevertheless M. Crevier, who all along seems (like Dr.

and, posting by great journeys into Farther Gaul, came to Geneva. He began with

Crevier,  
tom. xii.  
p. 202.

Middleton) to be strongly biassed by prepossession and prejudice against Cæsar, finds a different reason from what Cæsar himself gives, for his going suddenly and in haste to his province; and gives that journey a different date. He writes thus:—"Cæsar, having driven from the commonwealth the two men he most feared [Cicero and Cato], had no longer any reason to stay in the neighbourhood of the city, but had reason to remove from it: for the partisans of the aristocracy, beginning to recover from the consternation they had been thrown into by the consulship of Cæsar, and the violence exercised towards Cicero, thought of bestirring themselves to do something against the oppressor of the public liberty. Two of the prætors, L. Domitius and C. Memmius, would have the acts of Cæsar's consulship submitted to the examination of the senate, in order to their being annulled. His quæstor was prosecuted, and he himself attacked by the tribune Antistius; but he implored the aid of the other tribunes, that he might have the benefit of the law which sheltered from all prosecutions those who were absent in the service of the state: and he made haste to get away."

Crevier,  
tom. xii.  
p. 181,  
182.

Cæsar is here represented as running away from the neighbourhood of Rome, like a criminal who feared to be arrested and brought to punishment;—not a word of the Helvetii:—and this running away, which (as was just now observed) could not well be later than about the middle of March, was, according to M. Crevier, some time in April: for he tells us that Cicero went from Rome by night in the beginning of April, and that Cæsar did not leave the neighbourhood of Rome till he had driven Cicero from thence.

Now what authority has M. Crevier for contradicting Cæsar's account of the reason which induced him to go away on a sudden, and in haste, to his province, and of the time when he went? Suetonius is the only author cited, an historian remarkable for delighting in detraction, and for having no regard to the order of events, nor even to probability, in many things which he relates. But it happens in the present instance, that, though Suetonius says something not true, he does not say that for



breaking down the bridge over the Rhone; and, as there was at that time but one Roman

which he is cited. He does not say that Cæsar staid in the neighbourhood of Rome till he had driven Cicero out of it\*; that is, till the month of April; he does not postpone to that time the motion made in the senate by the two prætors; but speaks of it as made in the beginning of January: nor does he represent Cæsar as having any apprehension of danger from that motion; but, on the contrary, as consenting to have the senate take cognizance of the acts of his consulship [*cognitionem senatui detulit*]. And, according to Suetonius, the prosecution, begun against Cæsar's quæstor, and the attack, made by the tribune Antistius upon Cæsar himself, were not before his sudden departure from the neighbourhood of Rome, but after it.——*Functus consulatu, C. Memmio, Lucioque Domitio prætoribus, de superioris anni actis referentibus, cognitionem senatui detulit; nec illo suscipiente, triduoque per irritas altercationes absumpto, in provinciam abiit: & statim quæstor ejus in præjudicium aliquot criminibus arreptus est. Mox & ipse a L. Antistio tribuno plebis postulatus, appellato demum collegio, obtinuit, cum reip. causa abesset, reus ne fieret. Ad securitatem ergo posteritatis, in magno negotio habuit obligare semper annuos magistratus, & è competitoribus non alios adjuvare, aut ad honorem pati pervenire quam qui sibi pepigissent, propugnatos absentiam suam: cujus pacti non dubitavit a quibusdam jusjurandum, atque etiam syngrapham exigere.* [The last part of this tale appeared, I presume, too ridiculous to Dr. Middleton and M. Crevier, to be adopted by them, notwithstanding their great dislike of Cæsar.]

\* Plutarch in Cæs. tells us, that such a report there was.

Sueton. J. Cæs. 23.

Doctor Middleton conforms his relation to Suetonius, as to the time when the motion was made in the senate by the two prætors: but does not conform it either to Suetonius, or to Cæsar, as to the time when Cæsar went to his province: for the doctor places this journey after Cicero's departure into banishment, that is, in the month of April: whereas Suetonius places it in January, and Cæsar himself, manifestly, not later than about the middle of March.

The doctor's words are these: "Cæsar continued at Rome till he saw Cicero driven out of it [i. e. according

Middl. 337.

legion in Transalpine Gaul, he ordered great levies to be made throughout the whole province. The Helvetii, being informed of his arrival, deputed several noblemen of the first rank to wait upon him in the name of the state, and represent, “That they meant not to offer the least injury to the Roman province; that necessity alone had determined them to the design of passing through it, because they had no other way by which to direct their march; that they therefore entreated they might have his permission for that purpose.” But Cæsar did not think proper to grant their request: however, that he might gain time, till the troops he had ordered to be raised could assemble, he told the ambassadors he would consider of their demand; and that, if they returned by the thirteenth of April, they should have his final answer. Mean while, with the legions he

\* See  
Middl. 350.  
Sueton. J.  
Cæs. 23.

to the doctor, till about the end of March\*]: but had no sooner laid down his consulship [on the last day of December preceding] than he began to be attacked and affronted himself by two of the new prætors, L. Domitius and C. Memmius, who called in question the validity of his acts, and made several efforts in the senate to get them annulled by public authority. But the senate had no stomach to meddle with an affair so delicate; so that the whole ended in some fruitless debates and altercations [which had lasted only three days]: and Cæsar, to prevent all attempts of that kind in his absence, took care always, by force of bribes, to secure the leading magistrates in his interests; and so went off to his province of Gaul.”—I do not see how these last words, “and so went off,” &c. can be reconciled with Cæsar’s continuing at Rome till he saw Cicero driven out of it. The doctor seems not consistent with himself.

then had, and the soldiers that came in to him from all parts of the province, he raised a rampart sixteen feet high, and nineteen miles in length, with a ditch from the lake Lemanus, into which the Rhone discharges itself, to mount Jura, which divides the territories of the Sequani from those of the Helvetii. This work finished, he strengthened it with redoubts from space to space, and manned them with troops. When the ambassadors, on the appointed day, returned for an answer, he told them, that he could not, consistently with the usages of the people of Rome on the like occasions, grant any foreign troops a passage through the province: and he let them see, that, should they attempt it by force, he was prepared to oppose them.

The Helvetii, driven from this hope, endeavoured, some by the means of boats fastened together, and of floats which they had prepared in great abundance, others by the fords of the Rhone, where was the least depth of water, to force a passage over the river; sometimes by day, oftener in the night: but, being constantly repulsed by the strength of the works thrown up, and by flights of darts, they at last abandoned the attempt. One way still remained, which was through the territories of the Sequani, but so narrow, that, without the consent of the natives, they could not pass. Not able to prevail by their own persuasions, they sent ambassadors to Dumnorix the Æduan, that, through his intercession, they might obtain this favour of the

Sequani. Dumnorix, by his popularity and generosity, had great influence with the Sequani, and was also well affected to the Helvetii, because he had married an Helvetian, the daughter of Orgetorix. Besides, he was framing to himself schemes of ambition, and wanted to have as many states as possible bound to him by offices of kindness. He readily therefore undertook the negotiation, and he obtained for the Helvetii the liberty of passing through the territories of the Sequani, the two nations mutually giving hostages to secure their not molesting or injuring each other during the march.

Cæsar had intelligence of their design; which was to pass through the countries of the Sequani and Ædui into the territories of the Santones\*, which border upon those of the Tolosati†, a state that made part of the Roman province. He foresaw many inconveniencies likely to arise to the Romans, should they have for their neighbours, in an open and plentiful country, a people ill-affected to them, and of a martial disposition. Leaving, therefore, the care of the new works he had raised to T. Labienus, his lieutenant, he himself hastened by great journeys into Italy. There he raised two legions, and drew three more, that were cantoned round Aquileia, out of their quarters; and with these five legions took the nearest way over the Alps into Farther Gaul. The mountaineers opposed his passage, but without effect: he descended into the country of the

\*Sain-  
tonge.

† People of  
Toulouse.



Vocontii\*, traversed the territories of the Allobroges, crossed the Rhone, entered upon the lands of the Segusiï† and all this with such expedition, that he overtook the Helvetii at the passage of the Arar‡.

\* Le Diois.

† Le Lyonnais.

‡ The Saône.

They had marched their forces through the narrow pass of mount Jura, and the territories of the Sequani: and were at this time actually employed in passing the Arar. Cæsar, informed by his scouts, that three parts of their forces were got over the river, and that the fourth, which was the canton of the Tigurini, still remained on this side, left his camp about midnight, with three legions, and came up with the troops of the enemy that had not yet passed. As he found them unprepared for fighting, and encumbered with their baggage, he attacked them immediately, and put a great number of them to the sword: the rest fled, and sheltered themselves in the nearest woods.

The people of Zurich.

The forces of this very canton, about fifty years before, had vanquished and killed the consul L. Cassius, and obliged his army to pass under the yoke. “Thus,” says Cæsar, “whether by chance or the direction of the immortal gods, that part of the Helvetic state, which brought so signal a calamity upon the Roman people, was the first to feel the weight of their resentment.” In this case, Cæsar revenged not only the public, but likewise his own domestic injuries; because in the same battle where Cassius fell,

Vid. vol. VII. p. 144.

was slain also his lieutenant, L. Piso, the grandfather of L. Piso, Cæsar's father-in-law.

After this victory, Cæsar, throwing a bridge over the river, led his army, without delay, in pursuit of the enemy. The Helvetii, dismayed at his sudden approach, as he had spent only one day in crossing the river, which they had not, without the utmost difficulty, accomplished in twenty, sent an embassy to him, at the head of which was Divico, who had been general of the Helvetii in the war against Cassius. He addressed Cæsar in words to this effect :

“ If you are disposed to conclude a peace, we are willing to go and settle in what country you shall think fit to assign us. But, if you persist in the resolution of making war, you will do well to call to mind the disgrace which befell the Romans heretofore, and the experienced bravery of the Helvetic nation.”

Cæsar answered : “ I have the less doubt concerning what will be the issue of a war, as I do bear in mind that disaster to which you refer, and which I well know to have happened to the Romans undeservedly. Had they been conscious of any injury by them committed, had they done any thing which could give them cause to fear, they would have kept themselves upon their guard ; a conduct which admitted of no difficulty.— But, were I inclined to forget old injuries, can you expect I should forget likewise your late insult in attempting, against my will, to

force a passage through the Roman province, and your ravaging<sup>6</sup> the territories of the Ædui, Ambarri, and Allobroges? Your boasting so insolently of the victory over Cassius, is an additional provocation of my resentment. However, if you will make satisfaction to the Ædui and their allies, for the devastations committed in their countries, as also to the Allobroges, and will give hostages for the performance of your promises, I am ready to conclude a peace with you." Divico replied: "The Helvetii are accustomed to receive hostages, not to give them; and no people are better apprized of this than the Romans." He said, and retired.

The next day the Helvetii decamped: Cæsar did the same; and, to observe their motions, sent forward all his horse, which, to the number of four thousand, he had drawn together from the province, and the countries of the Ædui and their allies. The cavalry pressing too close upon the rear of the enemy, the latter seized a moment, when they had the advantage of the ground, turned suddenly upon their pursuers, and put them to the rout, with some slaughter of the most advanced. Elated by this success, as having, with no more than five hundred horse, repulsed so great a multitude, they began to assume a bolder appearance, and frequently to face the Romans. Cæsar

<sup>6</sup> Of this injury the sufferers had sent complaints to Cæsar.

kept back his men from fighting, thinking it sufficient for the present to straiten the enemy's forages. In this manner the armies marched for fifteen days together : between the Roman van and the rear of the Helvetii the distance did not exceed five or six miles.

In the mean time Cæsar daily pressed the Ædui for the corn which they had promised in the name of the public : for, by reason of the coldness of the climate, he was so far from finding the corn ripe in the fields, that there was not even sufficient forage for the horses. Neither could he receive those supplies which were coming to him by the Arar ; because the Helvetii had turned off from that river, and he was determined not to quit the pursuit of them. The Ædui, to conceal from him the motive of their conduct, sometimes pretended that the corn was bought up, and ready to be sent ; sometimes that it was actually on the way : but, when he saw no end of these delays, and that the day approached for delivering corn to the troops, he called together the Æduan chiefs, of whom he had a great number in his army, and among the rest Divitiacus, and their supreme magistrate<sup>7</sup> Liscus. Cæsar reproached them severely for not having taken care to supply him in so pressing a conjuncture, and while the enemy was so near : adding, that, as he had engag-

<sup>7</sup> This supreme magistrate, styled *vergobret* in the language of the country, was created annually, and had a power of life and death.



ed in that war chiefly at their request, he had the greater reason to complain of their request.

Hereupon Liscus thought proper to declare what he had hitherto concealed, "That there were some among them, who, though but private men, had yet more authority with the people than the magistrates themselves: that those men had, by artful and seditious speeches, alarmed the multitude, and persuaded them to keep back their corn; insinuating, that, if their own state could not obtain the sovereignty of Gaul, it would be better for them to obey the Helvetii, Gauls like themselves, than the Romans; there not being the least reason to question but the Romans, after having subdued the Helvetii, would deprive the *Ædui* too, with all the rest of the Gauls, of their liberty: that the very same men gave intelligence to the enemy of whatever the Romans designed or transacted in their camp; his authority not being sufficient to restrain them: that he was not ignorant of the danger to which he exposed himself by the discovery he now made, compelled to it by necessity; his silence being no longer consistent with the safety of the state."

Cæsar perceived that Dumnorix, the brother of Divitiacus, was pointed at by this speech: but not thinking it advisable that these matters should be debated in the presence of so many witnesses, he speedily dismissed the council, retaining only Liscus; whom he

then questioned on what he had just said; and was answered with great courage and freedom. He put the same questions to others; who all confirmed the truth of what Liscus had told him, that Dumnorix was a man of an enterprising spirit, fond of revolutions, and in great favour with the people because of his liberality: that he had for many years farmed the customs, and other public revenues of the Ædui, at a very low price; no one daring to bid against him: that by this means he had considerably increased his estate, and was enabled to extend his bounty to all about him: that he constantly kept a great number of horsemen in pay, who attended him wherever he went: that his influence was not confined merely to his own country, but extended likewise to the neighbouring states: that the better to support his interest, he had married his mother to a man of principal rank and authority among the Bituriges\*, matched his sister, and the rest of his kindred, into other the most powerful states; and had himself taken a wife from among the Helvetii: that he favoured and wished well to the Helvetii on the score of that alliance, and personally hated Cæsar, and hated the Romans, because by their arrival his power had been diminished, and his brother Divitiacus restored to his former credit and authority: that, should the Romans be overthrown, he was in great hopes of obtaining the sovereignty by means of the Helvetii. On the contrary, should they pre-

\* People  
of Bourges.

vail, he must not only give up these hopes, but even all expectation of retaining the influence he had already acquired.

Cæsar learnt also, that, in the late engagement, Dumnorix, who commanded the Æduan cavalry, was the first who fled, and by his flight struck a terror into the rest of the troops; and that it was he who had procured for the Helvetii a passage through the territories of the Sequani; and had effected an exchange of hostages between the two nations: and that he had done these things not only without permission from his own state, but even without their knowledge: all this, together with his being accused by the chief magistrate of the Ædui, seemed to Cæsar a sufficient ground for taking cognizance of the matter himself, or ordering the state to proceed against him. One thing, however, restrained him a while from coming to any resolution, his regard for Divitiacus, the delinquent's brother, a man of singular probity, a faithful ally of the Roman people, and a friend of Cæsar's. That he might not wound a man for whom he had so great a value, Cæsar sent for him, and, having removed the usual interpreters, spoke to him by C. Valerius Procillus, a prince of the Roman province, his intimate friend. He reminded Divitiacus of what, in his own presence, had been said of his brother Dumnorix in the council of the Gauls, adding the later informations which he had received against him in private; and Cæsar earnestly



requested of Divitiacus to consent, that either he himself or the state might take the matter into consideration. Divitiacus, embracing Cæsar, begged of him with many tears not to come to any severe resolution against his brother. “What you have heard is all true, and I myself have more reason than any man to be dissatisfied with him. At a time when my authority was great, both at home and in the other provinces of Gaul, and my brother, because of his youth, but little considered, I employed my interest to bring him into credit: and though Dumnorix has made use of the power he acquired by my means to diminish my favour with the people, yet I still find myself swayed by my affection for him, and by my regard for the public esteem: for, should my brother meet with any rigorous treatment from you, while I myself possess so large a share of your favour, all men will believe it done with my consent, and the minds of the Gauls be for ever alienated from me.”

Cæsar, observing his concern, took him by the hand, bid him say no more, comforted him, and assured him that, for his sake, he would overlook not only the injuries done to himself, but to the republic. He then sent for Dumnorix, and in his brother's presence declared the subjects of complaint he had against him, and admonished him to avoid for the future giving any ground for suspicion; adding, that he would pardon what was past for the sake of his brother: Cæsar



appointed, however, some persons to have an eye over his behaviour, and to observe what company he frequented.

The same day having learnt by his scouts, that the enemy had posted themselves under a hill, eight miles from his camp, he sent out a party to view the ground, and examine the ascent of the hill. These reporting it to be extremely easy, he detached, about midnight, his lieutenant Labienus, (to whom he imparted the design he had formed) with two legions, and with the same men for guides, who, the day before, had examined the ground, to take possession of the summit of the hill. At three o'clock in the morning, having first sent forward his cavalry, he himself followed with the foot. He had directed Considius, an officer of reputation, who had served in the army of Sylla, and afterwards in that of Marcus Crassus, to go with the scouts to reconnoitre.

At day-break, when Labienus had executed his commission, and Cæsar was within a mile and a half of the enemy's camp, they knowing nothing yet either of his or Labienus's approach, Considius came galloping back, and assured Cæsar, that the summit of the hill was possessed by the enemy, and that he had seen the Gallic ensigns there.

Cæsar retired to a rising ground, and drew up his men in order of battle. Labienus, whose instructions were not to engage the enemy till he saw the rest of the army approaching, that the attack might be made on

all sides at the same time, having gained the top of the hill, waited the arrival of the Roman main body, without stirring from his post. The day was far spent before Cæsar learnt from his scouts that Considius, blinded by his fear, had made a false report, and that the enemy had decamped. The rest of that day Cæsar followed the enemy, and pitched his camp within three miles of them.

Autun.

The next day, as the time drew near for delivering out corn to the army, and as he was not above eighteen miles from Bibracte \*, the capital of the Ædui, where he hoped to find sufficient supplies for the subsistence of his troops, he quitted the pursuit of the Helvetii, and directed his march thither. The enemy, informed of this motion by some deserters, and either ascribing it to fear, because Labienus, though possessed of the higher ground, had not attacked them the day before; or flattering themselves with the hopes of intercepting Cæsar's provisions, all on a sudden changed their resolution, and, instead of continuing their march, began to pursue and harass the rear-guard of the Romans. Cæsar retired to a hill, and sent his cavalry to sustain the charge, while he drew up his forces in battalia. His four veteran legions he ranged in three lines towards the middle of the ascent; and above them he posted his two legions newly raised in Cisalpine Gaul, and all the auxiliaries; in such wise, that the whole hill was covered with his troops: the baggage was committed to

the care of those on the upper ground. The Helvetii repulsed the Roman cavalry, formed themselves into a phalanx, and advanced in close order to attack the Roman van.

Cæsar, having sent away first his own horse, and then the horses of all his officers, that, by making the danger equal, no hope might remain but in victory, encouraged his men, and began the charge. The Romans, who fought from the higher ground, pouring their darts upon the enemy, easily broke their phalanx, and then fell upon them sword in hand. The battle was bloody, and continued for a long time doubtful; but the enemy being at length obliged to give way, one part withdrew towards a hill, and the rest sheltered themselves behind their carriages, which they had drawn together into one place before they began the battle. During this whole action, though it lasted from one o'clock in the afternoon till evening, no man saw the back of an enemy. The fight was renewed with great obstinacy at the carriages, and continued till the night was far spent. After a long dispute, the Romans got possession of the baggage and camp of the enemy. A son and daughter of Orgetorix were found among the prisoners. Only one hundred and twenty thousand of the Helvetii survived this defeat; who, retreating all that night, and continuing their march without intermission, arrived on the fourth day in the territories of the Lingones\*. The Romans, detained by the care of looking after their wounded, and of

\* The people of Langres.



burying their dead, continued upon the spot three days : but Cæsar sent messengers and letters to signify to the Lingones, that, if they would avoid drawing upon themselves the same calamities which the Helvetian fugitives were under, they must not furnish them with corn or other necessities : and, after three days' repose, he set forward to pursue the enemy.

The Helvetii, compelled by an extreme want of all things, sent ambassadors to him to treat about a surrendry. These meeting him on the way, and throwing themselves at his feet, in suppliant terms, and with many tears, begged for peace. Cæsar gave them no express answer at that time ; he only ordered that the Helvetii should wait for him in the place where they then were ; which they accordingly did. Upon his arrival, he demanded hostages, their arms, and the slaves who had deserted to their camp. Upon their complying with these terms, they were admitted to a surrendry. The Helvetii, Tulingi, and Latobrigi, he ordered to return to their own countries, and rebuild the towns and villages they had burnt : and because, having lost all the corn, they were utterly destitute of subsistence, he gave it in charge to the Allobroges to supply them. Cæsar's design, in sending the Helvetii home, was that their lands might not be left unoccupied, and the Germans, dwelling on the other side the Rhine, be thereby tempted to pass over and take possession of them ; by which they would



become neighbours to the Allobroges, and the Roman province in Gaul. The Boii, at the request of the Ædui themselves, who esteemed them highly on account of their courage, were permitted to settle in the Æduan territories, where lands were assigned them, and they were, by degrees, admitted to all the rights and privileges of natives.

The war with the Helvetii being ended, ambassadors from all parts of Gaul, men of principal consideration in their several states, waited upon Cæsar to congratulate his success, which, they said, had been highly advantageous to Gaul in general, the Helvetii having left their own country with a view to make all the other states tributary to them; and these ambassadors requested, on the part of their constituents, "that they might have his permission to hold, on a day prefixed, a general assembly of all the provinces of Gaul; there being some things, which they wanted to propose to him, which concerned the whole nation in common." Their request was granted; they fixed a day for the assembly, and they bound themselves by an oath not to disclose what should be transacted there, but to such persons as should be named for that purpose by general consent.

Upon the rising of the council, the same chiefs of the state, who had come before to Cæsar, came again to him, and begged to be admitted to confer with him in private, concerning matters that regarded their own and the common safety. Cæsar complying, they

all threw themselves at his feet, and with tears represented to him, that it was of no less importance to them to have their present deliberations kept secret, than to succeed in the petition they were going to make ; because should any discovery happen, they were in danger of being exposed to the extremest cruelties. Divitiacus, the Æduan, in the name of the rest, spoke thus :

“ Two factions divide all Gaul: at the head of one are the Ædui: of the other the Arverni. After a contention of many years between these for the superiority, the Arverni, in concert with the Sequani, came at last to a resolution of calling in the Germans: of these, fifteen thousand only came over the Rhine at first; but finding Gaul an agreeable and plentiful country, others soon followed, insomuch that at present there are no less than a hundred and twenty thousand of them here. The Ædui and their dependents have frequently tried their strength against them in battle, but, by successive defeats, have lost all their nobles, senate, and cavalry. Broken by these calamities, they, who formerly held the chief sway in Gaul, both by their own bravery and the favour and friendship of the Roman people, are now reduced to the necessity of sending some of the principal men of their state to the Sequani, to remain with them as hostages; and of obliging themselves by an oath, neither to demand their hostages back, nor to implore the assistance of the Roman people, nor to refuse a perpetual submission to the

dominion and authority of the Sequani. I alone of all the Ædui refused to take the oath or give my children for hostages ; and on that account I fled my country, and went to Rome to implore the assistance of the senate, as being the only man in the state who had not laid himself under the restraints of hostages and an oath. After all, it has fared worse with the victorious Sequani than with the vanquished Ædui ; because Ariovistus has seated himself in their territory, seized a third part of their lands, the most fertile in Gaul, and has lately ordered them to yield up another third to the Harudes, who, to the number of twenty-four thousand, came over the Rhine a few months ago, wanting habitations and a settlement. In a few years all the native Gauls will be driven from their territories, and the Germans be transplanted hither from the other side of the Rhine ; our climate far excelling that of their country, and our different ways of living not admitting a comparison.—Ariovistus is a man of a savage, passionate, and tyrannical disposition, whose government is no longer to be borne ; and unless we find some resource in you and the people of Rome, the Gauls must, like the Helvetians, abandon their country, and seek some other settlement remote from the Germans, wherever fortune shall point it out. Were these complaints and representations to come to the knowledge of Ariovistus, I doubt not but he would exercise the greatest cruelties upon all the hostages in his hands : but it will be easy for



you, by your own authority, the dread of the army you command, the fame of your late victory, and the terror of the Roman name, to hinder any more Germans from coming over the Rhine, and to defend Gaul from the insults of Ariovistus."

When Divitiacus had made an end of speaking, all who were present began, with many tears, to implore Cæsar's aid. He observed, that the Sequani alone did nothing of all this ; but pensive, and with downcast looks, kept their eyes fixed on the ground. Wondering what might be the cause, he questioned them upon it. Still they made him no answer, but continued silent, as before, with the same air of dejection. When he had interrogated them several times, without being able to obtain one word in return, Divitiacus, the Æduan, resumed the discourse, and observed, " that the condition of the Sequani was by much more deplorable and wretched than that of the rest of the Gauls ; as they alone durst not, even in secret, complain of their wrongs, or apply any where for redress, and no less dreaded the cruelty of Ariovistus when absent, than if actually present before their eyes : that the other states had it still in their power to escape by flight ; but the Sequani, who had received him into their territories, and put him in possession of all their towns, were exposed to suffer every kind of torment."

Cæsar encouraged the Gauls, and promised to have regard to their complaints ; he told



them he was in great hopes that, out of regard to him and the authority of the Roman people, Ariovistus would put an end to his oppressions. Having returned this answer, he dismissed the assembly.

Many urgent reasons occurred upon this occasion to Cæsar, why he should consider seriously of the grievances which the Gauls had complained of, and undertake their redress. He saw the Ædui, friends and allies of the people of Rome, held in subjection and servitude by the Germans, and compelled to give hostages to Ariovistus and the Sequani; which, in the present flourishing state of the Roman affairs, seemed highly dishonourable both to himself and the commonwealth. He saw it likewise of dangerous consequence to suffer the Germans to accustom themselves to come over the Rhine in great multitudes, and settle in Gaul: for this fierce and savage people, having once possessed themselves of the whole country, were but too likely, after the example of the Cimbri and Teutoni, to break into the Roman province, and thence advance even into Italy.

These considerations induced Cæsar to send ambassadors to Ariovistus with the proposal of an interview, and to desire that he would appoint a place for it, in order to their conferring upon certain public affairs of the highest importance to them both. Ariovistus answered, "That, if he had wanted any thing of Cæsar, he would have gone to him in person; and that Cæsar, if he had any bu-

siness with him, must come to him : that he could neither venture, without an army, into those provinces of Gaul where Cæsar commanded, nor bring an army into the field without great trouble and expense. That he wondered extremely what business either Cæsar or the people of Rome could have in that part of Gaul which he had conquered."

On the report of this answer, Cæsar sent another embassy, with commission to speak thus to the king : " Since you have so little sense of the great obligations you lie under to the Roman people, and to Cæsar, in whose consulship you were styled king and friend by the senate, as to refuse a conference with him, and decline treating of affairs that regard the common interest, he sends you the particulars of what he requires of you : first, not to bring any more Germans over the Rhine into Gaul. In the next place, to restore the hostages you have received from the Ædui, and permit the Sequani likewise to restore the hostages given to them. Lastly, to forbear all injuries towards the Ædui, and neither make war upon them nor upon their allies. If you comply with these conditions, it will establish a perpetual amity between you and the Roman people ; but, if you do not comply, Cæsar will think himself bound to have regard to the just complaints of the Ædui, and the other allies of Rome in this country ; the senate having decreed in the consulship of M. Messala and M. Piso [Y. of R. 692.] that whoever should have in charge the pro-

vince of Gaul, should, so far as was consistent with the interest of the republic, protect and defend them."

To this Ariovistus sent the following reply :  
" That, by the laws of war, the conqueror had a right to impose what terms he pleased upon the conquered : that the people of Rome did not govern the vanquished by the prescriptions of other nations, but according to their own pleasure : that he did not intermeddle with their conquests, nor interrupt them in the free enjoyment of their rights ; nor ought they to concern themselves with what regarded him : that the *Ædui*, having tried the fortune of war, had been overcome and rendered tributary to him, and that Cæsar would be highly unjust if he attempted to deprive him of his revenues, or to diminish them. That he was resolved not to part with the hostages which the *Ædui* had put into his hands ; but would, nevertheless, engage, not to make war either upon them, or upon their allies, provided they observed the treaty he had made with them, and readily paid the tribute agreed upon : if otherwise, they would find the title of friends and allies of the people of Rome of little advantage to them : that as to Cæsar's menace of not neglecting the complaints of the *Ædui*, he would have him to know, that none had ever entered into a war with Ariovistus but to their own destruction."

At the same time that Cæsar received this reply, ambassadors arrived from the *Ædui* and *Treviri* : from the *Ædui*, to complain that



the Harudes, who had lately come [from Germany] into Gaul, were plundering their territories, so that even by their submissions and hostages they could not obtain peace of Ariovistus; from the Treviri, to inform him that a hundred cantons of the Suevi, headed by two brothers, were arrived upon the banks of the Rhine, with design to come over that river. Cæsar, deeply affected with this intelligence, determined to begin the war without delay: and fearing lest this new band of Suevi should strengthen the forces of Ariovistus, he advanced expeditiously towards the king, and the third day was informed, that he approached with all his forces to seize Vesontio\*, the capital of the Sequani. Cæsar judged it by all means necessary to prevent him in this design, as the town was well fortified by nature, and stored with all sorts of ammunition. Marching, therefore, day and night, without intermission, he possessed himself of the place, and put a garrison into it.

\* Began-  
son.

While he continued here a few days, to settle the affair of his convoys and supplies, a sudden terror seized his whole army. It was occasioned by the curiosity of his men, and the reports of the Gauls, who talked much of the prodigious stature of the Germans, their invincible courage, and wonderful skill in arms. The terror first began among certain young officers of the Roman army, who had voluntarily and gaily followed Cæsar into Gaul, and were but little acquainted with military affairs. Some of these, under vari-



ous pretences, desired leave to return home ; and others, though, out of shame, they seemed willing to continue in the camp, were not able to put on a cheerful countenance, or to refrain from lamenting ; with their companions, the dangers to which they fancied themselves exposed. Wills were made all over the camp, and the consternation began to seize even the veteran soldiers, the centurions, and the officers of the cavalry : only, to avoid the reproach of cowardice, they said, “ it was not the enemy they feared, but the narrow passes and forests that lay between them and Ariovistus, and the difficulty they should find in getting provisions.” Some even intimated to Cæsar, that when he gave orders for marching, he would not be obeyed.

Cæsar hereupon called a council of war, and, having summoned thither all the centurions of the army, spoke to them to the following effect :—“ Ariovistus, during my consulship, earnestly sought the alliance of the Roman people ; why then should any one imagine he will so rashly and hastily depart from his engagements ? On the contrary, so soon as he comes to know my demands, and the reasonable conditions I am about to propose to him, he will, I am firmly persuaded, be very far from rejecting either my friendship or that of the Roman people. But if, urged on by madness and rage, he should resolve upon war, what, after all, have you to be afraid of ? Why should you distrust either your own courage or my con-

duct? You are to deal with enemies of whom, in the memory of our fathers, trial has been already made. By our victory over the Teutoni and Cimbri, the army itself acquired no less glory than Caius Marius, the general who commanded it.—They are the very same Germans with whom the Helvetii, though not a match for our army, have so often fought, and whom they have so often vanquished. The defeat which the Gauls suffered was rather by the conduct and craft of the Germans, than by their superior bravery. But though the king, by a stratagem, might baffle a rude and undisciplined soldiery, he cannot hope to prevail by such means against a Roman army. As to those who shelter their cowardice under the pretence of narrow passes, and the difficulty of procuring provisions, it argues, I think, no small presumption to betray such a distrust of their general's conduct, or to prescribe to him what he ought to do. These things fall properly under my care: the Sequani, Luci \*, and Lingones, are to furnish me with provisions: the corn is now ripe in the fields: as to the ways, you yourselves will soon be judges of them.

\* People of  
Lorraine  
about Toul.

“I am not in the least disturbed by what is whispered about, that the army will not obey me; for no general was ever so slighted by his soldiers, when neither ill success, nor rapacious covetousness, nor other crimes, had drawn that misfortune upon him: in all these respects I imagine myself secure, as the whole course of my life bears witness to my integrity; and my good fortune has shewn itself in

the war against the Helvetii. I am therefore resolved to execute, without delay, what I had intended to put off a little longer. I shall give orders for decamping this very night, three hours before day, that I may know as soon as possible, whether honour and a sense of duty, or an ignominious cowardice, have the ascendant in my army : nay, should all the rest of the troops abandon me, I will nevertheless march with the tenth legion alone, of whose fidelity and courage I have not the least doubt, and who shall serve me for my prætorian guard." [Cæsar had always favoured and chiefly confided in this legion, remarkable for its intrepid bravery.]

This discourse made a wonderful change in the minds of all, and produced an uncommon alacrity, and eagerness for the war. The tenth legion, in particular, returned him thanks, by their tribunes, for the favourable opinion he had expressed of them ; and assured him of their readiness to follow him. Nor were the other legions less industrious, by their tribunes and principal centurions, to reconcile themselves to their general, protesting that they had never entertained either doubt or fear, nor had ever imagined that it belonged to them, but to him alone, to direct in matters of war. Cæsar, having accepted of their submission, and being informed by Divitiacus (in whom of all the Gauls he most confided) that, by taking a circuit of about forty miles, he might avoid the narrow passes, and lead his army through an open country, he



set forward three hours after midnight, as he had said; and, after a march of seven days, understood by his scouts, that he was within four and twenty thousand paces of Ariovistus's camp.

The king, informed of Cæsar's arrival, sent ambassadors to acquaint him, that, as they were come nearer to each other, he was willing to have an interview with him, which he believed might now be without danger. Cæsar did not decline the proposal, imagining that the German, now offering of his own accord what he had before refused, when requested, might perhaps be disposed to hearken to reason. The fifth day after was appointed for the interview; and, in the interval, frequent deputations passed and repassed from one side to the other, to regulate the circumstances and conditions of it. Ariovistus, under pretence that he feared an ambush, demanded that Cæsar should bring no infantry with him: both he and the king were to be attended by their cavalry only. To this Cæsar consented; yet, not caring to trust his safety to the Gauls, he dismounted all the Gallic cavalry, and gave their horses to the men of the tenth legion, that, in case of danger, he might have a guard on which he could rely.

In the midst of a large plain, there was a rising ground equally distant from both camps: at this place, by appointment, the conference was to be held. Cæsar stationed the legionary soldiers, whom he had converted into



troopers, two hundred paces from the mount. Ariovistus did the same with the German cavalry. The two commanders advanced to meet one another, each accompanied by ten friends, or principal officers; for so Ariovistus had desired it might be. The conference was on horseback. Cæsar began by reminding the king of his obligations to the republic. "You have been styled friend and ally by the senate, and very considerable presents have been sent you: these honours, conferred by the Romans on very few, and only for signal services to the state, have been bestowed on you, not on account of any just claim you had to them, but merely by my favour and the bounty of the senate." He mentioned likewise the ancient alliance which had subsisted between the Romans and Ædui, in whose favour the senate had made many honourable decrees. He added: "The Ædui always held the first rank and authority in Gaul, even before their alliance with Rome; and it is the invariable maxim of the Roman people, not only to defend their friends and allies in the possession of their just rights, but likewise to study the increase of their honour, interest and dignity: therefore it can never be supposed that they will submit to see their friends stript of those privileges, which had belonged to them before the commencement of that friendship." And he concluded with repeating the same demands which he had before made by his ambassadors; that the king should not make war upon the Ædui or their allies; that he

should restore to them their hostages; and that, if he could not oblige the Germans to repass the Rhine, at least he should suffer no more of them to come into Gaul.

Ariovistus answered: "I crossed the Rhine, not of my own motion, but by invitation and intreaty from the Gauls. The great hopes and expectations they gave me were my only inducement to quit my country: the settlements I have in Gaul were assigned to me by the Gauls themselves; the hostages were voluntarily sent; and the tribute I receive is in consequence of the rights of war: I did not make war upon the Gauls, they made war upon me: their several states brought their united forces against me; but I found means to vanquish and disperse them: one battle sufficed: if they are again resolved to try the fortune of war, I am prepared to receive them; but, if they chuse peace, it will be unjust in them to refuse a tribute which they have hitherto voluntarily paid. The friendship of the Roman people ought not to be a detriment to me, but an honour and a security; I courted it in no other view: but if, on account of my alliance with them, I must submit to lose my tributes, and my rights over the people I have subdued, I am no less willing to give up that alliance than I was ambitious to obtain it. I have indeed brought over a multitude of Germans into Gaul, yet not with any design of disturbing the country, as appears by my not coming but at the request of the natives. My arrival in Gaul was prior to that

of the Romans, whose armies have never till now passed the boundaries of their own provinces. What can they mean by coming into a country that belongs to me? why do they concern themselves with a part of Gaul that is no less my property than the province itself is theirs? As to the pretence of alliance between the Romans and Ædui, I am not so much a barbarian, or so wholly a stranger to the affairs of the world, as not to know that the Ædui neither assisted the Romans in their late war against the Allobroges, nor received any assistance from them in their many conflicts with me and the Sequani. I have reason to be jealous of your pretended regard for the Ædui, and have but too much reason to suspect, that the continuance of the Roman army in Gaul can be with no other design than that of oppressing me. If you do not therefore withdraw your troops out of these parts, I shall no longer look upon you as a friend, but as an enemy. And I am well assured, that, should I happen to kill you in battle, I should do a pleasure to many of the nobles and great men at Rome, who have explained themselves to me by couriers, and whose favour and friendship I might procure by your death: but if you will retire, and leave me in the undisturbed possession of Gaul, I will not only amply reward you, but will engage, at my own cost and hazard, to put a happy conclusion to any war you shall think fit to undertake."

In answer to this discourse, Cæsar offered



many reasons why he could not depart from his first demands : “ That neither his own honour, nor that of the Roman people, would suffer him to abandon allies, who had deserved so well of the republic. That it no way appeared to him that Ariovistus had a juster claim to Gaul than the Romans : that the Arverni and Ruteni\* had been subdued by Q. Fabius Maximus, who yet, contented with their submission, had neither reduced their country into a province, nor subjected it to a tribute : that, if antiquity of title was to decide the question, the Romans had an undoubted right to the sovereignty of Gaul : or, if the decree of the senate was to take place, Gaul must remain free, and subject only to its own laws.”

\* La Rouergue.

Whilst these things passed at the interview, Cæsar was informed that Ariovistus’s cavalry were drawing nearer the eminence, and had even cast some darts at his horsemen. Hereupon he immediately broke off the conference, retreated to his own men, and strictly charged them to forbear all acts of hostility. He did not fear the success of an engagement between his chosen legion and the German cavalry ; but he was desirous to maintain a conduct perfectly clear, and not to give the enemy the least ground to assert, that they had been treacherously drawn into an ambush by a pretended conference. When it was known in the camp that Ariovistus, at the interview, had haughtily ordered the Romans to depart out of Gaul ; that his cavalry had insulted Cæsar’s



guard; and that this had put an end to the conference; it spread throughout the whole army an ardent desire of coming to a battle.

Two days after, Ariovistus sent ambassadors to Cæsar, to propose a renewal of the negotiation; and that he would either appoint a day for their meeting again, or depute some one to bring the treaty to a conclusion. Cæsar saw no reason for granting a second interview, especially when he considered that the Germans, as experience had taught him, could not be restrained from falling upon his men. Neither was he inclined to send any of his principal officers; it seemed too great a venture to expose them to the perfidy of these barbarians. He therefore cast his eyes upon C. Valerius Procillus<sup>8</sup>, a young man of eminent virtue and gentle manners, and whose knowledge of the Gallic language, which Ariovistus, by long residence in the country, had learnt to speak readily, fitted him in a particular manner for this embassy: and as the Germans could have no motive to insult him, Cæsar thought him safe from that danger. With him was joined, in the same commission, M. Mettius, a person who had a connection with Ariovistus by the ties of hospitality. Their instructions were to hear the king's proposals, and bring a report of them to Cæsar. But no sooner were they arrived in Ariovistus's

<sup>8</sup> He was the son of C. Valerius Caburus, who being made free of the city by C. Valerius Flaccus, had, according to custom, taken the name of his patron.

camp, than, in presence of the whole army, calling out to know their business, and whether they were come as spies, he commanded them to be put in irons, without suffering them to make any reply.

The same day he came forward with all his forces, and lodged himself under a hill, six miles from the Roman camp. The day after, he went two miles beyond it, to cut off their communication with the *Ædui* and *Sequani*, from whom they received all their provisions. Cæsar, for five days successively, drew up his men in order of battle before the camp, that, if *Ariovistus* had a mind, he might not be without an opportunity of coming to an engagement. The Germans kept all that time within their lines; only between the cavalry of the two armies there were daily skirmishes. The German manner of fighting was this: they had about six thousand horse, who chose a like number out of the foot, each his man, and all remarkable for strength and agility. These continually accompanied them in battle, and served as a rear-guard, to which, when hard pressed, they might retire: if the action became dangerous, these advanced to their relief: if any horseman was wounded, and fell from his horse, these gathered round to defend him: if speed was required, either for a hasty pursuit or sudden retreat, so nimble and active were they by continual exercise, that, laying hold of the manes of the horses, they could keep pace with them in running.

Cæsar, finding that *Ariovistus* declined a

battle, turned his thoughts chiefly to provide for the freedom of his convoys. With this view he marked out a place for a camp, six hundred paces beyond that of the enemy; and thither he marched with his whole army, drawn up in three lines. The first and second line had orders to continue under arms, while the third was to employ themselves in fortifying this new camp. Ariovistus detached sixteen thousand light-armed foot, and all his horse, to hinder the work, but without effect: the intrenchments were finished, and Cæsar leaving two legions there, with part of the auxiliaries led back the remaining four to his other camp. The next day, drawing out all his troops from both camps, he again offered the enemy battle, which Ariovistus still declined: Cæsar retired about noon. Ariovistus then detached part of his forces to attack the lesser camp. A sharp conflict ensued, which lasted till sun-set; when Ariovistus sounded a retreat. Cæsar inquiring of the prisoners, why Ariovistus declined an engagement, learnt, that it was the custom among the Germans for the women to decide by lots and divination, when it would be proper to hazard a battle: and that these had declared, that the army could not be victorious if they fought before the new moon.

Cæsar hereupon resolved to force the enemy, without delay, to a battle: at the head of all his forces, in three lines, he advanced quite up to the head of their camp. The Germans now appeared before their intrenchment: they



were distributed by nations, and disposed at equal distances one from another, and the whole army, encompassed with a line of carriages, to take away all hope of safety by flight. The women, mounted upon these carriages, weeping and tearing their hair, conjured the soldiers, as they moved forwards, not to suffer them to become slaves to the Romans. Cæsar began the battle in person at the head of his right wing, having observed the enemy to be weakest on that side. Their left wing was soon routed and put to flight, but their right had the advantage, and were like to overpower the Roman left wing by numbers. Young Crassus, who commanded the cavalry, observing this, made the third line advance to support them. The battle was renewed, and the enemy every where put to the rout: nor did they cease their flight till they had reached the banks of the Rhine, about fifty miles distant from the place of combat. There only a few escaped; some by swimming, others by boats. Of the latter was Ariovistus, who, embarking in a small vessel which he found by the edge of the river, got safe to the other side. All the rest were cut to pieces by the Roman cavalry. Ariovistus had two wives; one a Sueve, whom he had brought with him from Germany; the other a Norican, king Vocion's sister, whom he had married in Gaul. Both perished in this flight. Of his two daughters, one was killed, and the other taken prisoner. Proculus, whom, bound with a triple chain, his



keepers had dragged after them in their flight, fell in with Cæsar in person as he was pursuing the German cavalry. Cæsar's joy for his victory was exceedingly heightened by his good fortune in recovering, out of the hands of the enemy, his intimate and familiar friend, universally esteemed for his probity. Procillus told him, that lots had been thrice drawn in his own presence, to decide whether he should be burnt alive upon the spot, or the execution be deferred to another time; and that the lot, three times favourable, had preserved his life. Mettius was likewise recovered and brought to Cæsar.

This battle being reported beyond the Rhine, the Suevi, who were advanced as far as the banks of that river, thought it advisable to return to their own country; but retreating in disorder and confusion, were attacked by the Ubii, a people bordering upon the Rhine, who put many of them to the sword.

Cæsar, having thus, in one campaign, given a happy conclusion to two very considerable wars, went into winter-quarters somewhat sooner than the season of the year required. He distributed his army among the Sequani, and leaving Labienus to command in his absence, set out for Cisalpine Gaul, to preside in the assembly of the states.

In the winter whilst Cæsar was in that country, he was alarmed by frequent reports, confirmed by letters from Labienus, that all the Belgæ \* had joined in a league against the Roman republic, and ratified it by an exchange of hostages.

J. C.  
Comm.  
lib. ii.

\* The people of the Netherlands.

The causes of this confederacy were : first, their fear, lest the Romans, having subdued all the rest of Gaul, should afterwards turn their arms against them : in the next place, the persuasions and importunity of some among the Celtæ ; many of whom, as they had greatly disliked the neighbourhood of the Germans in Gaul, so were they no less displeased to see a Roman army take up its winter-quarters, and grow habitual, in the country : others from a levity and inconstancy of temper, fond of every project that tended to a revolution. Lastly, some were influenced by ambitious views ; it being usual in Gaul for those who were the most powerful in their several states, and had men and money at command, to exercise over their fellow-subjects a kind of sovereignty, which they foresaw would be greatly checked by the authority and credit of the Romans in Gaul.

[Year of Rome 696\*.]

Cæsar, upon receiving these messages and reports, levied two new legions in Cisalpine Gaul, and early in the spring sent Q. Pedius, his lieutenant, to conduct them over the Alps ; and he himself, as soon as there began to be forage in the fields, went to the army. He commissioned the Senones\* and other Gauls, who bordered on Belgic Gaul, to inform themselves of the motions and designs of the confe-

\* The people of Sens.

\* Cn. Corn. Lentulus Spinther, and Q. Metellus Nepos, consuls.

derates, and send him from time to time an exact account. They all agreed in reporting that the Belgæ were levying troops, and drawing their forces to a general rendezvous. Whereupon Cæsar, thinking he ought no longer to delay marching against them, decamped, and in fifteen days arrived on the confines of the Belgæ.

As his approach was sudden, and much earlier than had been expected, the Rhemi \*, \* The people of Rheims. who of all the Belgæ lay the nearest to Celtic Gaul, dispatched the two principal men of their state to represent to Cæsar: "That they put themselves and fortunes under the power and protection of the Romans, as having neither approved of the designs of the rest of the Belgæ, nor had any share in their confederacy against the people of Rome: that, on the contrary, they were ready to give hostages, execute his commands, receive him into their towns, and furnish him with corn, and other provisions for his army; that indeed the rest of the Belgæ were all in arms, and that the Germans, on this side the Rhine, had associated with them: nay, that so universal was the infatuation, that the Rhemi had not been able to dissuade from entering into the confederacy the Suessones, a people united to them by the nearest ties of blood and friendship, both being subject to the same laws, living under the same form of government, and acknowledging one common magistrate."

Cæsar learnt from the Rhemi, that the Belgæ were for the most part Germans origi-



The people of  
Beauvais.

The people of Soissons.

nally, who, inticed by the fertility of the country, had crossed the Rhine, driven out the ancient inhabitants of that part of Gaul, and settled themselves there.—That, as to their numbers, the Bellovaci, the most considerable of the several states, were able to muster a hundred thousand fighting men, and out of that number had promised to select sixty thousand for the war: that next to them in dignity were the Suessones, over whom, of late years, Divitiacus, the most powerful prince of Gaul, had been king; but that their present sovereign was Galba, whose singular prudence and justice had procured him, by the consent of all the confederates, the supreme command of the war: that these had within their territories twelve fortified towns, and had promised to bring into the field fifty thousand men: that the like number had been stipulated by the Nervii<sup>9</sup>, esteemed the most fierce and warlike of all the Belgic nations; and that the

<sup>9</sup> The Nervii possessed the country between the Scheld and the Sambre. Their chief cities are thought to have been Cambray, Valenciennes, and Tournay. The Atrebates (people of Artois) were to furnish fifteen thousand: the Ambiani (people of Amiens) ten thousand: the Morini (people of Terouane and Boulogne) twenty-five thousand: the Menapii (people of Ghent, Antwerp, and the sea-coast of Brabant) nine thousand: the Caletes (people of Caux) ten thousand: the Velocasses and Veromandui (people of Vexin and St. Quentin) the like number: the Aduatici (people of Namur) twenty-nine thousand; and the Condrusi, Eburones, Cæræsi, and Pæmani, all comprehended under the common name of Germans, forty thousand.



lesser states were to furnish troops proportionably.

Cæsar, exhorting the Rhemi to continue firm in their alliance, and promising amply to reward their fidelity, ordered the whole body of their senate to repair to his camp, and the sons of the principal nobility to be brought him as hostages; all which was accordingly performed by the day appointed. He then addressed himself to Divitiacus, the Æduan, representing, in the warmest manner, of what consequence it was to the common cause to divide the forces of the enemy, that the Romans might not be under the necessity of encountering so great a multitude at once. This division, he told him, might easily be effected, if the Ædui would march their forces into the country of the Bellovaci, and begin to plunder it and lay it waste. With these instructions he dismissed him.

Being soon after informed by his scouts and by the Rhemi, that the united forces of the Belgæ were marching towards him in a body, and that they were even advanced within a few miles, he, with all the expedition he could, passed his army over the Axona, which divides the Rhemi from the rest of the Belgæ, and encamped on the farther side of it; putting himself in such a situation as to secure all behind him, cover one side of his camp with a river, and render the communication with the Rhemi, and those other states whence he expected to be supplied with provisions, safe and easy.

The Aisne,

Bievre, between Pont à Vere and Laon.

The Belgæ, having been disappointed in an attempt upon Bibrax, a town belonging to the Rhemi, and likewise in an attempt to pass the Axona ; and finding that provisions began to be scarce, and that the Romans could not be drawn to fight at a disadvantage, called a council of war. It was there judged most expedient to separate, and return every man to his own country, with a resolution, however, to assemble from all parts in defence of that state whose territories should be first invaded by the Romans : for they concluded it much safer to carry on the war at home, where they might have provisions, and every thing at command, than venture a battle within the confines of a foreign state. These reasons were at the same time backed by a still more powerful consideration : for the Bellovaci, upon advice that their territories would quickly be invaded by Divitiacus and the Ædui, could not be restrained from marching directly homewards.

In pursuance of the resolution above-mentioned, the Belgæ broke up their camp about the second watch of the night. All was noise and tumult : not regarding either order in their march, or the command of their officers, each man pressed to be in the foremost rank, that he might get the sooner home ; insomuch that their retreat had all the appearance of a precipitate flight. Cæsar, who had immediate notice of this from his scouts, apprehending some stratagem, because he knew not yet the reason of their departure, would not stir out of his trenches in the night ; but early in

the morning, upon more certain intelligence of their retreat, detached his lieutenants, Pedius and Cotta, with all the cavalry, after them. Labienus had orders to follow with three legions. The enemy suffered a great slaughter in their flight, the Romans little or no loss. The latter, about sun-set, gave over the pursuit, and returned to the camp, in obedience to the orders they had received.

The next day, before the enemy had time to rally, or recover out of their consternation, Cæsar led his army into the territories of the Suessones, which joined to those of the Rhemi, and, after a long march, reached Noviodunum. Noyon. He was in hopes of carrying the town by assault, as being destitute of a sufficient garrison: but, as the ditch was broad, and the wall very high, the defendants, though few in number, withstood all his efforts. Wherefore, having fortified his camp, he began to provide engines, and get every thing in readiness for a siege. Mean time, such of the Suessones as had escaped the late slaughter threw themselves, during the night, into the town. But Cæsar advancing his preparations with great expedition, and approaching, under cover of his mantlets, to the very walls, where he cast up a mount, and planted his battering towers, the Gauls, astonished at the greatness of the works, as having never seen nor heard of any such before, and at the dispatch wherewith they were carried on, sent deputies to treat about a surrendry; and the Rhemi interceded for them.



\* Beau-  
vais.

Cæsar, having received the principal men of the Suessones as hostages (amongst whom were two sons of Galba their king) and obliged them to deliver up all their arms, admitted them to a surrendry, and led his army against the Bellovaci. These, retiring with their effects into Bratuspantium \*, their capital city, and understanding that Cæsar was advanced within five miles of it, sent a deputation of their old men, who came forth in venerable procession to meet him, signifying by outstretched hands, and the most submissive terms, that they put themselves under his power and protection, and did not pretend to appear in arms against the people of Rome: and when he approached nearer the city, and encamped within view of the walls, the women and children from the ramparts, with extended arms, according to the custom of their country, besought the Romans for peace. Hereupon Divitiacus, who, after the retreat of the Belgæ, had dismissed the Ædui, and returned to Cæsar's camp, interposed in behalf of the Bellovaci, pleading: "That they had always lived in strict friendship with the Ædui, and, by the artful insinuations of their chiefs, had been seduced to forsake their ancient allies, and take up arms against the Romans, whom they had represented as holding the Ædui under an ignominious tyranny and oppression: that the authors of that advice, seeing its pernicious effects, were retired into Britain." Cæsar, out of regard to Divitiacus and the Ædui, promised pardon and protection to the



Bellovaci; but as these were possessed of very extensive territories, and surpassed in power, and number of forces, all the other Belgic states, he demanded six hundred hostages.

These being accordingly delivered, together with all their arms, Cæsar left their city and advanced into the country of the Ambiani\*, who, upon his approach, immediately submitted. Adjoining to these were the Nervii†; of whose manners and genius Cæsar, enquiring, learnt: “That they suffered no resort of merchants into their city, nor the importation of wine, or of any thing tending to luxury, which they thought enfeebled the mind, and extinguished its martial fire: that they were men of a warlike spirit, and were continually reproaching the rest of the Belgæ for ignominiously submitting to the Roman yoke; and had openly declared their resolution of neither sending ambassadors to Cæsar, nor accepting any terms of peace.”

\* People of Amiens.

† People of Cambresis.

Cæsar, after a march of three days through their territories, understood from some prisoners: “That he was now advanced within ten miles of the Sambre, on the other side of which the enemy had posted themselves, and there waited the coming of the Romans: that they had been joined by the Atrebatess and Veromandui||, neighbouring nations, whom they had persuaded to take part in the fortune of the war: that they expected also to be reinforced by the Aduatici, who were already on their march: and that all their women, and such as, on account of age, were unfit to bear

‡ People of Artois.

|| People of Vermandois, a part of Picardy.

arms, had been conveyed to a place of safety, inaccessible by reason of the marshes that surrounded it." The two armies posted themselves on two hills, opposite to each other, the Sambre running between, which was not, in that part, above three feet in depth.

The battle which ensued was bravely and resolutely fought on both sides, and with great variety of fortune: each army possessed itself of the enemy's camp: the Roman cavalry were once broken and put to flight: the twelfth and the seventh legions reduced to the utmost distress: nor was there any body of reserve from which they could expect succour. In this extremity, Cæsar, snatching a buckler from one of the soldiers, and pressing to the front of the battle, called upon the centurions by name, and encouraged the rest. His arrival inspired the legionaries with new hope; and, every one being ambitious of distinguishing himself in the presence of his general, they redoubled their efforts, and checked the progress of the enemy. In the mean time, two new-raised legions, that had been placed in the rear of the Roman army, had been appointed to follow and guard the baggage, hearing of the battle, advanced with all possible speed: and Labienus, who had made himself master of the enemy's camp, observing from the hill on which that stood how matters went with Cæsar, detached the tenth legion to his assistance.

The arrival of this detachment produced so great a change in favour of the Romans, that

many of the soldiers, who before lay oppressed with wounds, now resuming courage, renewed the fight: nay, the very servants of the camp, unarmed as they were, observing the consternation of the enemy, rushed among their armed battalions. The cavalry too, striving, by extraordinary efforts, to wipe off the ignominy of their late flight, charged the enemy in all places where the void spaces between the legions suffered them to advance. Mean time the Nervii, now very hard pressed, exerted themselves with such determined courage, that, their front ranks being cut off, those who stood behind mounted the bodies of the slain, and thence continued the fight: and when these too, by their fall, had raised a mount of carcases, those who remained, ascending the pile, poured their javelins upon the Romans as from a rampart, and even returned the darts thrown at them by their enemies. Fame therefore (says Cæsar) did not deceive in proclaiming so loudly the bravery of this people.

In a battle, maintained with such obstinacy, the loss of the vanquished must necessarily be prodigious: the very name and nation of the Nervii were in a manner quite extinguished: the old men, who, with the women and children (as above related) had been conveyed into a place surrounded with bogs and morasses, upon the report of this terrible overthrow, resolved, with the consent of all that survived the late destruction, to send a deputation to Cæsar, and surrender themselves. These deputies,



in reciting the calamities of their country, represented, that of six hundred senators there remained only three; and that from sixty thousand fighting men their soldiers were reduced to five hundred. Cæsar readily took them under his protection, allowing them free and full possession of their towns and territories, and strictly commanding all the neighbouring nations to abstain from doing them any injury.

The Aduatici<sup>1</sup>, of whom mention has been made above, being upon their march with all their forces to join the Nervii, and hearing of their total defeat, immediately returned home; and then abandoning all their other towns and castles, conveyed themselves and their riches into a place which nature had strongly fortified: for it was on every side surrounded with high rocks and precipices, having only one avenue of about two hundred feet broad, that led to the town by a gentle rising. Here they raised a double wall of prodigious height, whereon, as a farther security, they laid great numbers of huge stones and strong-pointed beams.

On the first arrival of the Roman army be-

<sup>1</sup> This people were descended from the Teutoni and Cimbri, who, in their march towards the Alps and Italy, left their heavy baggage on this side the Rhine, with a detachment of six thousand men to guard it. These, after the final overthrow of their countrymen, being for many years in wars with the neighbouring states; sometimes acting on the offensive, sometimes on the defensive; at length, with the consent of all the bordering nations, obtained peace, and settled themselves in this place.



fore the town, the inhabitants made frequent sallies from it, and engaged the besiegers in slight skirmishes. But Cæsar having drawn a line of contravallation twelve feet high, fifteen miles in circumference, and every where well fortified with redoubts, they kept themselves within their walls. When the Romans had finished their approaches, and cast up a mount, and were preparing a tower of assault behind their works, the besieged from their battlements at first derided them, and in contemptuous language asked the meaning of that prodigious engine raised at such a distance! With what hands or strength, men of the size and make of the Romans (whose small stature the Gauls, who were for the most part very tall, despised) could hope to bring forward so unwieldy a machine against their walls? But when they saw it removed, and approaching near the town, astonished at the new and strange appearance, they sent ambassadors to Cæsar to sue for peace. These, being introduced, told him, "That they doubted not but the Romans were assisted in their wars by the gods themselves; it seeming a more than human task to transport, with such facility, an engine of that amazing height, by which they were brought upon a level with their enemies, and enabled to engage them in close fight. That they therefore put themselves and their fortunes into his hands, requesting only, that, if his clemency, of which they had heard much, should determine him to spare them, he would not deprive them of their arms: that the

neighbouring nations were almost all their enemies, against whom they could not defend themselves if their arms were taken away; and that they would chuse to undergo any fortune from the hands of the Romans, rather than expose themselves to be cruelly slaughtered by those, over whom they had been wont to exercise dominion."

To this Cæsar answered, "That, to conform himself to his usual conduct on such occasions, and not for any merit of theirs, he was willing to grant them peace, provided they submitted before the battering ram touched the walls; but that no surrendry would be accepted, unless they delivered up their arms: that he would take the same care of them as he had before done of the Nervii, and lay his express commands upon the neighbouring nations to abstain from all injuries towards a people who had put themselves under the protection of the Romans." The ambassadors returning with this answer, their countrymen accepted, in appearance, the conditions offered them; and threw so vast a quantity of arms into the ditch before the town, that the heap almost reached to the top of the wall. Nevertheless, as was afterwards known, they retained about a third part, and concealed them within the town. The gates being thrown open, there was peace for the remaining part of that day.

In the evening, Cæsar ordered the gates to be shut, and his soldiers to quit the town, that no injury might be offered to the inhabitants

during the night. The Aduatici, imagining that the Romans, after the surrendry of the place, would either set no guard at all, or, at most, keep watch with little care, armed themselves partly with those weapons they had secretly retained, and partly with targets, made of bark or wicker, and covered over hastily with hides, and made a furious sally about midnight with all their forces, on that side where the Roman works seemed to be of easiest access. The alarm being immediately given by lighting fires, as Cæsar had directed, the soldiers ran from the neighbouring forts to the place of action. A very sharp conflict ensued: for, the enemy now driven to despair, and having no hope but in their valour, fought with all possible resolution; though the Romans had the advantage of the ground, and poured their javelins upon them both from the towers and the top of the rampart. About four thousand were slain upon the spot; the rest retired into the town. Next day the gates were forced, no one offering to make the least resistance, and the army having taken possession of the place, the inhabitants, to the number of fifty-three thousand, were sold for slaves.

About the same time Publius Crassus, whom Cæsar had sent with a legion against the Veneti\*, and six other neighbouring states<sup>2</sup>, inhabiting the sea-coast, dispatched messengers

\* The people of Vannes.

<sup>2</sup> The Unelli, Osismii, Curiosolytæ, Sesuvij, Aulerici, and Rhedones. The exact situation of these is unknown.

to acquaint him, that all those states had submitted to the dominion of the Romans.

The campaign being ended, and all the provinces of Gaul subdued, such was the opinion conceived of this war among the barbarians round about, that even the nations beyond the Rhine sent ambassadors to Cæsar, offering to give hostages, and submit to his commands : but he, being then in haste to return to Italy and Illyricum, ordered them to attend him next spring. Having put his army into winter-quarters, in the territories of the Andes, Turones, and Carnutes, which states lay nearest to the provinces that had been the seat of the war, he himself set out for Italy.

The people  
of Anjou,  
Touraine,  
and Char-  
train.

The senate, informed by letters from Cæsar of his successes, decreed a thanksgiving of fifteen days, a number never granted before to any general<sup>3</sup>.

J. C.  
Comm.  
lib. iii.

Cæsar, upon his departure for Italy, sent Sergius Galba, with the twelfth legion, against the Nantuates<sup>4</sup>, Veragri, and Seduni, whose territories extended from the confines of the Allobroges, the lake Lemanus, and the river Rhone, to the top of the Alps. His design, in this expedition, was to open a free passage over those mountains for the Roman mer-

<sup>3</sup> Pompey was the first general to whose honour so many as ten days had been decreed. Vid. Vol. VIII. p. 96, 97.

<sup>4</sup> The Nantuates are said to have been the ancient inhabitants of that part of Savoye now called Lechablais. The chief town of the Veragri was Aquanum, now St. Maurice. The capital of the Seduni was Sion in Switzerland.



chants, who had hitherto travelled them with great danger, and subject to many grievous exactions. Galba executed his commission, made himself master of several forts, received ambassadors from the nations all round, and, having settled the terms of peace with them, received hostages for their fidelity. Having quartered two cohorts among the Nantuates, he himself, with the rest of the troops, took up his winter-quarters in a town of the Veragri, called Octodurus. It was situated in the midst of a valley, upon a plain of no great extent, and bounded on all sides with very high mountains.

As the city was divided into two parts by a river, he left one to the Gauls, and assigned the other to his soldiers, commanding them to fortify it with a ditch and rampart. After many days spent here, he was suddenly informed, that the Gauls had abandoned, in the night, that part of the city which had been allotted to them; and that the impending mountains were covered with the Veragri and Seduni. Upon this intelligence, Galba, who had neither completed the fortifications of his camp, nor laid in a sufficient store of corn and other provisions, as little apprehending an insurrection of this kind among a people who had submitted and given hostages, speedily assembled a council of war: the danger was imminent and unexpected; there was no room to hope for succours, or for supplies of provision, the enemy being in possession of all the avenues to the camp. Some of the council,

thinking the case desperate, declared for abandoning the baggage, and attempting by a sally to recover their old quarters ; but the greater number were for reserving this expedient to the last extremity, and in the mean time defending the camp in the best manner they could. It was not long before the enemy came rushing down upon them from all parts, and began the assault with a shower of stones and darts. When the battle had lasted upwards of six hours without intermission, the Romans not only found their strength greatly exhausted, but even began to be in want of weapons wherewith to annoy the enemy. The Gauls, on the other hand, urged the combat with greater fury than ever ; and, meeting with but a faint resistance, fell to demolishing the rampart, and filling up the ditch. All was giving way before them, when P. Sextius Baculus, a centurion of the first rank, and highest reputation for courage, who had received many wounds in the battle against the Nervii ; as likewise Volusenus, a man equally distinguished for his conduct and his bravery, came to Galba, and represented to him that the only expedient now left was to make a sudden sally, and put all upon the issue of one bold attack. Accordingly Galba, calling the centurions together, directed them immediately to signify to the soldiers, that they should for some time keep only upon the defensive, and when they had a little recovered their strength, and furnished themselves with the weapons thrown at them by

the enemy, upon a signal given, to sally out of the camp, and place all their hopes of safety in their valour. The orders were punctually obeyed: the Romans, rushing furiously upon the enemy, gave them no time either to comprehend the meaning of so unexpected an attack, or to recover out of the confusion into which it threw them: and thus fortune changed sides. Of thirty thousand fighting men, who had been engaged in the assault, more than ten thousand perished upon the spot: the rest fled in terror and confusion. Galba, seeing the enemy entirely dispersed, quitted the pursuit and retired within his entrenchments. The next day, unwilling to expose himself a second time to the inconstancy of fortune, and being in great want of corn and forage, set fire to the town, and began his march back into the province. As there was no enemy in the field to molest or oppose him in his retreat, he brought the legion safe into the country of the Nantuates, and thence into the territories of the Allobroges, where he put them into winter-quarters.

The insurrection being thus entirely quelled, Cæsar, who believed that tranquillity was now re-established in Gaul (the Belgæ being subdued, the Germans expelled, and the inhabitants of the Alps compelled to submit) made a journey, in the beginning of the winter, into Illyricum; when all on a sudden a new war broke out in Celtic Gaul. The occasion of it was this: the seventh legion, commanded



by young Crassus, had been quartered among the Andes, a people bordering upon the ocean. As there was a great scarcity of corn in those parts, Crassus sent some officers of the cavalry to solicit a supply from the neighbouring states. Of these states the Veneti were by far the most powerful, not only on account of their abundant shipping, wherewith they drove a mighty traffic to Britain, but because most of the nations that trade on those seas were tributaries to them. They began to revolt by detaining the officers sent to them by Crassus, hoping, by this means, to recover the hostages put into his hands. The neighbouring states, moved by their example and authority, (as the Gauls are in general very sudden and forward in their resolves) detained, for the same reason, the officers sent to them, and, speedily dispatching embassies from one to another, entered into a strict confederacy for supporting the common cause; earnestly soliciting, at the same time, the inland provinces to rise in defence of that liberty they had received from their ancestors, and not tamely submit to the ignominious yoke of the Romans. All the states upon the sea-coast coming readily into this alliance, they jointly sent ambassadors to Crassus to acquaint him, that he must first restore to them their hostages, if he expected to have his officers restored to him.

Cæsar, receiving intelligence of these things from Crassus, and being then at a great distance from Gaul, sent orders for building a



great number of galleys upon the Loire, and for drawing together, from the province, mariners, rowers, and pilots. These orders were executed with good dispatch : and he himself, as soon as the season of the year permitted, went to the army.

[Year of Rome 697 <sup>5</sup>.]

The Veneti and their allies, not ignorant of the greatness of their crime, in detaining and loading with irons ambassadors, a name ever looked upon, among all nations, as sacred and inviolable, made preparations in proportion to the danger that threatened them. The natural situation of their country gave them confident hopes of being able to defend themselves : for the passes by land were every where cut asunder by many friths and arms of the sea ; and the approach by sea was no less difficult on account of the small number of harbours, the little knowledge the Romans, accustomed only to the navigation of the Mediterranean, had of the art of governing ships on the ocean, and their total ignorance of the coast. Neither did the Veneti believe it practicable for the Roman army to continue long in that country, by reason of the great scarcity of corn ; and they had a mighty confidence in the strength and number of their shipping.

Cæsar, to restrain those of the Gauls who

<sup>5</sup> Cn. Corn. Lentulus Marcellinus, and L. Marcius Philippus, consuls.

had not yet declared themselves, and to hinder the confederates<sup>6</sup> from uniting their forces into one army, divided his troops, and dispersed them into different parts of Gaul. He sent Labienus towards Treves with a body of cavalry. P. Crassus, at the head of twelve legionary cohorts, passed the Garonne, and entered into Aquitaine, to prevent the enemies receiving any supplies from that quarter. Another of his lieutenants, Titurius Sabinus, with three legions, found employment for the people who inhabited the coasts of Bassebretagne, and of Normandy as far as Lisieux. To D. Brutus was given the command of the fleet, and Cæsar himself conducted the land forces.

Most of the enemies' towns were built upon promontories, and points of land, whose feet were washed by the sea at high water, and left dry at ebb : so that neither his land forces nor his ships could stay long before them.

Cæsar, duly considering this, perceived plainly, that he should never be able to reduce the Veneti but by a naval battle. He resolved therefore to wait for his fleet. His fleet arrived ; and the enemy did not delay to come out of their ports to fight. Full of confidence in their naval strength and skill, they, with two hundred and twenty tall vessels, fell

<sup>6</sup> Cæsar tells us, that the Veneti brought into their alliance the Osismii, Lexovii, Nannetes, Ambiani, Morini, Diablintes, and Menapii ; and dispatched ambassadors into Britain, which lies over against their coast, to solicit assistance from thence.

furiously upon the Romans. The construction of their ships, which were much higher than the Roman galleys, gave the Gauls a considerable advantage in throwing their darts; and the Romans suffered much at first from this circumstance. But Cæsar had fortunately provided a great number of sharp crooked scythes, like those that were used in sieges. With these, fixed to the end of long poles, the Romans, laying hold of the tackle of the enemy's vessels, towed them away by force of rowing; then, cutting the cables, the mainyards fell down, whereby the enemy, who relied on their sails and rigging, were at once deprived of the use of them: and now, the dispute depending wholly on courage and manhood, the Roman soldiers, who fought under the eye of their general, and of a vast number of witnesses (for all the hills that looked upon the sea were covered with spectators) easily obtained the victory.

The Veneti, observing that the Romans had already boarded and made themselves masters of a great part of their fleet, began to think of providing for the safety of the rest by flight. Accordingly they tacked about to run before the wind: but all on a sudden there ensued so dead a calm, that not a vessel could stir out of its place; and then the Romans took them with great ease. After a conflict that had lasted from nine in the morning, a very few escaped under favour of the night.

This victory put an end to the war with

the Veneti; for they had lost the whole body of their youth, as well as the most eminent men among them for rank or authority, and all their naval strength. Those who survived this defeat, having no resource left, surrendered themselves to Cæsar's mercy; who thought it necessary to proceed against them with severity, that he might impress upon the minds of the Gauls for the future a proper regard to the sacred character of ambassadors. He condemned therefore all their senators to death, and sold the people for slaves.

The arms of Cæsar prospered on every side. At the same time that he vanquished the Veneti, Titurius Sabinus obtained a great victory over the united forces of the Unelli, Eburovices, and Lexovii \*. The two last mentioned nations were so furiously bent upon the war, that they massacred their senate for opposing it. After this cruel execution, they joined their troops to those of the Unelli, whose conductor Viridovix was recognized for generalissimo of the army of the three nations. Under his command they advanced against the Romans, and, approaching near their camp, defied them to battle. Sabinus pretended fear, kept close within his entrenchments, and, by means of a pretended deserter, deceived the enemy into a belief that he was the next night to steal privately out of his camp, in order to go to the succour of his general, much distressed by the Veneti. By this stratagem he drew the Gauls to attack him in his camp, which was upon an emi-

\* Inhabitants of Coutance, Evreux, and Lisieux.



nence. Mounting it with precipitation, they arrived quite out of breath. Sabinus instantly caused all his troops to sally out upon them by two gates at once. The assailants, not able to support the very first shock, took to flight; the Roman cavalry pursued them, and almost finished the destruction of that numerous army.

Much about the same time, P. Crassus arrived in Aquitain. Having made due provision of corn, raised some cavalry, assembled his auxiliary troops, and strengthened his army with a select body of volunteers from Toulouse, Carcasson, and Narbonne, states in that part of the Roman province that lies nearest to Aquitain, he advanced with all his forces to the territories of the Sotiates \*. Crassus, with great slaughter, put them to the rout, and presently after invested their capital. They made a brave resistance for some time; but finding that the Romans would surmount all the difficulties that could be thrown in their way, they sent to Crassus, requesting that they might be admitted to a surrendry.

\* Inhabiting the country about Aire.

The defeat of the Sotiates, and the reduction of their city, roused the other states of Aquitain to unite themselves against the conqueror: and they procured assistance from the Spaniards, their neighbours. Crassus attacked them in their camp, and of fifty thousand men, of which their strength consisted, scarce a fourth part escaped being cut in pieces. The fruit of this victory was the submission of all Aquitain.

[This was the last service performed by P. Crassus in the war of Gaul; for, with Cæsar's permission, he went soon after to Rome, and the next year into Asia, taking with him a thousand Gallic horse, to assist his father in his expedition against the Parthians.]

When Cæsar had finished the war against the Veneti, the season was far advanced: nevertheless, as the Morini<sup>7</sup> and Menapii, who were situated in the northern part of Gaul, and who, though they had entered into the league which was just dissolved, had taken no step yet to shew their submission to the Romans, Cæsar, who thought nothing done, while there remained any thing to do<sup>8</sup>, marched against them in order to finish his conquest. At his approach they retired, with all their effects, into the woods and morasses, with which their country abounded, hoping to find there a safe shelter. But Cæsar resolved to lay low those immense forests; and with the trees which he cut down he made a kind of rampart to cover the flanks of his army against any sudden incursions of the barbarians. He had made a considerable progress in this work, when, the bad weather coming on, and the continual rains requiring that he should find some shelter for his army, necessity compelled him to leave his conquest

<sup>7</sup> The Morini probably inhabited the sea-coast from the Somme to the Scheld: the Menapii both banks of some part of the lower Rhine.

<sup>8</sup> Nil actum credens, dum quid superesset agendum.

Lucan. ii. 657.

incomplete. Having ravaged the country and burnt the villages, he retired, and distributed his troops into winter-quarters in the territories of the Auleri-Eburovices, Lexovii, and the other newly subdued states <sup>9</sup>.

[Year of Rome 698.]

The next year [when Pompey and Crassus were consuls] a great body of the Usipetes and Tenchtheri, German nations, passed the Rhine, not far from its mouth. The hostilities of their neighbours the Suevi, who had for many years harassed them with continual wars, and hindered them from cultivating their lands, were the cause of their making this emigration.

J. C. Com.  
lib. iv.

The Suevi, by far the most warlike and considerable of all the Germans, were divided into a hundred cantons, each of which used to send yearly into the field a thousand armed men. The rest, who continued in their several districts, employed themselves in cultivating the lands. These husbandmen became the next year soldiers, and were succeeded in the care of the lands by the troops that had served the year before. Thus they lived in the continual exercise of agriculture and war alternately. In the distribution of the lands, no such thing was allowed among them as property or private possession, their residence in any place being confined to one year.

<sup>9</sup> For what passed at Rome this year, 697, in relation to Cæsar, see above, p. 21, 22, &c.



They had little trade, having nothing to sell but spoils taken in war. They suffered no wine to be imported into their territories, as thinking that it both enervated the mind, and unfitted the body for exercise and labour.

Having tried the strength of their neighbours, the Ubii, in many wars, they found them too numerous and potent to be dispossessed of their territories; yet they prevailed so far as to impose a tribute upon them, and very much reduce their power.

But the Usipetes and Tenchtheri, before mentioned, after many years' resistance, were at length totally driven out of their possessions by the Suevi. Having wandered over many regions of Germany during the space of three years, they arrived at last upon the banks of the Rhine, where the Menapii had houses, lands and villages, on both sides the river. These, alarmed at the approach of so prodigious a multitude (for they were not an army, but two nations, who marched in a body, men, women, and children, to the number of above four hundred and thirty thousand) they abandoned all their habitations on the right bank of the Rhine, and, retiring to the left side, disposed their troops in a proper manner, to hinder the passage of the invaders. The Germans tried every expedient; and finding they could neither force a passage, because of their want of shipping, nor steal over privately, by reason of the strict watch kept by the Menapii, had re-



course to stratagem. They gave out that they would, without delay, go back to their own country; and, to gain credit to this report, they, in fact, thitherward made a three days' march. The Menapii were deceived. Such of them as had dwelt on the farther bank of the Rhine returned to their habitations, secure and fearless of danger. Surprised by the German cavalry, who in one night recovered the whole ground of the three days' march, they were all put to the sword: and the Germans, having seized the shipping before the Menapii on this side had intelligence of their approach, passed the river, took possession of towns and villages, and supported themselves the rest of the winter with the provisions there found.

Cæsar, informed of these things, and dreading the levity of the Gauls, who were very changeable in their councils, and fond of novelties, made all the haste he could to join his army. Upon his arrival he found that things were fallen out exactly as he had apprehended: some of the states of Gaul had sent ambassadors to the Germans, inviting them to leave the banks of the Rhine, and assuring them that all their demands should be readily complied with. The Germans, allured by these hopes, had already penetrated into the territories of the Eburones and Condrusi, both which nations were under the protection of the Treviri\*. Cæsar assembled the chiefs of the Gauls, dissembled his knowledge of their secret designs, and by

The people  
about  
Liege and  
Namur.  
\* People of  
Treves.

soft words endeavoured to confirm them in their alliance with the people of Rome: he then demanded of them a certain number of horse, and prepared to march against the Germans.

When he came within a few days' march of their camp, ambassadors arrived from them, who addressed him in words to the following effect: "The Germans have no design of beginning a war with the people of Rome; they are come into these parts against their inclination, having been forcibly driven from their former dwellings. If the Romans are disposed to accept of their friendship, they will rest satisfied with the quiet possession of those lands they have already conquered, or with such as the Romans shall think proper to assign them; in bravery they yield to the Suevi alone, for whom the immortal gods themselves are not an equal match."

Cæsar made such reply as best suited his present views: but the conclusion of his speech was of the following purport: "That he could enter into no treaty of friendship with them, so long as they continued in Gaul: that men unable to defend their own territories were not likely to make conquests in other countries: that there were no uncultivated lands in Gaul, sufficient for so great a multitude, without invading the properties of others: but that, if they pleased, they might incorporate themselves with the Ubii, whose ambassadors were then in his camp to complain of the injuries done them by the Suevi, and

request his aid against their encroachments : and this he promised to obtain for them from the Ubii." The ambassadors replied, " That they would report to their countrymen what he had said, and in three days return with an answer ; requesting that in the mean time he would not advance with his army."

But this Cæsar refused, as knowing that, a few days before, they had sent a great body of cavalry over the Meuse, to forage and plunder in the territories of the Ambivariti\*. He thence concluded, that they asked for delay, because they waited the return of that party. Cæsar therefore still advanced. When within twelve miles of the enemy, he was met by the ambassadors on the day appointed : they were very earnest in their request that he would advance no farther ; but not being able to prevail, entreated him that he would restrain the cavalry of his advanced guard from doing any act of hostility : and in the mean time permit them to send ambassadors to the Ubii ; from whose senate and magistrates, if they could obtain, under the sanction of a solemn oath, the conditions proposed by Cæsar, they declared themselves ready to accept them : only they desired, that he would allow them the space of three days to bring matters to a final issue. Cæsar believed that they had no other view in what they said, than to gain time till their cavalry should arrive : he told them, nevertheless, that, for the sake of water, he would that day advance four miles, and no farther ; but

\* Probably the people of Breda and Boisleduc.



desired that their chiefs would attend him the day after to acquaint him with their demands. In the mean time he sent orders to the officers of his cavalry not to attack the enemy ; and, in case they should be attacked themselves, only to maintain their ground till he should come up with the rest of the army.

But the Germans, though their cavalry did not exceed eight hundred, by reason of the absence of those who had been sent to forage, yet, seeing the Roman horse advance without caution, fell suddenly upon them. These amounted to five thousand, but having no apprehension of an attack, because they knew that the German ambassadors had been with Cæsar a little before, and had obtained a day's truce, were easily thrown into disorder and put to flight. The Romans lost seventy-four men'. And now Cæsar re-

Tom. XII.  
p. 506.

1 " This battle," says M. Crevier, " is of very great importance, on account of the circumstance of its being fought at a time when there was a negotiation actually on foot between Cæsar and the Germans. By whom the hostility was begun, and consequently upon whom the reproach of perfidy ought to fall, is a problem, that labours under some difficulty. Cæsar threw the fault upon the barbarians : but several persons at Rome were persuaded, that it was he who had violated the faith of the negotiation : and when the senate were decreeing him honours for his exploits in this campaign, Cato gave it as his opinion, that Cæsar should be delivered up to the Germans ; to the end that he alone might suffer the punishment of his breach of faith, and the commonwealth not be answerable for it to gods or men.

" It is difficult to decide upon a point so obscure, and



solved neither to give audience to the ambassadors of the Germans, nor admit them to

concerning which the interest of Cæsar, on one hand, lessens the weight of his evidence; and hatred and partiality, on the other, may have carried Cato beyond due bounds. It is known that Cæsar was not scrupulous in morals" [for he was too much addicted to gallantry] "but his proceedings were frank and generous, at least outwardly so; and how little care soever he took to have truth and justice really on his side, he always affected to have the appearances of them. It must, nevertheless, be allowed, that appearances are not for him here. It is not probable, that eight hundred horsemen should think of attacking five thousand." Surely it is less probable, that eight hundred horse should beat five thousand, unless the latter were "surprised and unprepared (as Cæsar says they were) because trusting to the truce granted at the enemy's request." M. Crevier proceeds: "And what seems to prove the good faith of the Germans is, that, the day after the battle, they sent their deputies again to Cæsar, to make apologies, and to continue the negotiation." If they were perfidious in attacking the Roman cavalry, it is no wonder that Cæsar shewed no regard to their apology, but considered them as no less perfidious in their new deputation. But, with relation to the notable advice said to have been given by Cato to the senate, what evidence is there of the fact, that Cato did deliver that opinion? Is it sufficiently warranted? Who is the historian that records it? Plutarch, the only writer we have who mentions the matter, gives us Tanusius Geminus for his authority. And who was this Tanusius or Tamusius? (He is cited by Suetonius for several tales of the slanderous kind, that carry no face of probability.) Vossius, concerning him, writes thus: *Ex Senecæ verbis liquet, fuisse annales Tamusii, quales illi Volusii, qui eodem vixit tempore. De eo sic Catullus:*

*Annales Volusii cacata charta.*

Add to this, the great unlikelihood that Cato, envious and malicious as he was, even almost to madness, whenever Cæsar's name was in question, should yet expose his weakness to so great a degree, as, in the consulship of

De Hist.  
Lat. lib. i.  
cap. xii.

terms of peace, seeing they had treacherously solicited for a truce, and afterwards broke it themselves. He likewise considered that it would be downright madness to delay coming to an action, till the German army should be augmented by their cavalry, then absent; and, besides, he was perfectly well acquainted with the levity of the Gauls, among whom the successful attack made by the Germans had given them a considerable reputation. A very lucky accident fell out to bring about Cæsar's purpose: for the very next morning the Germans, persisting in their treachery and dissimulation, came in great numbers to his camp; all their nobility making part of the embassy. Their pretended design in coming, was to vindicate themselves in regard to what had happened the day before; but their real motive was to obtain, if possible, another insidious truce. Cæsar, overjoyed to have them thus in his power, caused them to be secured: and immediately drew his forces out of the camp. The cavalry, whom he supposed terrified by the late disaster, were commanded to follow in the rear.

Having drawn up his army in three lines, and made a very expeditious march of eight miles, he appeared before the enemies' camp. Their consternation was not a little increased by the unexpectedness of his appearance, and

Crassus and Pompey, to give an advice concerning Cæsar, which at any time must appear senseless and impracticable.

the absence of their own officers; they had hardly time to take counsel, or to arm: their camp was presently forced: the women and children betook themselves to flight on all sides. Cæsar sent the cavalry in pursuit of them: the Germans, hearing a noise behind them, and seeing their wives and children put to the sword, threw down their arms, and fled out of the camp. Being arrived at the conflux of the Rhine and Meuse, and finding it impossible to continue their flight any farther, they threw themselves into the river; where, through fear, weariness, or the force of the current, they almost all perished. And thus the Romans, without the loss of a man, put an end to this formidable war. Cæsar offered those of the Germans whom he had detained in his camp liberty to depart: but they, dreading the resentment of the Gauls whose lands they had ravaged, chose rather to continue with him, and they obtained his consent.

Cæsar had various reasons for resolving to lead his army over the Rhine: but what chiefly swayed him was, that, seeing the Germans were so easily induced to transport their forces into Gaul, he thought it might be of no small service to let them see that the Romans wanted neither resolution nor ability to transport an army into Germany. Add to this, that the cavalry of the Usipetes and Tencheri, who, having passed the Meuse (as was above related) to forage and plunder, and escaped thereby the disaster of the late defeat,



\* From whom the Franks were descended.

had, upon receiving the news of it, repassed the Rhine, and retired into the territories of the Sicambri \*; and Cæsar, having demanded that these troops should be delivered up to him, had received for answer, “That the Rhine was the boundary of the Roman empire: that if he thought it unjustifiable in the Germans to pass over into Gaul without his leave, upon what pretence could he claim any power or authority on the German side of that river?”

But Cæsar had a third reason: for the Ubii, who alone, of all the nations beyond the Rhine, had sent ambassadors to him, entered into alliance with him, and given him hostages, earnestly entreated him to come to their assistance, they being very hard pressed by the Suevi. They said, that his shewing himself in Germany would be alone sufficient to secure repose to them for the future; and they offered him boats to transport his legions.

Cæsar builds a bridge over the Rhine.

Cæsar thought that it was neither safe, nor for the dignity of the Roman name, to make use of boats for crossing the Rhine. To build a bridge would be difficult, on account of the breadth, depth, and rapidity of the river: nevertheless he undertook it; and the work was completed in ten days, reckoning from the time they began to bring the timber to the bank of the river. Cæsar led over his army; and leaving a strong guard on each side the stream, marched directly into the territories of the Sicambri; who, so soon as they heard that the bridge was begun, had, by advice of the Usipetes and Tenctheri, withdrawn, with their



effects, into the neighbouring woods and deserts. Cæsar made but a short stay in their country, burnt their villages, cut down their corn, and marched into the territories of the Ubii. The Suevi, in pursuance of an order of their national council, acted as the Sicambri, only with this difference, that all such as were able to bear arms met, by command, at a place of general rendezvous, in the very heart of their country, there to wait the arrival of the Romans, and give them battle. But Cæsar, having accomplished all he intended, in carrying his arms over the Rhine, which was to spread an universal terror among the Germans, take vengeance of the Sicambri, and set the Ubii at liberty, after a stay of only eighteen days in Germany, led back his army into Gaul, and broke down the bridge.

Though but a small part of the summer now remained, Cæsar resolved to pass over into Britain, having certain intelligence that, in all his wars with the Gauls, they had constantly received assistance from thence. He foresaw that the season of the year would not permit him to finish the enterprise; yet he thought it would be of no small advantage, should he only take a view of the island, learn the temper and manners of the inhabitants, and acquaint himself with the coast, harbours, and landing-places, to all which the Gauls were perfect strangers. The merchants who traded thither, and of whom he inquired, could neither tell him what was the extent of the island, nor what was the strength of the

Cæsar prepares to pass into Britain.

nations that inhabited it, nor their skill in war, nor what harbours they had, fit to receive large ships. For which reason, before he embarked, he thought proper to send C. Volusenus with a galley, to get some knowledge of these things; commanding him to return with all expedition, when he had informed himself as fully as opportunity would allow. Cæsar himself marched with his whole army into the territories of the Morini; because thence was the nearest passage into Britain. Here he ordered a great many ships from the neighbouring ports to attend him, and the fleet which he had made use of the year before in his war with the Veneti.

Mean while the Britons, having notice of his design by the merchants that resorted to their island, ambassadors from many of their states came to him with an offer of hostages, and submission to the authority of the people of Rome. To these ambassadors he gave a favourable audience, and, exhorting them to continue in the same mind, sent them back into their own country. With them he dispatched Comius, whom he had constituted king of the Atrebates, a man, in whose virtue, wisdom, and fidelity, he greatly confided, and whose authority in the island was very considerable. To him he gave it in charge to visit as many states as he could, and persuade them to enter into an alliance with the Romans; letting them know, at the same time, that Cæsar designed, as soon as possible, to come over in person into their island.

Volusenus, having taken a view of the

country, so far as it was possible for a man who was resolved not to quit his ship, or trust himself in the hands of the barbarians, returned on the fifth day, and acquainted Cæsar with his discoveries.

While Cæsar continued in the country of the Morini, for the sake of getting ready his fleet, deputies arrived from almost all their cantons, to excuse their late war with the people of Rome, and to promise an entire submission for the future. This fell out very opportunely; because a war with these people would have obliged him to postpone his expedition into Britain. He therefore ordered them to send him a great number of hostages; and on their compliance, received them into his friendship. Having got together about eighty transports, he thought these would be sufficient for carrying over two legions. His galleys he distributed to his quæstor, lieutenants, and chief officers of the navy. Eighteen vessels, which he had appointed to transport his cavalry, were detained by contrary winds at a port about eight miles off. The rest of the army, under the command of Titurius Sabinus and L. Aurunculeius Cotta, were sent against the Menapii, and those cantons of the Morini which had not submitted. P. Sulpicius Rufus had the charge of the harbour where he embarked, with a strong garrison to maintain it.

Things being in this manner settled, and the wind springing up fair, Cæsar weighed anchor about midnight, ordering the cavalry



Cliffs of  
Jove's.

to embark at the other port, and follow him. About nine in the morning he himself, with a part of the fleet, reached the coast of Britain, where he saw all the cliffs covered with the enemies' forces. From those cliffs it was easy for them to pour down their javelins upon the Romans. Not thinking this, therefore, a convenient landing-place, he cast anchor at three in the afternoon, purposing to wait the arrival of the rest of his fleet. Meanwhile, having called the lieutenants and military tribunes together, he informed them of what he had learnt from Volusenus; instructed them in the part they were to act; and particularly exhorted them to do every thing with readiness and upon a signal given, agreeably to the rules of military discipline: expedition and dispatch being more especially requisite in sea-affairs, because of all the most liable to sudden changes. Having dismissed them, and finding both the wind and weather favourable, he made the signal for weighing anchor, and, after sailing about eight miles farther, he arrived at a smooth open shore.

Deal.

But the barbarians, perceiving his design, had sent before them their cavalry, and their chariots, such as they commonly made use of in battle; and, following with the rest of their forces, endeavoured to oppose his landing. And indeed the difficulty of effecting it was great on many accounts; for the Roman ships drew so much water, that they could not come very near the shore; and it was a painful service for the soldiers, loaded with a weight



of armour, and unacquainted with the place, to leap from the ships, and, wading breast-high through the waves, encounter an enemy; who, standing upon dry ground, or advancing only a little way into the water, had the free use of their arms; and, knowing perfectly the ground, could also boldly spur on their horses against the invaders. All these circumstances spread a terror among the Romans; wholly strangers to this way of fighting, they shewed not their wonted alacrity, and cheerful readiness to advance against the enemy. Cæsar, observing this, ordered some of his galleys, which drew less water than his transports, to draw nearer the shore, and endeavour, by showers of darts from the engines \* which they carried, to drive the enemy to some distance. This proved of considerable service to them: for the surprise occasioned by the make of the galleys, the motion of the oars, and the playing of the engines, made the barbarians halt, and presently after begin to give back. But the Roman soldiers still demurring to leap into the sea, chiefly because of the depth of the water in those parts, the standard-bearer of the tenth legion, having first invoked the gods for success, cried out aloud: "Follow me, fellow-soldiers, unless you will betray the Roman eagle into the hands of the enemy: for my part, I am resolved to discharge my duty to Cæsar and the commonwealth." Instantly he jumped into the sea, advanced with the eagle, and was followed by all that were in the ship: which being perceived by

\* Balistæ.

those in the other vessels, they also did the like, and boldly approached the enemy.

The Britons defended themselves with resolution: nor were the Romans able to get firm footing, till Cæsar ordered some small boats to be manned with recruits, and go to the assistance of the foremost ranks; by which means they were soon enabled to put the enemy to the rout. But as the cavalry were not yet arrived, Cæsar could not pursue the runaways, nor advance far into the island.

The vanquished, soon after their defeat, dispatched ambassadors to Cæsar to sue for peace, offering hostages and an intire submission to his commands. With these ambassadors came Comius, whom Cæsar (as above related) had sent before him into Britain. The natives had seized him as soon as he landed, and, though charged with a commission from Cæsar, thrown him into irons. Upon the late defeat, they thought proper to release him and send him back; casting the blame upon the multitude. Cæsar, after some reproaches for having begun the war against him after they had sent ambassadors to him into Gaul to sue for peace, at length told them he would forgive their fault; and commanded them to send a certain number of hostages. Part were delivered immediately, and the rest, as living at some distance, they promised to send in a few days. In the mean time they disbanded their troops; and the several chiefs came to Cæsar's camp, to negotiate their own concerns and those of

the states to which they belonged : a peace being thus concluded four days after Cæsar's arrival in Britain.

The eighteen transports appointed to carry the cavalry, of whom we have spoken above \*, \* p. 307. put to sea with a gentle gale : but, when they had so near approached the coast as to be within view of the camp, so violent a storm all on a sudden arose, that, being unable to hold on their course, some were obliged to return to the port whence they set out, and others driven to the farther end of the island westward, not without great danger. There they cast anchor : but the waves rising very high, so as to fill the ships with water, they were again, in the night, obliged to stand out to sea and make for the continent of Gaul. That very night it happened to be full moon, when the tides upon the sea-coast always rise highest, a thing, in those days, wholly unknown to the Romans. Thus, at one and the same time, the galleys, which Cæsar had caused to be drawn up on the strand, and the transports that were at anchor in the road, were raised up, tossed about, and beat to pieces by the tempestuous waves. Nor was it possible to attempt any thing for their preservation. This disaster spread a general consternation through the camp : for there were no other ships to carry back the troops, nor any materials to repair those that had been disabled by the tempest. And, as it had been all along Cæsar's design to winter in Gaul, he was wholly without corn to subsist the troops.



All this being known among the British chiefs, who, after the battle, had repaired (as was just now said) to Cæsar's camp, they began to hold conferences among themselves. They plainly saw that the Romans were destitute of cavalry, shipping, and corn; and judged from the smallness of their camp, that the number of their troops was but inconsiderable; in which notion they were the more confirmed, because Cæsar, having brought over the legions without baggage, had occasion to inclose but a small spot of ground. They thought, therefore, they had now a fair opportunity to rid themselves of the invaders, and effectually put a stop to all future attempts upon Britain. Having, therefore, entered into a confederacy, they gradually left the camp, and began to draw the islanders together. But Cæsar, though he was not yet apprised of their design, yet conjecturing their intention, from the disaster which had befallen his fleet, and the delays formed in relation to the host-ages, made preparations accordingly. He sent reapers every day into the fields, and stored his camp with corn. The timber of the ships that had been most damaged, he ordered to be made use of in repairing the rest, sending to Gaul for what other materials he wanted. As the soldiers were indefatigable in this service, his fleet was soon in a condition to sail, being diminished only by twelve ships. During these transactions, a cloud of dust appeared suddenly on the side where the seventh legion was supposed to be foraging. As but one



field remained unreaped, the enemy suspected that the Romans would go thither to forage; and had therefore hid themselves, during the night, in the woods, there waiting till the reapers had quitted their arms, and dispersed themselves for the work in hand: then sallying out on a sudden they began to surround them with horses and chariots. Cæsar, conjecturing how matters went, marched away with the cohorts that were upon guard, and ordered those that were in the camp to follow him as soon as possible. He had gone but a little way, when he saw his men with great difficulty sustaining the fight, being driven into a small compass, and exposed on all sides to the darts of the assailants. Upon his approach the enemy made a stand, and the Romans recovered from their fear. However, Cæsar, not thinking it a proper time for a general engagement, stood a while facing the enemy, and then led back his legions to the camp. The continual rains that followed for some days both kept the Romans within their intrenchments, and withheld the enemy from attacking them. Mean time the Britons dispatched messengers into all parts to make known to their countrymen how favourable an opportunity they had of enriching themselves with spoil, and of securing themselves for ever from all future invasions, by forcing the camp of the Romans, whose number was very small. By this means having drawn together a great body of horse and foot, they boldly advanced towards the Roman intrenchments. Cæsar

drew up his legions in order of battle before the camp, and gave the Britons so warm a reception, that they presently turned their backs and fled. He pursued them, with great slaughter, till his men were out of breath; and then returned to his camp. The Britons, disheartened by the loss they had sustained, dispatched ambassadors the same day to sue for peace; which Cæsar readily granted, upon their promising to send him over into Gaul double the number of hostages he had required before. His want of horse, and the fear of exposing his fleet to another storm, if he staid till the equinox, made him hasten his departure. The same night therefore, the wind proving favourable, he weighed anchor, and arrived safe in Gaul; whence he immediately wrote to the senate, acquainting them with his exploits in Britain; for which a supplication, or general thanksgiving, was decreed for twenty days<sup>2</sup>.

The Britons, it would seem, were not much awed by Cæsar's arms; for of all the states who had promised to send him hostages, two only performed their engagements. He resolved therefore to make a new descent the following spring with a more powerful fleet and army. With this view, before he returned to Italy, where he usually passed a part of the winter, he ordered his lieutenants to refit the old ships, and build as many new ones as they could.

<sup>2</sup> See above, p. 42, and 53, for those transactions at Rome of the year 698, wherein Cæsar was interested.

When he had finished what he had to do in Cisalpine Gaul, he set out for Illyricum, upon advice that the Pirustæ, a people of that country, were making devastations in the province [that is, in those parts of Illyricum which recognised the Roman government.] When he arrived there, he ordered the several states to furnish their contingents, and appointed a place of general rendezvous. Cæsar was put to no other trouble than that of appearing in the country to compel the injurious barbarians to give hostages and make satisfaction for the damage they had done.

[Year of Rome 699\*.]

The order which Cæsar had left with his lieutenants had been executed with such diligence during his absence, that, at his return into Gaul, he found six hundred transport ships, and twenty-eight galleys, ready to be launched in a few days. He ordered the whole fleet to rendezvous at port Itius, the island being there not above thirty miles distant from the continent: but because the Treviri seemed disposed to rebellion, having neither appeared at the general diets of Gaul, nor submitted to the orders of the republic, and were reported to have even solicited assistance from Germany, he marched into their territories with four legions and eight hundred horse; being desirous totally to quiet Gaul before he en-

J. Cæs.  
Comm.  
l. v.

\* L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, and App. Claudius Pulcher, consuls.



gaged in his enterprise against Britain. Two of the principal men of the Treviri, Indutiomarus and Cingetorix, were at this time competitors for the supreme authority. The latter, so soon as he heard of the arrival of Cæsar, came to him and assured him, that he and all his party would continue firm to their duty. The other soon after submitted, finding himself deserted by some principal men of his own party. Cæsar exacted of him two hundred hostages, among whom were to be his son, and all his nearest relations, specified by name. Indutiomarus complied: nevertheless Cæsar, assembling all the principal men of Treves, reconciled them one after another to Cingetorix, thinking it of importance to establish thoroughly the authority of a man, of whose inviolable attachment he had received convincing proofs.

This affair being settled, Cæsar hastened with his legions to port Itius<sup>3</sup>, where he found

<sup>3</sup> Calais or Boulogne.

Middl. 494. "Cæsar was now upon his second expedition into Britain, which raised much talk and expectation at Rome, and gave Cicero no small concern for the safety of his brother, who, as one of Cæsar's lieutenants, was to bear a considerable part in it. But the accounts which he received from the place soon eased him of his apprehensions, by informing him, that there was nothing either to fear or to hope for from the attempt; no danger from the people, no spoils from the country. In a letter to Atticus: 'We are in suspense,' says he, 'about the British war: it is certain that the access of the island is strongly fortified; and it is known also already, that there is not a grain of silver in it, nor any thing else but slaves; of whom you will scarce expect any, I dare say, skilled in music or letters.'

Ad Quint.  
i. 16.

Ad Att.  
iv. 16.



four thousand Gallic horse, and all the prime nobility of the several states assembled. Cæsar's design was to leave behind him a few only of these nobles, on whose fidelity he could rely, and to take the rest into Britain as hostages, in order to prevent any commotions in Gaul during his absence.

Among those whom he resolved to carry away with him, was Dumnorix the Æduan; because he knew him to be a lover of novel-

In another to Trebatius: 'I hear that there is not any gold or silver in the island: if so, you have nothing to do but to take one of their chariots and fly back to us.' Ep. Fam. vii. 7.

"From their raileries of this kind (says Dr. Middleton) one cannot help reflecting on the surprising fate and revolutions of kingdoms: how Rome, once the mistress of the world, the seat of arts, empire and glory, now lies sunk in sloth, ignorance, and poverty; enslaved to the most cruel as well as to the most contemptible of tyrants, superstition and religious imposture: while this remote country, anciently the jest and contempt of the polite Romans, is become the happy seat of liberty, plenty, and letters, flourishing in all the arts and refinements of civil life; yet running, perhaps, the same course which Rome itself had run before it; from virtuous industry to wealth, from wealth to luxury, from luxury to an impatience of discipline and corruption of morals; till, by a total degeneracy and loss of virtue, being grown ripe for destruction, it falls a prey at last to some hardy oppressor, and, with the loss of liberty, losing every thing else that is valuable, sinks gradually again into its original barbarism."

This reflection is undoubtedly very judicious as far as it regards the danger to which our country, with respect to its liberties, is exposed by the corruption of its morals: but who would not imagine that, in the opinion of the author, ancient Rome was free from superstition and religious imposture? Who would imagine that the author had written a book with this title: The religion of the present Romans derived from that of their heathen ancestors?

ties, ambitious, enterprising, and of great interest and authority among the Gauls. Dumnorix at first earnestly requested to be left behind; sometimes pretending that he was unused to the sea, and afraid of it; sometimes, that religious engagements required him to stay at home: but, finding his reasons had no weight with Cæsar, he began to cabal among the Gallic nobles, advising them not to leave the continent, and telling them that Cæsar's intention was undoubtedly to destroy them all; but that not daring to do it in their own country, he was carrying them into Britain, where he hoped to find a favourable opportunity of executing his cruel purpose.

Cæsar, though fully informed of these practices, yet, in consideration of the Ædui, a nation for which he had a singular regard, satisfied himself with endeavouring to traverse the designs of the malcontent; being determined, nevertheless, to continue inflexible, and to prefer the interest of the commonwealth to every other consideration. While detained at the port about five and twenty days, during which the north-west wind, very common on that coast, hindered him from sailing, he studied to keep Dumnorix in his duty by ways of gentleness and persuasion, not neglecting, however, to watch all his motions. At length, the wind springing up fair, he ordered both horse and foot to embark. As the execution of this order universally engaged the attention of the camp, Dumnorix seized the opportunity to draw off the Æduan ca-

valry ; and he began his march homeward. Cæsar had early notice of it, instantly put a stop to the embarkation, and, postponing every other business, sent out a strong party of horse to pursue the Æduan, and bring him back. Their orders were to kill him in case of disobedience or resistance. They overtook him ; he refused to return, defended himself sword in hand, and implored the assistance of his followers, often crying out to them, that he was free, and the subject of a free state. The Romans, pursuant to the orders they had received, surrounded and slew him ; upon which all the Æduan cavalry returned to Cæsar.

And now Cæsar, leaving Labienus, with three legions and two thousand horse, to secure the port, provide corn, and have an eye upon the transactions of the continent, embarked on board his vessels the same number of horse, together with five legions ; and weighing anchor about sun-set, arrived with his whole fleet, the next day by noon, on the British coast, where he landed without opposition, in the same place which he had found so convenient the year before. The Britons had assembled in vast multitudes to oppose his landing, as he afterwards understood by the prisoners : but, being terrified at the sight of so numerous a fleet, which, with the vessels that private persons had provided for their own use, amounted to eight hundred and upward, had quitted the shore, and retired to the hills. Cæsar left ten cohorts and three

Cæsar's second invasion of Britain.



hundred horse to secure the fleet; and with the rest marched in quest of the enemy, whom, agreeable to the intelligence he had received, he found posted on the farther side of a river \*, about twelve miles from the place where he had landed. They made some efforts to hinder his passage, but were quickly driven from their post, and put to flight. However, the day being far spent, Cæsar, who was wholly unacquainted with the country, would not pursue them, but chose to employ the rest of the day in fortifying his camp.

\* Supposed  
to be the  
Stour.

Early the next morning he sent out, in pursuit of the enemy, his troops, both horse and foot, divided into three bodies: these were but just come within sight of the British army, when they received orders from Cæsar to proceed no farther, but to return to the camp. Some horsemen, dispatched by Q. Atrius, had brought him word that, by a dreadful storm in the night before, his fleet was in a manner destroyed. This made him hasten back to the sea-side. Forty of his ships, he saw were entirely lost, and the rest so damaged as to seem almost irreparable. Nevertheless he set all the carpenters of both the fleet and the army to work, and sent over to Gaul for others, ordering, at the same time, Labienus to build as many ships as he could, by the labour of the legions that were with him. And, to prevent the like misfortune thereafter, he drew all his ships on shore, and enclosed them within the fortifications of his camp.



This stupendous work was completed in ten days, the soldiers labouring the whole time without intermission. The ships being thus secured, and the camp strongly fortified, he left the same troops to guard it as before, and returned to the place where he had ceased the pursuit of the enemy.

Upon his arrival he found their numbers greatly increased. The chief command and administration of the war had, by common consent, been conferred upon Cassibelanus, king of the Trinobantes\*, whose territories (says Cæsar) were divided from the maritime states by the river Thames at eighty miles distance from the sea. This prince had hitherto been engaged in almost continual wars with his neighbours: but the terror, caused by the arrival of the Romans, making the Britons unite among themselves, they intrusted him with the whole conduct of the war.

\* The people of Middlesex and Essex.

The Britons, in the beginning, gained some slight advantage over the Romans, surprised and astonished at their manner of employing their chariots in battle; but in an attempt which they afterwards made to cut off the Roman foragers, they suffered so terrible a slaughter from the Roman cavalry whom Cæsar sent to the assistance of the foragers, that the auxiliary troops of Cassibelanus abandoned him, returning to their respective countries: nor did the Britons any more, with their united forces, engage the Romans.

Cæsar marched towards the Thames, in

order to penetrate into the kingdom of Cassibelanus. The river was fordable but in one place, and not there without much difficulty ; and the enemy were drawn up in great numbers on the other side : they had likewise fortified the bank with sharp stakes, and driven a great number of these into the bed of the river, so as to be covered by the water. Of this Cæsar had intelligence from prisoners and deserters : nevertheless he undertook to force his passage ; and he succeeded. The legions advanced with so much expedition and alacrity, though up to their necks in water, that the enemy, unable to sustain the charge, betook themselves to flight.

Cassibelanus from that time determined to avoid a general action : disbanding his other forces, he kept with him only four thousand chariots, with which he watched opportunities to cut off the Roman stragglers ; or, when he had enticed the Romans, by a prospect of booty, to a disadvantageous ground, to start from his ambush, and fall upon them by surprise. These frequent alarms obliged Cæsar to order his cavalry to keep always so near the foot, as to be sure of having the support of these when necessity required.

And now several of the states round about sent ambassadors to make their submission to Cæsar. Of these the Trinobantes were the first. Their king Imanuentius had been put to death by Cassibelanus, and Mandubratius, the son of that unfortunate prince, was now in Cæsar's army, to whom he had fled, even

into Gaul, for shelter and protection. The Trinobantes desired Cæsar to send him back to govern them. They obtained their request; and in compliance with Cæsar's demands, sent him forty hostages, and supplied him with corn.

The protection granted to the Trinobantes securing them from the insults of the soldiers, several other petty states sent ambassadors to Cæsar, and submitted. From them he had intelligence, that he was not far from the capital<sup>4</sup> of Cassibelanus, which was situated amidst woods and marshes, and whither great numbers of men and cattle were retired. Thither Cæsar marched his legions: and though the place appeared to be exceeding strong, both by art and nature, he nevertheless attacked it in two several quarters, and, after a short resistance, carried it; the Britons retiring to another part of the wood.

While these things passed on the north side of the Thames, four petty kings of Kent, by order from Cassibelanus, drew all their forces together, purposing to fall by surprise on the naval camp of the Romans: but these, sallying out against them as they approached, put them to the rout with great slaughter, took one of the four kings prisoner, and returned safe to the camp. Cassibelanus, discouraged by so many losses, the devastation of his terri-

<sup>4</sup> A town among the Britons was nothing more than a thick wood, fortified with a ditch and a rampart, to serve as a place of retreat against the incursions of their enemies.



tories, and, above all, the revolt of the provinces, sent ambassadors to Cæsar to sue for peace, by the mediation of Comius of Arras.

Cæsar, designing to pass the winter in Gaul, because of the frequent commotions in that country, and reflecting that but a small part of the summer remained, during which it would be easy for the Britons to protract the war, demanded hostages, and appointed the yearly tribute which Britain should pay to the Romans. At the same time he took Mandubratius and the Trinobantes under his protection, strictly charging Cassibelanus to give them no molestation. Having received the hostages, he led his forces back to the seaside, where he found his fleet repaired. The time of the equinox drew near: he seized therefore the opportunity of a favourable gentle breeze, weighed anchor about ten at night, and brought his whole fleet safe to the continent. He was the first of the Romans, says Tacitus, who transported an army into Britain: he terrified the natives, and became master of the coast; yet it would seem, that he only gave his countrymen a view of Britain, not the possession of it. Tac. Agric. n. 13.

Having led up his fleet, and held a general assembly of the Gauls at Samarobriva\*, his next affair was to put his legions into winter-quarters; and as the crop this year had been very thin, by reason of the great droughts, he was obliged to quarter his men in different

\* Amiens.



provinces. One legion he quartered on the Morini \*, under the command of C. Fabius; another among the Nervii †, under Q. Cicero: a third with the Ædui ‡, under L. Roscius: and a fourth in the country of the Rhemi, on the borders of the Treviri, under Labienus. Three were sent into Belgium †, over whom he appointed three commanders, his quæstor, M. Crassus, L. Munatius Plancus, and C. Trebonius. The eighth and last, which Cæsar had newly raised on the other side of the Po, were sent, together with five cohorts, among the Eburones ||, between the Rhine and the Meuse, where Ambiorix and Cativulcus reigned. At the head of this last body were two of Cæsar's lieutenants, Q. Titurius Sabinus and L. Aurunculeius Cotta. By this distribution of his legions, Cæsar thought he had found a remedy against the scarcity of corn; and yet they lay all within the compass of one hundred miles, except the legion under L. Roscius, for which he was in no pain, as being quartered in a very quiet and friendly country. He resolved, however, not to leave Gaul till he had received assurances that their quarters were established, fortified, and secured.

\* People of Teroëne in Artois.  
† People of Cambresis.

‡ The present Picardy, a part of Belgic Gaul.

|| People of Liege.

Among the Carnutes § lived Tasgetius, a man of distinguished birth, and whose ancestors had been possessed of the sovereignty of that state. Cæsar had restored him to the dignity of his forefathers, in consideration of

§ People of Chartres.

<sup>5</sup> In the text of Cæsar we read Essui [an unknown people], but Vossius thinks we should read Ædui, the Autunois.

the many services he had done him in all his wars. It was now the third year of his reign, when he was openly assassinated. The affair was laid before Cæsar, who, fearing lest the great number concerned in the plot might draw the state into a revolt, ordered L. Plan-  
cus, with a legion from Belgium, to march speedily into the country of the Carnutes, fix his winter-quarters in that province, seize all who had been concerned in the murder, and send them to him.

Scarce fifteen days had elapsed since the arrival of the legions in their appointed quarters, when a general conspiracy of the Gauls broke out, discovering itself first in the revolt of the Eburones. Their two chiefs or kings, Ambiorix and Cativulcus, had been to meet, in a friendly manner, on their frontiers, Sabinus and Cotta; and had supplied them with corn: but now, instigated by Indutiomarus of Treves, they excited their people to take up arms; and, having fallen by surprise on some Roman soldiers who were cutting wood, and put them to the sword, came with a great body of troops to attack the camp where the legion was entrenched. Repulsed with loss, they had recourse to cunning and perfidy, demanding a conference, and pretending that they had something to say which concerned the common interest, and might put an end to the present differences.

Accordingly Arpinus, a Roman knight, a friend of Sabinus; and Junius of Spain, who had frequently before been sent to Ambiorix;

were deputed to treat. Ambiorix addressed them in words to this effect: "I have in no sort forgot the many obligations I am under to Cæsar, who freed me from the tribute I was wont to pay to the Aduatici, and restored to me my son and nephew, whom that people, after receiving them as hostages, had treated as slaves. The hostilities I have just now committed were not the effect of my own private animosity against the Romans, but were the act of the whole state; where the government is of such a nature, that the people have as much power over me as I have over the people. Even the state itself in a manner has been forced into this war: I can appeal to my own weakness for the truth of what I say, being not so very unskilled in affairs, as to imagine that the Eburones are a match for the Romans. It is a scheme concerted by all the states of Gaul, to assault in one day, this very day, all the quarters of the Roman army, so that no one may be able to succour another. It was not easy for us to resist the importunity of those of our own nation, especially when the proposal was to act in concert, for the recovery of liberty. But, having performed what the common voice of my country demanded, I think I may now listen to that of gratitude: I find myself compelled by my attachment to Cæsar, and by my friendship for Sabinus, to give you notice of the extreme danger to which your legion is exposed. A great body of Germans has actually passed the Rhine, and will be here in two days at



farthest : Sabinus and Cotta therefore are to consider whether it will be advisable to retire with their troops, and, before the neighbouring states can be apprised of their design, go and join Labienus or Cicero, who are neither of them distant above fifty miles. As for myself, I promise, by all that is sacred, to secure your retreat through my territories; and I undertake this the more readily, as I shall thereby not only discharge my duty to my country, in delivering it from the inconvenience of wintering the Romans, but at the same time I shall manifest my gratitude to Cæsar." Having made this speech, he withdrew.

Arpinus and Junius reported what they had heard to the lieutenants, who thought the information not to be neglected, though it came from an enemy: for it appeared to them altogether incredible, that the Eburones, a weak and inconsiderable people, should, unsupported, presume to rise up in arms against the Romans: they laid the matter therefore before a council of war. Cotta, with a great number of the military tribunes, and centurions of the first rank, were against undertaking any thing hastily, or quitting their winter quarters, before they had received orders from Cæsar so to do. They alleged that their camp was well fortified, and might be defended against all the forces of the Germans: that it was well stored with provisions, so as to be in no danger of distress on that account. And lastly, that nothing could be



more dishonourable or injudicious, than, in affairs of the greatest moment, to take measures upon the information of an enemy.

Sabinus, on the other hand, exclaimed, that it would be too late to think of retiring, when the enemy, strengthened by the accession of the Germans, should come against them; or when the Romans in the nearest quarter to them should have received some considerable blow: that Cæsar was unquestionably gone into Italy; and that the enemy knew it, which gave the Carnutes the boldness to think of assassinating Tasgetius, and the Eburones of assaulting the Roman camp. "Who could imagine Ambiorix, without a certainty of being supported, would have embarked in so dangerous an enterprise?" He added, "My advice is in all respects safe; because, if no such confederacy has been formed, we have nothing to apprehend in marching to the nearest legion; if, on the contrary, all Gaul and Germany are united, expedition alone can save us from destruction: whereas, by following the advice of Cotta, though we may defend ourselves for a while, we are sure in the end of perishing by famine." The dispute grew warm, and continued long: Cotta and the principal officers strongly opposing the march of the troops. At last Sabinus raising his voice, that he might be heard by the soldiers without: "Be it so, then (says he) since you seem so resolved: I am not the man who is afraid of death. But if any misfortune happen, those who hear me will know

whom to blame. In two days, did not you oppose it, we might easily reach the quarters next us ; and there, in conjunction with our fellow-soldiers, confront the common danger : whereas, by keeping the troops separate, and at a distance, you reduce them to the necessity of perishing by sword or famine.”

The officers, surrounding their generals, conjured them not to put all to hazard by their dissension.—That, whatever resolution was taken, whether to go or stay, the danger was by no means great, provided they acted in concert ; but their disagreement threatened the troops with inevitable destruction. The debate continued till midnight : when at length, Cotta, vanquished by importunity, yielded to Sabinus. Orders were given for marching by break of day. The remainder of the night was none of it passed in sleep, each man being taken up in chusing what things to carry with him ; so that their want of rest rendered them incapable of a vigorous defence, in case of being attacked upon their march. At day-break they left their camp, not like men acting by the advice of an enemy, but as if Ambiorix had been their particular friend ; marching in a very extended column, and followed by a great train of baggage.

The enemy, judging, from the hurry and bustle in the camp, that the Romans intended to leave it, placed themselves in ambush in a wood, and there waited for them at about two miles distance ; and when the greater part

of the army had entered a large valley, suddenly appeared, and attacked them both in front and rear.

Then Sabinus, like one conscious of having neglected all the necessary precautions, and unable to hide his concern, ran up and down among the troops, beginning to dispose them in order of battle; but with an air so timid and disconcerted, that it appeared he had no hopes of success, as happens for the most part to those who leave all to the last moment of execution. But Cotta, who had foreseen that this might happen, and had therefore opposed the departure of the troops, omitted nothing in his power for the common safety, calling to and encouraging the men like an able general, and at the same time fighting with the bravery of a common soldier; and, because the great length of the column rendered it difficult for the lieutenants to remedy all disorders, and repair expeditiously enough to the places where their presence was necessary, orders were given to quit the defence of the baggage, and form into an orb. This disposition, though not improper in these circumstances, was nevertheless attended with very unhappy consequences; for, being considered as the effect of terror and despair, it discouraged the Romans, and augmented the confidence of the enemy. Besides, as unavoidably happens on such occasions, many of the soldiers, quitting their ensigns, hurried away to fetch from the baggage the things they most valued, and filled all parts with uproar and lamentation.

The Gauls conducted themselves with great



prudence: their officers proclaimed through the ranks: "Let no man stir from his post; the baggage of the Romans and every thing they have shall be yours; but let your first care be to secure the victory." The Romans not being fewer in number or less brave than the enemy, cherished a hope, though they had neither a general nor fortune on their side, that yet by their bravery they should be able to surmount all difficulties; and whenever any of the cohorts sallied out, so as to come to close fighting with the enemy, a considerable slaughter of the Gauls ensued. This being observed by Ambiorix, he ordered his men to cast their darts at a distance, avoid a close fight, retire before the Romans, when they advanced, and pursue them when returning to their standards. These orders were exactly followed, much to the advantage of the enemy. The Romans however, still maintained their ground; and though the fight had continued from sunrise till two in the afternoon, they had done nothing, in all that time, unworthy of the Roman name. At length Balventius, who the year before had been made first centurion of a legion, a man of distinguished courage, and great authority among the troops, had both his thighs pierced through with a dart. Lucanius, an officer of the same rank, endeavouring to rescue his son, whom he saw surrounded by the enemy, was killed after a brave resistance: and Cotta, the lieutenant, encouraging the several cohorts and companies, received a blow on the mouth from a sling.

These disasters totally dispirited Sabinus;



who, perceiving Ambiorix at a distance animating his troops, sent his interpreter, Cn. Pompey, to beg quarter for his soldiers and for himself. Ambiorix answered: "That, if Sabinus desired a conference, he was ready to grant it, and to pledge his faith, that no hurt should befall his person; and that, as to the Roman soldiers, he hoped to prevail with the multitude to spare them too." This answer Sabinus communicated to Cotta, proposing to him that they should go and confer with Ambiorix, from whom he hoped to obtain quarter both for themselves and their men. Cotta absolutely refused to go to an armed enemy, and persisted in that resolution. Sabinus, attended by such of the officers as were then about him, set forward; and when he drew near to Ambiorix, being commanded to lay down his arms, obeyed; ordering those that were with him to do the same: after which, being gradually surrounded, while Ambiorix purposely spun out a long discourse, he was perfidiously murdered. Then the Gauls, according to their custom, raising a shout and crying out victory, charged the Roman troops with great fury, and put them into disorder. Cotta, fighting manfully, was slain, with the greatest part of the soldiers. The rest retreated to the camp they had quitted in the morning; of these, Petrosidius, the standard-bearer, finding himself sore pressed by the enemy, threw the eagle within the intrenchments, and was killed fighting bravely before them. Those that remained, with much difficulty, sustained

the attack till night ; but, having no hope of preservation, killed one another to the last man. A few, who had escaped out of the battle in the field, got by different ways to Labienus's camp, and brought him the news of this sad event.

Ambiorix, elated with his victory, marched immediately, at the head of his cavalry, into the country of the Aduatici, which bordered upon his territories. Having informed them of his success, and roused them to arms, he the next day arrived among the Nervii, and urged them not to lose the favourable opportunity of freeing themselves for ever from the yoke of slavery, and revenging the injuries they had received from the Romans. He added : “ Two of their lieutenants have been slain, and a great part of their army cut in pieces : it will be an easy matter, by a sudden attack, to destroy the legion quartered in your country, under the command of Cicero ; and I myself am ready to assist you in the enterprise.” By this speech he drew in the Nervii. They dispatched messengers forthwith to the cantons dependent on their state, and, having assembled what forces they could, came unexpectedly upon Cicero's quarters, who had heard nothing yet of the fate of Sabinus. Here it unavoidably fell out, that, by the sudden arrival of the cavalry, the Roman soldiers who had been sent out to cut wood for firing, and for the fortification of the camp, were intercepted and put to the sword ; after which the Eburones, Aduatici, and Nervii, with their

allies and tributaries, amounting to a formidable army, came and attacked the camp. The Romans instantly flew to arms, mounted the rampart, and sustained that day's assault, though with difficulty; for the enemy placed all their hopes in dispatch, and firmly believed, that, if they came off conquerors upon this occasion, they could not fail of victory everywhere else.

Cicero's first care was to write to Cæsar, promising the messengers great rewards if they carried the letters safe: but, as all the ways were beset with the enemies' troops, most of his couriers were intercepted. Of the materials which had been brought for fortifying the camp, a hundred and twenty towers were built with incredible dispatch during the night, and the works about the rampart completed. Next day the enemy, much stronger than before, attacked the camp and filled up the ditch, but were again repulsed by the Romans. This continued for several days together. The night was wholly employed in repairing the breaches made by day; insomuch that neither the sick nor the wounded were exempted from labour. Cicero himself, though much out of order, would take no repose even during the night, unless when the soldiers constrained him to it.

In the mean time some officers of the Nervii, who were well acquainted with Cicero, desired a conference with him: to this he having given consent, they addressed him in the same strain that Ambiorix had used to



Sabinus : they said that all Gaul was in arms : that the Germans had passed the Rhine : that Cæsar and the rest of the Romans were besieged in their winter-quarters. They told him likewise of the fate of Sabinus, and, to gain credit, produced Ambiorix, adding : “ It is in vain for you to expect relief from those who are in the utmost distress : we mean not, however, any injury to you or to the Romans ; but only to prevent their wintering in this country, and bringing that practice into a custom : you are at liberty therefore to leave your quarters, and may retire, in safety and without molestation, whithersoever you please.” To this Cicero made a short answer : “ It is not usual with the people of Rome to accept conditions from an armed enemy : but, if you will lay down your arms, I promise to be your mediator ; and will permit you to send ambassadors to Cæsar, from whose justice you may reasonably expect redress.”

The Nervii, not succeeding by this stratagem, surrounded the camp with a line, the rampart of which was eleven feet high, and the ditch fifteen deep. They had learnt something of this in their former wars with Cæsar, and they got further instructions from their prisoners : but being unprovided of the tools necessary in this kind of service, they were obliged to cut the turf with their swords, dig up the earth with their hands, and carry it in their cloaks. And hence it will be easy to form some judgment of their number : for in less than three hours they completed a line of



fifteen miles in circuit. The following days were employed in raising towers proportioned to the height of the Roman rampart; and in preparing scythes and wooden galleries, in which they were again assisted by the prisoners.

On the seventh day of the attack, a very high wind arising, they began to throw red-hot balls of clay, and burning javelins, upon the barracks of the Romans, which, after the manner of the Gauls, were thatched with straw. These soon took fire; and the flames were in a moment spread by the wind into all parts of the camp. The enemy falling on with a mighty shout, as if already secure of victory, advanced their towers and galleries, and prepared to scale the rampart. But such was the constancy of the Roman soldiers, that though the flames surrounded them on every side, and they were oppressed with showers of darts, and saw their huts, their baggage, and their whole fortunes in a blaze, yet not only did they continue firm in their posts, but scarce a man offered so much as to look behind him; so intent were they on fighting and repelling the enemy. This was by much the hardest day for the Roman troops; but had nevertheless this fortunate issue, that the greatest number of the enemy were on that day wounded or slain: for, as they had crowded close up to the ramparts, those behind prevented the front ranks from retiring. The flames abating by degrees, and the enemy

having brought forward one of their towers even to the foot of the rampart, the centurions<sup>6</sup> of the third cohort drew off their men a little, beckoning to the Gauls, and challenging them to enter : but, as not a man of them

<sup>6</sup> In this legion were two centurions of distinguished valour, T. Pulpio and L. Varenus, who stood fair for being raised to the first rank of their order. These were perpetually disputing with one another the pre-eminence in courage, and at every year's promotion contended with great eagerness for precedence. In the heat of the attack before the rampart, Pulpio said to Varenus : " What hinders you now, or what more glorious opportunity would you desire of signalising your bravery ? This, this is the day for determining the controversy between us."—Instantly he sallied out of the camp, and rushed amidst the thickest of the Gauls. Nor did Varenus decline the challenge ; but, thinking his honour at stake, followed at some distance. Pulpio darted his javelin at a Gaul in the enemy's van, and transfixed him : he fell dead ; the multitude covered him with their shields, and all poured their darts upon Pulpio, giving him no time to retire. A javelin pierced his shield, and stuck fast in his belt. This accident gave the enemy time to surround him, before he could make use of his right hand to draw his sword. Varenus flew to his assistance, and endeavoured to rescue him. Immediately the whole multitude, quitting Pulpio, as fancying the dart had dispatched him, turned upon Varenus. He met them with his sword drawn, charged them hand to hand ; and having laid one dead at his feet, drove back the rest : but pursuing them with too much eagerness, stepped into a hole, and fell down. Pulpio hastened to his relief ; and both together, after having slain a multitude of the Gauls, and acquired infinite applause, retired unhurt within the intrenchments. Thus fortune gave such a turn to the dispute, that each owed his life to his rival ; nor was it possible to determine which of them had the better title to the prize of valour.

would run the hazard, the Romans attacked them on all sides with stones, drove them from the tower, and set it on fire.

As the defence every day became more difficult, chiefly by the great multitude of killed and wounded, which considerably lessened the number of defendants, Cicero sent letter after letter to inform Cæsar of his danger. Many of these couriers, falling into the enemies' hands, were tortured to death within view of the Roman soldiers. There was at this time in the Roman camp a Nervian of distinction, by name Vertico, who in the beginning of the siege had fled to Cicero, and given ample proofs of his fidelity. This man engaged one of his slaves by the hope of liberty and a promise of great rewards, to carry a letter to Cæsar. The slave passed through the camp of the Gauls unsuspected, as being himself of their nation, and arrived safe at Cæsar's quarters.

Cæsar, receiving the letter about five in the afternoon, immediately dispatched a messenger to Marcus Crassus, who was quartered among the Bellovaci twenty-five miles off, ordering him to draw out his legion at midnight, and march with all possible expedition to join him. Crassus came away with the courier. Cæsar sent likewise to C. Fabius, who wintered with the Morini, to lead his legion into the country of the Atrebatès, which was in the way to Cicero: and he wrote to Labienus to meet him upon the frontiers of the Nervii, if it could be done with safety. He himself, in the mean time, assem-



bled about four hundred horse from the nearest garrisons, resolving not to wait for those parts of his army which lay at too great a distance.

At nine in the morning he had notice from his scouts of the arrival of Crassus. That day he marched twenty miles, leaving Crassus with a legion at Samarobriva \*, where he had deposited the baggage, hostages, public papers, and all the provisions which had been laid up for the winter. Fabius, in consequence of his instructions, having made all the haste he could, met him with his legion. Labienus, who had been informed of the death of Sabinus, and the destruction of the troops under his command, and who saw all the forces of Treves advancing against him, fearing, lest, if he should quit his quarters, the enemy might construe it into a flight, and that it would be impossible for him to sustain their attack, especially as they were flushed with their late success against Sabinus, wrote to Cæsar, informing him of that disaster, and of the danger that would attend the quitting his camp; and that all the forces of the Treviri, both horse and foot, were encamped within three miles of him.

Cæsar approved his reasons, though he thereby found himself reduced from three to two legions: and well knowing that all depended upon expedition, he made forced marches, reached the territories of the Nervii, and there learnt from some prisoners the state of the siege, and the danger the legion was in. Immediately he engaged a Gallic horseman,



by the promise of great rewards, to carry a letter to Cicero: it was written in Greek characters, that if it fell into the enemy's hands, it might not be intelligible to them. The messenger had orders, in case he found it impracticable for him to get into the Roman camp, to tie the letter to a javelin, and throw it in. In this letter Cæsar sent word to Cicero, that he was already on the march to relieve him, and would be up very soon; exhorting him to defend himself in the mean time with his wonted bravery. The Gaul, fearing to be discovered and intercepted, threw the letter into the camp as he had been ordered: but the javelin, accidentally sticking in a tower, remained there two days unperceived: on the third a soldier saw it, took it down, and brought it to Cicero; who immediately read it in full assembly, and thereby diffused universal joy through the camp. Presently after, they perceived the smoke of the villages fired by Cæsar in his march, which put the arrival of succour beyond all doubt.

The Gauls, having notice of it also by their scouts, thought proper to quit the siege and march away to meet Cæsar. Their army consisted of about sixty thousand men. Cicero, now at liberty, applied himself again to Vertico for the slave above spoken of, whom, having admonished him to use the utmost diligence and circumspection, he dispatched with a letter to Cæsar, informing him, that the enemy had raised the siege, and were advancing against him with all their forces. Cæsar

received the letter about midnight, communicated the contents to his army, and exhorted them to meet the enemy with courage. Next day he decamped early, and, after a march of four miles, discovered the Gauls on the other side of a large valley, with a rivulet in front. As the siege of Cicero's camp was now raised, Cæsar had no longer any reason to be in a hurry: he encamped, therefore, in the most convenient spot he could find, and completed his entrenchments. His army, consisting of no more than seven thousand men, without baggage, required but a very small camp; nevertheless, to inspire the enemy with the greater contempt of him, he contracted it as much as possible; and, in the mean time, sending out scouts on all sides, he endeavoured to find where he might cross the valley with safety.

The rest of the day passed in slight skirmishes near the brook; but the main body of the army on both sides kept within their lines: the Gauls, in expectation of more forces, which were not yet come up: Cæsar, that, by pretending fear, he might draw the enemy to his side of the valley. Early the next morning, the enemy's cavalry, approaching the camp of the Romans, charged their cavalry; which, by Cæsar's orders, purposely gave ground and retired behind the works. At the same time he ordered the ramparts to be raised higher, and the gates to be barricaded; and that the soldiers, in the execution of these orders, should run up and down tumultuously,

and affect an appearance of timidity and concern. The enemy, invited by all these appearances, crossed the valley, and drew up in a very disadvantageous place. The Romans in the mean while retiring from the rampart, the Nervii approached still nearer, cast their darts on all sides within the trenches, and sent heralds round the camp to proclaim that, if any of the Gauls or Romans had a mind to come over to them, they should be at liberty so to do till nine o'clock, after which no quarter would be granted. Nay, so far did they carry their contempt, that, thinking they could not break in by the gates (which, to deceive them, were stopped up with a single row of turf) some began to scale the rampart, and others to fill up the ditch. But then Cæsar, sallying forth by all the gates at once, and charging them briskly with his cavalry, put them to so precipitate a flight that not a man offered to make the least resistance. Great numbers were slain, and the rest obliged to throw down their arms. The same day he joined Cicero with all his forces, when, beholding the towers, galleries, and other works of the Gauls, he could not help being struck with admiration. He then reviewed Cicero's legion, and found that not a tenth man had escaped unwounded, which gave him a just idea of the greatness of the danger to which they had been exposed, and of the vigorous defence they had made. He bestowed great commendation on the legion and its commander; and addressed himself to the centurions and military tribunes



by name, of whose valour Cicero made honourable mention.

In the mean time, the report of Cæsar's victory flew with incredible speed, through the country of the Rhemi, to Labienus. For though he lay at the distance of fifty miles from Cicero's camp, where Cæsar did not arrive till past three in the afternoon, yet before midnight a shout was raised by the Rhemi at the gates of Labienus's camp, by which they notified Cæsar's victory, and their congratulations on that success. This news being carried to the Treviri, Indutiomarus, who had determined to attack the camp of Labienus the next day, made off in the night, and retired with all his forces into his own country. Cæsar sent back Fabius with his legion to his former quarters, resolving to take up his own for the winter near Samarobriva with three legions, and to continue in person with them, Gaul being then universally in motion. For the defeat and death of Sabinus spreading every where, the states of Gaul were almost every one of them meditating a revolt; with which view they sent messengers and deputies into all parts, to concert measures, and agree upon the properest place where to begin the war.

Amiens.

But Cæsar, having summoned the principal noblemen of every state to attend him, and having made them sensible that he was no stranger to their designs, prevailed, partly by menaces, and partly by exhortations, to keep the greatest part of Gaul in its duty. The

Senones, however, a potent state, and of great authority among the Gauls, formed a design of assassinating Cavarinus, whom Cæsar had given them for a king; whose brother Moritagus had held the sovereignty at the time of Cæsar's arrival in Gaul, and whose ancestors had long been in possession of that dignity. Cavarinus, having intelligence of the plot, thought proper to fly; whereupon pursuing him to the very frontiers, they drove him from his kingdom, and sent ambassadors to Cæsar to justify their conduct: but, upon his ordering their whole senate to repair to him, they refused to comply. And of such influence was this example among the barbarians, that some at last became hardy enough to declare open war; and so great a change did it produce in the inclinations of all, that, except the Ædui and Rhemi, who had been always particularly distinguished and favoured by Cæsar (the first, on account of their ancient and inviolable fidelity to the people of Rome; the last, for their late services in the Gallic war) scarce was there a single state in all Gaul that did not give cause of suspicion. Nor is it, in truth, to be much wondered at, that a people of high spirit, and famed above all other nations for their military virtues, could not with patience see themselves so fallen from their former height of glory, as to be forced to bend under the yoke of Roman domination.

Indutiomarus and the Treviri ceased not, during the whole winter, to send ambassadors over the Rhine soliciting the German states,

People of  
Sens.

offering them money, and assuring them that the greater part of the Roman army was already cut off: but no one of those states could be persuaded to come into their designs: because, having twice before tried their fortunes with the Romans, first in the war of Ariovistus, and then in the defeat of the Tenchtheri, they were resolved, they told them, to run no more hazards. Indutiomarus, disappointed of this hope, was not less active in drawing forces together, soliciting recruits from the neighbouring states, providing horses, and encouraging even outlaws and convicts, by the promise of great rewards, to engage in his service. And so great credit and authority had he by this means acquired in Gaul, that, from all parts, embassies and messages were sent to solicit his alliance and friendship.

Finding himself thus voluntarily courted; on one side by the Senones and Carnutes, whom a consciousness of guilt incited thereto; on another by the Nervii and Aduatici, who were actually preparing for a war with the Romans; so that, if he once took the field, forces would not be wanting; he called an assembly of the states in arms. This, according to the custom of the Gauls, implies an actual commencement of war; and, by a standing law, obliges all their youth to appear in arms at the assembly; in which they are so very strict, that whosoever has the misfortune to come last, is put to death, in sight of the multitude, with all manner of torments. In this assembly, Cingetorix, the



son-in-law of Indutiomarus, and who (as related above) had declared for Cæsar, and still continued firm to him, was proclaimed a public enemy, and his estate confiscated.—After which Indutiomarus acquainted the council, that the Senones, Carnutes, and several other states of Gaul, had solicited his assistance; that he accordingly intended to join his forces with theirs, taking his route through the territories of the Rhemi, and giving up their lands to be plundered; but that, before he began his march, he was desirous of mastering the camp of Labienus: and, to effect this, he gave the necessary directions.

Labienus, whose camp, both by the nature of the ground, and the fortifications he had added, was extremely strong, feared nothing; but was wholly intent upon a project to give the enemy some considerable blow. Informed by Cingetorix and his adherents of the speech made by Indutiomarus in the council of Gaul, he sent deputies to the neighbouring states, to solicit them for a recruit of horse, and appointed a day of rendezvous for the cavalry they should send: in the mean time, by an affectation of fear, the Roman was contriving to beget presumption and security in the mind of his enemy. The stratagem succeeded. The king, at the head of his cavalry, came every day quite up to the camp of the Romans, insulting them with opprobrious language, and challenging them to fight.—The Romans making no answer, the Gauls

retired towards night, and, without observing any order, dispersed themselves. Labienus had, unknown to the enemy, received into his camp by night, all the horse he had sent for. One evening, therefore, when the enemy had retreated in their careless manner, he ordered all his cavalry to make a sally on a sudden, strictly cautioning and charging his men, that, as soon as they had put the Gauls to flight (which happened according to his expectation) they should every one single out Indutiomarus, nor attempt to kill or wound any other, till they saw him slain: for Labienus was unwilling that any delay, occasioned by the slaughter of the rest, should give the general an opportunity to escape: and he promised great rewards to the man who should kill him. This measure succeeded: for, as all were intent upon the destruction of Indutiomarus alone, he was overtaken and slain in passing a river, and his head brought to the camp. The Roman cavalry, in their return, put all to the sword that came in their way. Upon the news of this defeat, the forces of the Eburones and Nervii returned home; and Gaul was somewhat quieter the rest of the winter.

J. C.  
Comm.  
lib. vi.

Cæsar, for many reasons, expecting greater commotions in Gaul, ordered his lieutenants, M. Silanus, C. Antistius Reginus, and T. Sextius, to levy recruits. And as Pompey, now proconsul, had, during his second consulship (688) enlisted, in Cisalpine Gaul, a considerable number of soldiers, to the amount of a

legion, but had not put them into that form, (the public affairs detaining him near the city) Cæsar requested of him to set those forces on foot, form them into a legion, and send it to him : for he thought it of the utmost importance, towards securing a proper respect from the Gauls for the time to come, to give them such an idea of the power of Italy, as might convince them, that it was not only able speedily to repair any losses sustained, but even to bring a greater force into the field. "Friendship and the good of the commonwealth," says Cæsar, "equally determined Pompey to comply with his request:" and the lieutenants having with great diligence executed their commissions, three new legions, containing double the number of cohorts lost with Sabinus, were brought into Gaul before the end of winter.

After the death of Indutiomarus, slain as related above, the Treviri conferred the command on his relations. They persisted likewise in soliciting the Germans, and gained them by force of money ; and they associated Ambiorix in the confederacy. Cæsar found that he was threatened with war on all sides ; the Nervii, Aduatici, Menapii, with all the Germans on that side the Rhine, were actually in arms : the Senones refused to attend him, pursuant to his orders ; and were tampering with the Carnutes, and other neighbouring states : and that the Treviri were soliciting the Germans by frequent embassies : he judged therefore that it would be necessary to



open the campaign early. Accordingly, without waiting till the winter was over, he drew together the four nearest legions, and fell unexpectedly into the territories of the Nervii, before they could either assemble in a body, or find means to save themselves by flight. Having carried off a great number of men and cattle, enriched the soldiers with booty, and laid waste the country, he compelled the inhabitants to give hostages, and then led back his legions into their winter-quarters<sup>7</sup>.

[Year of Rome 700<sup>8</sup>.]

Early in the spring, Cæsar summoned a general assembly of Gaul. No deputies from the Senones, or the Carnutes, or the Treviri, appearing, he looked upon this as the beginning of a revolt, adjourned the session, and transferred it to Lutetia; whose inhabitants, though they had been united with the Senones for one hundred years past, did not appear to be concerned with them in their present measures. The same day in which he declared the adjournment, he set out with his legions against the Senones, and made such haste, that Acco their chief, not having time to collect his forces, ordered the multitude to shelter

Paris.

<sup>7</sup> For the events and transactions, at Rome, in this year 699, see above, p. 105, 106.

<sup>8</sup> N. B. Cn. Domitius Calvinus, and M. Valerius Messala, the consuls of the year 700, did not enter on their magistracy before the middle of July.

themselves in their towns: but before this could be done the Romans appeared. Intreaties were now the only resource left to the Senones. Cæsar, at the request of his faithful allies the Ædui, whose clients they were, pardoned them; but demanded of them one hundred hostages; and these he committed to the custody of the Ædui. The Carnutes likewise submitted, and obtained the same conditions by the mediation of the Rhemi, their patrons. Cæsar then went to Lutetia, put an end to the session of the states, and ordered the Gauls to furnish him with a body of cavalry.

Celtic Gaul being thus restored to a state of tranquillity, Cæsar turned his thoughts to the war with the Treviri, and with Ambiorix, king of the Eburones, purposing to revenge, by his death, the slaughter of the Roman cohorts.

He knew that Ambiorix was in friendship with the Menapii, a fierce nation, who, living in a country full of woods and morasses, had hitherto eluded the efforts of the Roman army, and had never made the least step towards a submission to Cæsar: he knew likewise, that, by means of the Treviri, he had entered into an alliance with the Germans. Cæsar thought it adviseable, therefore, to deprive him of those two supports, before he attacked him in person. This resolution being taken, he sent the baggage of the whole army to Labienus in the country of the Treviri, ordered him a reinforcement of two

legions, and marched himself against the Menapii with five legions, who carried nothing with them but their arms. The Menapii were soon constrained to submit and give hostages. Cæsar granted them peace on condition of their engaging not to admit Ambiorix, or any one from him, into their territories. These things settled, he left Comius of Arras there, with a body of horse, to keep them in awe, and set out himself against the Treviri.

In the mean time Labienus, by pretending fear and flight, had drawn the Treviri over a river, that was between him and them; and had then with great ease put them to the rout. The Germans, who were coming to their assistance, hearing of their defeat, returned home; and the relations of Indutiomarus, who had been the authors of the revolt, chose likewise to retire with them: and within a few days the whole state submitted. Cingetorix, who had always continued faithful to the Romans, was thereupon invested with the supreme authority.

Cæsar, after his arrival at Treves from the country of the Menapii, resolved, for two reasons, to pass the Rhine a second time; to punish the Germans for sending succours to the Treviri, and to deter them from giving or promising a retreat to Ambiorix. In consequence of this resolution, he set about making a bridge, which was finished in a few days. Upon his arrival on the German side of the river, ambassadors came to him from



the Ubii, to assure him that they had neither sent troops to the assistance of the Treviri, nor in any instance departed from their engagements; and they requested that he would spare their territories, and not, out of a general hatred to the Germans, involve the innocent in the punishment of the guilty. Cæsar, upon inquiry, found that the Ubii were wholly innocent, and that the aids sent to the Treviri were from the Suevi. These, upon certain information of the arrival of the Roman army, had retired to the remotest part of the country with all their forces, and those of their allies; and there they waited the coming of the enemy at the entrance of an immense forest, called Bacenis<sup>9</sup>, which served as a barrier between the Cherusci and the Suevi, to prevent their mutual incursions<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>9</sup> Cellarius takes it to be the forest of Hartz in Lower Saxony, in the principality of Wolfenbüttele.

<sup>1</sup> On this occasion, says Cæsar, it may not be improper to say somewhat of the manners of the Gauls and Germans, and the difference of customs between these two nations. A spirit of faction prevails throughout Gaul, and that not only in their several states, districts, and villages, but almost in every private family.——When Cæsar arrived in the country, the Ædui were at the head of one faction, and the Sequani of the other. The latter being the weaker, because the Ædui had several considerable states in their dependence, they united with Ariovistus and the Germans, whom, by great presents and promises, they drew over the Rhine to their assistance. This alliance made them so powerful, that, having worsted their adversaries in several battles, and killed almost all their nobility, they forced the states dependent upon the Ædui to have recourse to them for protection; obliged the Ædui

Cæsar, fearing the want of provisions, because Germany was but ill cultivated, resolv-

themselves to give the children of their principal nobility as hostages, swear publicly not to attempt any thing against the Sequani, and resign up to their possession a part of their territories; and by this means they rendered themselves in a manner sovereigns of all Gaul. Divitiacus, in this necessity, applied himself to the senate of Rome for relief, but without effect. Cæsar's arrival soon changed the face of affairs. The Æduan hostages were sent back, their former clients restored, and new ones procured them by Cæsar's interest; it appearing, that such as were under their protection, enjoyed a more equal and milder lot than others: by all which their fortune and authority being considerably enlarged, the Sequani were obliged to resign the sovereignty. The Rhemi now held the second place: and, as they were known to be in the same degree of favour with Cæsar, such of the Gauls as could not get over their old animosity to the Ædui, put themselves under the protection of the Rhemi. These were extremely attentive to the interests of their clients, and thereby both preserved their old authority, and that which they had newly acquired. Such, therefore, was the then situation of Gaul: the Ædui possessed indisputably the first rank, the Rhemi were next in consideration and dignity.

Over all Gaul, there are only two orders of men in any degree of honour and esteem: for the common people are little better than slaves; attempting nothing of themselves, and having no share in the public deliberations. As they are generally oppressed with debt, heavy tributes, or the exactions of their superiors, they make themselves vassals to the great, who exercise the same jurisdiction over them as masters do over slaves. The two orders of men, with whom, as we have said, all authority and distinction are lodged, are the druids and the nobles. The druids preside in matters of religion, have the care of public and private sacrifices, and interpret the will of the gods. They have the direction and education of the youth, by whom they are held in great honour. In almost all controversies, whether public or private, the decision is left to them:.

ed not to advance any farther : but, to keep the enemy still in some fear of his return, and

and if any crime is committed, any murder perpetrated ; if any dispute arises touching an inheritance, or the limits of adjoining estates ; in all such cases they are the supreme judges. They decree rewards and punishments : and if any one refuses to submit to their sentence, whether magistrate or private man, they interdict him the sacrifices. This is the greatest punishment that can be inflicted among the Gauls ; because such as are under this prohibition are considered as impious and wicked : all men shun them, and decline their conversation and fellowship, lest they should suffer from them by contagion. They can neither have recourse to the law for justice, nor are capable of any public office. The druids are all under one chief, who possesses the supreme authority in that body. Upon his death, if any one remarkably excels the rest, he succeeds : but if there are several candidates of equal merit, the affair is determined by a plurality of suffrages. Sometimes they have even recourse to arms before the dispute can be decided. Once a year they assemble at a consecrated place in the territories of the Carnutes, whose country is supposed to be in the middle of Gaul. Hither such as have any suits depending flock from all parts, and submit implicitly to the decrees of the druids. Their institution is supposed to have come originally from Britain ; and even at this day, such as are desirous of being perfect in it travel thither for instruction. The druids never go to war, are exempted from taxes and military service, and enjoy all manner of immunities. These mighty encouragements induce many to put themselves of their own accord, under the discipline of this order ; and many are made to enter into it by their parents and relations. They are taught to repeat a great number of verses by heart, and often spend twenty years upon this institution ; for it is deemed unlawful to commit their statutes to writing ; though in other matters, whether public or private, they make use of Greek characters. They seem to me (adds Cæsar) to follow this method for two reasons : to hide their mysteries from the knowledge of the vulgar ; and to

Le pays  
Chartrain.



to prevent their sending succours in Gaul, after his repassing the river, broke down

exercise the memory of their scholars, which would be apt to be neglected, had they letters to trust to, as we find is often the case. It is one of their principal maxims, that the soul never dies, but after death passes from one body to another ; which, they think, contributes greatly to exalt men's courage, by disarming death of its terrors. They teach likewise many things relating to the stars and their motions, the magnitude of the world and our earth, the nature of things, and the power and prerogatives of the immortal gods.

The other order of men are the nobles [Cæsar calls them *equites*, cavaliers; doubtless because they fought on horseback, as at this time the Polish nobility do, and as those among-us formerly did, whom our ancestors called men of arms] ; who, when any war breaks out (and before Cæsar's arrival the Gauls were almost every year engaged in war, either offensive or defensive) take all the field, at the head of their clients and dependents ; and the greater number of these, the more honourable the leader ; for the Gauls have no other measure of dignity and grandeur.

The whole nation is extremely addicted to superstition : whence, in threatening distempers, and the imminent dangers of war, they make no scruple to sacrifice men, or engage themselves by vow to such sacrifices ; in which they make use of the ministry of the druids : for it is a prevalent opinion among them, that the life of one man cannot be ransomed but by the life of another ; insomuch that they have established even public sacrifices of this kind. Some prepare huge colossuses of osier twigs, into which they put men alive, and setting fire to them, those within expire amidst the flames. They prefer for victims such as have been convicted of theft, robbery, or other crimes ; believing them the most acceptable to the gods : but, when criminals are wanting, the innocent are often made to suffer. Mercury is the chief deity with them : of him they have many images, account him the inventor of all arts, their guide and conductor in their journeys, and the patron of merchandise and gain. Next to him are

only about two hundred feet of his bridge on the German side ; and, to secure the rest,

Apollo, and Mars, and Jupiter, and Minerva. Their notions in regard to them are pretty much the same with those of other nations. Apollo is their god of physic ; Minerva of works and manufactures ; Jove holds the empire of heaven ; and Mars presides in war. To this last, when they resolve upon a battle, they commonly devote the spoil. If they prove victorious, they offer up all the cattle taken, and set apart the rest of the plunder in a place appointed for that purpose. And it is common in many provinces to see these monuments of offerings piled up in consecrated places. Nay, it rarely happens, that any one shews so great a disregard of religion, as either to conceal the plunder, or pillage the public oblations ; and the severest punishments are inflicted upon such offenders.

The Gauls fancy themselves to be descended from the god Pluto ; which, it seems, is an established tradition among the Druids. For this reason they compute their time by nights, not by days ; and the observance of birth-days, new moons, and the beginning of the year, always commence the celebration from the preceding night. In one custom they differ from almost all other nations ; which is, that they never suffer their children to come openly into their presence, until they are of age to bear arms : the appearance of a son in public with his father, before he has reached the age of manhood, is accounted dishonourable.

Whatever fortune the woman brings, the husband is obliged to equal it out of his own estate. This whole sum, with its annual product, is left untouched, and goes always to the survivor. The men have power of life and death over their wives and children : and when any father of a family of illustrious rank dies, his relations assemble, and, upon the least ground of suspicion, put even his wives to the torture like slaves. If they are found guilty, iron and fire are employed to torment and destroy them. Their funerals are magnificent and sumptuous, according to their quality. Every thing that was dear to the deceased, even animals, are thrown into the pile : and formerly, such

built at the extremity a tower of four stories, where he left a garrison of twelve cohorts, and

of their slaves and clients as they loved most sacrificed themselves at the funeral of their lord.

In their best regulated states they have a law, that whoever hears any thing relating to the public, whether by rumour or otherwise, shall give immediate notice to the magistrate, without imparting it to any one else: for the nature of the people is such, that rash and unexperienced men, alarmed by false reports, are often hurried to the greatest extremities, and take upon them to determine in matters of the highest consequence. The magistrates stifle things improper to be known, and only communicate to the multitude what they think needful for the service of the commonwealth: nor do the laws permit to speak of state affairs, except in public councils.

The Germans differ widely in their manners from the Gauls. For neither have they Druids to preside in religious affairs, nor do they trouble themselves about sacrifices. They acknowledge no gods but those that are objects of sight, and by whom they are apparently benefited, the Sun, the Moon, and Vulcan [fire.] Of others they know nothing, not even by report. Their whole life is addicted to hunting and war; and from their infancy they are inured to fatigue and hardships. They esteem those most who continue longest strangers to women, as imagining nothing contributes so much to stature, strength, and vigour of body: but to have any commerce of this kind before the age of twenty is accounted in the highest degree ignominious. Nor is it possible to conceal any irregularity in this way, because they bathe promiscuously in rivers, and are clothed in skins, or short mantles of fur, which leave the greatest part of their bodies naked.

Agriculture is little regarded amongst them, as they live mostly on milk, cheese, and the flesh of animals. Nor has any man lands of his own, or distinguished by fixed boundaries. The magistrates, and those in authority, portion out yearly, to every canton and family, such a quantity of land, and in what part of the country they think proper; and the year following remove them to some



strengthened the place with all manner of works. To C. Volcatius Tullus he gave the

other spot. Many reasons are assigned for this practice : Lest, seduced by habit and continuance, they should learn to prefer tillage to war : lest a desire of enlarging their possessions should gain ground, and prompt the stronger to expel the weaker : lest they should become curious in their buildings, in order to guard against the extremes of heat and cold : lest avarice should get footing amongst them, whence spring factions and discords. Finally, to preserve contentment and equanimity among the people, when they find their possessions nothing inferior to those of the most powerful.

It is accounted honourable for states to have the country all around them lie waste and depopulated. For they think it a proof of bravery to expel their near neighbours ; and a part of prudence thus to provide against sudden incursions. When a state is engaged in war, either offensive or defensive, they make choice of magistrates to preside in it, whom they arm with power of life and death. In time of peace there are no public magistrates ; but the chiefs of the several provinces and clans administer justice, and decide differences within their respective limits. Robbing has nothing infamous in it, when committed without the territories of the state to which they belong : they even pretend that it serves to exercise their youth, and prevent them from falling into sloth. When any of their princes offers himself publicly in council to be the leader of an expedition, such as approve of it rise up, declare themselves ready to follow him, and for this are applauded by the whole multitude. They who go back from their engagement are looked upon as traitors and deserters, and lose all esteem and credit for the time to come. The laws of hospitality are held inviolable among them. All that fly to them for refuge, on whatever account, are sure of protection and defence ; their houses are open to receive them, and they plentifully supply their wants.

Formerly the Gauls exceeded the Germans in bravery, often made war upon them, and, as they abounded in peo-

charge of the fort and garrison. He himself, as soon as the corn began to be ripe, marched against Ambiorix and the Eburones, taking his way through the forest of Arden. Basilus, whom he sent before him with all the cavalry, pushed on with such expedition, and so well concealed his approach from the enemy, that he surprised great numbers of them in

ple beyond what the country could maintain, sent several colonies over the Rhine. Accordingly, the more fertile parts of Germany, in the neighbourhood of the Hercynian forest (which I find mentioned by Eratosthenes and other Greek writers under the name of Orcinia) fell to the share of the Volcæ Tectosages\*, who settled in those parts, and have ever since kept possession. They are in the highest reputation for justice and bravery, and no less remarkable than the Germans for poverty, abstinence, and patience of fatigue, conforming themselves to the German customs both in habit and way of living. But the neighbourhood of the Roman province, and an acquaintance with commerce, have introduced luxury and plenty among the Gauls: whence, becoming gradually an unequal match for the Germans, and being worsted in many battles, they no longer pretend to compare with them in martial prowess.

The Hercynian forest, of which mention was just now made, is about nine days' journey in breadth: for as the Germans are ignorant of the art of measuring land, they have no other way of computing. It begins from the borders of the Helvetii, Nemetes, and Rauraci, and, following directly the course of the Danube, extends to the territories of the Anartes and Daci: thence, turning from the river to the left, it runs through a multitude of different regions: and though there are many in the country who have advanced six days' journey into the forest, yet no one pretends to have reached the extremity of it, or to have discovered how far it extends.

\* A people of Gallia Narbonensis, of whom whole armies passed not only into Germany, but into Asia.

the field. Being informed by them of the place whither Ambiorix had retired with a few horse, thither he without delay directed his course.

Fortune, says Cæsar, has a considerable share in all human concerns, and particularly in those of war. For, as it was a very extraordinary chance, that Basilus should come upon Ambiorix before he had the least notice of his approach, so was it equally an effect of fortune, that the Gaul, after having lost his arms, horses, and chariots, should yet find means to escape. This was principally owing to the situation of his house, which was surrounded with a wood; it being customary among the Gauls, in order to avoid the heats, to build in the neighbourhood of woods and rivers. His attendants and friends, possessing themselves of a narrow pass, sustained the attack of the Roman cavalry for some time; during which, one of his servants having provided him with a horse, he got safely off.

Ambiorix, seeing the storm that was going to break on his country, and knowing that he could not possibly assemble an army strong enough to make head against Cæsar, dispatched messengers privately through the country, to signify to the Eburones, that every one should shift for himself as well as he could. They followed his advice, and, dispersing themselves, retired, some into woods, others to inaccessible morasses, others to places near the sea, which at high water became islands. Many, abandoning their country altogether,



trusted themselves and their fortunes to the faith of foreigners. Cativulcus, who had shared the rule with Ambiorix, being very old and infirm, and therefore incapable of supporting the fatigues of either war or flight, poisoned himself, after venting bitter imprecations against his colleague for drawing him into so fatal an enterprise.

Tongres,  
in the  
country of  
Liege.

Cæsar's intention was utterly to extirpate the Eburones: the difficulty was how to find them. With this view he divided his forces, and deposited the baggage of the whole army in the fort of Aduatica<sup>2</sup>, which was situated in the heart of their country, the late quarters of the unfortunate Sabinus and Cotta. As its works were still entire, the labour of the soldiers would be the less. The fourteenth legion, one of the three lately levied in Italy, he left to guard the fort, under the command of Q. Cicero. Dividing the rest of his army, he sent Labienus with three legions towards the sea-coast, and the provinces that bordered upon the Menapii: Trebonius, with the like number of legions, he commissioned to lay waste the country adjoining to the Aduatici; and resolved to march himself with the other three towards the Scheld, and to the extremities of the forest of Arden, whither he was informed that Ambiorix had retired with a few horse. Cæsar, at his departure, pro-

<sup>2</sup> The Aduatici were a distinct people from the Eburones; and their capital, according to many geographers, was Namur. Crevier.

mised to return at the end of seven days, the legion which he had left in garrison being provided with corn only for that time : and he exhorted Labienus and Trebonius, if they found it consistent with the public advantage, to return with their legions at the same time ; that consulting together, and taking their measures from the conduct of the enemy, they might resolve whither next to carry the war.

The Eburones, as was before observed, had no formed body of troops, no garrison, no fortified town to defend by arms, but were a dispersed multitude. Wherever a cave, or a thicket, or a morass, offered them shelter, thither they retired. This made it difficult for Cæsar and his army to take their revenge on this perfidious race ; whom he could not attack with his united forces, nor, without great danger to his men, suffer them, in small parties, to seek out the enemy in their hiding-places. He sent messengers therefore to the neighbouring states, inviting them all, by the hopes of plunder, to join in the extirpation of the Eburones. Accordingly, great numbers flocked suddenly thither from all parts. The Eburones were attacked on all sides, and the havock continued till the seventh day, which Cæsar had appointed for returning to his camp. It then evidently appeared, says Cæsar, what influence fortune has in war. The report being spread among the Germans beyond the Rhine, that the territories of the Eburones were given up to be plundered, and that all

Vid. *supr.*  
p. 303.

without distinction were invited to share in the spoil, the Sicambri, who had afforded a retreat to the Usipetes and Tenchtheri (spoken of above) assembled immediately a body of two thousand horse, passed the river in barks, about thirty miles below Cæsar's bridge and fort, and advanced directly towards the territories of the devoted nation. Many of the scattered people fell into their hands, and abundance of cattle; and the invaders, allured by this success, pushed on still farther. Inquiring of the prisoners concerning Cæsar, they understood that he had left the country with his whole army, and was a great way off. "What makes you lose your time (says one of the prisoners) in the pursuit of acquisitions trifling and insignificant, when fortune offers you so rich a booty? In three hours you may reach Aduatica, where the Romans have deposited all their wealth. The garrison is hardly sufficient to line the rampart, much less to make sallies." The Sicambri, full of hope, marched directly towards Aduatica, under the guidance of the captive who had given them the information.

Cicero, who hitherto had kept his soldiers strictly within the camp, according to Cæsar's orders, nor had suffered so much as a servant to straggle beyond the lines, seeing the seventh day arrive, began to despair of Cæsar's return; who, he heard, was marched farther into the country. Wearied out therefore with the continual murmurings of the soldiers, who complained that he kept them up like men



besieged ; and not suspecting that any accident could befall him within the small extent of three miles, especially from an enemy in a manner totally dispersed, he sent out five cohorts to forage in a field, separated from the camp by only a single hill. About three hundred men, who had been sick, and were now pretty well recovered, joined the detachment : these were followed by almost all the servants of the camp, together with a vast number of carts and carriage horses. In that very instant the German cavalry arrived, and, without discontinuing their course, endeavoured to force an immediate entrance by the Decuman gate. As their march had been covered by a wood, they were not perceived till they were just upon the camp ; insomuch that the suttlers, who kept their booths under the rampart, had not time to retire within the intrenchments. The cohort upon guard could scarce sustain the first onset, so surprised and struck were the soldiers by the sudden and unexpected attack. The whole camp was in an uproar, every one inquiring of another the cause of the confusion ; nor could they determine which way to advance the standards, or where to post themselves. Some reported, that the camp was already taken ; others, that the Germans, having destroyed Cæsar and his troops, were come victorious to assault it. The greater number, full of imaginary fears, called to mind the fate of Cotta and Sabinus, who perished on that very spot.

Among the sick in the garrison was P. Sextius Baculus, a centurion of the first rank, of whom honourable mention has been already made. This officer, though he had not tasted food for five days, rushed unarmed out of his tent. Seeing the enemy at hand, and the danger extreme, he snatched up the first arms that offered, and posted himself in the gate of the camp. The centurions of the cohort upon guard followed his example, and for a while sustained the enemies' charge. Sextius expired under a multitude of wounds, and was with difficulty carried off by the soldiers. But the Romans now had begun to resume their courage ; so far at least as to mount the rampart, and make a show of defending themselves.

Mean time the foragers, returning, heard the noise at the camp. They sent some horsemen before to learn the cause of it, who were quickly apprised of the danger. The new levies, unexperienced in matters of war, fixed their eyes upon the officers, waiting their orders. Not a man was found so hardy and resolute as not to be disturbed and disconcerted by the unexpected accident. The Germans, when they perceived the Roman ensigns at a distance, gave over the attack of the camp, imagining at first that it was Cæsar with the legions ; but discovering in a short time how few they were whom they had to deal with, fell upon them on all sides.

The servants of the camp fled to the nearest rising ground ; whence being presently driven,

they threw themselves amongst the ranks of the cohorts, and thereby increased their terror. Some retired to a hill, there to defend themselves in the best manner they could: but the veteran soldiers of the detachment, mutually encouraging one another, and being led on by their commander, C. Trebonius, a Roman knight, broke through the midst of the enemy, and all to a man arrived safe at the camp. The servants and cavalry following them, and assisting their retreat, were likewise by their bravery preserved. But the troops which had retired to the hill, being unexperienced in military affairs, did not persist in the resolution they had taken of defending themselves there, but in a short time, quitting the advantage of their situation, endeavoured to gain the camp: but they failed in the attempt: a few only escaped; the rest were surrounded and cut to pieces by the barbarians.

The Germans, despairing now to force the camp, repassed the Rhine with the booty which they had deposited in the woods: but, even when they were gone, the terror the Romans were under, continued to be so great, that Volusenus, arriving in the camp the same night with the cavalry, could not persuade them that Cæsar and the army were safe: they persisted in believing that the infantry was wholly destroyed, and that the cavalry alone had escaped, it seeming to them altogether incredible, that the Germans would have dared to attack the camp, had no misfortune befallen



the Roman army. Cæsar's arrival quickly put an end to their fears.

Being informed of what had happened, he only complained of the sending out the cohorts to forage: observing, that in war nothing ought to be left to fortune, whose power had shewed itself evidently in the sudden arrival of the enemy, and much more in their coming up unperceived to the very gates of the camp. But nothing in this whole affair appeared to him more wonderful than that the Germans, having crossed the Rhine with the purpose of plundering the territories of Ambiorix, should do him a most acceptable service, by falling upon the Roman camp.

Cæsar marched a second time to harass and distress the enemy, and having drawn a great number of troops together from the neighbouring states, sent them into all parts upon this service. Such devastation was made, that it seemed likely, if the enemy escaped the sword for the present, they would afterwards perish by famine. Nothing was left unattempted to take Ambiorix prisoner, the parties that were sent out in search of him believing they should thereby gain the highest favour with Cæsar, whose good fortune wanted only this to render it complete. But all their endeavours were fruitless: Ambiorix found means to hide himself in the woods and morasses; whence removing privately in the night, he escaped into other countries accompanied

only by four horsemen, in whom alone he durst confide.

Cæsar in this expedition had lost only two cohorts; and, having laid waste the whole country, led back his army into the territories of the Rhemi. There he summoned a general assembly of Gaul, to examine into the affair of the Senones and the Carnutes; and having passed sentence against Acco, the author of the revolt, ordered him to be executed on the spot. Some, fearing a like fate, fled; whom having banished by a decree of the assembly, he quartered two legions in Treves, two among the Lingones, and the remaining six in the country of the Senones: and, having provided the army with corn, he went, pursuant to his design, into Italy, to hold the assemblies of Cisalpine Gaul.

While Cæsar was on the Italian side of the Alps, the Gauls on the other side plotted a general revolt: and made a more vigorous effort, than they had ever done before, to shake off the Roman yoke. The execution of Acco, chief of the Senones, had alarmed all the great men, each thinking himself exposed to the same treatment. And what more especially encouraged their making an attempt at this time to recover their freedom, were the intestine commotions and seditions at Rome, which the death of Clodius had occasioned, and which they thought would detain Cæsar a long time in Italy. Besides, as his ten legions were stationed in the remote extremity of Gaul, on the north and the east, if the country

J. Cæs.  
Comm.  
l. vii.

between him and them revolted, it would not be easy for him to rejoin them, when he should be at leisure to do it; nor would the legions, without their general, dare to leave their winter-quarters. And lastly, they came to this conclusion, that it was better to die bravely in the field, than not regain their former martial glory, and the liberty derived to them from their ancestors.

Such were the debates and resolutions in the private councils of the Gauls, held in woods and remote places for the sake of secrecy. The Carnutes, declaring themselves ready to submit to any danger for the common safety, offered to be the first to take up arms against the Romans; and because the exchanging of hostages might occasion a too early discovery of their design, they proposed, that the other states should bind themselves by a solemn oath, sworn before the military ensigns collected together (which is the most sacred obligation among the Gauls) not to abandon them during the course of the war. This offer of the Carnutes was received with universal applause, and the oath taken by all present: after which, the time for action being fixed, the assembly separated.

When the appointed day came, the Carnutes, headed by two men of desperate resolution, flew on a sudden to Genabum, massacred the Roman citizens who had settled there on account of trade, and seized their effects.— Among the slain was C. Fusius Cotta, a Roman knight of eminence, to whom Cæsar had



committed the care of supplying the army with provisions. The fame of this massacre soon spread into all the provinces of Gaul: for, when any thing extraordinary and important happened, it was their custom to publish it from place to place by outcries, which, being successively repeated by men stationed on purpose, were carried with incredible expedition over the whole country. And thus it was on the present occasion; what had been done at Genabum about sun-rising, was known before nine at night in the territories of the Arverni, a distance of one hundred and sixty miles.

Instigated by this example, Vercingetorix, the son of Celtillus, of the nation of the Arverni, a young nobleman of great power and interest (whose father had presided over all Celtic Gaul, and for aiming at the sovereignty had been put to death by his countrymen) calling his clients and followers together, easily persuaded them to a revolt. His design being discovered, the people immediately flew to arms; and Gobanitio, his uncle, with the other principal men of the state, dreading the consequences of so rash an enterprise, united all their authority against him, and expelled him the city of Gergovia<sup>3</sup>. But Vercingetorix, not discouraged by this opposition, having engaged in his service a considerable number of outlaws and fugitives, soon made him-

<sup>3</sup> City of Auvergne, the ruins of which are visible two leagues south-east of Clermont: the mountain is still called Gergoie.

self master of Gergovia, and drove out of the country all those who had so lately forced him to leave that city. He was, upon this, saluted king by his followers, and immediately dispatched ambassadors into all parts to exhort the confederate states to continue firm to their engagements. The Senones, Parisii, Pictones, Cadurci, Turones, Aulerci, Lemovices, Andes, and the nations bordering upon the ocean, readily came into the alliance, and with unanimous consent declared him generalissimo of the league. Invested with this authority, he demanded hostages of the several states; ordered them, at a prefixed time, to furnish him with a certain number of men and arms; and more particularly applied himself to the raising of a numerous cavalry. To an extreme diligence, he joined an extreme rigour of command: for greater faults, the criminals, after having been tortured, were burnt alive; and for lighter offences, they had their ears cut off, or one of their eyes put out, and were in that condition sent home to serve as an example to the rest. Thus by the severity of his punishments, he obliged the irresolute to declare themselves in his favour.

Having assembled a considerable army, he sent Luterius of Quercy, a bold and enterprising man, with part of the forces, against the Rutheni\*; and marched himself into the territories of the Bituriges. This people, upon his arrival, dispatched ambassadors to the Ædui, under whose protection they were to demand succours against the enemy. The Ædui, by the ad-

\* The inhabitants of Rouergue.

vice of the lieutenants Cæsar had left with the army, ordered a body of horse and foot to the assistance of the Bituriges; but those troops advanced no farther than the banks of the Loire, which divides their country from that of the Bituriges, and after halting there a few days, returned home, pretending that they had received information, that in case they passed the river, they would be treacherously attacked on one side by the Bituriges, whom they went to assist, and on the other by the Arverni. On their departure, the Bituriges immediately joined the forces of the revolted states.

[Year of Rome 701<sup>4</sup>.]

Cæsar, upon the first report of this insurrection, left Italy, and set out for Transalpine Gaul. On his arrival there he found it very difficult to resolve, in what manner to join the army; for should he order the legions to repair to the province, he foresaw they would be attacked on their march in his absence; and should he himself proceed to the quarters of the legions, he was not without apprehension of danger, even from those states that seemingly continued faithful to the Romans.

In the mean time Luterius of Quercy, who had been sent by Vercingetorix into the territories of the Rutheni, brought over that state to the alliance of the Arverni. Advancing from thence among the Nitobrigi\*

\* People of the Agenois.

<sup>4</sup> For the events and transactions at Rome in the year 700, see above, p. 109, 134.



\* Those of  
the Gevaudan.

and Gabali\*, he received hostages from both nations; and having got together a numerous body of troops, drew towards Narbonne, to attack the Romans on that side. Cæsar, informed of his design, thought it incumbent on him first to provide for the security of the province. He therefore flew to Narbonne, secured that town, placed garrisons in the towns of the Rutheni, subject to the Romans, also in those of the Volsci, Tolosati, and other states bordering upon the enemy. Luterius, not daring to march forwards among so many Roman garrisons, thought proper to retire. Thus Cæsar was left at liberty to execute the project he had formed of penetrating into the country of the Arverni, through the territories of the Helvetii, which were separated from each other by the high mountain Cebenna. With this view he joined a part of the provincial forces, and the recruits he had brought from Italy, whom he had before ordered to rendezvous on the frontiers of the Helvii, and proceeding on his march, opened a way over the Cebenna, with infinite labour to the soldiers, the mountain being covered with snow to the depth of six feet. The Arverni, who looked upon the Cebenna as an impenetrable barrier, impassable in that season even to single men, were altogether unprepared on the arrival of the Romans; and Cæsar, to strike a general terror among them, ordered his cavalry to spread themselves on all sides over the country.

Fame and messengers from the state soon

informed Vercingetorix of the calamity of his country. The Arverni gathered round him, and with looks full of dismay, conjured him to have regard to their fortunes, and not abandon them to the ravages of the enemy; especially as he now saw that the whole war was pointed against them. Vercingetorix, moved by their intreaties, broke up his camp, and marched towards Auvergne. This Cæsar had foreseen: and his scheme being to amuse the enemy on that side, while he stole off to his legions, he staid only two days in the camp; and leaving young Brutus to command in his absence, with orders to disperse the cavalry as wide as he could, he set out on pretence of going for a reinforcement, promising to return, if possible, in three days. But posting by great journeys to Vienne, he there joined the new levied cavalry, whom he had sent thither some time before. From thence travelling day and night, without taking any rest, through the country of the Ædui, to prevent by his expedition any designs they might form against his person, he at length reached the confines of the Lingones, where two of his legions wintered; and sending immediately to the rest, he drew them all together, before the Arverni could be apprized of his arrival in those parts.

Vercingetorix, upon notice of this junction, led back his army into the territories of the Bituriges, and invested Gergovia, a town belonging to the Boii, where they had been settled by Cæsar after the defeat of the Hel-

vetii, and made subject to the Æduan state. This motion of the enemy greatly perplexed the Roman general. If he continued encamped with his legions during the rest of the winter, and abandoned the subjects of the Ædui to the attempts of the enemy, he had reason to apprehend that the Gauls, seeing him afford no protection to his friends, would universally revolt. On the other hand, if he took the field too early, he risked the want of provisions and forage, by the great difficulty of procuring convoys. Resolving, however, not to submit to an affront that must for ever alienate the minds of his allies, he in the strongest terms enjoined the Ædui to be diligent in supplying him with the necessary provisions, dispatched messengers to the Boii, to inform them of his approach, and exhort them to continue firm to their duty: then leaving two legions with the baggage of the whole army at Agendicum\*, he began his march to the relief of Gergovia.

\* Sens.

† Beaune  
in Gatinois.

He arrived the next day before Vellaunodunum†, a city of the Senones, which surrendered after a siege of two days. In two days more he reached Genabum, where the Roman citizens had been lately massacred by the Carnutes. Cæsar's sudden approach had not left the enemy time to prepare for a defence; they therefore attempted to make their escape in the night by a bridge over the Loire. To prevent the execution of such a design, Cæsar had ordered two legions to be in readiness under arms: and about midnight, being in-



formed by his scouts that the enemy were stealing off, he set fire to the gates of the town; the legions entered, pursued the fugitives over the bridge, and almost entirely destroyed them. The town was plundered and burnt.

Here Cæsar passed the Loire, and, marching into the territories of the Bituriges, sat down before Noviodunum\*. The inhabitants sent deputies to treat of a surrendry, but before the articles agreed upon could be put into execution, the cavalry of Vercingetorix appeared at a distance. This general of the Gauls, informed of Cæsar's approach, had raised the siege of Gergovia, and marched to meet the Romans. The besieged, on this prospect of relief, though they had already given hostages, and received into the town some centurions and soldiers of the Roman army, with great clamours flew to arms, shut the gates, and manned the walls. The centurions in the town judging, from the noise among the Gauls, that they had some new project in view, had cautiously posted themselves at one of the gates, and getting all their men together, retreated without loss to the camp. Cæsar soon dispersed the enemies' horse, which was not supported by the body of the army; and the people of Noviodunum, disappointed and terrified at the defeat of their friends, seized immediately on all those who had been instrumental in breaking the capitulation, sent them prisoners to Cæsar's camp, and delivered up the town. From thence

\* Nouan!

Cæsar marched on to Avaricum, the strongest and most considerable city of the Bituriges.

Vercingétorix, alarmed at the loss of so many towns in so short a time, called a general council of his followers, and represented to them : “ That it was necessary to resolve upon a very different plan of war, from that which they had hitherto pursued ; and, instead of giving battle to the Romans, they should bend their whole aim to intercept their convoys and foragers : that this might be easily effected, as they themselves abounded in cavalry, and in the present season of the year, there being no forage in the fields, the enemy must unavoidably disperse themselves into the distant villages for subsistence, and thereby give daily opportunities of destroying them. That, where life and liberty were at stake, poverty and private possession ought to be little regarded ; that therefore the best resolution they could take was, at once to burn all their houses and villages, from the territories of the Boii to wherever the Romans might extend their quarters for the sake of forage : that they themselves had no reason to apprehend scarcity, as they would be plentifully supplied by those states, whose territories they were ready to defend at so great loss ; whereas, the enemy must either be reduced to the necessity of starving, or making distant and dangerous excursions from their camp ; that it equally answered the purpose of the Gauls, to defeat the Roman army, or seize upon their baggage and convoys ; because without these

last, it would be impossible for them to carry on the war : that, in his opinion, they would do well to set fire even to the towns themselves, which were not strong enough to be perfectly secure against all danger ; as by this means they would neither become places of retreat to their own men, to screen them from military service ; nor contribute to the support of the Romans by the supplies and plunder they might furnish :” he added, “ that though these things were indeed grievous, yet they ought to reflect that it was still more grievous to see their wives and children dragged into captivity, and be themselves put to the sword, the unavoidable fate of the conquered.”

This proposal being approved by all, more than twenty cities of the Bituriges were burnt in one day ; the like was done in other states ; nothing but conflagrations were seen over the whole country ; and though the natives bore this desolation with extreme regret, they comforted themselves with the hopes, that it was the sure way to a speedy victory, which would amply recompense their losses. The fate of Avaricum was solemnly debated in council, whether it should be burnt or defended ; the Bituriges falling prostrate on the ground, earnestly begged that they might not be obliged to burn with their own hands one of the most beautiful cities of Gaul, the ornament and the security of their state ; especially as the town itself, almost wholly surrounded by a river and morass, and affording but one very narrow approach, was, from the nature of its situation,



capable of an easy defence. Vercingetorix at first opposed their request, but at length moved by their prayers, and the generous compassion of the army, he yielded, and sent a strong garrison to defend the town.

This affair determined, he followed Cæsar by easy marches, and chose for his camp a place surrounded with woods and marshes, about fifteen miles distant from Avaricum. There he had hourly intelligence by his scouts, of all that passed before the town; and sent his orders from time to time to the garrison. He kept a constant watch upon the Roman convoys and foragers, whom, notwithstanding their vigilance, he frequently cut off when necessity obliged them to seek for provisions at too great a distance.

Cæsar having encamped on that side, where the river and morasses left a narrow access to the town, began to raise a mount, bring forward his battering engines, and prepare two towers of assault; without attempting to make lines of circumvallation, which the nature of the ground rendered impossible. He was continually soliciting the Æduans and Boii for corn, but received no great supplies from either; partly through the negligence of the Æduans, who were not zealous in the affair; partly through the inability of the Boii, who, possessing an inconsiderable territory, soon consumed all the corn their land produced. The army were for many days altogether without bread, and had nothing to appease their hunger but the cattle brought from distant

villages: yet not an expression was heard among the soldiers unworthy of the majesty of the Roman name, or the glory they had acquired by former victories. And when Cæsar visited the different quarters of the legions in person, and offered to raise the siege, if they found the famine insupportable; they with one voice requested him not to do it, adding, "That, during the many years they had served under him, they never yet had met with any check, or formed any enterprise in which they had not succeeded; that they could not but look upon it as inglorious to abandon a siege they had once begun; and had rather undergo the greatest hardships than not revenge the blood of the Roman citizens, perfidiously massacred by the Gauls in Genabum."

And now the towers began to approach the walls, when Cæsar was informed by some prisoners, that Vercingetorix, having consumed all the forage round him, had removed his camp nearer to Avaricum, and was gone himself at the head of the cavalry, and the light-armed troops accustomed to fight in their intervals, to form an ambuscade for the Romans, in a place where it was supposed they would come the next day to forage. Upon this intelligence, setting out about midnight in great silence, he arrived the next morning at the enemy's camp. But they, having had timely notice by their scouts, instantly conveyed their baggage and carriages into a thick wood, and drew up in order of battle on an open hill.

Cæsar immediately ordered all his soldiers to prepare for an engagement.

The hill itself where the enemy stood, rising all the way with an easy ascent, was almost wholly surrounded by a morass difficult and dangerous to pass, though not above fifty feet over. Here the Gauls, confiding in the strength of their post, and having broke down all the bridges over the morass, appeared with an air of resolution. They had formed themselves into different bodies, according to their several states; and planting select detachments at all the avenues and fords, waited with determined courage, that, if the Romans should attempt to force their way through, they might fall upon them from the higher ground, while embarrassed in the morass. The Romans, full of indignation, that the enemy should dare to face them, loudly demanded to be led to battle. Cæsar checked their ardour, and endeavoured to make them sensible, that in attacking an army so strongly posted, the victory would be attended with the loss of many brave men; adding that he could not be too tender of the lives of those, whom he found ready to encounter every kind of danger for his glory. Having by this speech comforted the soldiers, he led them back the same day to Avaricum, and applied himself wholly to the carrying on of the siege.

Vercingetorix, upon his return to the camp, was accused by the army of treason. The removal of his quarters nearer to those of the



enemy, his departure at the head of all the cavalry, his leaving so many troops without a commander in chief, and the opportune and speedy arrival of the Romans during his absence; all these things, they said, could not easily happen without design, and gave great reason to believe, that he had rather owe the sovereignty of Gaul to Cæsar's favour, than to the free choice of his countrymen. To this charge he replied; "That the removal of his camp was occasioned by the want of forage, and made at their own express desire: that he had posted himself nearer to the Romans, on account of the advantage of the ground, which secured him against all attacks: that cavalry were by no means wanted in a morass, but might have been extremely serviceable in the place to which he had led them. That he purposely forbore naming a commander in chief at his departure, lest the impatience of the multitude should have forced him to give battle; to which he perceived they were all strongly inclined, through a certain weakness and effeminacy of mind, that rendered them incapable of bearing long fatigue; that whether accident or intelligence brought the Romans to their camp, they ought to thank, in the one case fortune, in the other the informer, for giving them an opportunity of discovering, from the higher ground, the inconsiderable number of the enemy, and despising their feeble efforts; for, not daring to hazard an engagement, they had ignominiously retreated to their camp: that for his

part, he scorned treacherously to hold an authority of Cæsar, which he hoped soon to merit by a victory, of which both he and the rest of the Gauls had now a certain prospect : that he was willing to resign the command, if they thought the honour done him by that distinction, exceeded the advantages procured by his conduct." He added : " To convince you of the truth of what I have said, hear the Roman soldiers themselves." Instantly he produced some slaves, whom he had made prisoners a few days before, and whom by severity and hard usage he had brought to his purpose. These, according to the instructions they had received, declared, " That they were legionary soldiers : that urged by hunger, they had privately stolen out of the camp, to search for corn and cattle in the fields : that the whole army was reduced to so weak a condition, as no longer to be capable of supporting fatigue : that the general had therefore resolved, if the town held out three days longer to draw off his men from the siege." " Such (said Vercingetorix) are the services you receive from the man, whom you charge with treason. To him it is owing, that, without drawing a sword, you see a powerful and victorious army almost wholly destroyed by famine. He has moreover taken effectual care, that when necessity compels them to seek refuge in a shameful flight, no state shall receive them into its territories."

The whole multitude set up a shout ; and, as their manner was, clashing their arms, to

denote their approbation of the speaker, proclaimed Vercingetorix a consummate general, whose fidelity ought not to be questioned, and whose conduct deserved the highest praise. They decreed that ten thousand men, chosen out of all the troops, should be sent to reinforce the garrison of Avaricum; it seeming too hazardous to rely upon the Bituriges alone for the defence of a place, whose preservation, they imagined, would necessarily give them the superiority in the war.

Though the Romans carried on the siege with incredible vigour, yet was their progress greatly obstructed by the address and contrivance of the Gauls. For they were a people of singular ingenuity, quick of apprehension, easily imitating whatever they saw practised by others. They turned aside, with ropes, the hooks made use of by the Romans, and after having seized them, drew them into the town with engines. They likewise endeavoured to undermine the mount; an art they were perfectly skilled in, as their country abounded with iron-mines. At the same time they raised towers on all parts of the wall, covered them with raw hides, and in frequent sallies by day and night, either set fire to the mount, or fell upon the workmen. In proportion as the Roman tower increased in height, by the continual addition to the mount, in the same proportion did they advance the towers upon their walls<sup>5</sup>, raising one story

<sup>5</sup> The fortified towns, among the Gauls, had their walls mostly built in the following manner. Long massy beams

above another. And counter-working the mines with the utmost diligence, they either filled them with great stones, or poured melted pitch into them, or repulsed the miners with long stakes, burnt and sharpened at the end.

Such were the obstacles the Romans met with in this siege. But the soldiers, though much incommoded, during the whole time, with cold and perpetual rains, yet, by dint of labour, overcame all difficulties, and at the end of twenty-five days had raised a mount three hundred and thirty feet broad, and eighty feet high. When it was brought almost close to the walls, Cæsar, according to custom, attended the works, and encouraged the soldiers to labour without intermission; a little before midnight it was observed to smoke, the enemy having undermined and fired it. At the same time they raised a mighty shout, and sallying of wood were placed upon the ground, at the distance of two feet one from another, and so as to constitute by their length the thickness of the wall. These being again crossed by others, which served to bind them together, had their intervals on the inside filled up with earth, and on the outside with large stones. The first rank thus completely and firmly joined, a second was laid over it, with the same distance between the beams; but these did not rest upon the beams of the order below, but were placed above their intervals, and filled up as before with earth and stones. In this manner the work was carried to a proper height, and the building was as useful as beautiful. For as the variety and regular intermixture of the materials pleased the eye, so the stone was proof against fire, and the beams against the battering-ram; for being fastened on the inside with continued planks, they could neither be disjointed nor thrown down.



from two of their gates, vigorously attacked the works. Some threw lighted torches and dry wood from the walls upon the mount, others pitch and all sorts of combustibles ; so that it was not easy to know on which side it was proper first to send relief. But, as Cæsar kept always two legions upon guard in the trenches, besides great numbers employed in the works, who relieved one another by turns, his troops were soon in a condition, some to oppose those that sallied from the town, others to draw off the towers, and make openings in the mount ; whilst the rest endeavoured to extinguish the flames.

The fight continued with great obstinacy during the remaining part of the night. The enemy still entertained hopes of victory, and persisted with the more firmness, as they saw the mantlets that covered the towers burnt down, the Romans being unable to rescue them for want of shelter. Fresh troops were continually advancing from the town to relieve the fatigued, the enemy believing that the safety of Gaul depended on that critical moment. “Here (says Cæsar) I cannot forbear mentioning a remarkable instance of intrepidity, to which I was myself a witness upon this occasion. A certain Gaul, posted before the gate of the city, threw into the fire balls of pitch and tallow to feed it. This man being exposed to the discharge of a Roman battery, was struck through the side with a dart, and expired. Another, striding over his body, immediately took his place. He also was killed in the

same manner. A third succeeded; to the third a fourth: nor was this dangerous post left vacant, till the fire of the mount was extinguished, the enemy repulsed on all sides, and an end put to the conflict."

The Gauls, having in vain tried all methods of defence, consulted the next day about leaving the town, in consequence of the orders they had received from Vercingetorix. This they hoped easily to effect in the night; as that general's camp was not far off, and the morass between them and the Romans would serve to cover their retreat. Night came, and the besieged were preparing to put their scheme in execution; when suddenly the women running out into the streets, and throwing themselves at their husbands' feet, conjured them, with many tears, not to abandon to the fury of an enraged enemy them, and their common children, whom nature and weakness rendered incapable of flight. Finding their intreaties ineffectual (for, in extreme danger, fear often excludes compassion) they began to set up a loud cry, to inform the Romans of the intended escape. This alarmed the garrison, who, apprehending the passages would be seized by the enemy's cavalry, desisted from their attempt.

Next day Cæsar brought forward the tower, and gave the necessary directions concerning the works. A heavy rain chancing just then to fall, he thought it a favourable opportunity of effecting his purpose, especially as he observed that the walls were negligently guarded.

Wherefore, ordering the soldiers to abate a little of their ardour in the works, and having instructed them in what manner to proceed, he exhorted the legions, who advanced under cover of the machines, to seize at last the fruit of so many toils. Then promising rewards to those who should first scale the town, he gave the signal of attack. The Romans rushed suddenly upon the enemy from all parts, and in a moment possessed themselves of the walls. The Gauls, terrified at the vigour of the assault, and driven from their towers and battlements, drew themselves up in the form of a triangle in the market-place, expecting that the Romans would advance to attack them. But observing that they still kept upon the walls, and were endeavouring to get possession of their whole circuit, they began to fear they should be shut up on every side. Therefore, throwing down their arms, they ran tumultuously to the farthest part of the town, where many of them were slain by the legionaries, the narrowness of the gates obstructing their flight. Others were slaughtered by the cavalry without the walls. The Romans, regardless of plunder, but eager to revenge the massacre of Genabum, and exasperated by the obstinate defence of the place, spared neither old men, women, nor children; insomuch that of all that multitude, amounting to about forty thousand, scarce eight hundred who had quitted the town upon the first alarm escaped safe to Vercingetorix. He received them into his camp in the dead of the night:



for, fearing lest their entrance by day, and in a body, should occasion a tumult among the troops, he had sent out his friends, and the principal noblemen of each province, to meet them by the way, and conduct them to the quarters of their several states.

Vercingetorix, having called a council, comforted the soldiers, and exhorted them not to be discouraged by their late misfortune. He said, “ The Romans had not overcome by bravery, or in the field, but by their address and skill in sieges, an art the Gauls were little acquainted with ; that they deceived themselves, who in war expected success to attend every enterprise ; that he himself, as they all knew, had never advised the defence of Avaricum, and could not but impute the present disaster to the imprudence of the Bituriges, and the too easy compliance of the rest: that he hoped, however, soon to compensate their loss by superior advantages, as he was using his utmost endeavours to bring over the other states, which had hitherto refused their concurrence, and to form one general confederacy of all Gaul, against whose united strength, not the whole world would be able to prevail: that he had even in a great measure effected his design, and in the mean time only required of them, for the sake of the common safety, immediately to fortify their camp, the better to secure themselves from the sudden attacks of the enemy.” This speech was not displeasing to the Gauls, and the rather, that notwithstanding so great a blow, Vercingetorix neither retired from public



view, nor seemed to have lost any thing of his wonted courage. They even entertained a higher opinion of his prudence and foresight ; as from the first he had advised the burning of Avaricum, and at last sent orders to abandon it. Thus ill success, which usually sinks the reputation of a commander, served only to augment his credit, and give him greater authority among the troops. At the same time, from the assurances he had given them, they were full of hopes that the other states would accede to the alliance. And now for the first time the Gauls set about fortifying their camp ; being so humbled by their late misfortunes, that, though naturally impatient of fatigue, they submitted to every task imposed upon them by their general.

Vercingetorix on his side was extremely active to bring over to the confederacy the other provinces of Gaul, endeavouring, by presents and promises, to gain the leading men in each state. For this purpose he made choice of fit agents, who, by their address, or peculiar ties of friendship, were most likely to influence those to whom they were sent. He provided arms and clothing for the troops that had escaped from Avaricum, and to repair the loss sustained by the taking of that place, gave orders to the several states in alliance to furnish a certain number of men, and send them to the camp, by a day prefixed. At the same time he required of them, that all the archers, of which there were great numbers in Gaul, should be sought out and sent to the army.

By these measures he soon filled up the places of those he lost at the siege of Avaricum. In the mean time Theutomatus, the son of Ollovico, and king of the Nitobrigi, whose father had been styled friend and ally by the senate of Rome, came and joined Vercingetorix with a great body of horse, which he had raised in his own territories, and in the province of Aquitain.

Cæsar finding great plenty of corn and other provisions at Avaricum, stayed there several days to refresh his troops, after their late sufferings from scarcity and fatigue. Spring was now approaching, and as the season invited him to take the field, he resolved to march against the enemy, either to draw them out of the woods and marshes, or besiege them in their fortresses. While he was preparing for this expedition, deputies arrived from the Ædui to beg he would interpose his authority to settle the differences in their state. "Every thing there," they told him, "threatened an intestine war. That as it was their custom to be governed by a single magistrate, who possessed the supreme power for one year, two noblemen contended for that office : each affirming his election was according to law. The one was Convictolitanis, an illustrious and popular young man ; the other Cotus, of an ancient family, great authority, and powerful relations, whose brother Videliacus had held the same magistracy the year before : that the whole state was in arms, the senate and people divided ; nor had they hopes of escaping a

civil war, but in his care and timely endeavours to put an end to the contest.”

Although Cæsar was sensible it would greatly prejudice his affairs, to quit the pursuit of the war, and leave the enemy behind him; yet reflecting on the mischiefs that arise from divisions, and desirous if possible to prevent so powerful a state, in strict amity with the people of Rome, and which he had always in a particular manner cherished and befriended, from having recourse to violence and arms, which might drive the party that least confided in his friendship to seek the assistance of Vercingetorix, he resolved to make it his first care to put a stop to the progress of those disorders. And because, by the constitutions of the Ædui, it was not lawful for the supreme magistrate to pass beyond the limits of the state, that he might not seem to infringe their privileges, he resolved to go thither in person, and summoned the senate and the two candidates to meet him at Decetia. The assembly was very numerous, and it appeared that Cotus had been declared chief magistrate by his own brother, in presence of only a few electors privately called together, without regard to time or place, and even contrary to the express laws of the state, which prohibited two of the same family to hold the supreme dignity, while he who first obtained it was alive, or so much as sit together in the senate. Cæsar therefore obliged Cotus to resign in favour of Convictolitanis, who, upon the expira-

tion of the office of the preceding magistrate, had been elected in due form by the priests.

This sentence being passed, Cæsar exhorted the Ædui to lay aside their quarrels, and apply themselves solely to the business of the present war; to expect with confidence the full recompense of their services, as soon as the reduction of Gaul should be completed; and to send him immediately all their cavalry, and ten thousand foot, to form a chain of posts for the security of his convoys. He then divided his army into two parts. Four legions, under the conduct of Labienus, he sent against the Senones and Parisii, and the other six he led in person along the banks of the Allier, towards the territories of the Arverni, with a design to invest Gergovia. Part of the cavalry followed Labienus: part remained with Cæsar. Vercingetorix having notice of these motions, broke down all the bridges upon the Allier, and marched along the other side of the river.

As both armies were continually in view, encamped almost over-against each other, and the enemies' scouts so stationed, that it was impossible for the Romans to make a bridge for carrying over their forces, Cæsar began to be uneasy, lest he should be stopped in his progress the greatest part of the summer, by the river, the Allier being seldom fordable till towards autumn. But he soon found means to compass his end. He encamped in a place covered by woods, over-against one of those



bridges which Vercingetorix had caused to be broken down. The next day, remaining there concealed with two legions, he sent forward with all the baggage the other four, dividing them into six corps, that the number of the legions might appear complete, and ordered them to march as far as they could. When, by the time of the day, he judged they were arrived at the place of their encampment, speedily he rebuilt the bridge upon the old piles, the lower part of which the enemy had left standing; marched over the troops he had with him, and, having chose a proper place for his camp, recalled the rest of his forces. Vercingetorix being informed that the Romans had passed the river, marched on before them by long journeys, that he might not be forced to a battle against his will.

Cæsar, after five days' march, came before Gergovia, where he had a slight engagement with the enemy's cavalry. Having taken a view of the place, which he found situated on a very high hill, all whose approaches were extremely difficult, he not only despaired of reducing it by storm, but resolved not to invest it, till he had secured a supply of provisions for his army. Vercingetorix was encamped near the town, where he had disposed the forces of the several states in different divisions, separated from one another by moderate intervals. As his army covered the whole summits of the hill, it made a very formidable appearance. Every morning, by day-break, the chiefs of each state, who composed his council, assembled in his tent, to advise with him,

and receive his orders : and he scarcely let a day pass without detaching some cavalry, intermixed with archers, to skirmish with the Romans, that he might make trial of the spirit and courage of his men. There was a rising ground, that joined to the foot of the hill on which the town stood, well fortified by nature, being very steep on all sides. This eminence, though of such importance to the Gauls, that if the Romans should get possession of it, they could in a great measure deprive them of water and forage, was yet but indifferently guarded. Cæsar therefore leaving his camp about midnight, dislodged the enemy before any assistance could arrive from the town, seized the hill, and having placed two legions to defend it, drew a double ditch twelve feet deep from the greater to the lesser camp, that the soldiers might pass and repass without danger.

While these things were transacted at Gergovia, Convictolitanis the Æduan, to whom, as we have before related, Cæsar had adjudged the supreme magistracy, being bribed by the Arverni, endeavoured to engage in the confederacy some young noblemen, the chief of whom were Litavicus and his brothers, of the most distinguished family in the country. With these he shared the money he had received, and exhorted them to consider, “ That they were free, and born to command : that the Ædui alone obstructed the victory of the league, that their authority restrained the other states from joining in the common cause, and that their concurrence in it would not leave

the Romans a possibility of supporting themselves in Gaul. That he himself indeed was under some obligation to Cæsar, at least so far as an equitable decision deserved that name, but he still owed more to his country; adding, that the Ædui had no greater reason to have recourse to the Roman general, in what regarded their laws and customs, than the Romans had in the like case to apply themselves to the Ædui." The representations of the magistrate, and the rewards he bestowed, soon prevailed with the young noblemen. They offered to become the chief conductors of the enterprise; and nothing remained but to consult on the proper means for accomplishing their design; for they well knew, that the state would not be easily induced to engage in the war. It was agreed, that Litavicus should have the command of the ten thousand foot appointed to join Cæsar, and that his brother should be sent before. They also concerted in what manner the rest of the project should be executed.

Litavicus having taken the command of the army, and led them within thirty miles of Gergovia, suddenly called the troops together, and addressing them with tears: "Whither, soldiers," said he, "are we going? All our cavalry, all our nobility are slain. Eporedorix and Virдумarus, men of the first quality in the state, accused by the Romans of treason, are put to death without a trial. But learn these things of those who have escaped the slaughter; for, as to me, overwhelmed with



grief for the loss of my brothers and kinsmen, I am unable to utter our calamities." He then produced some, whom he had before instructed for that purpose, who repeated to the multitude, "That the greatest part of the Æduan cavalry had been put to the sword, under pretence of their holding intelligence with the Arverni; and that they themselves had escaped with great difficulty by mixing with the Roman soldiers." Hereupon the whole army called aloud to Litavicus, entreating him to provide for their safety; "As if," said he, "there was room for counsel, or any choice left, but that of marching directly to Gergovia, and joining the Arverni. Can we doubt, after so black an instance of Roman perfidy, but that they are already on their way to destroy us? Let us, therefore, if any spirit or courage remains in us, revenge the death of our countrymen, so unworthily slain, and put these inhuman spoilers to the sword." He then pointed to some Roman citizens, who had taken the opportunity of their march to bring a large supply of corn and provisions to the camp. Instantly the convoy was plundered, the Romans put to death with cruel torments, and messengers dispatched through all the territories of the Ædui, to spread the same forgery of the massacre of the cavalry and princes, and excite them to take the like vengeance on the common enemy.

Eporedorix, the Æduan, a young nobleman of distinguished birth, and great interest in the state; as likewise Virdumarus, of the same



age and equal authority, though not so well descended (whom Cæsar, on the recommendation of Divitiacus, had raised from a low condition to the highest dignities) were both at this time in the Roman camp. Between these two was a competition for greatness; and in the late dispute about the magistracy, the one had declared warmly for Convictolitanis, the other for Cotus. Eporedorix, having notice of Litavicus's design, came at midnight to Cæsar's tent, discovered the whole plot, and entreated him not to suffer the state, through the mischievous counsels of a few young men, to fall off from the alliance of the Romans, which he foresaw must happen, if they should join the enemy with so many thousand men, whose safety would neither be neglected by their relations, nor disregarded by the state.

This intelligence gave Cæsar extreme concern, because he had always had a particular regard for the Ædui. He therefore immediately drew out four legions, together with all the cavalry; nor had he time to contract his camp, because the affair seemed wholly to depend upon expedition. He left C. Fabius, his lieutenant, to command in his absence with two legions. Litavicus's brothers, whom he ordered to be seized, had some time before escaped to the enemy. Having exhorted the soldiers to bear the fatigue cheerfully in so pressing a conjuncture, they marched with great alacrity, and about five and twenty miles from Gergovia came within sight of the Ædui. Cæsar im-

mediately detached the cavalry to retard and stop their march; but with strict charge to abstain from slaughter. He ordered Eporedorix and Virdumarus, whom the Ædui had lamented as dead, to ride up and down among the squadrons, and call to their countrymen. They were soon known, and Litavicus's forgery being detected, the Ædui stretched out their hands, offered to submit, and, throwing down their arms, begged their lives might be spared. Litavicus, with his clients (who by the custom of the Gauls cannot without infamy abandon their patrons, even in the greatest extremity of fortune) fled to Gergovia.

Cæsar, having dispatched messengers to the Ædui to inform them, that from a regard for their state he had spared those, whom by the right of war he might have put to the sword, after allowing the army three hours' rest, marched back to Gergovia. About half way he was met by a party of horse, sent by Fabius, to acquaint him with the danger that threatened his camp. They told him, "That the enemy had attacked it with all their forces, relieving the fatigued with supplies of fresh men, while the Romans were kept to continual labour; for the vast extent of ground they had to defend obliged them to be perpetually upon the rampart. That the multitude of arrows and darts discharged by the Gauls had wounded many of the soldiers, notwithstanding the protection received from the engines, which yet had been of good service in repel-

ling the assailants : that Fabius, upon the retreat of the enemy, had closed up all the gates of the camp except two, carried a breastwork quite round the rampart, and made preparation for sustaining the assault the next day." Cæsar, upon this news, hastened his march with all diligence, and, seconded by the ardour of the troops, arrived in the camp before sunrise.

While these things passed at Gergovia, the *Ædui*, upon receipt of the first dispatches from *Litavicus*, staid not for the confirmation of the report ; but prompted, some by avarice, others by revenge, and many hurried on by a levity and rashness, natural to that people, who are always ready to give credit to every flying rumour, ran immediately to arms, plundered the Roman citizens, killed some of them, and sold others for slaves. *Convictolitanis* incited to the utmost this fury of the multitude, that, by engaging them in desperate acts of violence, he might render a return to right measures the more difficult. At his instigation, they obliged *M. Aristius*, a military tribune, who was upon his way to join the army, to quit *Cabilonum*, promising not to molest him in his journey : they engaged also several Roman merchants, who resided there on account of traffic, to quit their habitations ; then attacking them treacherously on the road, they stripped them of their baggage, and invested day and night those who made resistance. But as soon as they had intelligence that all their troops were in Cæsar's power, they ran to *Aris-*

tius ; assured him that nothing had been done by public authority ; ordered informations to be brought against those who had been concerned in pillaging the Romans ; confiscated the estates of Litavicus and his brothers, and sent ambassadors to Cæsar, to excuse what had happened. This they did with a view to recover their troops ; but unwilling to part with the plunder, in which great numbers had shared, conscious of guilt, and dreading the punishment they deserved, they began privately to concert measures of war, and by their ambassadors solicited other states to join them. Though Cæsar was not ignorant of those practices, he spoke with the greatest mildness to the Æduan deputies, assuring them that he would not consider the imprudence and levity of the multitude, as a crime of the whole nation, nor upon that account lessen his regard for the state. Apprehending, however, an universal revolt of Gaul, and that he might be surrounded by all the forces of the states at once, he began to think of retiring from Gergovia, and drawing his whole army again into a body ; yet in such a manner, that a retreat, occasioned by the fear of a general insurrection, should not carry with it the appearance of a flight.

While he was intent on these thoughts, fortune seemed to present him with an opportunity of acting against the enemy with success. For coming into the lesser camp, to take a view of the works, he observed a hill quite destitute of troops, that for some days before was



scarce to be seen for the multitude that covered it. Wondering what might be the cause, he inquired of the deserters, who flocked daily in great numbers to his camp. They all agreed with Cæsar's scouts, that the back of the hill was almost an even ground, but narrow and woody in that part where a passage led to the other side of the town : that the enemy were extremely afraid of losing this post, because the Romans, who had already possessed themselves of one hill, if they should seize the other, would in a manner quite surround them, become masters of all the outlets, and entirely cut off their forage : that Vercingetorix had therefore drawn all his forces on that side, in order to fortify the passage.

Cæsar, upon this intelligence, dispatched some squadrons of cavalry towards that place about midnight, ordering them to ride up and down with as much noise as possible. At day-break he drew a great number of mules and carriage-horses out of the camp, without their usual harness, and furnishing the grooms and waggoners with helmets, to make them appear like cavalry, commanded them to march round the hill. With these he joined some squadrons of horse, who, for the greater show, were to range a little more freely. The whole detachment had orders to move towards the same place, taking a very large circuit. All these dispositions were seen from the town, which commanded a full view of the Roman camp, though the distance was too great to distinguish objects with certainty. At the

same time Cæsar, the more effectually to deceive the enemy, detached a legion towards the eminence; and when it was advanced a little way, stationed it at the foot of the hill, affecting to conceal it in the woods. This increasing the suspicion of the Gauls, they immediately led all their forces to defend that post. Cæsar seeing their intrenchments abandoned, made his soldiers cover the military ensigns and standards, and file off in small parties from the greater to the lesser camp, that they might not be perceived from the town. He then opened his designs to his lieutenants, whom he had appointed to command the several legions, directing them above all things to moderate the ardour of the soldiers, that the hope of plunder, or desire of fighting, might not carry them too far. He represented to them the danger they were exposed to by the disadvantage of the ground, for which there was no remedy but dispatch; and that he intended only to make a sudden attack, not to fight a battle. These precautions taken, he gave the signal to engage, and at the same time dispatched the Ædui by another ascent, to charge the enemy on the right.

The wall of the town was about twelve hundred paces distant from the foot of the hill, without reckoning the breaks and hollows. The compass the troops were obliged to take, to moderate the steepness of the ascent, added still to this space upon the march. About half way up the hill, the Gauls had run a wall

of large stones, six feet high, the better to defend themselves against the attacks of the Romans. Between this and the plain, the enemy had no troops ; but the upper part of the hill, to the very walls of the town, was crowded with the camps of their several states.

The signal being given, the Romans immediately mounted the hill, scaled the nearest wall, and possessed themselves of three of the enemies' camps. Such too was the expedition wherewith they carried them, that coming suddenly upon Theutomatus, king of the Nitobrigi, as he was reposing himself in his tent about noon, he very narrowly escaped being taken : he was obliged to fly half naked, and had his horse wounded under him.

Cæsar, having accomplished all he had in view, ordered a retreat to be sounded ; and the tenth legion, which fought near his person, obeyed ; the other legions did not hear the signal, being separated from him by the valley ; but the lieutenant and military tribunes, according to the instructions given by Cæsar in the beginning, commanded them to halt. Nevertheless, elated with hopes of a speedy victory, and the remembrance of their former successes, they thought nothing impracticable to their valour ; nor did they desist from the pursuit, till they had reached the walls and gates of the town. Upon this a great cry arising from all parts, those that were farthest from the place of assault, terrified by the noise and tumult, and imagining the enemy already

within the gates, quitted the town with precipitation. The women throwing their money and clothes from the walls, with naked breasts and extended arms conjured the Romans to spare their lives, and not, as at Avaricum, sacrifice all to their resentment without distinction of age or sex. Some being let down from the wall, delivered themselves up to the soldiers. L. Fabius, a centurion of the eighth legion, told his troop, that he had not yet forgot the plunder of Avaricum, and was resolved no man should enter the place before him. Accordingly, having with the assistance of three of his company got upon the town-wall, he helped them one after another to do the like.

In the mean time the Gauls, who, as we have before related, were gone to defend the post on the other side of the town, excited by the cries of the combatants, and the repeated accounts that the enemy had entered the place, sending all the cavalry before to stop the progress of the Romans, advanced in great crowds to the attack, and as they arrived drew up under the walls. They soon became formidable by their multitude, and the women, who a little before had implored the compassion of the Romans, now began to encourage their own troops, shewing their dishevelled hair, and producing their children, according to the custom of the Gauls. The contest was by no means equal either in respect of numbers, or of the ground; and the Romans, already fatigued



with their march, and the length of the combat, were little able to sustain the attack of fresh and vigorous troops.

Cæsar perceiving the disadvantages his troops laboured under, began to fear the event : sending therefore to Sextius his lieutenant, whom he had left to guard the lesser camp, he ordered him to draw out the cohorts with all expedition, and post them at the foot of the hill upon the enemy's right : that if the legions engaged should give way, the cohorts might deter the Gauls from pursuing them. He himself advancing a little with the tenth legion, waited the issue of the combat.

While the conflict was maintained with the utmost vigour on both sides ; the enemy trusting to their post and numbers, the Romans to their courage ; suddenly the Ædui, whom Cæsar had detached by another ascent on the right to make a diversion, appeared on the open flank of his men. As they were armed after the manner of the Gauls, this sight greatly terrified them, and though the Ædui extended their right hands in token of peace, yet still the Romans imagined it a stratagem to deceive them. At the same time L. Fabius the centurion, and those who had mounted the wall with him, being surrounded and slain, were thrown down by the enemy from the battlements. M. Petreius, a centurion of the same legion, who had endeavoured to force the gates, finding himself overpowered, and despairing of safety, because he was already covered with wounds, turned to the soldiers

that followed him, and said: "Since I find I am unable to save both myself and you, I will do my utmost to preserve your lives, which, through too eager a desire of glory, I have brought into this danger; seize the opportunity and retire." Then rushing on, killed two of the enemy, drove the rest from the gate, and seeing his men approach to his assistance, he cried: "In vain do you endeavour to preserve my life: my blood and strength forsake me. Go therefore, while you may, and rejoin your legion." Continuing still to fight, he expired soon after, generously sacrificing his own life to the safety of his followers.

The Romans, thus pressed on all sides, were at length driven from the place. But the tenth legion, which had been posted on a more advantageous ground to cover their retreat, checked the impetuous pursuit of the Gauls, and was sustained by the cohorts of the thirteenth legion, who had quitted the lesser camp under Sextius, and possessed themselves of an eminence. The legions having reached the plain, immediately halted, and faced about towards the enemy; who, advancing no farther than the foot of the hill, returned back to their intrenchments. The Romans lost forty-six centurions, and about seven hundred men.

Cæsar having assembled the army the next day, severely blamed the temerity and avarice of the soldiers, "That they had taken upon themselves to judge how far they were to proceed, and what they were to perform; regarding neither the signal to retreat, nor the orders

of their officers. He represented to them the danger of fighting on disadvantageous ground, and reminded them of his own conduct at the siege of Avaricum, when, having surprised the enemy without a general, and without cavalry, he had chosen rather to give up a certain victory, than, by attacking them in a difficult post, hazard a considerable loss : that as much as he admired their courage, which neither the intrenchments of the camps, nor the height of the hill, nor the walls of the town could check ; so much did he blame their licentiousness and arrogance, who thought they knew more than their general, and could see better than him the way to conquest : that he looked upon obedience and moderation as virtues no less essential to a good soldier, than valour and magnanimity." In the end he exhorted them " not to be discouraged by their late misfortune, nor ascribe that to the bravery of the enemy, which was entirely owing to the disadvantage of the ground, on which they fought." He still persisted in his design of retiring from Gergovia, but first drew out his legions on the plain, and offered battle to the enemy ; which Vercingetorix declined, not thinking it advisable to quit the advantage of his situation : and Cæsar returned to his camp, after a small but successful skirmish between the cavalry. The following day he again drew out his army, and thinking he had done enough to confirm the courage of his own men, and abate the pride of the Gauls, he decamped and marched towards the territories of

the Ædui. The enemy made no attempt to pursue him. He arrived the third day on the banks of the Allier, and having repaired the bridge, passed over with his whole army.

Here Eporedorix and Viridomarus informed him, that Litavicus was gone with all the cavalry to solicit the Ædui to revolt; and that it imported greatly, that they should be there before him, to confirm the state in their attachment to the Romans. Though Cæsar was by many proofs fully convinced of the perfidy of the Ædui, and foresaw that the departure of these men would hasten the revolt, yet not to give ground of offence, or betray any fear, he did not think it advisable to detain them. After enumerating the many services he had done the Ædui; “That having found them low and depressed, shut up within their towns, deprived of their lands, without troops, tributaries to their enemies, and ignominiously obliged to give hostages, he had not only restored them to their former condition, but had raised them to a degree of power and authority beyond what they had ever possessed;” he dismissed them.

Noviodunum was a town belonging to the Ædui, conveniently situated on the banks of the Loire. Here Cæsar had lodged all the hostages of Gaul, his provisions, the public money, and great part of his own and his army’s baggage: here also he kept the horses brought from Italy and Spain for the service of the war. When Eporedorix and Viridomarus arrived at this place, and were informed



how the Æduan state was disposed: "That Litavicus had been received into Bibracte; that Convictolitanis, the chief magistrate, and almost all the senate, had repaired thither to meet him; that ambassadors had been publicly sent to Vercingetorix, to conclude a treaty of alliance;" they thought the present favourable opportunity was by no means to be neglected. Having therefore put to the sword the garrison of Noviodunum, with all the Romans found in the place, they divided the money and horses, ordered the hostages to be conducted to Bibracte, and set fire to the town. Then drawing together the troops cantoned in the neighbourhood, they placed guards along the banks of the Loire, and began to scour the country with their cavalry, in order to cut off Cæsar's convoys, and oblige him, through want of provisions, to return into the Roman province. This they thought the more easy to effect, as the Loire was then considerably swelled by the melting of the snow, and did not appear to be any where fordable.

Cæsar, sensible that a retreat into the Roman province over the Cebenna would be both inglorious and difficult, and that it was necessary to rejoin Labienus with the legions under his command, and come to an action with the enemy before they could draw all their forces together, resolved to cross the Loire, though he should be under a necessity of building a bridge over it. Therefore, marching day and night with the utmost diligence, he arrived unexpectedly on the banks of the river. His

cavalry very opportunely having found a ford, which however was so deep that the water reached to the shoulders of his men, he placed his horse higher up in order to break the stream, and carried over his army without loss; the enemy being so terrified at his boldness, that they did not dare to make any opposition. Finding an abundance of corn and cattle in the fields, he plentifully supplied his army, and directed his march towards the country of the Senones.

While Cæsar was thus employed, Labienus on his side, leaving at Agendicum, to guard his baggage, the new levies lately arrived from Italy, marched with four legions to Lutetia, a town of the Parisii, situated in an island of the Seine. Upon notice of his approach, the enemy drew together a great army from the neighbouring states; which was commanded by Camulogenus, an Auler-cian, who, though very much advanced in age, was raised to that honour for his singular knowledge in the art of war. This general pitched his camp near the town behind a large morass, whose waters ran into the Seine, and obstructed all the passages on that side. Labienus attempted, by the means of hurdles covered with mold, to make a passage through it; but not succeeding, he silently made off in the night, and retired as far as Melodunum, a city of the Senones, situated also in an island of the Seine. There having seized about fifty boats, and filled them with soldiers, with a view of storming the town; the inhabitants,

terrified at this new manner of attack, and being too few to defend the place, because the greater part of them had joined Camulogenus, yielded without making any resistance. Labienus immediately repaired the bridge, which had been cut down on his approach, crossed the Seine, and following the course of the river, marched back to Lutetia. The Gauls, informed of his motions, set fire to the town, broke down the bridges, and encamped on the other side of the river over-against the Romans.

It was now every where known, that Cæsar had left Gergovia, and that the Ædui, with many other states of Gaul, had joined in the revolt. It was likewise reported that Cæsar had been obliged to return into the Roman province. At the same time the Bellovaci, who bordered upon the territories of the Parisii, were raising troops with all diligence. In this situation of affairs, Labienus, menaced on one side by this warlike people, and pressed on the other by the army of Camulogenus, saw it was no proper time to think of making conquests, but rather in what manner to secure his retreat to Agendicum, where he had left all his baggage, with the rest of his troops, and from which place he was now separated by a large river. This he effected in the following manner.

He had brought from Melodunum the fifty boats found there, the command of which he gave to so many Roman knights, and ordered them to fall down the river silently four miles below Lutetia, and there wait his arrival.

Five cohorts, the least fit for action, were appointed to guard the camp ; the other five of the same legion were directed to march up the river with all the baggage, making as much stir and noise as possible ; while a few barks that attended them increased this noise with their oars. Soon after their departure, he marched with three legions to the boats that waited for him, and passed them over. Camulogenus, informed at day-break of these motions, imagined that the legions were ordered to pass the river in three different places, and dividing his army into three corps, one he left to guard the passage over-against the Roman camp ; another had orders to march up the river as far as the Romans should proceed that way ; and the rest, being the greatest part of his troops, he led himself against Labienus. On his approach, the Roman general drew up his army, and gave the signal for battle. At the first charge, the seventh legion, which formed the right wing, routed the left of the Gauls. But their right wing, where Camulogenus commanded in person, and which was engaged with the twelfth legion, maintained its ground with the utmost bravery ; the conflict was long and doubtful, till the seventh legion, leaving the pursuit of the left, faced about and attacked the Gauls in the rear. Thus surrounded, they still obstinately maintained the fight, and were with their general cut to pieces. Labienus having gained a complete victory, retired to Agendicum, and from thence marched with all his forces and joined Cæsar.



The revolt of the Ædui gave great strength to the confederacy. Interest, money, authority, were all employed to procure the concurrence of the states, that still continued quiet. The hostages found at Noviodunum were made a means to compel some of them. But it was with great reluctancy that the Ædui submitted to the command of Vercingetorix, an Arvernian; they loudly demanded to have the chief conduct of the war, which not being consented to by Vercingetorix and his friends, the affair was referred to the decision of a general assembly of the revolted states, summoned to meet at Bibracte for that purpose, where the public voice declared Vercingetorix general in chief.

Confirmed in his command, he demanded of the states to furnish him with fifteen thousand horse. He told them, "He was sufficiently provided with infantry, as he had no intention to refer the decision of the war to fortune, or hazard a pitched battle; but would endeavour to intercept the convoys of the enemy by the means of his superior cavalry; which he judged the easiest and safest way to ruin them: that the confederates must resolve to destroy their corn and houses, and patiently submit to the present loss, which would be rewarded by perpetual liberty." He ordered the Ædui and Segusii to raise ten thousand foot, to whom having joined eight hundred horse, he gave the command of them to Eporodorix's brother, with directions to attack the Allobroges. On the other hand, he com-

missioned the Gabali, and some cantons of Auvergne, to make an irruption into the territories of the Helvii, and sent the Rutheni, and Cadurci, into those of the Volsci-Arecomici. He neglected not, however, both by public ambassadors and private agents, to solicit the concurrence of the Allobroges; endeavouring to gain the leading men by presents, and allure the state by an offer of the sovereignty of the Roman province.

L. Cæsar, who commanded in those parts, had levied twenty-two cohorts in the province, and with them prepared to make head on all sides. The Helvii venturing to come to an engagement with the enemy, were defeated, and forced to shelter themselves in their walled towns. But the Allobroges, placing detachments at proper distances along the banks of the Rhone, guarded all the avenues of their country with great diligence.

Cæsar, seeing that the enemy was much superior in cavalry, and that his communication with Italy and the province was cut off, had recourse to his German allies beyond the Rhine, of whom he obtained a supply of cavalry, with some light-armed infantry accustomed to fight amongst them. On their arrival, finding that they were but indifferently mounted, he gave them the horses of the tribunes and other officers of his own army, and marched through the frontiers of the Lingones into the country of the Sequani, in order to be at hand to succour the Roman province.

The forces of the enemy from Auvergne, and the cavalry of all the confederate states, were now met at the general rendezvous, and formed a very numerous army. Vercingetorix, elated with the prosperity of his affairs, and suffering himself to be led into a contempt of Cæsar, whom he thought had no other view, but of retiring into the Roman province, rashly deviated from that prudent plan of war, which he had hitherto so steadily pursued. He followed the Romans, and posted himself at about four miles' distance from their army in three camps. Having assembled the officers of the cavalry, he endeavoured to persuade them that the time of victory was come. He told them, " that the Romans were at last obliged to leave Gaul, and retreat into the province: that this retreat secured liberty for the present, but did not ascertain future tranquillity; as the Romans would doubtless soon return with greater forces, and persist in the design of enslaving them, that it was therefore highly expedient to attack them now, while they marched encumbered with their baggage: that in this attack their cavalry would never dare to stir from the main body of the army; and if the infantry faced about, in order to assist them, they would thereby be unable to continue their march: if, as was more likely, they abandoned the baggage to provide for their own safety, they would be deprived of every conveniency, and return home covered with ignominy and reproach: that to strike a greater terror into



the enemy, he would, during the action, keep all his infantry under arms before the camp." These words were followed by the acclamations of all the cavalry, who proposed taking an oath never to return home, nor see again their parents, wives, or children, if they did not twice pierce through the Roman army.

This proposal being approved, and the oath administered to all, Vercingetorix the next day attacked the Romans on their march ; he had divided his cavalry into three bodies, two of which moved towards the flanks of the enemy's army, while the third began to charge and harass them in front. Cæsar formed also his horse into three divisions, and ordered them to advance against the Gauls, while the infantry halted, and covered the baggage, which was received into the centre. Wherever the Roman cavalry gave way, or appeared hard pressed, thither Cæsar sent detachments from the legions, which both checked the progress of the Gauls, and confirmed the courage of his own men. At last the Germans on the right, having driven the enemy from an eminence, pursued them with great slaughter to the river, where Vercingetorix was posted with the infantry. The rest of the Gallic cavalry perceiving the defeat of their countrymen, and apprehensive of being surrounded, betook themselves likewise to flight. Three Æduan noblemen of distinguished rank were brought prisoners to Cæsar : Cotus, general of the cavalry, who the year before had been competitor with Convictolitanis for the su-



preme magistracy; Cavarillus, who, after Litavicus's revolt, was appointed to command the infantry; and Eporedorix, who had been generalissimo of the Æduan forces in the war against the Sequani before Cæsar's arrival in Gaul.

Vercingetorix seeing his cavalry routed, drew off the infantry, and immediately retreated towards Alesia, a town belonging to the Mandubii. Cæsar pursued him till night, cut three thousand of his rear to pieces, and arrived the next day before Alesia. After examining the situation of the town, he resolved to take advantage of the consternation of the enemy, and lay siege to it.

Alesia was situated on the top of a very high hill, at the bottom of which ran two rivers that washed it on two sides. Before the town was a plain extending about three miles in length, but on every other side the place was surrounded, at a moderate distance, by a ridge of hills, whose summits were nearly of an equal height. Under the walls, on the side facing the east, lay encamped all the forces of the Gauls, which were defended by a ditch, and a rampart six feet high. The line of circumvallation made by the Romans took in a circuit of eleven miles. Their camp was conveniently situated, and strengthened with three and twenty redoubts, in which centinels were placed by day, and a strong guard by night.

Whilst the Romans were employed in these works, Vercingetorix ventured another en-

gement with the cavalry, in the plain between the hills. The battle was sharply maintained on both sides, but the Romans beginning to give ground, Cæsar detached the Germans to their assistance, and drew up the legions in order of battle before the camp, that he might be ready to oppose any sudden irruption of the enemy's infantry. The sight of the legions encouraged his men; the Gauls were put to the rout, and crowding upon one another in their flight, obstructed their entrance at the gates of their camp, and gave the Germans, who pursued them to their intrenchments, an opportunity of destroying great numbers, and carrying off a multitude of prisoners.

Vercingetorix now resolved to dismiss his cavalry, before Cæsar had completed his lines. At their departure he enjoined them, "To repair to their respective states, and assemble all the men capable of bearing arms. He set forth the many services he had done them, and conjured them not to neglect his safety, or abandon to the cruelty of the enemy one who had deserved so well of the common liberty. He told them, that, if they were dilatory in the execution of his orders, eighty thousand chosen men must perish with him: that he had scarce corn for thirty days, and that with the utmost œconomy it could not be made to last much longer." After giving these instructions, he sent them away silently about nine at night, on the side where the Roman line was not yet finished. He then

distributed among his soldiers all the cattle in the place, but ordered the corn to be brought in to him, resolving to deliver it out sparingly and by measure. He entered the town with all his forces, and having prepared for an obstinate defence, waited for the expected succours.

Cæsar, informed of these dispositions by the prisoners and deserters, constructed his fortifications in the following manner. He first drew a perpendicular ditch twenty feet wide. All the other works he made four hundred feet farther from the town than that ditch. This he did to secure his workmen from the darts of the enemy by day, and his works from sudden and nocturnal sallies. Observing therefore the distance above-mentioned, he made two other ditches, each fifteen feet broad, and as many deep, and filled the innermost, which lay in a low and level ground, with water from the river. Behind these he raised a rampart twelve feet high, strengthened with a parapet and battlements; and to prevent the enemy from getting over, a fraise ran along the foot of the parapet, made of long stakes, with branches cut into points, like the horns of a stag. On the whole work were placed turrets, eighty feet distant one from another.

But as the soldiers were employed to fetch provisions, bring materials, and work at the fortifications, which considerably lessened the number of troops left to defend them, and as the enemy sometimes sallied out to attack the



lines, Cæsar judged it necessary to make the following addition to his works, that they might not require so many men to guard them. Between the first and second ditches that were nearest the town, he run a trench five feet deep, and fixed in it small trees and strong branches, the tops of which he had caused to be sharpened. He then filled the trench with earth, so that nothing appeared above ground but the sharp points of the branches, which must necessarily run into those who attempted to pass them: and as there were five rows of them, interwoven in a manner with each other, they could not be avoided. In the front of these he caused pits to be dug three feet deep, and something narrower at bottom than at top. In these pits he fixed strong stakes, about the thickness of a man's thigh, burnt and sharpened at the top, which rose only four inches above the level of the ground, into which they were planted three feet deeper than the pits, to keep them firm. The pits were covered with bushes to deceive the enemy. There were eight rows of them at the distance of three feet from each other, and disposed in the form of a quincunx. The whole space between the pits and the advanced ditch was sowed with crows' feet, or caltrops, of an extraordinary size.

These works completed, he drew another line fourteen miles in compass, constructed in the same manner as the former, and carried through the most even places he could find, to serve as a barrier against the enemy without ;



that if the Gauls should attack the camp, they might not be able to surround it with their troops, or charge with equal vigour in all parts. To prevent the danger his men might be exposed to, when in quest of provisions and forage, he laid in a sufficient store of both for thirty days.

Whilst these things passed before Alesia, a general council being held by the chiefs of the Gauls, it was not thought advisable to assemble all that were able to bear arms, as Vercingetorix had desired, but to order each nation to furnish a contingent ; lest so great a multitude should occasion a scarcity of provisions, and render the observance of military discipline impracticable. The *Ædui*, with their vassals the *Segusii*, *Ambivareti*, *Aulerci Brannovices*, and *Branuari*, were rated at thirty-five thousand men. A like number was demanded of the *Arverni*, in conjunction with their dependents the *Cadurci*, *Gabali*, and *Velauni*. The *Senones*, *Sequani*, *Bituriges*, *Xantones*, *Rutheni*, and *Carnutes*, were ordered each to furnish twelve thousand ; the *Bellovaci*, ten thousand ; the *Lemovices*, the same number ; the *Pictones*, *Turoni*, *Parisii*, *Helvii*, *Suessiones*, each eight thousand ; the *Ambiani*, *Mediomatrici*, *Petricorii*, *Nervii*, *Morini*, *Nitobrigi*, *Aulerci Cenomani*, each five thousand ; the *Atrebates*, four thousand ; the *Bellocasii*, *Lexovii*, and *Aulerci Eburovices*, each three thousand ; the *Rauraci* and *Boii*, thirty thousand ; the maritime and Armorican states, of which number were the *Curioselites*,

Rhedones, Caletes, Osismii, Lemovices, Veneti, and Unelli, each six thousand. The Bellovaci alone refused to furnish the troops required, declaring that it was their design to wage an independent war with the Romans, without being subject to the command of any foreign general or state: however, at the request of Comius, they sent a body of two thousand men.

Comius, as has been before related, had been singularly faithful and serviceable to Cæsar in his *Britannic* expedition: in consideration of which, his countrymen had been exempted from tribute, restored to the full enjoyment of their laws and privileges, and had their territories enlarged by the addition of the country of the *Morini*. But such was the present zeal of the Gauls to vindicate their liberty, and recover their ancient military glory, that neither friendship nor benefits received had any influence on them, but all with one consent devoted themselves and their fortunes to the support of this war. They raised an army of two hundred and forty thousand foot, and eighty thousand horse, and the country of the *Ædui* was the place of general rendezvous. Four commanders in chief were appointed, Comius, the *Atrebatian*, *Viridumarus* and *Eporedorix*, *Æduans*, and *Virgiasillaunus* of *Auvergne*, cousin-german to *Vercingetorix*. To these were added a select number of men, chosen from among the several states, to serve as counsellors to the generals in the conduct of the war. The whole army advanced to-

wards Alesia with great alacrity, confident that the Romans would not so much as sustain the sight of so vast a multitude, especially as they would be attacked by another numerous army from the town.

The troops shut up in Alesia, having consumed all their provisions, finding the day appointed for the arrival of succours expired, and knowing nothing of what was transacted among the *Ædui*, summoned a council of war to debate on what was requisite to be done in the present extremity. Various were the opinions proposed: some advised a surrendry; others were for sallying forth, while yet their strength would permit, in order to break through the enemy, or die bravely in the field. Amongst the rest, Critognatus, a man of the first rank and authority in Auvergne, addressed the assembly in a speech, which, says Cæsar, deserves to be mentioned for its singular and detestable inhumanity. He said, "I shall take little notice of the opinion of those, who, under the name of a surrendry, advise you to an ignominious servitude. Such should neither be esteemed Gauls, nor suffered to come into this assembly. Let me rather apply myself to them who approve of a general sally. In this proposal you seem to think there is something worthy of our ancient bravery. It is not courage that inspires such thoughts, but weakness and an effeminacy of mind, which render us unable to bear want for a few days. It is easier to find men who will voluntarily rush on death than such as can patiently en-

dure pain. I should not however be against this proposal, which has something generous in it, if only our own lives were at stake. But on our present determination depends the fate of all Gaul, which we have stirred up to our assistance. How would it dishearten our relations and friends to see eighty thousand of their countrymen slaughtered in one place, and be obliged to fight in the midst of their dead bodies! Deprive not then of your assistance those, who, to save you, have exposed themselves to the greatest dangers; nor, through folly and rashness, or imbecility of mind, destroy at once the expectations of Gaul, and condemn her to perpetual servitude. If the expected succours are not arrived exactly at the appointed time, ought you therefore to suspect the fidelity and constancy of your countrymen? Can you think that it is for amusement only that the Romans labour on those lines towards the country? Though you hear not from your friends, because all communication is interrupted, yet you may learn their approach from your enemies, who, through fear of them, work day and night on those fortifications. What then do I propose? What, but to do as our ancestors did in the war with the Teutones and Cimbri; a war much less important than the present? Compelled to shut themselves up in their towns, and reduced to a distress equal to that we now suffer, rather than surrender to their enemies, they fed upon the bodies of those whom age had rendered useless in war. Had we no such precedent to



follow, yet still I should esteem it glorious, in the noble cause of liberty, to give one to posterity. The Cimbri, after spreading desolation over the country, at length withdrew their forces, and repaired to other regions; leaving us in the full enjoyment of our lands, laws, and liberties. But the Romans, envying a people so renowned and powerful in war, aim at nothing less than to take possession of our cities and territories, and reduce us to perpetual servitude. This has ever been the object of their wars. If you are unacquainted with what passes in distant countries, cast your eyes upon the adjoining Gaul, which, reduced into the form of a province, deprived of its laws and privileges, and subjected to the arbitrary sway of Rome, groans under the yoke of endless slavery." When all had delivered their opinions, it was resolved, that such as were unfit for war should be obliged to quit the town, and every expedient be tried, rather than agree to the proposal of Critognatus: but if relief were long deferred, and necessity urged, they determined to submit to his advice, rather than consent to a surrendry. The Mandubii, natives of the town, were ordered to leave it with their wives and children. When they came to the Roman lines, they with tears petitioned to be received as slaves, and to be saved from perishing by famine: but Cæsar having planted guards along the rampart, refused to admit them into his camp.

At length Comius and the other generals of the Gauls appeared with their army before

Alesia, and encamped on a hill not above five hundred paces from the Roman lines. The next day they drew out their cavalry, and covered the whole plain under the hill: the infantry were stationed at some distance on the heights. Great was the joy of the besieged at this sight; they immediately came forth with all their forces, posted themselves before the town, and having filled up the nearest ditch with earth and fascines, prepared for a vigorous attack.

Cæsar having disposed his troops along both his lines, ordered the cavalry to march out and charge the enemy. The Gauls had interspersed among their horse some archers and light-armed troops, to sustain them, and check the impetuosity of the Roman cavalry. Many of these being wounded at the first onset, were obliged to quit the battle. The Gauls seeing they had the advantage, and that the Romans were hard pressed by numbers, set up a general shout, both within and without the place, to give new life to their troops. As the action passed in view of both armies, the desire of applause and fear of ignominy, spurred on both parties to exert their utmost bravery. After a conflict that lasted from noon till near sun-set, victory still continuing doubtful, the Germans in close order charged furiously the Gauls upon one side, and routed them. Their flight leaving the archers exposed, they were all surrounded and cut to pieces. The success was equal in other parts of the field, where the Romans, pursuing the

runaways to their camp, gave them no time to rally. The troops on the side of the town, despairing of victory, retired disconsolate within the walls.

After the interval of a day, which was spent in providing a great number of fascines, scaling-ladders, and iron hooks, the Gauls issued out of their camp about midnight, and approaching the Roman lines, set up a shout, to give notice to the besieged of their arrival, threw their fascines into the ditch, and endeavoured by a discharge of stones, darts, and arrows, to drive the Romans from the rampart. At the same time Vercingetorix gave the signal, and led forth his men to the attack. While the Gauls kept at a distance from the Roman lines, they did great execution by the multitude of their darts; but in proportion as they advanced, they either entangled themselves among the caltrops, or tumbling into the pits, were wounded by the pointed stakes, or were pierced by the darts discharged from the towers and rampart. Finding, when day appeared, that they had not forced any post in the lines, and fearing to be taken in flank by some troops that were sallying from the redoubts on the eminence, they retreated to their camp. The besieged, on their side, after much time spent in making preparations for the assault, and filling up the advanced ditch, seeing their countrymen were retired, before they could so much as approach the works, returned into the town without effecting any thing.

The Gauls, thus twice repulsed with great loss, thought it proper to change the plan of their attack. North of the town was a hill of too great compass to be taken into the Roman lines, and Cæsar had been obliged to place a camp on the ascent, in a disadvantageous situation, as it was commanded by the summit. C. Antistius Reginus and C. Caninius Rebilus guarded this quarter with two legions. The Gallic generals, informed by their scouts of the situation of this camp, resolved to form the attack on that side. Having concerted their plan, they selected fifty-five thousand of their best men, and assigned the command of them to Vergasillaunus of Auvergne, with directions to begin the assault at noon. This general, marching out in the evening, arrived before day-break at the back of the hill on which the Roman camp above-mentioned was situated. There lying concealed, he ordered his troops to take refreshment. About noon he approached the quarters of the two legions. At the same time the Gallic cavalry advanced into the plain, and the rest of the army drew out before their camp. Vercingetorix, observing these motions, led forth his troops from Alesia, carrying with him fascines, covered galleries, long poles, hooks, and other instruments prepared to force the lines. The fight began on all sides at once, and was maintained by the Gauls with great ardour. The Romans, having such extensive works to guard, scarcely sufficed for the defence of them all.



What greatly contributed to disturb them was the cries of the combatants behind, which informed them that their safety depended on the valour of others.

The chief stress of the battle lay at the higher fortifications, where Vergasillaunus charged with his forces. The eminence which commanded the declivity of the hill gave his men great advantage. Some threw darts, others advanced under cover of their shields formed into a tortoise, fresh troops continually succeeded in the room of the fatigued. The earth they threw up against the lines not only enabled them to mount the rampart, but filled the pits and ditches, and frustrated the design of the works made in the ground. The Romans, thus continually pressed, had neither strength nor weapons left to make resistance.

Cæsar, who had chosen a post from whence he could see all that passed, observing the danger his men were in on that side, sent Labienus with six cohorts to their assistance; ordering him, if he was not able to defend the works, to draw off the troops, and sally out upon the enemy: yet this only in case of extremity. He went in person to the rest of his men, and exhorted them to bear up courageously under the present fatigue, representing that the fruit of all their former victories depended upon the issue of that critical moment.

The Gauls, under the command of Vercingetorix, despairing to force the intrenchments in the plain, on account of the great strength

of the works, attacked them in the higher and uneven ground, whither they brought all the instruments for the assault. They soon drove the Romans from the towers by a discharge of darts, filled up the ditches and pits with earth and fascines, and began to pull down the rampart and breast-work with their hooks.

Cæsar first sent young Brutus, with six cohorts, to the aid of his men ; after him, C. Fabius, with seven more ; and, as the contest grew warmer, led in person fresh troops to their assistance. Having restored the battle, and forced the enemy to retire, he hastened to the side where Labienus was engaged. He drew four cohorts from the nearest fort, ordered part of the cavalry to follow him, and commanded the rest to take a circuit round the outward works, and fall upon the enemy's rear. Labienus, finding that neither the rampart nor ditch were sufficient to stop the progress of the Gauls, drew together about thirty-nine cohorts from the nearest forts, and sent to inform Cæsar of his design to sally out upon the enemy. Cæsar immediately quickened his march that he might be present at the action.

His arrival being known from the colour of his garments, by which he used to distinguish himself in the day of battle, and the troops and cohorts he had ordered to follow him appearing, the fight was renewed. The Gauls raised on all sides a mighty shout, which, being returned from the rampart, was carried quite round the lines. The Romans having cast

their darts, fell furiously upon the enemy sword in hand. At the same time the cavalry appeared unexpectedly in their rear; fresh cohorts flocked continually to the assistance of those already engaged; the Gauls, unable to sustain the violent shock, took to flight, and being met by the Roman cavalry, a dreadful slaughter ensued. Sedulius, chief and general of the Lemovices, was slain upon the field of battle; Vergasillaunus of Auvergne was made prisoner in the pursuit; seventy-four colours were taken; and, of so numerous an army, very few regained their camp. The rout and slaughter being observed from the town, the besieged, on their side despairing of success, drew off their troops from the attack. The rest of the Gauls instantly abandoned their camp; and had not the Romans been exhausted by the continual fatigue of the day, the whole Gallic army might have been destroyed. However, about midnight, Cæsar detached the cavalry to pursue them, who falling in with their rear, slew and took great numbers. The rest fled to their several cities.

The next day, Vercingetorix, assembling a council, represented to the besieged, “That he had undertaken that war, not from a motive of private interest, but to recover the common liberty of Gaul; and that, since there was a necessity of yielding to fortune, he was willing to become a victim for their safety, whether they should think proper to appease the

anger of the conqueror by his death, or to deliver him up alive."

Deputies were immediately sent to Cæsar to receive his commands. He ordered them to surrender their arms, and deliver up all their chiefs. Having seated himself at the head of his lines, their leaders were brought before him, and Vercingetorix was delivered up, together with their arms. Cæsar, reserving the Ædui and the Arverni, as a means to recover those two nations, divided among his soldiers the rest of the prisoners.

These affairs dispatched, he marched into the territories of the Ædui, and received the submission of their state. There he was addressed by the ambassadors of the Arverni, who promised an entire obedience to his commands. Having exacted a great number of hostages, and restored to those two states twenty thousand captives, he sent his legions into different parts of Gaul to keep the country in subjection. T. Labienus with two legions and the cavalry, was quartered among the Sequani, jointly with M. Sempronius Rutilus. C. Fabius and L. Minutius Basilus were ordered with two legions into the country of the Rhemi, to defend it against the attempts of the Bellovaci, their neighbours. C. Antistius Rheginus had his station assigned him among the Ambivareti; T. Sextius among the Bituriges; and C. Caninius Rebilus among the Rutheni; each with one legion. Q. Tullius Cicero and P. Sulpicius were placed at Cabillo and



Matisco upon the Arar in the country of the Ædui, and were charged with the care of the provisions. He himself took up his winter-quarters at Bibracte.

Thus ended this memorable campaign, in which Cæsar gave those proofs of military skill and valour, which have been the object of the admiration of the greatest generals in all ages. Having sent an account of his victory to the Roman senate, they decreed a thanksgiving of twenty days.

The unsuccessful event of this campaign had convinced the Gauls, that they were not able to resist the Romans by any army they could bring together into one place; but they persuaded themselves, that if many states revolted at once, and set on foot many separate wars, the Romans would have neither time nor troops sufficient to oppose them all. And though some of those states must be sufferers, yet that misfortune, they thought, should be borne with, since their particular loss would purchase the liberty of the rest. Many states therefore agreed to this plan, and began to make preparations for renewing the war. To disappoint their views, Cæsar judged it necessary to use the utmost expedition. Leaving M. Antony, the quæstor, to command in his winter-quarters, he set out on the last of December from Bibracte with his cavalry, and went to the camp of the thirteenth legion, which he had placed among the Bituriges, not far from the territories of the Ædui. To these

<sup>6</sup> For what passed at Rome this year, see above, p. 155.

Year of  
Rome  
702<sup>6</sup>.

he joined the eleventh legion, whose quarters lay nearest ; and, leaving two cohorts to guard the baggage, marched with the rest of the army into the most fertile parts of the country of the Bituriges. By this sudden and unexpected arrival he found them unprepared, and dispersed up and down in the fields. He forbade setting fire to the houses, the usual sign of an invasion, that he might neither alarm the enemy, nor expose himself to the want of corn and forage, if it should be necessary to advance far into the country. Many thousands of the Bituriges were made prisoners, surprised by the Roman cavalry before they could retreat into their towns. Such as escaped fled in great terror to the neighbouring states. But Cæsar pursued them with great expedition, and those states, anxious for their own safety, submitted, gave hostages, and were received into his protection. The Bituriges, seeing that his clemency left the way still open to his friendship, followed their example, and were pardoned. Cæsar, to recompense the fatigue and labour of his soldiers, gave two hundred sesterces to every private man, and two thousand to every centurion ; and, having sent back the legions to their winter-quarters, returned again to Bibracte, after an absence of forty days. He had not been there above eighteen days, when ambassadors arrived from the Bituriges to implore his assistance against the Carnutes, who were laying waste their country. Cæsar set out to their relief with the sixth and fourteenth legions, which had not

been engaged in the last expedition. The Carnutes, hearing of his approach, abandoned their towns and villages, consisting then mostly of little cottages, ran up in haste to defend them from the cold, and fled different ways. Cæsar, thinking it sufficient, in that severe season of the year, to have dispersed the forces that began to assemble, and prevented their rekindling the war, encamped at Genabum during the remaining part of the winter.

A new and more difficult war gave him more serious employment in the beginning of the spring. The Rhemi, by frequent embassies, informed him that the Bellovaci, the most distinguished for bravery of all the Belgic or Gallic nations, with some of the neighbouring states, under the conduct of Correus, general of the Bellovaci, and Comius the Atrebatian, were raising an army, and drawing their forces to a general rendezvous, with design to invade the territories of the Suessiones, a people subject to the jurisdiction of the Rhemi. Honour and interest required of him to undertake the defence of allies, who had deserved so well of the commonwealth. He marched therefore immediately, with four legions, into the country of the Bellovaci, which he found abandoned by its inhabitants. The few prisoners his cavalry made had been left as spies. These informed him, "That all those capable of bearing arms had assembled in one place, and been joined by the Ambiani, Aulerci, Caletes, Vellocassii, and Atrebates; that they had chosen

for their camp a rising ground, surrounded with a difficult morass, and disposed of their baggage in woods that lay behind them ; that many of their chiefs were in the army, but the principal authority rested in Correus, because he was known to bear an implacable hatred to the Roman name ; that, a few days before, Comius had left the camp to solicit aid of the Germans, who were their nearest neighbours, and abounded in troops ; that it had been resolved among the Bellovaci, with consent of all the chiefs, and at the earnest desire of the people, to offer battle to Cæsar, if, as was reported, he came at the head of only three legions, lest they should be afterwards obliged to fight upon more unequal terms, when he had got his whole army together ; but, if he brought greater forces with him, to continue within their camp, intercept his convoys, and cut off his forage, which in that season of the year was extremely scarce.”

In consequence of this information, Cæsar resolved to try every method to draw the enemy into a contempt of his numbers, and thereby induce them to hazard a battle. He had with him the seventh, eighth, and ninth legions, all veterans of approved valour ; and though the eleventh, which he had also drawn out of its winter-quarters, was not of equal standing, nor had attained the same reputation of bravery, they were yet chosen men, of great hopes, and had served under him in eight campaigns. Calling therefore the army together, he laid before them the advices he



had received, and exhorted the soldiers to behave themselves with their usual courage. He arrived before the enemy's camp much sooner than they expected, and, as he approached, disposed the legions in the following order. The seventh, eighth, and ninth legions marched in front, the baggage followed, and the eleventh legion formed the rear. Thus there appeared in view no more than three legions, the number the Gauls had determined to encounter. But, when they saw the Romans advancing against them with a steady pace, they did not think it proper to follow the resolution which had been reported to Cæsar; and either fearing the event of a battle, or surprised at his sudden approach, or desirous to penetrate further into his intentions, they would not descend from the higher ground, but drew up in arms before their camp. Cæsar, though earnest to come to an engagement, yet, considering the multitude of the enemy, and the advantage of their situation, contented himself for the present to encamp directly over-against them, being separated from them by a deep but narrow valley. He threw up before his camp a rampart twelve feet high, strengthened by a proportionable breastwork, and secured it by two ditches, each fifteen feet wide, with perpendicular sides. Upon the rampart he raised, at small distances, turrets of three stories, and joined them to each other by galleries, which had little parapets of osier before them. Thus the works were defended by a double range of sol-

diers ; one of which fighting from the galleries, and secured by their height, would with more boldness and advantage launch their darts against the enemy ; the other, though nearer danger, and placed upon the rampart, were yet skreened by the galleries from the impending darts. All the entrances of the camp were secured by strong gates, over which he placed turrets of a greater height than the rest.

Cæsar had a twofold design in these fortifications ; one, by the greatness of the works, to make the enemy believe he was afraid of them, and thereby increase their presumption ; the other, to enable him to defend his camp with a few troops, when it should be necessary to go far in quest of corn and forage. There happened frequent skirmishes between the two camps, carried on for the most part with missive weapons at a distance, by reason of a morass that separated the combatants. Sometimes the auxiliary Gauls and Germans in the Roman army crossed the morass and pursued the enemy ; sometimes the Bellovaci, having the advantage, passed in their turn and drove back the Roman auxiliaries. And as the Romans daily sent out parties to forage, who were obliged to disperse themselves over the country, their men were sometimes surprised and cut to pieces by the detachments of the enemy. In one of these encounters, the Rhemi, auxiliaries in Cæsar's army, lost a great part of their cavalry. The Bellovaci, having observed the daily stations of the horse destined to guard

the Roman foragers, placed a chosen body of foot in ambush in a wood, and sent some squadrons of cavalry to draw the enemy into the snare. The cavalry of the Rhemi, upon guard that day, suddenly discovering the Gallic horse, and despising their small numbers, attacked and pursued them with such eagerness, that, being surprised and almost surrounded by the foot, they fled with precipitation, lost many of their men, and, among the rest, their commander Vertiscus, the chief man of their state. This general, though so far advanced in years that he could hardly sit on horseback, yet, according to the custom of the Gauls, would neither decline the command on account of his age, nor suffer his people to fight without him.

Cæsar, finding that the enemy kept within their camp, and considering that he could neither force their intrenchments without great loss, nor with so small an army inclose them within lines, wrote to C. Trebonius to join him with three legions. Upon their arrival, the generals of the Bellovaci, fearing a siege like that of Alesia, ordered all those who were weak, and less fit for service, to be sent away by night, and with them the baggage of the army. But, before this confused and numerous train could be put in order, day-light appeared ; and the Gauls, to hinder the Romans from disturbing the march, drew up in arms before their camp. Cæsar did not think it proper to attack them in so advantageous a post, nor was he willing to let them retire

without loss. To be in readiness for the pursuit, he passed the morass with his legions, and seized an eminence which commanded the enemy's camp, and was separated from it only by a small valley. The Gauls, confiding in the strength of their post, did not decline fighting, if they were attacked, and both armies remained in order of battle the whole day. At night the Bellovaci, seeing the Romans prepared for the pursuit, made use of the following stratagem to secure their own retreat. Having collected and placed at the head of their line all the fascines in the camp, they set fire to them at once, and, being concealed by the smoke, marched off with the utmost diligence to another advantageous post ten miles distant. Cæsar, though he suspected that this was a contrivance to cover their flight, yet fearing also an ambuscade, and that they might possibly continue in the same post, to draw his men into a place of disadvantage, followed but slowly with his army, and suffered the enemy to escape.

The Bellovaci from their new camp carried on the same defensive war, and in frequent ambuscades attacked and cut to pieces the Roman foragers. Cæsar, having suffered many losses of this kind, was at last informed by a prisoner, that Correus, general of the Bellovaci, had chosen six thousand of his best infantry, and a thousand horse, to form an ambuscade in a place abounding in corn and grass, and where it was therefore presumed the Romans would come to forage. Upon this intelli-



gence he sent the cavalry, who formed the ordinary guard of the foragers, before, intermixed them with platoons of light-armed foot, and he himself followed with some legions to support them. The Gauls had disposed their forces in ambush round the plain where the Romans were to forage, which extended a mile every way, and was environed with thick woods or a deep river. The Roman cavalry entered the plain, troop by troop, with great resolution, knowing that the legions were behind to sustain them. Correus immediately appeared, but with a few men, and fell upon the nearest squadrons. The Romans, prepared for the attack, did not flock together in crowds, which frequently happens among the cavalry on occasions of sudden surprise, and often throws them into confusion; but, preserving the proper distances, received the enemy in good order; nor did they suffer themselves to be taken in flank. The rest of the Gallic cavalry then broke from the woods, and advanced to the aid of those who fought under Correus. The contest was maintained with great heat and equal advantage, till the infantry of the Gauls, advancing slowly in order of battle, obliged the Romans to give way; but their light-armed infantry, marching up speedily, and posting themselves in the intervals of the squadrons, restored and continued the fight. Soon after, both sides had notice that Cæsar was approaching with his forces in order of battle. The Roman cavalry then redoubled their efforts, lest the le-

gions should share with them the honour of the victory. The enemy, on the other hand, lost courage, and fled different ways : but, being obstructed by the same difficulties of the ground in which they hoped to have entangled the Romans, the greatest part of them were put to the sword. Correus, whose resolution no misfortune could abate, would neither quit the field nor accept of quarter ; but, fighting to the last with invincible courage, and wounding several of his enemies, forced them at length to transfix him with their javelins.

The Bellovaci, and the other states in their alliance, finding that their general was slain, their cavalry and the flower of their infantry destroyed, and dreading the approach of the Roman army, speedily assembled a council, in which it was resolved, by common consent, to send ambassadors and hostages to Cæsar. Comius alone refused to join in the treaty, from a distrust of the Romans, who had attempted the year before, by the order of Labienus, to assassinate him treacherously at an interview with Volusenus Quadratus, where he was grievously wounded by a Roman centurion.

Cæsar granted peace to the Bellovaci and their allies, and, having thus subdued the most warlike nations of Gaul, he divided his troops into several bodies, under the command of his lieutenants, and sent them into different parts, to keep the whole country in subjection. He himself marched into the territories of the Eburones, with a view to get Ambiorix into

his power. But the Gaul flying before him, Cæsar destroyed the country with fire and sword, killing or taking prisoners great numbers of the inhabitants, that he might render Ambiorix odious to his people as the cause of so great a calamity, and preclude his being again received into the state. He then dispatched Labienus, with two legions against the Treviri, who bordering upon Germany, and being exercised in continual wars with that nation, differed but little from them in barbarity and fierceness; nor ever submitted to his commands, unless enforced by the presence of an army. Leaving M. Antony, with fifteen cohorts, in the country of the Bellovaci, to prevent any new insurrection among the Belgæ, he marched into the country of the Carnutes. They had been lately reduced by his lieutenant Fabius, who had defeated Dumnaeus, the general of the Gauls in those parts, destroyed or dispersed his army, and expelled him out of that and the neighbouring countries. Cæsar pardoned the Carnutes, on their delivering up Gutervaulus, the prime mover and incendiary of the war. This man had hid himself, even from his countrymen; but, being diligently sought after by the people, desirous to appease Cæsar's resentment, they soon found him, and brought him to the camp, where he was beaten with rods and beheaded.

Caninius, one of Cæsar's lieutenants, had defeated the Cadurci in battle, under their generals Drapes and Luterius, and was besieged.

ing Uxellodunum, a strong fortress in that country. Thither Cæsar repaired, and found the circumvallation completed. Many reasons determined him to continue the siege. He could not raise it without dishonour; the obstinacy of the garrison, which consisted of only two thousand men, deserved exemplary punishment; and, if the place were not reduced, the Gauls might imagine that not strength but constancy had been wanting to enable them to resist the Roman arms; a persuasion which might perhaps induce other states, who had the advantage of strong towns, to endeavour again to assert their liberty; especially as it was generally known that only one year of his government remained, during which if they could but hold out, they had no farther danger to apprehend. Cæsar, understanding from the deserters that the besieged were well stored with provisions, determined, if possible, to deprive them of water.

Uxellodunum stood upon a steep rock, which was almost surrounded by a river, where the townsmen used to water. There was no possible way to turn the course of this river, because it flowed so near the foot of the rock, and in so low a channel, that ditches could not be sunk deep enough to receive it. But the descent to it from the town was so difficult and steep, and lay so open, that the people, in coming to it, could be easily annoyed by the Romans. Cæsar, taking advantage of this circumstance, posted archers and slingers, with some engines, over-against all the places



of access. This forced the townsmen to water at a fountain which issued close under the walls, on the side where the town was not surrounded by the river. To deprive them of this resource, Cæsar undertook to raise a terrass over-against the fountain, which could not be performed without incredible fatigue, almost continual fighting, and much danger to the soldiers ; for they were exposed to the assaults of the enemy, who fought in safety, at a distance, and from the higher ground. A terrass notwithstanding was raised, sixty feet high, and a tower of ten stories placed upon it ; not indeed equal to the height of the walls, for which no works were sufficient, but to command the fountain. From this tower the Romans continually played their engines upon all the accesses to the spring, which made it extremely dangerous to water there ; inso-much that not only cattle and beasts of burden, but great numbers of people perished by thirst.

The besieged were not dismayed by this distress. They filled many barrels with tallow, pitch, and dry wood, and having set them on fire, rolled them down upon the works ; and at the same time charged the Romans with great fury. The machines soon were on fire ; but Cæsar, to give his men time to extinguish it, and to draw off the enemy, ordered some troops to ascend the hill on all sides, and raise a great shout, as if preparing to scale the walls. This alarming the inhabitants, they recalled their men to the defence

of the town; and the Romans, being relieved from the attack, soon put a stop to the flames. The place continued to hold out with great obstinacy, till Cæsar contrived to drain the fountain by mines. When the besieged saw it suddenly become dry, they imagined it an event brought about not by human wisdom but by the will of the gods; and therefore, despairing of success, they immediately surrendered themselves.

Cæsar, satisfied that his clemency was known to all, and no way fearing that his severity on this occasion would be imputed to cruelty; as he perceived there would be no end of the war, if other states of Gaul should in like manner revolt; resolved, by a signal example of punishment, to deter them from such projects. He ordered the hands of all those whom he found in arms to be cut off; granting them their lives, that their punishment might be the more conspicuous. Drapes, who had been made prisoner by Caninius, either out of indignation for his captivity, or dreading a severer fate, put an end to his life by abstaining from food. Luterius, who had escaped out of the battle when Drapes was taken prisoner, falling into the hands of Epernactus of Auvergne, a faithful friend to the Romans, was by him delivered bound to Cæsar.

About this time Labienus sent intelligence that he had engaged the cavalry of the Treviri with success, killed a great number on the field of battle, with many Germans who had joined them, and made prisoners the greatest

part of their chiefs; amongst the rest Surus the Æduan, a man of distinguished birth and valour, and the only one of that nation who had till then continued in arms. Thus the whole country being pacified, Cæsar marched with two legions into Aquitain, which P. Crassus had in a great measure reduced to his obedience. On his arrival, the states sent ambassadors to him, and delivered hostages. At Narbonne he ordered his army into winter-quarters, under the command of his lieutenants. M. Antony, C. Trebonius, P. Vatinius, and Q. Tullius, were quartered in Belgium with four legions; two were sent into the country of the Ædui; two into that of the Turones, bordering upon the Carnutes, to hold the maritime states in awe; and the remaining two were stationed amongst the Lemovices, not far from Auvergne. He held at Narbonne the usual assemblies of the province, decided the differences subsisting among the states, recompensed those who had distinguished themselves by their fidelity and services, and, after dispatching all those affairs, repaired to the legions in Belgium, and took up his winter-quarters at Nemetocenna\*.

\* Arras.

Here he found all quiet; even Comius, that bitter enemy to the Romans, had been received into friendship. This Atrebatian general, who had headed the armies of the Bellovaci, retired to his German allies, when matters were compounded with Cæsar, but always kept a watchful eye upon the motions of his countrymen, that, in case of a war, he might be ready



to offer them his counsel and assistance. Finding that the state now submitted quietly to the Romans, he employed the troops that remained with him to support himself and his followers by plunder, and frequently carried off the convoys that were going to the Roman winter-quarters. M. Antony sent against him C. Volusenus Quadratus, an officer of distinguished valour; the man who, by the order of Labienus, had lately attempted to kill him at an interview, and who still preserved a particular hatred to him. These two mortal enemies soon met in battle: Volusenus, after a successful engagement, urged by an eager desire of making Comius prisoner, rashly pursued him with only a few attendants. The Gaul, by a precipitate flight, drew the Roman a considerable way from the main body of his army, then, turning to his own men, he called upon them to revenge the wound he had so treacherously received. They instantly faced about, charged their pursuers, and repulsed them. Comius, clapping spurs to his horse, ran furiously against Volusenus, and drove his spear through his thigh. The Romans, seeing their commander dangerously wounded, fought with redoubled fury, and put the enemy to flight a second time with considerable slaughter. Comius escaped by the swiftness of his horse; but, as he had lost the greatest part of his men, he sent a deputation to Antony, offering to retire wherever he should order him, to submit to any terms that should be imposed on him, and to give hostages for his good behavi-



our; requesting only that so much regard might be had to his fears, as that he should not be obliged to appear in the presence of any Roman. Antony, before the arrival of Cæsar, consented, took hostages, and granted him peace.

This campaign effectually completed the reduction of Gaul, and put an end to the Gallic war, in the course of which it is said that Cæsar either took by force eight hundred towns, or made them yield to the terror of his arms; that he subdued three hundred different nations; that he defeated in battle three millions of men, of which more than one million were killed in the field, and another million made prisoners.

[Year of Rome 703<sup>8</sup>.]

The ninth and last year of his government was quite pacific. In his winter-quarters at Nemetocenna in Belgium, and in the following year, he made it his business to ingratiate himself with the Gauls, and deprive them of all pretence for a revolt. He treated the several states with respect, imposed no new burdens upon them, and was extremely liberal to their chiefs. By these means he prevailed with them, wearied and exhausted by long and unsuccessful wars, to embrace the ease and quiet, attendant on their present submission. Thus

<sup>7</sup> Plut. in Cæs. Plin. Hist. Nat. viii. 25.

<sup>8</sup> For the transactions at Rome in this year, 703, see p. 188.

he had leisure, in this last year, to fix his attention on Rome, where a contest for and against him was carried on with great vehemence ; a contest which ended in that memorable civil war, that changed the form of the Roman government into monarchic despotism.

END OF THE NINTH VOLUME.

PSM  
1923









